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ABSTRACT
Developing foreign policy toward Indonesia has been a challenge for Australian governments and
this has resulted in a paradox of friendship and suspicion in the bilateral relationship between the
two states. The Australian public’s perception of Indonesia has amounted to an ‘imagined fear’ of
the country and this has pervaded foreign policy discourse in the public sphere. However, there
is a gap between the public’s perception of Indonesia and consecutive Australian governments’
desire to develop a solid bilateral relationship based on the strategic importance of Indonesia to
Australia.
In this thesis I provide an analysis of the political relationship between Australia and Indonesia
during the periods of the Keating and Howard governments. I identify the differences and
similarities in the foreign policy approach of the two governments and the extent to which the
foreign policy decisions taken enhanced or hindered the political relationship between Australia
and Indonesia. While much has been written on the Australian and Indonesian relationship my
thesis provides a discussion, based on publicly available documents with only limited reliance on
secondary material.
I have drawn three major conclusions from my analysis of relevant publicly available documents.
First, that both the Keating and Howard governments adopted a pragmatic-realist approach to
foreign policy toward Indonesia, rather than a liberal-moral position. While there are periods
during both governments where a liberal-moral approach is evident, I argue that this ‘morality’ is
only evident when each government determines that it advances the national interests.
My second conclusion concerns the importance given to the Asian region by the two
governments.

The Keating government viewed Asia and Indonesia as being of primary

importance to Australia’s strategic and economic prosperity. The government therefore believed
that Indonesia was one of Australia’s most important bilateral relationships in terms of achieving
this objective. Keating’s goal was to build a relationship sufficiently strong it would overcome any
difficulties that may occur based on Australia and Indonesia’s cultural and historical differences.
While the Howard government understood the importance of maintaining good relations with
Asia, they believed that building relationships in the region should not detract from Australia’s
most vital relationship, namely the relationship with the US. Howard was concerned over
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Keating’s view of the importance of a relationship with Indonesia. He re-balanced Australia’s
foreign policy toward the US. He therefore downgraded the importance of Australia’s relationship
with Indonesia.
My third conclusion concerns the issue of Indonesia’s territorial integrity. This was not an issue
during the period of the Keating government because the government promoted Indonesian
sovereignty. However, this was not the perception of the Indonesians during the terms of the
Howard government, particularly following Australia’s actions in East Timor and the crisis over the
West Papuan asylum seekers.

While the Howard government assured the Indonesian

government of its commitment to Indonesian sovereignty, there remains a perception that
Australia’s intentions cannot be wholly trusted. While this was not accurate, there was a failure
by the Howard government to manage this perception and this failure has had a continued impact
on the level of trust associated with the Australia-Indonesia political relationship.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Second World War the relationship between Indonesia and Australia can be
described as a paradox of friendship and suspicion. While there have been attempts at genuine
relationship building there have also been times of tension and mistrust. For Australia, the
relationship with Indonesia is crucial in terms of Australia’s strategic interests in the region.
Indonesia has provided the key to Australia’s integration into Southeast Asia.
In this thesis I will consider both the differences and similarities in Australia’s foreign policy toward
Indonesia between the periods of 1991-2007. The period in question involves the Keating Labor
government from 1991-1996 and the Howard Coalition governments from 1996-2007. I will argue
that while the relationship between Australia and Indonesia during the period was broad and
strong, the political relationship reveals a level of misunderstanding and at times distrust. As
noted in the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT) Report,
Near Neighbours – Good Neighbours:
In the Committee’s view, the submissions from the government sector reveal that Australia and Indonesia’s
bilateral relationship is substantial at this level. Its strength at this stage comes from its breadth. It is a
relationship that is productive in the immediate term and is also, importantly, establishing the ground for a
positive relationship in the long term.1

However, the JCFADT report also identifies a relationship that:
…is not an even one…While there is a welcome willingness on both sides to engage, the Committee
detected and is concerned by the level of misunderstanding and even mistrust that is present in the
relationship. The Committee considers that the bilateral relationship needs considerable strengthening at
both the political and at the people-to-people levels.2

The authors of the JCFADT report argue that it is the political relationship that continues to cause
problems between the two states. It is therefore the political relationship with Indonesia fostered
by both the Keating and Howard governments that I am most concerned with in my thesis. In
terms of this political relationship I will discuss how the Keating and Howard governments have
Clause 2.49, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours - Good
Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, ed. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), p. 27.
2 Clause 1.29, Ibid., p. 7.
1
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managed the relationship with Indonesia and how they managed that relationship in terms of their
domestic Australian audience. I will assess the political relationship and the extent to which it
differs between the Keating and Howard governments. I have been selective in the issues I focus
on. I have concentrated on those issues that have supported or alternatively caused difficulties in
the political relationship. I will not provide an exhaustive account of the relationship at all levels.
Even at times when the relationship at the political level was at its most difficult following the East
Timor crisis, dialogue and cooperation continued at a bureaucratic level.
Building a solid relationship with Indonesia has provided the greatest challenge for Australian
foreign policymakers over the last sixty years. Indonesia has been perceived by Australia as a
threat, which derives as much from Australia and Indonesia’s political and cultural differences, as
from an imagined threat to Australia’s security. This imagined fear has pervaded Australia’s
foreign policy discourse and actions toward Indonesia, and the Australian public’s perception of
Indonesia. In a survey published in May 1999, sixty two per cent of Australians perceived
Indonesia “as ‘likely to pose a threat’”3 and the Lowy Institute 2009 poll of Australian public
opinion and foreign policy stated that fifty four per cent of Australians did not trust Indonesia.4
This perception of Indonesia as a threat to Australia has been current since the Indonesian
invasion of East Timor in 1975, though it existed well before this time. While this perception has
little substance in reality, the surveys indicate the continuation of this perception in Australia’s
imagination and signify the Australian public’s apprehension over Australia’s place in the region.
There is, however, a gap between the Australian public’s perception of Indonesia and that of
successive Australian governments. Australian governments have recognised the relationship
with Indonesia as crucial in terms of Australia’s strategic interests. As Wesley notes both
Australian and Indonesian governments have been:
…sensitive about being pressured by the other to act in ways inimical to the national interest. This means
that the more cordial official relations are, the more suspicious become the publics that national interests
and pride are being mortgaged for the sake of the bilateral relationship.5

Gary Brown, Military Threats Versus Security Problems: Australia's Emerging Strategic Environment, ed.
Parliamentary Research Service: Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Group (Parliament of Australia, 1999), p. 2.
4 Fergus Hanson, "Lowy Institute Poll 2009," in Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lowy
Institute for International Policy (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009), p. 7 and 22.
5 Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996-2006 (Sydney: ABC Books, 2007), p.
210.
3
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The diverse political, historical, religious and cultural heritage of Australia and Indonesia has
made it complex and difficult for consecutive Australian governments to develop foreign policy in
relation to Indonesia. As Evans and Grant note, most neighbouring states would share some
characteristics in common through their proximity over time. However, Indonesia and Australia
“might well have been half a world apart”.6 Nevertheless, there may be too much emphasis given
to the differences in terms of Australia and Indonesia’s relationship. These differences can be
used as justification for particular political decisions that may have little to do with cultural,
historical and religious differences.
The political differences are not just those between the two states, they also command
considerable domestic debate within Australia. These differences largely turn on those who place
major importance on developing state-to-state relations at any cost and those who argue that
Australian foreign policy cannot be pursued on the basis of a narrow set of national interests.
Australia’s national interests need to include a set of values that the public views as important.
Since Federation values, such as human rights and democracy have been the foundations of
Australia’s identity as a nation. It is these values of human rights and democracy that have
caused the most tension in the relationship between Indonesia and Australia. For successive
Australian governments foreign policy decisions in relation to Indonesia have been made in terms
of a realist framework. While there have been instances, in terms of the decisions made, which
reflect a more liberal framework, the foundation of Australia’s foreign policy towards Indonesia is
framed in terms of Australia’s national self-interest and security.
For the Keating Labor government the basic premise of foreign policy was the notion of the
national interest and as Gareth Evans noted Australia’s “overriding geo-political or strategic
interest is the defence of Australian sovereignty and political independence”.7 The Howard
government8 was equally concerned with the notion of the national interest as can be seen from
the title of the first Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper in 1997, In the National Interest:
Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. The Paper begins with the assertion that
“Australia’s foreign and trade policy is about advancing the interests of Australia and

Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, Second ed. (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1995), p. 198.
7 Ibid., p. 33.
8 The author understands that in referring to the Howard government there was more than one government. In terms
of the thesis when referring to the Howard government I will be referring to the four terms that Howard was Prime
Minister under a Coalition government, that is, from 1996 to 2007.
6
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Australians”.9 The prominence of the concept of the national interest is further highlighted in the
second White Paper issued by the Howard government titled Advancing the National Interest:
Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. It begins with this claim: “The purpose of
Australian foreign and trade policy is to advance the national interest – the security and prosperity
of Australia and Australians”.10 While both the Keating and Howard governments reflect the
strategic importance of both a regional and global dimension to the notion of national interest, for
the Keating Labor government, Indonesia as Australia’s closest neighbour, was of paramount
importance. The Howard government though, placed less importance on Australia’s geography
and more importance on Australia’s relationships with North America and Europe. As the second
White Paper stated: “Australia’s interests are global in scope and not solely defined by
geography. Australia is a Western country located in the Asia-Pacific region with close ties and
affinities with North America and Europe and a history of active engagement throughout Asia”.11
Notwithstanding the Howard government’s view of Australia’s primary interests, Indonesia has
continued to be of immeasurable strategic importance to Australia in terms of both security
interests and in terms of trade. As noted in the JCFADT Report, Near Neighbours – Good
Neighbours:
…more than half Australia’s economy is directly or indirectly dependent upon secure shipping. Much of
Australia’s trade and much of the trade of Australia’s major trading partners in north east Asia passes
through the Indonesian straits of Lombok, Ombai and Wetar.12

Secure shipping lanes are vital to the economic prosperity of Australia. Indonesia is also the 4th
most populous nation in the world, Australia’s 10th largest export market, the leading member of
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and for Australia a key player in regional
affairs.
The importance of Indonesia has led to a bipartisan approach by successive Australian
governments over the last sixty years. For some Australian governments there has been no
9 Commonwealth of Australia, In The National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997), p. iii.
10 Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003), p. vii.
11 Ibid., p. viii.
12 Submission No. 9, Australia Defence Association, p.3 in Clause 3.2, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours - Good Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, p.
35.
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other relationship more significant than the relationship Australia developed with Indonesia, and
therefore, this relationship demands much consideration and requires much effort.

The

relationship is, as I have noted, “a complex and sensitive relationship born of the differences in
history, demographics and cultural background”.13 It is the differences that provide an enormous
challenge for Australian governments building a sound working relationship with Indonesia. It
demands that both countries understand each other and work together to resolve the inevitable
tensions that occur due to the proximity of each nation and the very different cultural
perspectives. It is in the interests of Australian governments, irrespective of these differences, to
develop a sound working relationship in all aspects: political, economic, strategic and cultural.
For Australia, unless we understand the complexities between the two states it will be very
difficult for Australian governments to develop long-term effective working relations.
While there have been times of strain in the relationship between Australia and Indonesia created
by the differences in terms of history, culture and demographics, these differences have been
overstated. Too often it has been easier to focus on the differences in the relationships between
the two states rather than the similarities. It would be fair to say that the reactions of both sides in
terms of the actions of the other have sometimes suggested a level of racial intolerance.
However, it is easier to focus on the differences and downplay the similarities that may assist the
Indonesian and Australian governments to find some commonality. As noted in the JCFADT
Report, Near Neighbours – Good Neighbours: “Although there have been periods of strain, it has
been for the most part a positive relationship of considerable value to both countries and with the
potential to be significantly more so”.14
Much has been written by academics, foreign policy experts and journalists regarding the
difference in the relationship with Indonesia between the Keating and Howard governments.
Many have argued that during the period of the Keating government there was priority given to
engagement with Asia, and particularly with Indonesia, as Keating believed that Indonesia was
the key to Australia’s acceptance in Asia. As Keating himself acknowledged, Indonesia was one
of the most important relationships for Australia both strategically and economically and that
Australia’s future was to be found in Asia.15 While this was not new in terms of the importance of
Indonesia to Australia, Keating believed that it was a priority to build on the relationship. Keating

Clause 1.2, Ibid., p. 1.
Clause 1.2, Ibid.
15 Paul Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific (Sydney: MacMillan, 2000), p. 136.
13
14
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was particularly concerned that while there had been recognition of the importance of the
relationship by previous governments there had still been times of mistrust and strain in the
relationship. As Keating argues in Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, “The problem
with the relationship, in Gareth Evan’s good phrase, was that it had no ballast”.16 His priority was
to build a relationship that was sufficiently strong across all areas of government, civil society and
business, so that if one part of the relationship was strained the strength of the ties across a
variety of platforms would maintain a close working relationship. As Keating stated in Parliament
on 7 May 1992, following his first visit to Indonesia as Prime Minister:
In going to Indonesia it was my intention to demonstrate to the Indonesian Government and the Australian
people that Indonesia is in the first rank of our priorities. It is in many ways the best test of our ability to do
the things we must do in the wider region.17

The Keating government improved the bilateral relationship with Indonesia and Keating himself
established a stronger relationship with Suharto than previous Prime Ministers. This gave new
momentum to the bilateral relationship and extensive bureaucratic contacts were established
during the term of the Keating government. I argue, however, that while the relationship
developed at a bureaucratic level, the ‘ballast’ that Keating wished to create was light at the
political level. While the Keating government attempted to improve the political relationship and
Keating himself established stronger ties with Suharto, perceptions of a policy of appeasement
toward Indonesia caused problems. The ‘ballast’ policy overlooked a growing vocal Australian
public concerned with Australia’s continued support of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor and the
continued human rights abuses in East Timor led by militias backed by the Indonesian military. In
addition, there was also a concern that Keating was guiding Australia, with essentially an
European heritage, to become part of a region that was very different to Australia’s identity.
There can be no doubt that there was a lingering fear of the differences between the two states
and the idea of Indonesians being the ‘other’ was evident.
In terms of the Howard government, there is an argument that while there remained a policy
recognising Indonesia’s importance to Australia there was not the same level of intensity given to
the relationship as that cultivated by the Keating government. In both the 1996 Coalition
Manifesto and the first White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy in 1997, the Howard
Ibid., p. 127.
Paul Keating, Ministerial Statement: Visit to Indonesia and Papua and New Guinea (House Hansard, 7 May 1992),
p. 2631.
16
17
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government endorsed the Keating government’s position of the importance of Indonesia. As the
2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Advancing the National Interest states: “Australia
has a fundamental national interest in Indonesia’s stability. We strongly support Indonesian unity
and territorial integrity. Indonesia’s creation of a robust and functioning democratic system is
crucial to achieving these goals”.18 During the period of the Howard government, however, there
is a subtle, but noticeable change in the language adopted by the Howard government in terms of
the bilateral relationship.

The shift in language supports the argument that the Howard

government viewed the political relationship with Indonesia as less important than the Keating
government. While the Howard government maintained the importance of Asia and Indonesia in
terms of pursuing Australia’s national interests in a hard-headed and practical way, and certainly
maintained a strong relationship at the bureaucratic level, Howard was concerned about
Keating’s promotion of a grand vision that saw Australia as a part of Asia. Howard was obviously
uncomfortable with any vision that promoted a move away from Australia’s traditional allies,
whose political and cultural heritage was similar to Australia’s.
For Howard, while there was a need to maintain close engagement with Asia, particularly where
this engagement was required to ensure the security of Australia, and the jobs and standard of
living of the Australian people, there was a conviction that any such engagement must not be to
the detriment of Australia’s relationship with its traditional allies, particularly the United States
(US).

This position was strengthened following the downgrading of the relationship with

Indonesia in 1999 and further endorsed following the actions taken by the government after
September 11. The East Timor crisis, the “war on terror” and the tension developed over the
West Papuan19 refugees created considerable strain in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. This
tension was aggravated by Howard’s statement in an interview in 2002 that he would take preemptive strike action against terrorists in another country if he had evidence they were about to
attack Australia. It was the joint efforts in counter-terrorism (particularly following the Bali
bombings) that assisted in rebuilding the bilateral relationship and while the Howard government
was proud of its success in advancing the relationship with Indonesia, I argue that the
engagement became increasingly narrow. It centred on issues of counter-terrorism and border
security. While these issues are of vital importance in terms of the relationship, they do not

Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, p.
87.
19 The author has used the current title of the province, West Papua, in most instances, however, there may be
instances where a reference is made to West New Guinea or Irian Jaya which reflect the name of the province at that
given time.
18
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necessarily constitute a deepening engagement and understanding of Australia’s closest
neighbour, nor do they improve and strengthen a sustainable political relationship.
It is apparent that the Keating and Howard governments afforded differing significance to the level
of their engagement with Indonesia. For the Keating government, Indonesia was seen as one of
the most important international relationships for Australia. As Keating told a meeting in Sydney
in 1994, “No country is more important to Australia than Indonesia. If we fail to get this
relationship right, and nurture and develop it, the whole web of our foreign relations is
incomplete”.20 In terms of Australia’s bilateral relationships Keating believed Indonesia was of
equal importance to Australia’s strategic ally and economic partner, the US, and its major
economic partner, Japan. He believed that the relationship with Indonesia had to be given the
same amount of care as these other main relationships due to Indonesia’s closeness to Australia
and the potential for development between the two states.21 In contrast, the Howard government
delivered its first White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy in 1997, and while the language
seemed to move away from what was seen to be Keating’s ‘obsession’ with Asia, there did not
appear to be any broad re-direction of the foreign policy approach other than a move to embrace
bilateralism more fully than the previous government. It is only in the second White Paper on
Foreign and Trade Policy of 2003 that we see the differences between the two governments
emerging. As is noted by Allan Gyngell, while national interests remain important the language
used was about values:
While Australia has ‘close ties and affinities’ with North America and Europe, it has simply a ‘history of
active engagement’ with Asia. The ‘vital’ relationship with the US – the only country about which that telling
word is used – is underpinned by the fact that Australia and the US ‘share values and ideals’.22

It is the introduction of language about a “common heritage” that begins to reveal the subtle, but
nonetheless important, differences in emphasis in Australia’s foreign policy toward Indonesia by
the Howard government. In spite of the Howard government’s concern to afford primacy to the
Australia-US relationship joint statements of the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum (AIMF)
reveal continued cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. The statements support the
Laurie Brereton, "A Labor Perspective," in Development Issues Number Ten: Bridging the Arafura Sea: AustraliaIndonesia Relations in Prosperity and Adversity. ed. Shannon Luke Smith, G. Hanafi Sofyan, and Idris F. Sulaiman,
(The Australian National University, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, Asian Pacific School of Economics and
Management, 1998), p. 35.
21 Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, p. 136.
22 Allan Gyngell, "There's rhetoric and dinner talk, but little debate on foreign policy," Sydney Morning Herald 25
August 2003, p. 11. and Allan Gyngell, "Death of Dualism?," Griffith Review, 1 (2003): p. 85.
20
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JCFADT’s view that the relationship is substantial at a government sector level but the same
cannot be said of the political relationship and the people-to-people links.23

Aims of my Thesis
In this thesis I will consider the following key questions:
Is there a noticeable difference in the development of foreign policy toward Indonesia
between the Keating and Howard governments? If there is a difference:
i.

To what extent is there a change in policy or just a change in the details of the policy?

ii. To what extent have policy decisions during the period of investigation enhanced or
hindered the political relationship between Indonesia and Australia?
My research has underpinned my analysis of the continuity, ambiguity, contradictions and
outcomes of policy decisions. I have examined foreign policy development through three core
areas which I believe have dominated the political relationship between Australia and Indonesia
during the tenure of the Keating and Howard governments. These are the impact of East Timor
on the relationship, security interests including law enforcement, and maritime policy. I have not
examined all aspects of the relationship between Australia and Indonesia during this time, but
have focused on those aspects of the relationship at the political level that have dominated the
relationship over the period from 1991-2007.
I have examined and provided an analysis of publicly available government documents produced
during the period in question. These documents include those authored under the authority of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), the Department of Defence, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade (JCFADT), Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade References Committee and discussions in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate and accessed via Hansard. I have, of course, not used all documents authored under
these departments and committees. My analysis of available government documents has been
supplemented with a limited use of secondary literature. I have only employed secondary
Refer to Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 11 March
2003)., Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 18 March
2005)., Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Statement: 8th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum (Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2006)., Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement - 9th AustraliaIndonesia Ministerial Forum (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 12 November 2008).
23
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sources to enhance the argument that I have formulated through an analysis of primary source
material.
There are inevitable limitations when researching and writing a thesis such as this, however, I
hope this in no way detracts from the contribution that my thesis provides to the body of academic
literature on the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. Through an examination of
publicly available documents I provide another critical discourse on the importance of the
Australia-Indonesia relationship. However, there is a limit to the extent to which there is anything
new that can be added to the past and present discourse and analysis of the relationship
between Australia and Indonesia during the period I cover in my thesis. The development of
foreign policy between Australia and Indonesia over the past sixty years has been one of the
greatest challenges for successive Australian governments and also one of the most intensely
debated relationships Australia has had in relation to the international arena. This was equally so
during the periods of the Keating and Howard governments.

Nevertheless, primary

documentation in terms of cabinet discussions, policy discussions within and between the
departments of the bureaucracy, and sensitive information relating to Australia’s security is not
available and may not become available for at least another fifteen years. A significant portion of
this information may never become available for public scrutiny.
My contribution to the body of academic discourse on the relationship between Australia and
Indonesia rests on the extent to which I have provided an analysis of publicly available
government documents with limited reliance on secondary literature as a source of that analysis.
The strategic policy documents I used provided a rich source of information. A part of the
contribution that I bring to this thesis is my analysis of the continuities and ambiguities in the
documents themselves. They provide an understanding of the challenges and changes in foreign
policy toward Indonesia from the Keating to the Howard governments and the extent to which the
key issues discussed strengthened the political relationship. The policy statements provide
evidence of changes in foreign policy and the reasons for those changes from one government to
the next. This results in a discussion which brings into sharp focus any differences in rhetoric and
underlying assumptions and reveals the sometimes contradictory policy position in the two
government’s agendas.
Though, I have primarily based my thesis research on primary sources, I recognise that there is a
rich mine of secondary information that has been written on the relationship between Australia
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and Indonesia over the past 60 years. In order to situate my thesis in relation to the body of
existing literature I will now provide a brief summary of a portion of important secondary literature.
Much of the analysis in the existing literature rests on debate over the extent to which Australian
governments have accommodated Indonesia at the expense of moral and humanitarian
considerations. I have extended this debate.
Well known diplomat and academic, Rawdon Dalrymple, and prominent scholars such as Harold
Crouch and Jamie Mackie provide rich accounts of the Australia-Indonesia relationship over the
past 60 years. Along with others they have consistently asserted and promoted the importance of
Australia maintaining a solid relationship with Indonesia. I have not directly used their accounts in
this thesis, though their insights have obviously informed my foundation knowledge of the
Australia-Indonesia relationship. In this thesis I have focused on literature that deals specifically
with East Timor, the strategic relationship between Australia and Indonesia and maritime issues
between the two nations during the period 1991-2007.
Like many other scholars and commentators, prominent journalist and writer of Australia’s foreign
policy, Paul Kelly has argued for the importance of the Indonesia-Australia relationship. In his
latest book The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, Kelly argues that the
position adopted by Howard and Downer toward East Timor was to maintain the policy of
incorporation by Indonesia while secretly attempting to orchestrate East Timor’s independence.24
Kelly relies heavily on the DFAT document East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian
Policy Challenge and interviews with the major participants in the crisis to make this value
judgement. However, I disagree with his analysis of the role of DFAT and the government in
terms of the East Timor crisis. I argue that East Timor in Transition, as the department’s account
of Australia’s role in the crisis, is at times contradictory and misleading when judged against the
Senate report and other evidence I have drawn on for my thesis argument. I maintain that Kelly’s
assessment of Howard and Downer’s role in East Timor needs further evidence to support his
claim and that the DFAT report and interviews of participants in the crisis needed to be weighed
against this evidence. I also recognise that those in the department who wrote East Timor in
Transition, the same people as those who had implemented policy, were effectively assessing
their own performance by using material that was favourable to the decisions made. I am not
suggesting that the DFAT report is not a good resource, I have made considerable use of this
source in my thesis. However, it should be weighed against other evidence. Further, Kelly’s
Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
2009), p. 482.
24
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reliance on interviews with participants such as Downer and Howard after the event is
problematic. Participants are prone to making statements that provide self-serving justifications
for actions that have taken place. The interviews Kelly relied on needed to be verified using other
documentary evidence. However, there are areas of Kelly’s analysis which I agree with. Kelly
states that the idea of Australia liberating East Timor is false,25 and that Howard was incorrect in
taking a position that amounted to “cheap populism” when he declared that it had taken his
government to change the policy position on East Timor.26 I agree with Kelly that Howard was
following Habibie’s decision which opened the door for Howard and Downer to change their
government’s policy on East Timor.
One of the most seminal authors and academics on Australia’s role in East Timor is James
Cotton. My research for this thesis has convinced me that Cotton’s account of Australia’s role
and actions in East Timor is particularly sound. Cotton provides a thorough historical account of
Australia’s appeasement policy toward Indonesia in relation to East Timor. His account of the
period of 1999-2000 is comprehensive and his argument supported by strong evidence. He
reveals some of the discrepancies and omissions in DFAT’s account of the crisis. While the
DFAT East Timor in Transition report claims that the government would not preclude a
peacekeeping force prior to the consultation ballot, I endorse Cotton’s careful account of what
was actually planned in terms of peacekeeping arrangements. In other words, I believe Cotton is
correct when he argues that the level of planning involved was not that required for the kind of
operation that INTERFET became. In this thesis I have provided evidence that supports Cotton’s
assessment. My evidence has principally been drawn from the Australian National Audit Office
report.
Prominent defence strategist Hugh White’s account of the strategic implications for Australia of
the relationship with Indonesia is broad and has also provided very useful input to my thesis
argument. White offers a solid account of the strategic implications of Australia’s place in the
South East Asian region and Indonesia’s important role in maintaining stability within the region.
He raises the contradictory position taken by Australian governments where Indonesia has been
viewed both as a potential threat and as a protective Asian friend. White’s assessment of the
situation accords with my position in this thesis, particularly in the Strategic Environment section
of my work.
25
26

Ibid., p. 484.
Ibid., p. 514.
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I argue that the Australia-Indonesia relationship can best be described as a paradox of suspicion
and friendship and this is why Australia’s relationship with Indonesia is our most challenging
international relationship. White adds further complexity to the Australia-Indonesia relationship
when he recognises that Indonesia may now view Australia as a threat due to Australia’s role in
East Timor and the issue of the West Papuan refugees. Australia’s actions raise real concern for
the Indonesian government over Australia’s strategic objectives and over Australian government’s
respect for Indonesia’s territorial integrity. This is an important development in the relationship
during the timeframe of my thesis and I argue it is a point of consternation for Australian
policymakers during the period in question and for future Australian governments.
International maritime experts Victor Prescott and Stuart Kaye, provide detailed discussions of
the negotiations and outcomes of maritime agreements that have been developed between
Australia and Indonesia.

Their detailed accounts of the political, geographical and legal

considerations have provided a rich source of information on the development of maritime issues
between Australia and Indonesia that I discuss in the last section of my thesis. These accounts
support my argument concerning the mutual benefit both states gained through maritime issues.
I also argue that the development of maritime issues has assisted in building the AustraliaIndonesia relationship. Max Herriman and Martin Tsamenyi, widely recognised experts in the
field of maritime policy, raise important potential legal problems with the negotiation of the 1997
Treaty which call into question the positive outcome of the Treaty. I have incorporated the very
detailed legal assessment they have presented into my argument. Their insights in relation to the
1997 Treaty is particularly useful in terms of both the present and the future potential for
disagreement between the two states in the future.

Realist-Pragmatism versus Liberal-Morality
One of the underlying issues in terms of my discussion of the Australia-Indonesia political
relationship involves the issue of successive Australian governments taking a pragmatic position
rather than a moral position in terms of the political relationship with Indonesia. The issue of
realist-pragmatism versus liberal-morality revolves around a belief that foreign policy should be
guided by national self-interest unencumbered by moral decisions, and those who believe that
morality and cooperation between nations should play an important role in developing foreign
policy. This does not indicate that policy makers are immoral in their deliberations, but that the
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primary role of the state in international relations is a state’s national interest, and therefore
foreign policy needs to be guided by what is in its interests. This also does not suggest that there
is a clear division between foreign policy decisions which fall into an either/or box of realism or
liberal-morality. Indeed, national interests may well be served by either taking, or appearing to
take, a moral position.
The realist scholar, Morgenthau notes that the “national interest…is not defined by the whim of a
man or the partisanship of party but imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying
their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy”.27 As Burchill notes, Morgenthau assumed
that “national interests are permanent conditions which provide policymakers with a rational guide
to action: they are fixed, politically bipartisan and always transcend changes in government”.28
This is a realist approach to the idea of national interests as it assumes that in order to survive
and prosper, states need to protect their interests and that states are the most significant actors
in international affairs. The realist position decrees that “a state’s foreign policy is based on
prudent calculations of national interest”.29 States must exercise power in order to pursue their
national interests.30
What does this mean in terms of the development of Australian foreign policy? Gyngell and
Wesley note that, “For Australia, as for most states, the national interest has invariably been
defined as a combination of national security plus national prosperity, with the occasional dash of
national values”.31 This definition conforms to the notion that is explicit in the realist paradigm of
the importance of strategic and economic issues in order for states to achieve their goals. The
notion of national interest though is problematic and not easily defined, and any attempt at doing
so may well result in a very narrow definition of what is important to a state. It is the very
problematic nature of attempting to define national interests that can be seen in any discussion of
realist-pragmatism and liberal-morality. Joseph Nye while acknowledging the risk associated with
such a definition poses the following in terms of a democratic state:

27 H. Morgenthau in The New Republic, 22 January 1977 as cited in Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism," in
Theories of International Relations. 2nd ed., ed. Scott Burchill, et al., (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 81. When
discussing Realism I have not sought to differentiate between Realism and neo-Realism.
28 Ibid.
29 Marc A. Genest, Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations (Fort Worth: Harcourt
Brace College Publishers, 1996), p. 48.
30 Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, Understanding International Relations, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), p. 30. and Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism," p. 79.
31 Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), p. 26.

15

The national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is
broader than strategic interests, though they are a part of it. It can include values such as human rights
and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a
price to promote them.32

This suggests that national interests may not just revolve around the realist paradigm of the
pursuit of state power, but also can include a set of moral values that the public believe are
important to the state’s identity.
Australian governments have been faced with the public’s concern over moral issues, particularly
since Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, and I would also suggest, since the bloody coup
of 1965. However, the question of morality versus pragmatism in foreign policy rests largely on
liberal ideals of rights and justice and the development of liberal international relations thought
during the 20th century and the further development of moral standards of international behaviour.
This may cause problems in terms of a state’s pursuit of their national interests. Issues of
morality in terms of relationships between states, particularly concerning non-intervention and the
question of human rights, become complicated in terms of foreign policy as states do not
necessarily have the means of coercion over another state.
In opposition to the liberal ideology of a set of moral standards, realists take the position that the
“condition of profound insecurity for states does not permit ethical and humane considerations to
override their primary national considerations”.33 As Burchill notes:
There is no room for moral or ethical concerns, prejudice, political philosophy or individual preference in the
determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the state. The
‘national interest’, which ought to be the sole pursuit of statesmen, is always defined in terms of strategic
and economic capability.34

This, however, reveals the complexity of considering moral issues in foreign policy as there may
well be a constant struggle between what is in a state’s national interest and the rights of the
individuals of a state in situations of human rights abuses, particularly if a state’s national
interests are narrowly defined in terms of national security and prosperity. It is this very issue that
Jospeh S. Jr. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, 78, no. 4 (1999): p. 22.
Andrew Linklater, "What is a Good International Citizen?," in Ethics and Foreign Policy. ed. Paul Keal, (St.
Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with Department of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1992), p.
27.
34 Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism," p. 79.
32
33
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has caused controversy in Australia’s relationship with Indonesia over the past forty years and
continues to do so today, and is particularly relevant in terms of my discussion of consecutive
Australian governments’ foreign policy position on East Timor. This issue has caused, and
continues to cause, concern among the Australian public, and as I argue in the East Timor
chapters, is an issue that has not been adequately dealt with by successive Australian
governments.
Australian governments have taken the position that the strategic, economic and political
relationship with Indonesia was more important to Australia’s national interests than issues of
rights and justice or questions concerned with whether Australia as a moral community has an
obligation to ensure certain human rights. It is not that the policymakers are ill-informed or
unconcerned when considering the moral issues in terms of the policy position they take, but that
they have made a judgement on what they believe is in Australia’s national interests and a realist
notion of national interests has become their primary focus. It is therefore the relative weight
given to national interests rather than moral values that has dictated Australia’s foreign policy
toward Indonesia.

Thesis Structure
I have divided my thesis into three sections based on what I believe are the core areas that have
dominated the relationship between Australia and Indonesia at a political level during the period
of the Keating and Howard governments.
In Section One I will discuss the impact of East Timor on the relationship. For successive
Australian governments the issue of East Timor has created the most tension in the bilateral
relationship, however, consecutive Australian governments have also maintained a policy of
recognising Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. The issue of East Timor has largely revealed
the difference between those policy makers who believe that moral considerations are important
in developing Australia’s foreign policy against those who believe that while moral considerations
are important the role of the government is to ensure the state’s national interests. The
recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor changed during the period of the Howard
government and created a disruption to the bilateral relationship. In this section I provide a
discussion of the policy set during the period of the Whitlam government and then I raise three
key issues during the period of the Keating government which required the Keating government
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to reassess the continued policy of incorporation. Finally I provide a discussion of the actions of
the Howard government prior to the referendum in 1999 and their actions after violence erupted
following the referendum.
In Section Two I will discuss a key element of the relationship in terms of the strategic
environment. Australia’s geo-political position has created a sense of vulnerability in relation to
its security needs and this has been augmented in terms of Indonesia’s proximity to Australia and
the diverse cultures between the two countries. At times this has resulted in the perception that
Indonesia poses a threat to Australia’s security. In this section I provide a broad discussion of the
security agendas of both the Keating and Howard governments and discuss this in terms of the
changed focus of the security relationship with Indonesia. The section will provide a discussion of
the security agreements that were established during the Keating and Howard governments,
along with a discussion of defence cooperation, including the joint training exercises. I will finish
with a discussion of the Memorandums of Understanding that were established in the 21st
century. They re-established the security relationship with Indonesia following the abrogation of
the defence relationship at the time of the crisis in East Timor in 1999.
In Section Three I provide a comprehensive discussion of maritime agreements and treaties that
have been established between the two states. The seas that lie between Australia and
Indonesia are both strategically and economically important to Australia and therefore strong
bilateral relationships between Australia and Indonesia are of major significance in terms of
Australia’s national interests. In this section I will provide an overview of the importance of
maritime issues and the interrelationship of Australia’s defence policy and oceans policy. I will
offer a discussion of the agreements and treaties that have been established between the two
states in terms of the positive benefits they have had on the bilateral relationship. I will also
provide a discussion of fishing arrangements. While the negotiation of agreements relating to
maritime issues has largely been positive and dealt with at a bureaucratic level, I argue these
issues still have the potential to disrupt the political relationship.
I conclude my thesis by arguing that while both the Keating and Howard governments adopted a
realist position in terms of the development of foreign policy toward Indonesia there is a
noticeable difference between the two governments in the direction of Australia’s foreign policy
toward Indonesia. While the Keating government maintained the importance of the relationship
with the US and Australia’s traditional allies, it also recognised the strategic importance of
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fostering and developing Australia’s relationship with Indonesia and the broader Asian region.
For the Howard government, while there was recognition that Australia’s relationship with
Indonesia was important, the focus of Australia’s foreign policy was a rebalance toward the US
and therefore the emphasis given to developing the Australia-Indonesia relationship was
weakened.

I conclude that decisions made by both governments have not necessarily

strengthened the long-term political relationship. Although strengthening the long-term political
relationship was the goal of both the Keating and Howard governments, the outcome of the
decisions made produced the opposite effect.
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SECTION 1 – THE EAST TIMOR LEGACY
In any discussion of Australia’s foreign policy toward Indonesia the issue of East Timor has
caused the most strain in the relationship over the past thirty years. Australia has a complex
bilateral relationship with East Timor. In 1974 the issue of what was then known as Portuguese
Timor was described by Department of Foreign Affairs officials as a “running sore” for Indonesia.
However, in terms of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, the issue of East Timor and
Indonesia’s invasion in 1975 was to become a “running sore” for Australia’s relationship with
Indonesia. At times when the relationship between the two states was strengthening and
deepening, it was often issues over East Timor that created the greatest challenge for Australian
governments in terms of how they managed the relationship with Indonesia.
The policy position on East Timor was set by Whitlam’s position in terms of his desire for East
Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia and this position was adopted by consecutive governments.
The position adopted raised the issue of those who support a realist position in terms of foreign
policy and those who believe that foreign policy cannot be divorced from liberal ideals of rights
and justice.

This dichotomy can be seen during the period of the Keating and Howard

governments where the issue of East Timor reveals those who believe the primary organising
principle in Australia’s foreign policy approach toward Indonesia is one of realpolitik, where
Australia’s national interests and security must be the driving motivation of foreign policy decision
making, and those who believe that foreign policy cannot be separated from moral
considerations. There was an adoption of an either/or solution to the issue of East Timor
between those who determined that Australia’s national interests would be met through
Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor and those who believed in the rights of the East Timorese
to an act of self-determination.
Successive Australian governments adopted a realist perspective on the issue of East Timor and
believed that there was only an either/or solution. However, I argue that it is the idea that there
were only two solutions, that is, the pragmatic versus a moral position, or a realist versus liberal
position, that becomes a lasting problem for successive Australian governments. Through
continually taking a realist position on the issue of East Timor, Australia created a situation where
its national interests were not served in the long term. For successive Australian governments
adopting a realist view and interpreting Australia’s national interests in terms of maintaining a
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strong relationship with Indonesia actually created problems within the relationship and generated
a growing opposition within Australia’s domestic arena. This was certainly the view adopted by
the Keating government.
In 1999 during the period of the Howard government the policy position changes to support East
Timor’s right for a vote for independence. While it can be argued that the government adopted a
liberal-moral approach to the change in policy, this is a simplistic analysis of the policy position
taken by the government. The Howard government had little choice in adopting this position due
to events that were largely out of its control, and in doing so were able to take the moral high
ground while at the same time gaining support on the domestic front. The position adopted by
the Howard government underlines my previous discussion where I suggest that there are
limitations to an either/or position in terms of moral values versus pragmatism. National interests
can also have a moral value in themselves. The Howard government made a decision in 1999 in
terms of what they believed best served their national interests. Some would suggest this
resulted in the ranking of human rights as more important. However, what transpires here is the
inconsistency of the approach that sent confused signals to the Indonesian government in relation
to East Timor. It is through the inconsistent application of moral considerations that Australia has
weakened its position in the international arena and I would argue that the lack of consistency
means Australia bears some responsibility for the continuation of human rights abuses in East
Timor.
In the three chapters in Section One I will investigate publicly available government documents in
an attempt to understand the extent to which the issue of East Timor was a persistent ‘irritant’ in
the Australia-Indonesia relationship.
In chapter one I discuss the policy that was set by the Whitlam government in 1974-75 and
subsequently adopted by successive governments until the late 1990s. In this chapter I largely
rely on the documents that were released in 2000 by DFAT.1 These documents provide evidence
to support a discussion that shows the differences between the moral versus pragmatic positions
of officials and key policy makers in the Whitlam government. I argue that the policy position set
by the Whitlam government was a policy failure in terms of Australia’s long-term relationship with

1 I understand the difficulties of only relying on the documents that were released in 2000. However, other
information that may add value, such as intelligence reports, are not available.

23

Indonesia which underestimated the movement for independence in East Timor and the
condemnation of the policy position by a small, but vocal, group in Australia.
In chapter two I discuss the impact of East Timor during the period of the Keating Labor
government. In particular I recognise that there were three key issues during this period that
required the Keating government to reassess its policy position. These three issues were the Dili
Massacre in 1991, the Portuguese action taken against Australia in the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) over the conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty, and the signing of the Agreement on
Maintaining Security by Keating as Prime Minister. I argue that these three issues required the
Keating Labor government to reassess the policy position on East Timor.

However, the

government’s continued policy of appeasement toward Indonesia, the lack of acknowledgement
of the continuation of human rights abuses in East Timor by the Indonesian military, and the
disregard for the Australian public’s support of East Timor resulted in a continuation of the failed
policy set by the Whitlam government.
In chapter three I discuss the impact of East Timor on the Australia-Indonesia relationship during
the terms of the Howard government. I focus on Australia’s role in East Timor during 1998-99
beginning with a discussion of the lead-up to the East Timor referendum in 1999 and the actions
taken by the Australian government after violence erupted following the announcement of the
referendum result. I consider how the actions taken at this time strained relations between
Australia and Indonesia, though the foreign policy decisions taken by the Howard government
were presented as a turning point in Australia’s East Timor policy. I argue that rather than being
a significant turning point in foreign policy by the Howard government, the policy was ambiguous
and contradictory and rebalanced Australia’s foreign policy focus toward the US. It led to a
deterioration in the bilateral relationship with Indonesia.
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CHAPTER ONE – A ‘RUNNING SORE’ – EAST TIMOR AND THE
WHITLAM POLICY LEGACY
Introduction
The major issue that strained the Australia and Indonesia relationship during a thirty year period
was the issue of independence for East Timor.

Stephen Sherlock aptly titled a 1995

Parliamentary Research paper, A Pebble in Indonesia’s Shoe.1 The East Timor issue has also
been a pebble and at times a major irritant in the Australia-Indonesia relationship since
Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor in 1975.2 The East Timor issue revealed the
differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of political divisions.
While Australia’s liberal-democratic tradition was based on an implicit and unacknowledged
understanding of individual human rights, Indonesia’s struggle for independence and its relatively
new statehood had not led to a strong liberal tradition or a set of universal human rights traditions.
While Indonesia’s ideology had been founded on the 1945 Constitution and the five principles in
the Pancasila, namely, “social justice, a just and civilised humanity, belief in one god, Indonesian
unity, and government by deliberation and consent”,3 the meaning behind the Pancasila has
changed. It has been interpreted differently by each government. As Kingsbury notes, “the
Pancasila is so vague that it has been held to mean whatever the government of the day says it
means or wants it to mean”.4 I argue here that it is the interpretation of the political traditions of
human rights plus the complexities within the relationship between the two countries which is
reflected in the issue of East Timor.
For successive Australian governments the issue of East Timor has dominated the foreign and
security policy debates in terms of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia and in essence provided
a twenty-five year policy legacy. As a policy discussion on 11 December 1974 notes, “there was

Stephen Sherlock, ‘A Pebble in Indonesia’s Shoe’: Recent Developments in East Timor, ed. Department of Foreign
Affairs Defence and Trade, vol. No. 8 (Parliament of Australia, 1995 ).
2 The author understands that the correct name for East Timor prior to the invasion and incorporation of East Timor
by Indonesia was Portuguese Timor. For the purposes of this chapter Portuguese Timor will be referred to as East
Timor. There will be circumstances where Portuguese Timor will be used, however, these will generally be restricted
to direct quotes.
3 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 3rd ed. (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 40.
4 Ibid., p. 41.
1
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a risk that Portuguese Timor could turn out to be a ‘running sore’ for Indonesia”.5 However, the
issue of Indonesia’s dominance of East Timor was to become a ‘running sore’ for Australia, both
domestically and internationally.
The development of Australia’s foreign policy in relation to East Timor has been constrained by
the policy position taken by the Whitlam Labor government, particularly in the period 1974-75,
and therefore a detailed examination of the policy formulated at this time is appropriate. This
policy position provided a legacy for successive Australian governments and raises important
issues for Australia’s relationship with Indonesia and the extent to which successive Australian
governments have attempted to appease Indonesia at the expense of what the Australian public
may view as important.6
On this basis I argue that the policy decision of the Whitlam government raises a number of
important issues in terms of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. They are:

•

The extent to which the government allowed pragmatism to rule over a moral position.
This position was never sustainable in the long-term.

•

The extent to which a Labor tradition in foreign policy of international citizenship was
overlooked in favour of a narrow set of national interests. This was despite Whitlam’s
concern for human rights, aid, development and apartheid within other areas of foreign
policy development. The argument here is that the East Timor issue is a clear example
of a foreign policy decision based on a narrow set of national interests rather than
understanding that national interests should incorporate a broad set of principles that the
public view as important.

•

A failure to recognise the extent to which Suharto was prepared to act in terms of what
he perceived as Indonesia’s national interests, particularly resorting to the use of force.

5 “66 Record of Policy Discussion”, Wendy Way, Damien Browne, and Vivianne Johnson, eds., Documents on
Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 (Melbourne:
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Melbourne University Press, 2000), p. 145.
6 In the thesis I make reference to the ‘public’ or ‘Australian public’, particularly in relation to the three chapters on
East Timor. In the manner of not wishing to open a philosophical debate on the concept of the “public sphere” as this
is not the focus of my thesis, I discuss the public in practical terms meaning simply ‘everyone’. I am aware that while
Habermas develops a specific meaning of the “public sphere” in terms of a critical assessment of society based on
democratic principles and suggests a contestation or compromise between interest groups, associations, political
parties, the media and discussion within the private sphere, it is not my intention in my discussion to interpret the
public in terms of this contestation or compromise.
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This failure by the Whitlam government could be seen as duplicitous in terms of
assuming that force would not be used when evidence suggested the opposite.
•

The inherent contradiction within the Whitlam policy between an act of self-determination
and the desire for incorporation of East Timor by Indonesia.

In this chapter I set out the policy framework of the Whitlam government on East Timor which
established a twenty-five year policy legacy. This raises the question as to whether there is
anything new that I can add to the already exhaustive literature on Australia’s foreign policy
toward East Timor in relation to Indonesia during the period of the Whitlam government. The
purpose of the chapter is to provide the framework for the policy that was adopted by both the
Keating and Howard governments, and therefore I will not be providing a full discussion of the
extensive literature available, but rather selecting information from the documents that were
released in 2000 in terms of providing the foundation of the policy that was set and endorsed by
subsequent Australian governments. In the following chapter I will investigate the period from
1991-1996 and the Keating government’s response to this policy legacy, and in the chapter
following I will focus on the period of 1996-2007 and the apparent reversal in policy of the Howard
government.

The 1974-1975 Legacy
As far back as 1960 it was the Australian government’s position that the issue of East Timor
“should not be allowed to complicate the handling of the sensitive, and at times precarious,
relationship between Australia and Sukarno’s Indonesia”.7 A Working Group report of 4 April
1963 noted:
Sooner or later Indonesia will be obliged to declare that Portuguese colonialism in Timor must go…What
we have to fear in particular is an uprising and bloody suppression leading to Indonesian intervention…In
any event there would be better chances of a realistic engagement of the United Nations in such a situation
and better chances for Australia avoiding a head-on clash with Indonesia.8

With the coming into power of the New Order government in Indonesia in 1965 and Suharto’s
anti-communist position, both academics and diplomats devoted much effort into promoting

James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence (Sydney: Longueville Books, 2003), p. 111.
“Report by the Working Group of Departmental Officers”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on
Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 30.
7
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acceptance internationally of the New Order government. As noted by prominent Indonesianist,
Jamie Mackie, in 1974:
The new government was clearly anti-communist and committed to a low-key, unassertive foreign policy,
with a new stress on regionalism and ‘good neighbourly’ relations with nearby countries. The stage was
set for the working out of a ‘new and more constructive enduring set of links’.9

While a policy position on East Timor was beginning to take shape as far back as 1960,
particularly in terms of avoiding a political and diplomatic clash between Australia and Indonesia,
prior to Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s meeting with President Suharto in September 1974,
“there was no official Australian policy on the future of Portuguese Timor, merely a growing
awareness that a policy would be needed, and quickly”.10 Following the 1974 meeting a policy
position quickly developed, founded on the basis that the Whitlam government was determined
that the East Timor issue would not be allowed to complicate Australia’s relationship with
Indonesia.
In 1972 when the Whitlam Labor government came to power, Whitlam’s foreign policy focus was
Asia and the key to Whitlam’s Asia policy was Indonesia. Whitlam was determined to devote
much effort to the relationship between Jakarta and Canberra. Whitlam had two positions on
East Timor. The first was that East Timor was not viable as an independent state and that any
outcome for East Timor had to be determined through a process of self-determination. The
second position was that he based his decisions on “Suharto’s assurance that force would not be
used”.11 Considering the bloody coup of 1965 in Indonesia and the subsequent act of autonomy
in West New Guinea of 1969, which has been described as a “sham plebiscite”,12 Whitlam’s belief
in Suharto’s reassurance may well have been an error of political judgement in developing East
Timor policy. Subsequent events provide ample evidence that Whitlam’s faith in Suharto’s nonviolent assurance was misplaced.

9 J.A.C. Mackie, "Australia's Relations with Indonesia: Principles and Policies, part 2," Australian Outlook, 28 (1974):
p. 175. quoted in Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, p. 136.
10 “Introduction”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the
Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 3.
11 Nancy Viviani, "The Whitlam Government's Policy Towards Asia," in Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in
Australian Foreign Policy. ed. David Lee and Christopher Waters, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 106.
12 Martinkus used the term ‘sham plebiscite’ to describe the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969 which delivered West New
Guinea to Indonesian occupation. John Martinkus, "Paradise Betrayed: West Papua's Struggle for Independence,"
Quarterly Essay, no. 7 (2002): p. 2. Dalyrmple describes it as a ‘stage-managed ceremony’. Rawdon Dalrymple,
Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 168-70.
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It was the events in Portugal in 1974 that really brought the issue of East Timor to the forefront of
government attention and pressed the Australian and Indonesian governments to determine a
policy position on the future of East Timor. In late April 1974 the Armed Forces Movement in
Portugal brought down the right-wing authoritarian government of Marcello Caetano and
announced its intention to promote progressive autonomy for former colonies within a Portuguese
framework. Portugal considered three possible options for East Timor in June 1974: “continued
association with Portugal, independence, or becoming part of Indonesia”.13 No actions were
taken on any of these options. The Armed Forces Movement takeover of Marcello Caetano in
Portugal, and the potential shedding of Portugal’s territories by the new revolutionary leaders led
to East Timor becoming a major policy issue for the Australian and Indonesian governments.
With the changes announced by the new government in Portugal, Indonesia became concerned
that without the influence of Portugal, Indonesia would have a small leftist state within its
archipelago that may potentially be open to the influence of a larger communist state.14 The
apprehensions of Indonesia influenced the direction of the policy that the Whitlam government
was to pursue. Whitlam was concerned that East Timor had the possibility to destabilise its
neighbours and any destabilisation would have an impact on Australia’s security.15
A discussion of Australia’s interest concerning East Timor by the Department of Foreign Affairs
noted:
Indonesian absorption of Timor makes geopolitical sense.

Any other long-term solution would be

potentially disruptive of both Indonesia and the region. It would help confirm our seabed agreement with
Indonesia. It should induce a greater readiness on Indonesia’s part to discuss Indonesia’s ocean strategy.
We might be able to provide some assistance to a smooth transition…16

Another view, however, stated the need for “an internationally acceptable act of selfdetermination in Portuguese Timor” and noted that “the best result of that act of selfdetermination would be for the Timorese to choose union, or some form of association, with
Indonesia”.17 It was clear in 1974 that there was a strong belief within the Department of Foreign

Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Odonian Press, 1999), p. 25.
Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity, p. 195.
15 Michael B. Salla, "East Timor, Regional Security and the Labor Tradition," in Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in
Australian Foreign Policy. ed. David Lee and Christopher Water, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 226.
16 “9 Letter from McCredie to Feakes”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy:
Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 58.
17 “10 Letter from Feakes to McCredie”, Ibid., p. 59.
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Affairs that East Timor’s association with Indonesia would be the most desirable outcome and
serve Australia’s long-term interests.
The record of a meeting between Whitlam and Suharto on 6 September 1974 provides some
clarity for the policy position that was to be adopted.
The Prime Minister said that he felt two things were basic to his own thinking on Portuguese Timor. First,
he believed that Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia. Second, this should happen in
accordance with the properly expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor. The Prime Minister
emphasized that this was not yet Government policy but that it was likely to become that.18

Whitlam also noted that East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia should occur through “a natural
process arising from the wishes of the people”, at least “for the domestic audience in Australia”.19
In this meeting Whitlam also confirmed his belief that East Timor was too small, and economically
not viable to become an independent state, and that independence would be unwelcome in both
Australia and Indonesia and other regional countries.20
In his meeting with Whitlam, Suharto affirmed Indonesia’s position that while Indonesia was
committed to the right of the East Timorese to an act of self-determination, independence would
create problems for Indonesia. “Portuguese Timor in this way would become a ‘thorn in the eye
of Australia and a thorn in Indonesia’s back’”.21
The issue of East Timor seemed to be creating some debate in the Australian Labor Party (ALP).
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Victorian branch of the ALP listed three possible reasons
for Whitlam adopting his position of East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia.

First was

Australia’s position within the Asian region and the importance placed on Australia’s relationship
“26 Record of Meeting Between Whitlam and Soeharto”, Ibid., p. 95.
Ibid., p. 96. This is further enforced in a ‘Minute from Woolcott [Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and later Ambassador to Indonesia from 1975] to Renouf [Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs]’,
Canberra, 24 September 1974, in which Woolcott advised that he had “cleared a cable from the Prime Minister and
Acting Minister to the Minister in New York and Furlonger [Ambassador to Indonesia from 1972 to December 1974] in
Jakarta”. This cable confirms Whitlam’s position: “It is worth recording-for limited distribution only-that the Prime
Minister put his views on this subject frankly in the following way: ‘I am in favour of incorporation but obeisance has
to be made to self determination. I want it incorporated but I do not want this done in a way which will create
argument in Australia which would make people more critical of Indonesia’”. “37 Minute from Woolcott to Renouf”,
Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian
Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 111.
20 “26 Record of Meeting Between Whitlam and Soeharto”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on
Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, pp. 95-6.
21 Ibid., p. 97.
18
19

31

with Indonesia as the largest country within the region. Second, was the notion of East Timor
being too small and unviable which could mean a weak state that was open to the influence of
other bigger powers. The third reason was that Whitlam believed that Australia’s position would
not be enhanced if it had to deal with a number of small countries, it was far better to deal with
only one. 22
Australia’s desire to deal with only one country was particularly relevant in pursuing its national
interests in relation to the seabed resources. In a draft submission to Don Willesee23 on 5
December 1974 the Department of Foreign Affairs wrote:
…what interests we have – deriving from the territory’s proximity, its straddling of important shipping
routes, its nearness to our seabed resources zone, and our small commercial stake – are all best served
by its incorporation into Indonesia.24

Australia had already finalised seabed boundary agreements with Indonesia in 1971 and 1972
and there was a desire to finalise the gap left in the Timor Sea due to Portugal’s sovereignty over
East Timor. It was the Australian government’s position that finalising the seabed boundary was
more likely to occur with Indonesia than with Portugal.
A key group of government officials were instrumental in advice given to the Whitlam government
on the East Timor issue. While some of the advice given attempted to raise concerns over
Australia’s adoption of a policy of Indonesian incorporation, there was still an attempt to weave
into policy what can only be described as two contradictory policy notions: the incorporation of
East Timor by Indonesia and an act of self-determination. One of the officials instrumental in
advice given to Whitlam in terms of the development of the East Timor policy was Richard
Woolcott, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and later Ambassador to Indonesia from 1975.
From the outset Woolcott was determined to take a realist position in terms of Australia’s East
Timor policy rather than a liberal-moral position. In a letter he sent to Whitlam on 2 April 1975 he
actually raised the question “Do we want actually to encourage an independent East Timor? I
would doubt it”.

He also expressed concern over the government’s position of self-

Helen Hill, "Australia and Portuguese Timor: Between Principles and Pragmatism" (paper presented at the The
First Thousand Days of Labor - A.P.S.A. Conference 1975, Canberra, 1975), p. 345.
23 Don Willesee was Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 6 November 1973 – 11 November 1975.
24 “61 Draft Submission to Willesee”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy:
Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 136.
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determination.25 Further, in a dispatch to Willesee on 2 June 1975, Woolcott stated that the
premise behind the policy position expressed to Suharto by Whitlam in Townsville on 4 April 1975
was that the policy was “to be guided by the principle that good relations with Indonesia were of
paramount importance to Australia”.26 Further Woolcott stated in the dispatch that:
I do not think we should be too fussed about the manner chosen to determine the wishes of the people of
Timor…
If Indonesia decides to use force or crude pressure to achieve its objectives I do not think that Australian
opposition would prevent this…In these circumstances our best interests will lie in coming to terms with the
realities of the situation.27

To reinforce the pragmatic approach he further stated in a cablegram on 14 August 1975:
…in the final analysis we need to make a pragmatic, practical, hard-headed assessment of our real longterm interests. There is no doubt in my mind that our relations with Indonesia in the long-term are more
important to us than the future of Portuguese Timor…28

It is clear from the cablegram that Woolcott is recommending a realist position based on his view
that Australia’s national interests were far better served through Australia’s long-term relationship
with Indonesia than the right of the East Timorese to determine their own political future. This
meant that Australia’s “principles should be tempered by the proximity of Indonesia”,29 and
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia was far more important in terms of achieving Australia’s
national interests.
Indonesia’s position on the future of East Timor was known as early as 3 July 1974 when the
Department of Foreign Affairs were advised that Harry Tjan from the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Jakarta was recommending to Suharto “that Indonesia mount a
clandestine operation in Portuguese Timor to ensure that the territory would opt for incorporation

“121 Letter from Woolcott to Whitlam”, Ibid., p. 241.
“137 Dispatch to Willesee”, Ibid., p. 267.
27 Ibid., pp. 268-9.
28 “166 Cablegram to Canberra”, Ibid., p. 309. Further evidence of this approach can be seen in other Cablegrams
sent to Canberra by Woolcott, for example, 3 October 1975, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on
Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, pp. 444-6. 9
October 1975, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the
Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, pp. 456-8.
29 “166 Cablegram to Canberra”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy:
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into Indonesia”.30 Then, in a secret cablegram dated 24 February 1975 from the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta, Malcolm Dan31 advised Canberra that Embassy staff had been advised in a
meeting with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta that:
…a decision had been taken by the Indonesian Government that sooner or later Portuguese Timor must
form part of Indonesia. This was a unanimous decision by all the leading Indonesian personalities
involved, including the President. All that remained to be decided was when, and how, this should be
brought about…The Indonesian Government would first try every conceivable means before turning to a
military solution. He described the latter as the ‘ultimate act’.32

Indonesia’s preference for incorporation was further confirmed in a cablegram of 10 July 1975
which advised:
All events had to be seen in the context of Indonesia’s overriding objective of incorporating Portuguese
Timor. This was how the Indonesian Government interpreted every development in relation to Portuguese
Timor…
The blueprint of Indonesia’s plan for Portuguese Timor’s incorporation had been worked out. At one end of
the spectrum of alternative approaches was Portuguese Timor’s voluntary decision to join Indonesia. At
the other extreme was armed intervention in Portuguese Timor by Indonesia - the use of force without
provocation.33

The nature of Indonesia’s future plans to escalate their operations in East Timor were made
known to the Australian government beforehand through a number of meetings between
Embassy staff and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.34 The evidence
is clear that the Australian government was well aware, prior to Indonesia’s invasion, that the
Indonesian government were determined to incorporate East Timor, and if needed, unprovoked
force would be used to obtain this outcome. Yet a policy position was still being maintained by
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the Australian government that preferred and advocated East Timor’s incorporation with
Indonesia through an act of self-determination. While Whitlam had clearly indicated to Suharto in
a letter of 28 February 1975 that no Australian government could support any unprovoked force,35
there was still no change in the Australian government’s policy position of favouring incorporation
when all evidence pointed to the likelihood of Indonesia resorting to force. It is difficult to justify
this policy position. The Australian government was aware well in advance of the Indonesian
government’s intention to incorporate East Timor and its intention to use unprovoked force to
achieve this end even as a last resort.
Woolcott stated, following the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, “Indonesia will proceed
to incorporate East Timor” and further stated that “Indonesia regards this outcome as essential to
its longer term national interest and, indeed, as being in the interests of the region as a whole”.36
Further in the cablegram he states:
It is on the Timor issue that we face one of those broad foreign policy decisions which face most countries
at one time or another. The government is confronted by a choice between a moral stance, based on
condemnation of Indonesia for the invasion of East Timor and on the assertion of the inalienable right of
the people of East Timor to self-determination, on the one hand, and a pragmatic and realistic acceptance
of the longer term inevitabilities of the situation, on the other hand. It’s a choice between what might be
described as Wilsonian idealism or Kissingerian realism. The former is more proper and principled but the
longer term national interest may well be better served by the latter. We do not think we can have it both
ways. In other words we cannot continue, as we see the situation from Jakarta, to isolate ourselves from
other regional countries by public criticism of Indonesia and expect this to do no real damage to our
relations, especially as the Indonesians believe that Australian Government criticism of Indonesia fuels the
fires of existing union, student and media criticism of Indonesia.37

In his book The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings,
Woolcott attempted to justify his position by stating that:
…the Australian Government were caught between a rock and a hard place: between what was seen as
our national interest and the attitudes and interests of other regional countries, on the one hand, and the
right of the East Timorese, on the other, to determine their own future.38
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Woolcott’s comments here go to the heart of the pragmatic-realism and the liberal-moral dilemma
that all states face and that Australia particularly faces in its political relationship with Indonesia.
It raises the question of whether there has to be an either/or solution to the dilemma as Woolcott
seems to be indicating. Is the only solution to the dilemma one where Australia takes a realist
perspective in terms of what is in Australia’s national interests or takes a more liberal position,
which would assert the rights of justice and freedom for the East Timorese as the primary
consideration? Woolcott’s comments seem to indicate that there is only an either/or solution to
the dilemma. Certainly, taking a realist perspective on international relations, where security is
the primary national interest, leads decision makers into an either/or solution. However, it is the
idea that there are only two solutions to the dilemma, that is, the pragmatic versus a moral
position, or a realist versus liberal position, that becomes a lasting problem for successive
Australian governments. Through continually taking a realist position on the issue of East Timor,
Australia created a situation where its national interests were not served in the long-term.
While Whitlam takes the approach of favouring incorporation through an act of self-determination
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Willesee, stressed the need for an act of self-determination
and believed that the government needed to find ways of convincing the Indonesians to live with
the outcome of that act. Willesee wanted Whitlam to reassess his assumptions of incorporation
as he believed from the evidence coming through to the department during 1975 that the East
Timorese were unlikely to favour incorporation with Indonesia. In a letter to Whitlam on 14
January 1975 Willesee raises the contradiction inherent in Whitlam’s position:
…two main elements have emerged in our policy towards Portuguese Timor: first, an appreciation that the
association of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia would best suit our national interests; and second, our
commitment to the right of the people of Portuguese Timor to decide their own political future by means of
an internationally acceptable act of self-determination. When those two main elements in our policy
towards Portuguese Timor were emerging, we knew little of developments in the territory. We now know
more of the evolving situation there. It points to the incompatibility of the two objectives: self-determination
is likely to yield a result other than the association of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia.
The underlying thrust of my Department’s paper is to place more emphasis in our future policy on our
commitment to the right of the people of the territory to decide their own political future.39
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Willesee’s comments indicate a different theoretical approach to that of both Whitlam and
Woolcott. Can we, however, simply describe his position as liberal and Woolcott’s and Whitlam’s
as realist? I think not, as I would argue that Willesee was taking both a liberal and realist view of
the East Timor issue. Willesee very much supported the liberal view that recognised the rights of
the East Timorese to “decide their own political future”.40 However, in the same letter to Whitlam
he also stated a more realist position in terms of Australia’s national interests. “At the same time,
we believe that we should take a step backwards from involvement in the problem of Portuguese
Timor in order to avoid becoming any more enmeshed in it than we need be”.41 On this basis I
argue that there was no need to take an either/or solution as recommended by Woolcott, as
Willesee’s position seemed to indicate how a solution could be found to the dilemma Australia
faced in terms of maintaining both the relationship with Indonesia and at the same time
recognising the rights of the East Timorese. Willesee was raising the issue of the incompatibility
of the two positions of incorporation and self-determination and at the same time advising
Whitlam of the need to take a more liberal view and stress to the Indonesian government the
need for an act of self-determination. This raises two issues though, one where the Indonesian
government may have responded with an act of self-determination along the lines of the Act of
Free Choice that had taken place in West New Guinea in 1969 and has been described as a
“sham plebiscite”, and secondly that it overlooked Indonesia resorting to force. While these
issues cannot be disregarded, Willesee’s position still holds merit in terms of both maintaining the
liberal position of the rights of the East Timorese to self-determination and maintaining this
position with the Indonesian government. In terms of Indonesia taking East Timor by force, very
little would have prevented this. However, supporting Indonesia’s incorporation may well have
given Suharto confirmation of his actions.
Willesee was not alone in taking a different position to that of Woolcott. There were also varying
degrees of differing policy positions coming from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Department of Defence. The Department of Defence was particularly concerned that Australia’s
relationship with Indonesia should not be maintained at the expense of the East Timorese. In a
paper of 15 August 1974 it noted; “Australia thus has a clear Defence interest in opposing the
political or military domination of Portuguese Timor by either major powers or by Indonesia”.42
There was concern that Australia’s acceptance of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor would
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weaken Australia’s credibility in the region. Further, in a letter to Willesee on 11 February 1975,
Barnard43 expressed concern that the Australian government should not be seen to be accepting
military force as a means to changing political power in the region. As the Minister for Defence
noted:
If Indonesia moved militarily against Portuguese Timor despite Australian representations against this, we
would have to assess very closely whether we had to deal with a neighbouring state in which dominant
elements were disposed to deal with neighbourhood problems by use of military force.44

There was a real concern within the Department of Defence that Australia be aware of its
relationships within the region and not act in such a way that would undermine those
relationships. The Department of Defence were not the only ones aware of the dangers of
Australia’s support of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor through unprovoked force, and
stressed a reassessment of the policy position. Some officers within the Department of Foreign
Affairs also endeavoured at various times to critically examine the basis of Australia’s policy
position.45 They argued that East Timor was of very little value to major powers, and therefore,
no significant threat to Indonesia was likely and the cost of persisting with supporting Indonesia’s
intervention in East Timor may be high for both countries, particularly for Australia. Supporting
Indonesia’s intervention could be seen to be supporting a position that was contrary to the
government’s policies and principles.46 Even as late as October 1975 these officers attempted
again to have the policy position reassessed and for the government to dissuade the Indonesians
from annexation of East Timor on the basis “that it holds considerable disadvantages and
dangers for Indonesia, for Australian-Indonesian relations, and for regional relations”.47
The documents released in 2000 indicate a lack of consensus in relation to Australia’s support of
Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. There were those who supported a realist position which
determined that Australia’s national interests were of paramount consideration and were best
served through Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. However, there were also others in the
government and bureaucracy who supported a liberal view of the rights of the East Timorese to
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decide their own political future. I argue that there were two other positions that the documents
disclose. The first supports Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor as the first policy priority, and
also supports the right of the East Timorese to an act of self-determination. This position takes
both a realist and liberal perspective. However, I would argue that the primary consideration here
is Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor being in the best interests of Australia, and therefore,
only lip service is paid to the act of self-determination. From the evidence given the realist
position is dominant. The department and Whitlam were well aware that the East Timorese were
unlikely to favour incorporation with Indonesia and therefore supporting this view was not tenable.
If an act of self-determination occurred then East Timor’s agreement to Indonesia’s incorporation
was unlikely and therefore supporting this view was purely in Australia’s interests rather than the
interests of the East Timorese. This position also raises the incompatibility of the two elements of
the policy position, that is, how can you support a position of incorporation, and at the same time
support an act of self-determination when intervention in the outcome of the act of selfdetermination raises further moral dilemmas.
The second alternative position provides a commitment to the right of the East Timorese to
determine their own political future, but at the same time recommends Australia remove itself
from becoming involved in the problem of East Timor.

This appears to be more of a liberal

approach as the right of the East Timorese to an act of self-determination is paramount.
However, there is also a realist element in the policy approach in terms of protecting Australia’s
national interests through removing itself from the problem.
The differing policy positions between the government, government departments and key
individuals, such as Whitlam, Woolcott, Willesee and Barnard reveal the complexity in developing
foreign policy for decision makers. It is therefore too simplistic to suggest that the realist position
that was adopted ignored the moral considerations in terms of the rights of the East Timorese to
an act of self-determination. As I mention previously moral considerations do form a part of the
realist policy position, and in terms of the Whitlam government’s policy toward East Timor, this is
made apparent by a preference for an act of self-determination. However, in taking the view that
in Australia’s national interests East Timor needed to be incorporated into Indonesia, the moral
concerns in terms of the policy were superseded. The act of self-determination was in conflict
with the primary policy interest of incorporation and was inconsistent with the Labor government’s
endorsement of human rights under the United Nations (UN) declaration on human rights.
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While there were critical policy differences within the government, government departments and
key individuals, the policy that Whitlam endorsed – Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor and
an act of self-determination, also came under scrutiny from the Opposition and the Press, and
most importantly from some of the more left and socially conscious people within the ALP. In a
statement to Parliament in 1974 the Opposition’s position was put quite clearly when it stated:
…so far as Timor is concerned it is for the Timorese to decide their future...So far as Portuguese Timor is
concerned we would prefer to see Portugal remain in control and assist with a program for selfdetermination. It would then be up to the Timorese to determine their own future in a program that they
can work out.48

The parliamentary group that was most disturbed by the government’s policy, however, was the
Labor backbench. One of these who first spoke out against the policy was Chris Hurford, when
he said:
...we have a record to uphold, and to ignore the fate of this territory, in spite of its smallness and strategic
unimportance, would be to risk our diplomatic integrity among the small nations of the South Pacific area.49

Whitlam though was unmoved by these criticisms within his own party and maintained his policy
position.
The issue of East Timor, however, became a secondary concern for the Whitlam government with
first the supply crisis in October 1975 followed by the constitutional crisis in November 1975. In
October 1975 five Australian journalists were killed in Balibo and this caused consternation
among the media, the public and the government. In December 1975 Indonesia invaded East
Timor and asserted sovereignty over East Timor in 1976.
At the time of the invasion, a ‘caretaker’ government under Malcolm Fraser had taken office
following the dismissal of the Labor government on 11 November 1975. Australia joined with a
majority in the UN General Assembly Resolution of 12 December 1975 calling for the withdrawal
of Indonesian troops and the “inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to selfdetermination, freedom and independence”.50 Subsequent UN General Assembly resolutions
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 30 October 1974, p. 3044 quoted in Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage
to Independence, p. 121.
49 Press Release from Chris Hurford, 30 October 1974, quoted in Ibid., pp. 121-2.
50 United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX)," (12 December 1975).
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reaffirmed the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination and rejected Indonesia’s
claim of incorporation. However, by 1979 the strength of the resolutions had weakened. In the
final UN General Assembly Resolution 37/30 on 23 November 1982, the resolution sought only
for the parties to initiate consultations and for the Special Committee on the Situation to keep the
position in East Timor under “active consideration”.51 Along with the weakening of the texts of the
resolutions there was a decline in the voting pattern of the resolutions.52 The UN Security
Council also issued two resolutions on 22 December 1975 and 22 April 1976 calling upon states
to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and the inalienable right of the East Timorese to
self-determination, and called upon Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor.53
When we consider the press release by the new Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, on the day of
the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia it may appear that the policy position was changed,
particularly when he stated:
The Australian Government deeply regrets the course which events in East Timor have taken…While the
Australian Government fully appreciates the gravity of the problems posed for the Indonesian Government
by the breakdown of administration in East Timor, the continuation of fighting by the competing parties, and
the movement of 40,000 refugees into its territory, we had hoped - and have pressed - that there would not
be a recourse to the use of force by our neighbour. As recently as December 4 our Ambassador in Jakarta
again made it clear that this was our view…Since coming to office we have co-sponsored and vigorously
supported a draft resolution in the United Nations reaffirming the right of self-determination of the
Timorese, urging the need for a peaceful settlement, calling for a revival of talks among the conflicting
parties, and proposing that the Government of Portugal should request a United Nations visiting mission to
East Timor…It is obvious that the initiatives open to the Australian Government are limited. The options
have closed almost to vanishing point. We shall, however, continue our efforts to gain support for the
United Nations resolution.54

United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Resolution 37/30," (23 November 1982).
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While Australia’s support of the UN General Assembly resolutions created tension in the
relationship with Indonesia, the Australian policy position did not change following the election of
a new Australian government, and Australia’s opposition to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor
decreased. The policy position on East Timor under the new Coalition government soon reverted
to that held by Whitlam and the relationship with Indonesia once again became the first priority in
line with a realist view of what was in Australia’s national interests.55 Subsequently de facto
recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor was granted to Indonesia on 20 January
1978 followed by de jure recognition on 14 February 1979 by the Fraser government.56 As much
as the Opposition had been critical of the Whitlam government’s policy prior to gaining office their
position soon changed upon gaining government. The Hawke Labor government after gaining
office in 1983 maintained the policy position regarding East Timor, following eight years of
occupation and continued violence in East Timor effectively sanctioned by the Indonesian
government.

A Critique of the Position Adopted by Whitlam
The position adopted by Whitlam emphasised a preference for East Timor’s integration into
Indonesia and this was the general view held by most Department of Foreign Affairs officials.57
While Willesee maintained a strong preference for self-determination, Whitlam was not swayed
from his view of incorporation. The position adopted by Whitlam and by subsequent Australian
governments can best be described in Woolcott’s words as the need to take a pragmatic rather
than a moral position based around a realist approach of what was in Australia’s national
interests. Woolcott indicates that the policy position was one that was in the national interests,
and therefore, one that the government could live with. However, the position adopted by
Whitlam was a failure and demonstrates the need for governments to make decisions on foreign
policy that do not adhere to a narrow set of national interests. Continually in the arguments put
forward by Woolcott and others the realist position of what was in Australia’s national interests
was raised as a defining reason for maintaining a good relationship with Indonesia over the needs
of the East Timorese. Often this was based on strategic and commercial interests rather than
Derek McDougall, Australian Foreign Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (Melbourne: Longman, 1998), p. 215.
“Recognition is done in two ways. Full de jure recognition is accorded when, for example, a new government
comes to power and seems likely to remain in power. De facto recognition, by contrast, is of a more temporary
nature in that from certain facts it would seem at present that, for example, a new government is currently running a
nation. In due course that government will either be accorded full de jure recognition or a new government will take
its place”. Keith Suter, "The Timor Gap: Oil in Troubled Waters," Inside Indonesia, 17 (1993): p. 8.
57 “Introduction”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the
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moral concerns found in an understanding of liberal ideology. Realist thought has dominated
Australian foreign policy decision making and it is realism that can be seen at work in the position
adopted by Whitlam toward East Timor. Realism is concerned with a state’s national interests
and while any definition of national interests is problematic, it is what we regard as a state’s
national interests that are relevant in this discussion of Whitlam’s policy. Previously I used
Joseph Nye’s definition of national interests as a “set of shared priorities”58 that could include
moral values. It is this broadening of the definition of national interests that is useful in discussing
Whitlam’s position.
Australia’s political identity was founded on the basis of liberal-democratic principles, which
included a history of valuing human rights and human dignity, and the public had shown that they
had been willing to pay that price in order to maintain and promote those values, and yet here we
have a policy position that ignored just those values of Australian society. The government chose
to take a realist position over what the public would generally see as an important value inherent
in Australia’s democracy. The position comes down to those who view liberal ideals as inherently
important in terms of Australia’s foreign policy and realists who would argue that issues of
national interests override moral and humanitarian concerns. While one could argue that the
foreign policy position chosen was in Australia’s strategic interests, I would argue, based on
evidence of a draft submission to Willesee from the Department of Foreign Affairs on 5 December
1974, that the Australian public viewed the rights of the East Timorese as a part of a broader set
of national interests which include human rights and democracy.59 By recognising Indonesia’s
sovereignty over East Timor the government was opening itself up to be questioned by the
Australian public on a position that previously it would have condemned.
History and geography also play a role in terms of the government’s East Timor policy. The
policy was unpopular in the domestic arena and generated a well-organised and vocal movement
supporting the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence. The support
for the East Timorese was based around the sacrifice of the East Timorese in protecting
Australian soldiers against the Japanese during World War Two together with a growing East

Nye, "Redefining the National Interest," p. 22.
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Timorese refugee community in Australia. The government’s policy position was always going to
lead to adverse public opinion.
While it could be argued that foreign policy making in Australia has largely been based around a
realist tradition whereby maintaining Australia’s security becomes the predominant paradigm, this
cannot be viewed as the only influence on how Australia views itself in the international arena.
Nancy Viviani suggests there are three inherent themes when considering Labor traditions on
foreign policy, namely “Nationalism, regionalism and international citizenship”.60 While these
three themes were formally expressed by Gareth Evans, these themes are evident in early Labor
government foreign policies and none more so than during the Whitlam government period. The
theme that is of particular importance in relation to the East Timor policy position is that of
international citizenship which “has two dimensions: internationalism and international equality”,61
and requires Australia to “act as a good international citizen”.62 This was observable in other
policies taken by Whitlam “in his concern with development, aid, apartheid and human rights”.63
The policy developed by the Whitlam government on East Timor does not adopt this tradition of
internationalism and international equality; rather it undermines Whitlam’s foreign policy record
and exposes the inherent failure of adopting a realist policy position. The support of Indonesia’s
annexation of East Timor violated the very principles that Australia had embraced through the
UN, particularly in relation to the rights of the East Timorese to determine their own future that
had formed part of the Labor tradition.
The judgements made by the policy makers also need to be questioned. There was a strong
assumption that Suharto would not use force in East Timor to achieve his desired goal and
supporters of the policy position would suggest that the policy makers could not have foreseen
the forceful actions of a repressive regime. In his own book The Whitlam Government: 19721975, Whitlam stated that Suharto “seemed to have been most reluctant to sanction military
action in East Timor and only to have done so at the eleventh hour when he felt he had no
alternative”.64 This begs the question as to why there was this belief that Suharto would not
resort to force at some point to achieve his desired goal? The cablegrams from Jakarta to
Canberra indicated that the Indonesian government would resort to military force to achieve their
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Ibid., p. 100.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 (Ringwood, VIC: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 108.
60
61

44

objective and Barnard had warned that Australia needed to be concerned about a neighbouring
state that chose to use military force to deal with what they considered to be problems within the
region. In addition, the Suharto government had come to power in 1965 through one of the
bloodiest coups in the modern history of Indonesia and there was evidence that force had been
used in the ‘Act of Autonomy’ in West New Guinea in 1969.

Yet policy makers made

assumptions, presumably on the assurances Suharto had given Whitlam, that this would not
occur again. All evidence suggested that there was the possibility, and I argue the probability,
that the Suharto regime would act repressively at some point to achieve its goal of integration and
yet Australian policy makers chose to ignore this in terms of their own national interests, as they
made the assumption that Suharto’s government was necessary to Australian security. Whitlam’s
belief in Suharto’s assurance that unprovoked force would not be used was an error of political
judgement in the development of the East Timor policy and subsequent events confirmed that
Whitlam’s faith in Suharto’s assurance that violence would not be countenanced was misplaced.
An important issue within the development of the East Timor policy was the inherent contradiction
and conflict between the policy of an internationally accepted act of self-determination for East
Timor and the association of East Timor with Indonesia. Advisors in both the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Department of Defence raised this contradiction, the incompatibility and the
inevitable conflict within this approach, and this contradiction seems to have been clear to the
Indonesians. However, no change in the policy position was forthcoming. How do policy makers
maintain the position of the need for an act of self-determination on the one hand, and also
advocate a position for East Timor to become a part of Indonesia? Without some degree of
coercion, which could mean force, covert or otherwise, there appeared little likelihood that the
East Timorese would accept incorporation by Indonesia. The consistent message coming
through from the East Timorese was one of independence. Given this, while there seems to be
some recognition of the incongruity of the policy of incorporation and self-determination, the
documents released in 2000 do not appear to discuss in any detail the contradiction in these two
policy aims or that Whitlam took account of this contradiction. While Whitlam asserted the need
for the rights of the East Timorese to be maintained, he continually ignored these rights by
maintaining his favoured position of East Timor’s integration with Indonesia.

While the

contradiction between the two positions is ignored, Whitlam was giving clear signals to Indonesia
that maintaining good relations with Indonesia was more important than East Timor’s territorial
rights.
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Woolcott indicates that the position adopted by Whitlam was one that was in the national interest
and therefore one that the government could live with. History shows that rather than assessing
a policy on what one can live with, it should be assessed on the basis of whether a state can live
with itself in following a position that opens it to serious questions about the values that it
promotes. In a speech in 1999 Laurie Brereton sums up the extent of the failure of the East
Timor policy:
…it is a matter of enduring regret that Whitlam did not speak more forcefully and clearly in support of an
internationally supervised act of self-determination as the only real means of achieving a lasting and
acceptable resolution of East Timor’s status. At best Whitlam’s approach was dangerously ambiguous,
and by mid 1975 increasingly unsustainable.65

In the final report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee titled
East Timor, it is noted that:
Mr Whitlam agreed at the hearing on 6 December 1999 that, as East Timor was now gaining its
independence, in hindsight the decision not to oppose an Indonesian takeover of East Timor appeared to
be wrong. He also agreed that decisions were made in the context of the time.66

While all governments have to make decisions within the context of events happening at a
particular time, it seems that even Whitlam concedes that the policy position taken on East Timor
was misplaced. As history has revealed it was a policy that proved to be a failure and one that
successive Australian governments continued to support on the basis of what was perceived to
be in Australia’s national interests.

Conclusion
The Whitlam policy informed and established Australia’s foreign policy on East Timor and
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia for consecutive Australian governments. The Whitlam
government would suggest that the policy developed was defendable as it served the longer term
interests of Australia in terms of the importance of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. East
Timor, the government would maintain, had little ability to become a viable state due to its size
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and its economic fragility, and therefore, in the context of the political and strategic interests
within the region, incorporation of East Timor by Indonesia was the only course of action for long
term security and stability.
This position though was not defendable, but rather was a policy position that was not only
unsustainable in the long-term, but would prove to be a failure. Not only did it underestimate the
East Timorese desire for independence, it also ignored the continued use of violence instigated
by the Indonesian government. The policy developed by the Whitlam government reveals critical
policy differences between the government, government departments and key individuals and the
complexity involved in formulating foreign policy. It raises the differences between those who
support a realist approach to international relations against those who believe in the importance
of liberal ideals in foreign policy decision making. Further, it raises the issue of national interests
and whether national interests, defined in limited terms of what is in a state’s economic and
strategic interests, should override broader moral concerns. The continued violence in East
Timor by the Indonesian government falls under the category of moral considerations that I argue
should not have been ignored in terms of Australia’s national interests in developing Australia’s
foreign policy toward East Timor. The continued violence in East Timor by the Indonesian
government was not likely to be overlooked by a vocal group within the Australian public who
supported the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence.
The paradox of the policy was that the very reasons for Whitlam’s support for Indonesia’s
incorporation of East Timor, that is, the importance of developing a stronger relationship with
Indonesia, continued to create problems within the relationship for successive Australian
governments. A policy of appeasement of any nation will inevitably create problems for a
government and as can be seen in the case of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, can conceal
some of the fundamental differences between two countries. While Indonesia was the focus of
Whitlam’s Asia policy, it was the development of foreign policy toward East Timor that inevitably
left a stain on Whitlam’s foreign policy record.
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CHAPTER TWO - LOST OPPORTUNITIES? – EAST TIMOR AND THE
KEATING GOVERNMENT

Introduction
When Paul Keating became Prime Minister in December 1991 he was determined to strengthen
the relationship with Indonesia to ensure that misunderstandings between the two countries
would not undermine the fundamental strength of the relationship. This signalled the adoption of
the policy position of previous governments, where there was complete recognition of Indonesia’s
incorporation of East Timor that had been established by the Whitlam Labor government.
However, Keating’s desire to strengthen the relationship was to be tested once again over the
East Timor issue. As he noted in his book Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific: “At the
end of 1991, as so often before, the storm clouds blowing the relationship off course seemed
darkest over East Timor”.1 The particular storm cloud he refers to at this time was the Dili
massacre in November 1991, which once again raised the issue of Australia’s continued
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The Dili massacre, which I will discuss in
detail below, not only renewed support for East Timor in the public arena, but also renewed
debate in both the House of Representatives, the Senate and among the Australian public.
In spite of the increased attention publicly paid to the East Timor issue, the government’s position
on East Timor did not change and the government consistently gave out the message that the
Australian people had to accept the reality of the situation. This was despite the increased
attention given to the East Timor issue following the Dili massacre, where the government’s
continued appeasement of the Indonesian government was seen as condoning the actions of the
Indonesian military.

The continued policy of appeasement created condemnation of the

government’s actions and this condemnation was further strengthened by the signing of the
Agreement on Maintaining Security, and by what some perceived as the illegitimate actions of the
Australian government in granting de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.
Keating and Evans both took the view that quiet diplomacy was the most appropriate course of
action in raising Australia’s concerns over Indonesia’s continuing human rights abuses in East
Timor. Keating stated his position clearly when he pointed out that while he raised the issue of
East Timor in most conversations he had with Indonesian leaders, he was “not prepared to make
1

Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, p. 128.
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the whole of our complex relationship with 210 million people subject to this one issue. Like
previous Australian governments we accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia”.2
Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant confirm this position in Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World
of the 1990s when they noted that Australian governments:
…have concentrated efforts, rather, on pressuring the Indonesian government to improve the situation of
the East Timorese people, pressing for economic development and proper attention to human rights. But
that has not stopped the issue of East Timor…being a recurring irritant.3

The Prime Minister went even further, as noted in the Senate by Gareth Evans on 30 June 1994.
In answer to a question put to him, Evans advised that in a speech Keating had made in Jakarta
the night before, Keating had said: “I want Indonesia to be known by Australians for what it is, in
all its cultural richness and ethnic diversity, with all its challenges, its achievements and its
aspirations. This is a country of great tolerance itself with its vast ethnic and cultural diversity”.4
The practice of quiet diplomacy was reinforced by Evans in the Senate on 10 November 1994:
The Government believes the best way to serve and advance the interests of the people of East Timor is
by working constructively with the Indonesian Government within the framework of recognition of
Indonesia’s claims over the territory, rather than in a spirit of confrontation.5

Both Keating and Evans emphasised that Indonesia’s standing within the international community
would be adversely affected through its occupation of East Timor and would create an
impediment to further regional cooperation and integration. The dialogue suggested that there
was a determined effort on the part of the Keating government “to promote a resolution of the
crisis on the basis of internationalist principles, and the benefits such a resolution would bring to
regional security and integration”.6 This suggests that the Keating government was moving away
from the realist approach of the Whitlam government to incorporate what Nancy Viviani describes
as one of the themes of Labor foreign policy, namely international citizenship.7 However, this is a
simplistic reading of the statement as while the rhetoric suggests this, policy did not change
Ibid., p. 130.
Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, p. 200.
4 Gareth Evans, Question without Notice: Indonesia (Senate Hansard, 30 June 1994), p. 2450.
5 Gareth Evans, Question on Notice: East Timor (Senate Hansard, 10 November 1994), p. 2958.
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during the Keating period. The problem with this approach is that while quiet diplomacy may be
an effective approach in terms of international relations, it was very difficult for the Australian
public to have any understanding of how strongly the dialogue on human rights abuses in East
Timor was advanced with the Indonesian government.

Given the policy of successive

governments and the public concern over this issue, quiet diplomacy would inevitably be seen by
the public as mere words or paying lip service to the principles of human rights while at the same
time continuing a policy of appeasement of Indonesia.
As much as a policy of dialogue may have seemed an admirable approach on the part of the
Keating government to resolve the East Timor crisis and an example of political realism in terms
of Australia’s national interests, there was no concerted attempt by the Keating government to
reassess the foundations and assumptions of their East Timor policy, nor was there an attempt to
reassess this in light of a new international agenda. This is despite a recommendation in a report
prepared by the JCFADT in November 1993 titled Australia’s Relations with Indonesia. This
Report raised concern that the issue of human rights in Indonesia, and particularly in East Timor,
would continue to be an obstacle for the Australian public and for Australia’s relationship with
Indonesia.8
In adopting the policy of previous Australian governments on East Timor, the Keating government
accepted a policy of appeasement of Indonesia and indirectly endorsed a policy of continued
violence by the Indonesian government in East Timor. The government needed to reassess the
assumptions and realities of the policy position that was adopted, not only in terms of Australia’s
national interests, but also in terms of its standing in the international community. While the
Keating government could argue that the relationship with Indonesia was far more important in
terms of its national interests, it overlooks a growing opposition within Parliament and the
Australian public, and also growing opposition in the international arena.
I argue that the adoption of the policy and approach of quiet diplomacy did not succeed in
strengthening the relationship with Indonesia and that there were actions that the Australian
government could have taken rather than its indifferent response to the actions of the Indonesian
government in East Timor. The actions that could have been taken may have included a
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decrease in military cooperation, a decision to allow the ICJ to decide on the Portuguese case
over the Timor Gap Treaty rather than resorting to a contestation, and much stronger
condemnation of the Indonesian military actions at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Further
action over the Dili massacre could have included stronger condemnation of the sentences
handed down to the Indonesian military and cancellation of all arms sales to the Indonesian
government by the Australian government. However, rather than any reassessment of the policy,
the Keating government chose to adopt a failed policy position and continue a policy of
appeasement toward Indonesia. Keating continued a realist position by viewing Australia’s
relations with Indonesia as of primary national interest and thereby indirectly condoning the
continued violence against the East Timorese.
In this chapter I examine publicly available government documents in terms of three key issues
that required the Keating government to reassess its policy position on the East Timor issue.
These issues are:
1. The Dili massacre in November 1991 which was debated in the House of
Representatives and the Senate during 1991 and 1992 and reinvigorated the public’s
criticism of the government’s policy position on East Timor.
2. The Timor Gap Treaty and the subsequent Portuguese action against Australia in the ICJ
regarding the validity of the treaty.
3. The Agreement on Maintaining Security signed between Australia and Indonesia in 1995.

The Dili Massacre
On 12 November 1991, a month prior to Keating becoming Prime Minister, the issue of East
Timor was once again brought to the attention of the public and occupied much debate in the
House of Representatives and the Senate. This was the first opportunity for the Keating
government to reassess Australia’s policy on East Timor. However, this did not take place and
the Australian government’s actions following the massacre, and the Indonesian inquiry into the
massacre, can best be described as an exercise of least resistance.
On the morning of 12 November 1991 a commemorative mass was held for Sebastio Gomes in
Dili, followed by a procession to the Santa Cruz cemetery. During this procession flags and
banners in support of the independence cause were unfurled and pro-independence slogans
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were shouted. Scuffles broke out between protesters and the Indonesian military and in the
process two soldiers were stabbed.9

When the procession reached the cemetery gates

eyewitnesses said that approximately eighty five Indonesian troops and police arrived on the
scene and immediately opened fire on the crowd. While the military accounts said that those
taking part in the procession had been hostile, there was no independent corroboration of this
and eyewitnesses testified that the attack was completely without provocation or warning.10
Following the Dili massacre11 the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1992 and 1993 passed
resolutions on the human rights situation in East Timor. As noted in the Australian government’s
1994 Report, A Review of Australia’s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, the stronger
of these resolutions passed by the Commission in March 1993 read as follows:
…expressed concern and regret at the continuing human rights abuses in East Timor and at the failure of
the Indonesian Government to identify clearly those responsible for the Dili massacre or to address fully the
questions of just and fair treatment for the victims vis à vis the perpetrators of the Dili Massacre. The
resolution called on the Indonesian Government to respect the rights of and to treat humanely those in
custody; to release those not involved in violent activity; and to ensure that all trials were fair, just, public
and recognised the right to proper legal representation. This resolution also welcomed the resumption of
talks on East Timor.12

The Australian government initially condemned the action of the Indonesian military, but judged it
to be uncharacteristic behaviour and believed that the move by the President of Indonesia for an
official inquiry was sufficient to delay any further action.13 Following the release of the report by
the Indonesian government, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described the findings as
‘credible and reasonable’ and noted that the findings acknowledged that the military’s actions had
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2001), p. 7.
10 Clause 6.12, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect
Human Rights, ed. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade (Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1992), p. 72.
11 According to the JCFADT Report, A Review of Australia’s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, the
estimated death toll as recorded by Amnesty International was approximately 100. Clause 6.13, Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human
Rights, ed. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,
1992), p. 72. The committee in the review refers to the deaths at the Santa Cruz cemetery as the “Dili massacre”.
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and
Protect Human Rights, ed. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (House of Representatives, Canberra,
1994), p. 234.
12 Clause 13.77, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and
Protect Human Rights, ed. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade (House of
Representatives, Canberra, 1994), p. 234.
13 Gareth Evans, Questions without Notice: Indonesia (Senate Hansard, 16 June 1992), p. 3647.
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been excessive.14 However, in response to a question in the Senate in relation to the verdicts of
the trials he stated he was:
…disturbed at the apparent discrepancies so far in the sentences that have been administered for the
civilians and the military. It is the case that sentences in the civilians’ trials have ranged from six months to
10 years imprisonment while sentences in the military trials have ranged from eight to 18 months.15

Further, Evans stated:
We do recognise that much of the action taken by the Indonesian Government in response to the Dili
killings, particularly the public acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the military, does constitute
unprecedented action in Indonesia. But, as I have already said, we do believe it is important that those
responsible for the killings be appropriately punished.16

This, however, did not bring about a change in the policy position of the government even though
the 1992 Human Rights Report stated that: “From the outset, the Government had said that if the
outcome was not satisfactory, it would review the bilateral relationship”.17
Given the Australian Foreign Minister’s comments regarding the trial verdicts and what is noted in
the 1992 Interim Report on Human Rights, it is surprising that there was not a much stronger
condemnation of not only the actions on 12 November 1991, but also the seemingly mild
sentences given in the military trials. Was the Australian government so concerned about
upsetting the bilateral relationship that it did not wish to provide any stronger condemnation, or
did the government believe that the outcome of the Indonesian government’s inquiry was
adequate? There appears to be a contradiction here in the statements coming from the
government. The lack of any review of Australia’s policy would suggest that the Australian
government believed that the outcome of the Indonesian inquiry was satisfactory. However, the
Australian Foreign Minister still made reference in Parliament to his unease about the
inconsistency in the sentences given to the civilians and military. Surely this statement would
indicate that the outcome was not satisfactory and at the very least a review of the bilateral
relationship was required. There is no indication that any review was undertaken, and therefore,
Clause 6.23, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect
Human Rights, p. 75.
15 Evans, Questions without Notice: Indonesia, p. 3647.
16 Ibid.
17 Clause 6.23, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect
Human Rights, p. 75.
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it is not surprising that the JCFADT Report of 1993, Australia’s Relations with Indonesia, states
the need for a consistent Australian government response to human rights abuses.
Finally, while this country has a laudable history of promoting human rights and condemning human rights
abuses in distant parts of the world, by softening the European Community’s strongly worded resolution on
the killings in Dili, Australia lessened its credibility on the issue of human rights in Indonesia. Nothing
which has happened since December 1992 has altered the need for Australia to be consistent in its
expressions of concern about human rights, wherever abuses occur.18

While the 1992 Interim Report on Human Rights suggested that Australia’s response was not
sufficient and “deserved much stronger condemnation” and “that the Australian Government
should be consistent in its reaction to human rights outrages of this kind”,19 the 1993 Report into
Australia’s Relations with Indonesia softened its position by recommending:
…that the Australian Government continue, within the limits of national sovereignty and the principle of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, to make representations to the Indonesian
Government about the principles and application of human rights in all parts of Indonesia. Furthermore,
the Committee urges the Australian Government to use its good offices to facilitate reconciliation between
the Government of Indonesia and the people of…East Timor through discussions with all those who have
interests in resolving the issues which currently inhibit the Australia-Indonesia relationship.20

This response seems very restrained and suggests that the government was much more
concerned with Australia’s bilateral relations with Indonesia than in applying consistency in terms
of Australia’s basic principles of human rights. Again realism directs Australia’s foreign policy
position as the relationship with Indonesia was seen as more important in terms of Australia’s
national interests than in maintaining consistency in its reactions to human rights issues and
Australia’s credibility in the international arena.

Clause 7.9.25, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Indonesia, p. 106.
Clause 6.24, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect
Human Rights, p. 76.
20 Clause 7.9.41, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Relations with Indonesia, p. 110.
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In 1994 in the final report on A Review of Australia’s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human
Rights, the recommendation was stronger and clearly expressed the opinion that was formulated
in the initial report of 1992. The 1994 Report noted:
The Committee believes that, in relation to East Timor, if there is to be any prospect of peace, there should
be an enduring and just resolution of the Dili massacre – the release of political prisoners and those
detained as a consequence of peaceful demonstration, devolution of appropriate powers to the province
and the reduction of the combat military forces.21

Following the massacre, the government’s position was firmly stated.

When asked to

acknowledge in the Senate that the policy of appeasement by successive Australian governments
had failed, Senator Button stated that: “The issue of self-determination for East Timor was
resolved in terms of the world community – and particularly the Australian government’s position
– many years ago. It has been a bipartisan position on the part of the major political parties”.22
The Australian government though, was out of step with other countries such as Canada,
Denmark and notably the Netherlands, who reduced or suspended aid programmes to Indonesia
following the massacre. The US Congress “cancelled $2.3 million in international military
education and training funding for Indonesia from its 1993 Budget as a protest against Indonesian
human rights violations in East Timor”.23 Senator McGauran also noted in the Senate on 30
September 1993 that “the US Senate foreign relations committee voted to ban US arms sales to
Indonesia until it had improved its human rights record in East Timor”.24 In taking the position
that maintaining Australia’s relationship with Indonesia was Australia’s primary national interest at
the expense of the East Timorese, the Keating Labor government was illustrating the extent to
which Australia’s policy position had moved from the notion of international citizenship, one of the
key themes in Labor foreign policy. Given the actions of other countries in the international
arena, how could Evans have made such an incorrect assessment of the international reaction to
the massacre? The international condemnation revealed that the government’s policy was not
consistent with that expressed by the international community, and a policy of appeasement of
Indonesia continued.

Clause 13.82, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and
Protect Human Rights, p. 236.
22 J.N. Button, Question without Notice: East Timor (Senate Hansard, 13 November 1991), p. 3039.
23 R.F. Ray, Question on Notice: Indonesia (Senate Hansard, 10 December 1992), p. 4788.
24 J.J.J. McGauran, Adjournment: East Timor (Senate Hansard, 30 September 1993), p. 1600.
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It was obvious that the government was not intending to change or even review its policy position
and this was reinforced in the Senate two weeks later by the Australian Foreign Minister on 26
November 1991:
We believe – and Australian policy has been firmly embedded in this particular course since 1979 – that
the only realistic future for the East Timorese people does lie with their acceptance of Indonesian
sovereignty…It may be that the events of 12 November will change all that in terms of the international
reaction but, on the evidence so far, I honestly do not think that is the case.25

Not only was the Keating government endorsing a policy position that now was out of step with
other countries, the opposition in Australia to the government’s position was growing and crossed
party boundaries and was quite strongly asserted within the Labor party. Following the massacre
the Labor Member for Cunningham noted:
Our desire for cordial relations with Indonesia and the maintenance of the Timor Gap oil treaty must not
obscure our national responsibilities towards human rights, especially in our region. It is insufficient to
simply condemn this atrocity and further to demand an inquiry conducted by the Indonesian Government.26

As I noted in the previous chapter, the critical difference emerges in debate among those elected
to government who support liberal ideals, such as human rights, as being inherently important in
terms of Australia’s foreign policy and those who take a realistic perspective and argue that the
relationship with Indonesia is more important than the rights of the East Timorese.
Following the massacre, a motion to the House of Representatives on 26 November 1991
condemned the Indonesian military’s use of force, called on the Indonesian government to ensure
the inquiry was “free, accurate, just, thorough”, and that it be “conducted fairly and impartially”,
and requested the Australian government to take steps to review the bilateral relationship with
Indonesia, such as the continuation of military training programs.27 The motion also noted:
…the importance of any Australian Government response to the 12 November massacre not only reflecting
the deep concern of the wider Australian community but also…[needs to be] consistent with Australia’s own
national interests and above all with the interests and welfare of the East Timorese people.28

Gareth Evans, Matter of Urgency: East Timor (Senate Hansard, 26 November 1991), p. 3321.
S.J. West, Statements by Members: East Timor (House Hansard, 14 November 1991), p. 3094.
27 Notices, (House Hansard, 26 November 1991), p. 3326.
28 Ibid.
25
26

56

The motion produced much debate within the House of Representatives and while the Opposition
supported part of the motion, condemning the use of force, and supporting the motion in terms of
ensuring the enquiry was “free, accurate and just”, they also moved to amend the motion by
deleting any reference requesting the Australian government to take steps to review the bilateral
relationship.29 What was interesting in the debate, however, was that it did not follow a strict
bipartisan position. As Labor Member for Reid, Laurie Ferguson, noted:
We have accounts of a continuing, pervasive, aggressive and suppressing performance by the Indonesian
authorities…Any objective analysis must subscribe to each party in this country a large degree of
condemnation for the role of the Indonesians. As I said earlier, it is a position that is internationally
reprehensible; an international position that very few countries adopt.30

Ferguson seems to be indicating that not only was the role of Indonesia reprehensible, but also
the foreign policy position of the government. This is further endorsed by the Labor Member for
the Northern Territory, Warren Snowdon, who stated:
…the shame for Australia is that, on 7 December 1975, we took no action. Not only did we take no action,
but also we walked away from it…And we have walked away from it ever since…The fact of the matter is
that there have been successive opportunities – and the Labor Party is as much responsible as anyone
else in this – for Australia to play a very constructive role in trying to bring about some resolution of the
problems of East Timor…It is no longer good enough that the litany of human rights abuses that have
marked that occupation continue in 1991. It is no longer good enough and, in international terms, it is not
acceptable.31

There were also those in the Opposition who called for a stronger response from the government.
As the Liberal Member for Ballarat stated:
We have a very, very important role to play, in my view, in relation to the East Timorese-Indonesian
situation, and I hope we have the political and moral will that, after this official inquiry is conducted, if we
are not satisfied with what has happened, we will very, very strongly take further action.32

P.M. Ruddock, East Timor: Motion (House Hansard, 27 November 1991), p. 3466.
Laurie Ferguson, East Timor: Motion (House Hansard, 27 November 1991), p. 3469.
31 W.E. Snowdon, East Timor: Motion (House Hansard, 27 November 1991), p. 3475.
32 M.J.C. Ronaldson, East Timor: Motion (House Hansard, 27 November 1991), p. 3478.
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However, there were also those in the Opposition who endorsed the government’s position. The
National Party Member for New England stated:
We must not overreact. Indonesia is too important. We need to use our special relationship to ensure that
there is a proper prosecution of justice. Above all, we should not destroy what is a developing, critical
relationship with Indonesia. This is a vital issue. Let us treat it as a vital issue. Let us treat the issue
dispassionately, fairly and wisely, with a view to the future and not the past.33

The debate on the motion continued in both Houses of Parliament the following year and again
condemnation of the government’s position was advanced by both sides of Parliament. As the
Liberal Member for Menzies, Kevin Andrews, stated:
Our Government’s policy has been one of gravel grazing [navel gazing] before the military might of
Indonesia. Let us not pretend to take a moral stance about this: our position all along has been pragmatic,
which is really only a euphemism for allowing practical exigencies to excuse anything. This Government
has fallen over itself to shield Indonesia from criticism concerning East Timor. We should be clear about
this.

This amounts to nothing more than appeasement over serious and continuing human rights

violations.34

However, there were also those in the Opposition who endorsed the government position as
noted by the Liberal Member for Ryan:
The fact is that Indonesia, and most of the Asia-Pacific region, could survive very well without us, and
unless we attend to our relationships in this area there is a very real likelihood of some economic and
diplomatic isolation bearing down on us…We also remain concerned about reports of human rights abuses
in East Timor, and we must continue to support UN efforts to protect human rights in the region and,
indeed, around the whole world. However, if we really want to help the people of East Timor we must not
lock ourselves out through self-righteous lecturing and hysterical overreaction.35

It was obvious there were critical differences between those who supported a realist perspective
in terms of economic and strategic interests and those who placed equal importance on liberal
ideals of human rights spread across both parties, and there was no bipartisan support on the
issue of East Timor.
I.McC. Sinclair, East Timor: Motion (House Hansard, 27 November 1991), p. 3482.
K.J. Andrews, East Timor (House Hansard, 26 March 1992), p. 1185. Also refer to comments made by the ALP
Member for Denison, Mr D.J. Kerr, and ALP Member for Moreton, Mr. G.D. Gibson, on the same day.
35 J.C. Moore, East Timor (House Hansard, 26 March 1992), p. 1189.
33
34

58

The Dili massacre was regularly raised in the Senate and the House of Representatives during
the Keating government period. Petitions were regularly presented by Members of Parliament
and Senators on behalf of citizens to both Houses and these ranged from calling on the
Australian government to pressure Indonesia to begin negotiations over East Timor; to
condemning the violence at Dili, and calls for the Australian government to immediately suspend
all military training and arms sales. During the term of the Keating government the words of the
petitions also changed to call on the Australian government to reverse Australia’s recognition of
Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor and to repeal the Timor Gap Treaty.36
The issue of the Dili massacre was to create further problems for the Keating government in June
1995 when the Indonesian government appointed Lieutenant-General Herman Mantiri as the new
Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.37 This announcement was greeted with opposition in
Australia due to Mantiri’s view that the Dili massacre was “a quite proper response”.38 Opposition
came from both Houses. However, the government’s response to this was at best indifferent.
The Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, in response to a question put to him stated: “While MajorGeneral Mantiri’s remarks were unquestionably extremely regrettable – and that is being very
diplomatically polite – it is a different matter to say that they disqualify him from appointment as
Indonesia’s Ambassador to Australia”.39

Keating endorsed this position in the House of

Representatives on 29 June 1995 when he said:
I do not see the character of General Mantiri’s appointment being such as to rupture that
relationship…There has to be a totality in the relationship, and there is. I think that balance has been
struck. Both the foreign minister and I, in the course of keeping that balance, will never fail to put
Australia’s views about democracy, liberty and human rights. I do not see General Mantiri’s appointment
by President Suharto as the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia as in any way curtailing our capacity to
put that view.40

Regular petitions were presented by both Members of Parliament and Senators on behalf of citizens to both
Houses following the Dili massacre and continued throughout 1992. While there was some slight word differences
this was the message the petitions generally contained. While there were few petitions in 1993, in 1994 they began
with the additional wording petitioning the Australian Government to reverse its recognition of Indonesian
sovereignty. During 1995 and 1996 petitions of this nature were a regular feature of sitting days in the Senate.
37 Sherlock, ‘A Pebble in Indonesia’s Shoe’: Recent Developments in East Timor, p. 23 of print view.
38 E.C. Mack, Question without Notice: Indonesia: Diplomatic Representation (House Hansard, 29 June 1995), p.
2684.
39 Gareth Evans, Question without Notice: Indonesian Ambassador to Australia (Senate Hansard, 26 June 1995), p.
1722.
40 Paul Keating, Question without Notice: Indonesia: Diplomatic Representation (House Hansard, 29 June 1995), p.
2684.
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However, public opposition and that voiced in Parliament, the wording of the two reports on
human rights, and a review of past Labor party policy on East Timor, precipitated no change in
the Keating government’s position. The extent to which the Keating government responded
following the Dili massacre can be summed up by a comment in Engagement: Australia Faces
the Asia-Pacific where Keating noted:
The massacre was the result of an appalling lapse of control by individual security forces on the ground in
Dili rather than deliberate policy instructions from Jakarta. But it raised again the deeper question of why
the Indonesian authorities maintained such an intense military presence in East Timor, and how much
control the government exercised over its operations.41

The Dili massacre was more than just an appalling lapse of control. As the DFAT Report, East
Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge noted:
For many observers, the Santa Cruz massacre marked the beginning of the end of any chance of East
Timor’s successful integration into Indonesia. The shock and anger caused by the tragedy fuelled the
resentment felt by ordinary East Timorese towards the security forces and the failures of Indonesian rule.
It extinguished the hopes of many that some good could come from Indonesia’s administration.42

Keating viewed the Dili massacre as the actions of rogue forces on the ground rather than
sanctioned military actions of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Armed
Forces (TNI) and while he raised the question of the level of intense military presence in East
Timor in his book Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, he does not attempt to explore
the deeper issues of why the level of military presence was required and what they were doing.
While Keating noted that the issue raised the “general question of human rights in Australian
foreign policy”,43 he makes it quite clear that he was not prepared to sacrifice the relationship with
Indonesia over the issue of East Timor.44
Given the growing opposition in Australia and the recommendation in the JCFADT reports on
human rights, I argue that there was a need for the Keating government to reassess the policy
position of incorporation and to look beyond just the relationship with Indonesia and to its
41
42
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Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, p. 130.
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obligation to be consistent in its response to human rights issues. The 1992 Interim Report on
Human Rights stated that Australia’s position had been weakened by not supporting a much
stronger worded condemnation of Indonesia’s military actions in Dili. Yet while a review of past
Labor party policy took place, pragmatism ruled. The government was obviously not going to be
swayed from its policy position following the Dili massacre.

Keating had no intention of

jeopardising the relationship with Indonesia, and therefore, the policy position was maintained at
the cost of the East Timorese. As I have recognised, Keating’s perception of the Dili massacre
was that it was an appalling lapse of control on behalf of individual military forces on the ground
rather than an intentional decision from Jakarta, despite the evidence of the actions in Dili being
endorsed by senior members of the Indonesian military.45 Keating also chose to ignore Mantiri’s
statement that it was a proper response.
It is difficult to understand why Keating maintained the policy of Indonesia’s incorporation of East
Timor, given the Dili massacre which clearly showed that not only were the East Timorese not
willing to accede to Indonesia’s rule, but that the extent of the Indonesian military presence in
East Timor went far beyond that required for maintaining order. On the one hand I could argue
that Keating was simply endorsing the realist position of what was in Australia’s national interest,
that is, the relationship with Indonesia, which had been adopted by the Whitlam government and
endorsed by subsequent Australian governments, both Labor and the Coalition. However, this
raises similar problems to those discussed in my previous chapter. First the degree to which the
foundation of liberal-democratic principles and the Labor Party’s tradition of international
citizenship required the Keating government to go beyond the realist position of economic and
strategic interests and to take far more account of moral and humanitarian concerns. I am not
arguing that the Keating government’s realist position was not concerned with human rights; there
is evidence to suggest it was and the government raised these issues with the Indonesian
government at a number of meetings during their term in office. What I am arguing is that their
decision to maintain a policy of incorporation even following the Dili massacre showed that moral
considerations were overridden by a narrow and unfortunate formulation of national interests.
Second, the Dili massacre was an example where quiet diplomacy by successive Australian
governments had not decreased the violence in East Timor by the TNI. The question is whether
another approach than this may have prevented the massacre. This is impossible to answer as it
is very difficult for the government to have anticipated the events that occurred at the Santa Cruz
45
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cemetery, though given the level of continued violence that had taken place in the province from
1975, it was not difficult to ascertain that violence of this nature might occur. I am not arguing
that quiet diplomacy would have prevented the massacre, however, the continuation of quiet
diplomacy following the massacre resulted in a policy of appeasement. Stronger condemnation
of the actions by the Indonesian military was required by the Keating government. It required an
acknowledgement that the existing policy of appeasement was not working and a review of the
bilateral relationship with Indonesia was needed. Suspension of military training exercises and
sales of arms was also called for as a form of protest. While this did not necessarily change the
nature of the Indonesian government actions, it certainly sent a message to the Australian public
of the government’s condemnation of the actions of the Indonesian military.
This leads me to my discussion of a second issue, the Timor Gap Treaty and the subsequent
Portuguese action taken against Australia in the ICJ.

The Timor Gap Treaty
On 11 December 1989 following a long period of negotiations, the Treaty between Australia and
the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian
Province of East Timor and Northern Australia46 was signed between Australia and Indonesia and
entered into force on 9 February 1991. The treaty became known as the Timor Gap Treaty47 and
represented a compromise between Indonesia and Australia to resolve a dispute over the seabed
boundaries in the Timor Gap. The Timor Gap Treaty was in force until 1999 and was not without
some controversy in terms of its legality.
On 22 February 1991 Portugal filed an application against Australia with the ICJ in relation to
Australia’s conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty. Portugal was claiming and seeking a decision
from the ICJ that as Australia had participated in the negotiations with Indonesia that resulted in
the Timor Gap Treaty they had violated Portugal’s and East Timor’s rights in the Zone of
Cooperation and in terms of the resources of the seabed which should remain in the permanent

Hereinafter referred to as the Timor Gap Treaty or Treaty.
The Timor Gap Treaty was a comprehensive international legal agreement dividing a tract of approximately 60,000
square kilometres of the Timor Sea into three areas within a Zone of Cooperation. The Treaty details the operation
and management of each of these three areas. The Treaty is discussed in full in Chapter 7 “Opportunities Abound?
The Timor Gap Treaty and the 1997 Treaty”.
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sovereignty of the East Timorese people.48 The action taken by Portugal was commenced
against Australia and not against both Australia and Indonesia as Indonesia had refused to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Portugal asked for five declarations from the ICJ. They were:
1.

that the rights of the people of East Timor to self determination and to sovereignty over their
natural resources are opposable to Australia;

2.

that Australia had infringed the rights of the people of East Timor, the powers of Portugal, and
contravened Security Council resolutions by entering into the Timor Gap Treaty;

3.

that Australia had incurred international responsibility by failing to negotiate with Portugal with
respect to the exploitation of the Timor Gap;

4.

that Australia owed reparation to the people of East Timor and Portugal for the action it had
taken;

5.

that Australia was bound to cease from continuing breaches of international law until such time
as the people of East Timor had been granted self determination.49

Portugal’s claim rested particularly on Australia’s de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty
over East Timor which enabled the negotiation and completion of the Timor Gap Treaty to take
place. Australia’s de jure recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation had much to do with the
negotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty as there were significant resources within the Timor Sea that
Australia wished to explore, and the government believed that it was more beneficial to negotiate
with the Indonesians than it was with the Portuguese.50 Prior to de jure recognition being given,
Andrew Peacock, Australia’s Foreign Minister at the time, announced on 20 January 1978:
[It] is a reality with which we must come to terms…Accordingly, the Government has decided that although
it remains critical of the means by which integration was brought about it would be unrealistic to continue to
refuse to recognise de facto that East Timor is part of Indonesia.51

48 Sasha Stepan, "Portugal's Action in the International Court of Justice Against Australia Concerning the Timor Gap
Treaty," Melbourne University Law Review, 18, no. 4 (1992): p. 920.
49 Refer to East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) Application Instituting Proceedings, 22 February 1991, pp. 17-19 cited in
Donald R. Rothwell, "The Timor Gap Treaty: A Post-ICJ Analysis of its Implementation and Prospects," The
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, 2, no. 1 (1995): p. 51.
50 “169 Cablegram to Canberra”, Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy:
Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 314.
51 A Peacock, "Relations with Indonesia," Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 49, no. 1 (1978): pp. 46-7. In a
submission to Peacock on 26 April 1978, R.J. Smith, First Assistant Secretary, Legal and Treaties Division, in giving
a legal opinion to Peacock regarding recognition by Australia of Indonesian incorporation of East Timor suggests that
the government “may prefer to ‘slip’ into de jure recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. This would
not require any new announcement. If questions are asked about these changes the Government could explain its
position by arguing that it was necessary to acknowledge Indonesia’s claim to East Timor for the purpose of
negotiating an international agreement which is very much in Australia’s interest, but that the Government remains
critical of the means by which integration was brought about”. Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on
Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 840. This
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Following on from de facto recognition, de jure recognition was granted on 14 February 1979.
Without de jure recognition being given to Indonesia in 1979 Australia was unable to commence
negotiations with Indonesia. As Lindsay Tanner, ALP Member for Melbourne, noted in a speech
to the House of Representatives on 29 August 1994:
Australia is one of very few countries throughout the world that give legal recognition to Indonesia’s control
of East Timor. The reason why we do that is abundantly clear: self-interest. In order to be able to found a
strong legal base for the Timor Gap treaty, it is necessary for us to legally recognise Indonesian control of
East Timor and the associated seabed, which of course is all important with respect to the treaty.52

Australia’s response to Portugal’s case was to challenge both the merits and the jurisdiction of
the Court to hear the case. It contended that there was no real dispute between the parties as
Australia had always supported the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination. The
ICJ noted that there was a real dispute to be answered between Portugal and Australia, and
therefore, dismissed the first Australian objection. The second Australian objection was “that
Indonesia was an indispensable third party to the proceedings”.53 Australia maintained that as:
…the legality of Indonesia’s conduct was fundamental to the dispute, it was essential for Indonesia to be a
party to the proceedings, or at the very least have consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. Portugal’s
response was to argue that the dispute in question was in relation to Australia’s conclusion of the Gap
Treaty in the absence of Portugal as the proper administering power of East Timor.54

The ICJ found that the decision sought from the Court by Portugal would necessarily require it to
assess the legality of the conduct of a third state absent before the ICJ, namely Indonesia. It
would require the Court to determine the rights and obligations of the third state and this could not
be made in the absence of Indonesia, which did not submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

followed a Department of Foreign Affairs News Release of 20 January 1978 in which Peacock announces de facto
recognition of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. Way, Browne, and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian
Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 838. For a brief
discussion on de facto and de jure recognition see footnote No. 56 in the previous chapter.
52 Lindsay Tanner, Grievance Debate: East Timor (House Hansard, 29 August 1994), p. 538.
53 Stuart Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, 2nd ed. (Wollongong:
Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2001), p. 91.
54 Ibid.
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In terms of Australia’s behaviour in entering the Treaty by violating the rights of the East Timorese
to self-determination, infringing Portugal’s sovereign rights over East Timor and contravening
Security Council resolutions, international law expert, Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, noted that:
…in order to reach the conclusion that Australia indeed violated a supposed obligation of non-recognition,
the Court, will, of necessity, have to determine whether Indonesia had committed violations of international
law by intervening in East Timor and subsequently annexing the Territory – for only such illegality could
have triggered the allegedly ensuing duty of non-recognition.55

The ICJ considered it could not separate the behaviour of Australia from the question of the
legitimacy of Indonesia’s intervention in East Timor. This meant that Indonesian sovereignty over
East Timor had to be examined in order to rule on the legitimacy of Australia’s behaviour. With
the absence of Indonesia this could not be determined.56
Portugal argued further that fundamental human rights, particularly the right to self-determination,
had been violated by Australia. While the ICJ recognised that self-determination was an essential
principle in international law, the ICJ could not determine the legality of such without the
participation of Indonesia.57 Given the determinations of the ICJ the only acceptable position was
for the ICJ to dismiss the case brought by Portugal against Australia on the basis that Indonesia’s
presence was indispensable to the case being put forward.
However, the ICJ decision was not unanimous. There were two dissenting judgements. Of
particular relevance were that the dissenting judgements stated that the right of the East
Timorese to self-determination, was “one of the essential principles of contemporary international
law”,58 including a right to its natural resources as recognised by the UN and required
“observance by all Members of the United Nations”.59 Accordingly, Australia had an obligation to
act in relation to its responsibility as a voting member of the UN to recognise that Portugal was
the administrator of East Timor. Judge Skubiszewski said that therefore this meant that Australia
needed to fulfil its duties rather than accede to its national interests. Further, that the failure of

55 Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, "The Portuguese Timor Gap Litigation Before the International Court of Justice: A Brief
Appraisal of Australia's Position," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (1991): p. 175.
56 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 91.
57 Ibid., pp. 91-2. See also Fonteyne, "The Portuguese Timor Gap Litigation Before the International Court of Justice:
A Brief Appraisal of Australia's Position," p. 175.
58 Summary of the Judgement, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) 90, p. 4 of
print view (1995).
59 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski, Ibid., p. 276.
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another state to recognise the administrating power does not diminish Australia’s duties.60 Judge
Weeramantry agreed with Judge Skubiszewski and based his decision on Australia’s duty to
respect Portugal as the administering power of East Timor as well as the right of the East
Timorese to self-determination by virtue of its membership in the UN, though both recognised the
non-self-governing status of East Timor.61
The case brought by Portugal against Australia raised some debate over the success of the
Portuguese claims, the future of the Timor Gap Treaty and in effect de jure recognition given by
Australia to Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. It also raised the question of the impact the
decision would have on Australia-Indonesia relations. These questions were partly answered
when the ICJ delivered its judgements in June 1995. One of the substantive questions of the
Court as to whether Australia had violated the East Timorese rights to self-determination was not
answered. The Court had ruled on the basis that Indonesia was an essential party in enabling a
decision to be determined. While there was no decision from the ICJ, there remained the
fundamental question as to whether Australia violated the rights of the East Timorese to selfdetermination through granting de jure recognition and establishing a Treaty with Indonesia over
the rights in the Timor Sea.
Of particular concern is that even following the case brought by Portugal against Australia and
prior to the decision of the ICJ, in commenting on the JCFADT Report, Australia’s Relations with
Indonesia, which was tabled in the House of Representatives on 18 November 1993, the ALP
Member for Kingston noted that: “The Timor Gap Treaty is an outstanding example of an
innovative approach to what seemed an insoluble problem…” and went on to state that: “We
share the committee’s conclusion that human rights issues should neither be submerged in the
relationship nor be allowed to dominate it”.62 However, this was not a unanimous position of
Labor members.

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski, Ibid., pp. 276-7.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Ibid., pp. 142-223.
62 G.N. Bilney, Ministerial Statements: Australia's Relations with Indonesia (House Hansard, 2 June 1994), p. 1335.
60
61

66

In a speech to the House of Representatives on 29 August 1994, prior to the decision of the ICJ,
Lindsay Tanner, Member for Melbourne, stated:
…that, in effect, the Timor Gap treaty legitimises mass murder and it has been erected on the basis of the
devastation of the East Timorese people. Yes, national interest is involved. Yes, a very substantial
amount of potential revenue will accrue to the Australian people as a result of exploiting the Timor Gap
territory. The question we have to ask is: what price are we paying, morally, for doing so?...I would
seriously contend that the Timor Gap treaty is not in accordance with the values which we, across both
sides of this House, hold as fundamental to Australian society.63

Tanner went on to suggest in the same speech that Australia could correct the mistakes that had
been made by “pleading no contest in the forthcoming trial of the Timor Gap treaty in the
International Court of Justice…We could simply say, ‘We will leave it up to the Court to decide,’
rather than defending it vigorously”.64 Renewed opposition to the Timor Gap Treaty, due to the
Portuguese case, was expressed in both Houses of Parliament.
The policy position of the Australian government was that conclusion of the Treaty did not of itself
prevent the government from continuing to resolve the issue of East Timor with Indonesia.
However, the question I raise is - How was the government to resolve the issue, and how could
the government argue that it condemned the method of incorporation when the very conclusion of
the Timor Gap Treaty accepted Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor? The very act of
concluding the Treaty sent a strong message to the Indonesian government that Australia
supported Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. Further, given that the Treaty referred to “an
Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia”,65 it was
contradictory in the extreme for the Australian government to maintain a policy position of
protesting the method of incorporation and the right of the East Timorese to self-determination.
By the very act of finalising the Treaty the Australian government was endorsing Indonesia’s
incorporation of East Timor. While the government could continue to argue against the method of
incorporation this argument is not strong when weighed against Australia granting legal
recognition to Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor via the completion of the Timor Gap Treaty.

Tanner, Grievance Debate: East Timor, p. 538.
Ibid.
65 Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, ATS 9, 1991, (Enacted on 11 December 1989: Entered
into force on 9 February 1991).
63
64
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The ICJ case brought against Australia by Portugal raised not only some critical legal issues, but
also some fundamental policy issues regarding Australia’s “good international citizenship” image.
If the Portuguese case against Australia had been upheld by the ICJ, the Australian government
would have had to choose between abiding by the decision or carrying on with the Treaty, and
this would have weakened its good international citizenship image. As Cotton notes, “Given the
ostensible commitment of the government to the international rule of law this finding was nothing
less than a profound embarrassment”.66
The ICJ’s inability to rule on Portugal’s case called on the Australian government to at least
reassess its position on East Timor. However, the extent to which this may or may not have
occurred is difficult to ascertain. There is no evidence that a review took place, other than in the
petitions and comments brought before the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
extent to which these influenced the direction of the East Timor issue is probably very limited in
terms of the government’s continued policy on East Timor. In a comment made by Evans in the
Senate on 7 February 1995 it would appear that what was in Australia’s national interest took
priority, and support for Indonesia’s incorporation continued:
As to the Timor Gap treaty…it is important to realise, because this too has got lost in the argument about
this case, that Australia negotiated the Timor Gap treaty not to gain access to anyone else’s resources but
to our own share of the resources of the Timor Gap area…Finally, Australia has always tried to generate
actual results rather than rhetoric for the people of East Timor.67

It is difficult to believe that the Keating government still maintained the position of the right of the
East Timorese to self-determination, and believed that the finalisation of the Timor Gap Treaty
would produce actual results for the people of East Timor. As the Treaty was between Indonesia
and Australia it is a pure fabrication on the part of Evans to suggest that the people of East Timor
would see “actual results” from the Treaty. If Evans was referring to resources from the Treaty
itself then there was no basis to believe this. The Treaty stated that revenue found from
exploration and exploitation of resources in the Timor Gap were either Australia’s or Indonesia’s
or in the case of Area A, shared between the two states. There was no guarantee that the
Indonesian government would ensure that the East Timorese would have access to, or benefit
from, these resources. Again realism was to take centre stage in government policy as it was
determined that in terms of Australia’s national interests, the Timor Gap Treaty and the
66
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relationship with Indonesia was of primary concern rather than moral considerations. I argue that
through finalising the Timor Gap Treaty the Australian government had compromised even further
its declared liberal values of freedom and justice. It provided Indonesia with a potential benefit,
and renewed support for Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. This was contrary to Australian
public opinion. The inescapable fact was that the Treaty was based on Indonesia’s illegal
annexation of East Timor and this was endorsed by the Keating government, even though the ICJ
was unable to rule on this basis.

The Agreement on Maintaining Security
Another feature of the period of the Keating government was the increasing defence cooperation
between Australia and Indonesia. Defence cooperation was seen to be of strategic importance
by the Keating government and this period saw a significant rise in military training exercises.
Most significant in terms of Australia’s security initiatives was the signing of the Agreement on
Maintaining Security between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government
of Australia on 18 December 1995.68 However, the continuing defence cooperation between the
two countries was controversial and was a regular topic of discussion in both Houses of
Parliament. Typical of the concern raised was that the Keating government was continuing and
increasing defence cooperation despite the Dili massacre and the human rights violations that
had continued since that time.

Many of the petitions presented to either the House of

Representatives or the Senate reflected a desire for “an immediate cessation of Australian
military cooperation with Indonesia until Indonesia withdraws its troops from East Timor and
ceases abuses of human rights in the territory”.69 Petitions were regularly presented to both
Houses by Members and Senators on behalf of the public. The petitions requested the House of
Representatives or the Senate to cease defence cooperation with Indonesia, whether as aid or
military sales, condemn the continuing human rights violations, and reverse Australia’s
recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. The petitions ranged from less than 100
citizens to over 500.70 While the numbers in support of the petition may appear quite low, they

68 Hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Maintaining Security or Agreement. A discussion of the Agreement
and the move to joint military exercises with Indonesia is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, “A Security
Overview”. The inclusion of the Agreement here along with the mention of the joint training exercises, is to show the
opportunity that the Keating Government had in reassessing the government’s continued policy on East Timor in
relation to Indonesia. Therefore the discussion on the detail of the Agreement is brief.
69 Holding, Petition: East Timor (House Hansard, 29 May 1995), p. 481.
70 Petitions were presented to both Houses from 1992, for example, see 27/2/92 (House), 24/3/92 (Senate), 28/5/92
(both Houses), 1/6/92 (Senate), 25/6/92 (House), 6/12/94 (Senate), and most sittings of the Senate during August,
September, October, November and December 1995. Petitions also continued in the Senate in 1996. In terms of
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demonstrated a level of public disagreement at the Keating government’s continued
appeasement of Indonesia. It is difficult to know the level of impact regular petitions to both
Houses had on the Keating government. It appears that the government was unconcerned by the
matters raised by the public and by members within both Houses of Parliament, even though
members of its own government were quite vocal against continued cooperation. In presenting a
Second Reading of the Defence Cooperation Control Bill 1995 to the House of Representatives
on 23 October 1995, the ALP Member for Moreton, Mr Gibson, stated:
There is not one government or international body around the world which does not accept that East Timor
has been subjected to Indonesian military tyranny at its worst. Yet the Australian government believes that
it is fair and reasonable to engage in defence cooperation, joint military exercises, officer training, et cetera
with the very forces that have been used to kill and torture East Timorese people.71

The Keating Labor government chose to ignore this continued pressure and even went further in
terms of security cooperation by signing the Agreement on Maintaining Security in December
1995. The Agreement was negotiated in secret and provided a framework for Australia and
Indonesia to discuss and guide the security issues that were likely to emerge within the region in
the 21st century.72 The Agreement, along with the joint military training exercises with Indonesia,
was significant in terms of the message it sent to the Australian public about Australia’s continued
recognition of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor despite the actions of the Indonesian military
and continued human rights abuses by the military. The joint training exercises, particularly with
the Komando Pasukan Khusus - Indonesian Army Special Force Command (Kopassus) that were
reported to be behind the human rights abuses in East Timor, raised Australian public hostility
toward the Indonesian military. The Agreement and the training exercises indicated to opponents
of Indonesia’s rule of East Timor that the Australian government had entered into a security
agreement that would “lend respectability to a military dictatorship that showed no sign of moving
toward democracy”,73 and further, that the agreement gave legitimacy to the activities of the
military. The Agreement was also established following the Indonesian inquiry into the Dili
the petitions Hansard provides only the presenter of the petition and the numbers of citizens who have signed the
petition.
71 G.D. Gibson, Defence Cooperation Control Bill 1995: Second Reading (House Hansard, 23 October 1995), p.
2640.
72 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, "Facing the 21st Century: Security Cooperation," in Development Issues Number Ten: Bridging
the Arafura Sea: Australia-Indonesia Relations in Prosperity and Adversity. ed. Shannon Luke Smith, G. Hanafi
Sofyan, and Idris F. Sulaiman, (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, Asian Pacific School of Economics and Management,
The Australian National University, 1998), p. 60.
73 Jim George, "Australia's Global Perspectives in the 1990s: A Case of Old Realist Wine in New (Neo-Liberal)
Bottles?," in Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy. ed. Dave Cox and Richard Leaver,
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 41.

70

massacre where there were questions raised by both the Australian Foreign Minister and the
Prime Minister over the level of military presence in East Timor.
For opponents of both the Agreement and the joint training exercises, the Agreement entangled
Australia with what was seen as an authoritarian regime and legitimised the brutal actions by the
Indonesian government in East Timor. Keating was well aware of the opposition within a vocal
section of the Australian public and within his own party to the actions of the Indonesian military
and Australia’s stance on supporting Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. This opposition was
self-evident. It had existed and grown over a period of twenty years. Negotiating and signing the
Agreement in secret left those opposed to Australia’s policy on East Timor to believe that the
Keating government maintained the realist policy position of previous governments where the
relationship with Indonesia was far more important in serving Australia’s national interests than
liberal ideals of human rights. The establishment of the Agreement along with the actions over
the Timor Gap Treaty and the Dili massacre reinforced this view.

Conclusion
As with any foreign policy decision, governments have to weigh up what they perceive is the right
thing to do in terms of a country’s national interests against what may not be domestically
palatable. This can and often will create tension between domestic policy and international
relations. The Whitlam government and consecutive Australian governments had chosen to
adopt a realist position in terms of East Timor. The Keating government endorsed this position
and continued to take the view that in terms of Australia’s strategic interests the relationship with
Indonesia was far more important than humanitarian considerations of the East Timorese. The
policy was a failure, given the resistance by the East Timorese independence movement and the
continued violence that occurred in the province. There had been a belief by the Whitlam
government that the resistance by the East Timorese to the Indonesian military would subside
over a period of time. Sixteen years following the invasion, however, there had been little
decrease in the actions of the resistance movement and in effect resistance had increased. This
therefore, required the Keating government to reassess the foundations and assumptions of
previous Australian governments’ East Timor policy. Given the actions surrounding the Dili
massacre, the Portuguese case taken against Australia in the ICJ, and the Australian public’s
reaction to the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security, a reassessment of the policy
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position was required. In reassessing the policy the government needed to give some credibility
to the notion of an act of self-determination for the East Timorese.
The Keating government chose to adopt the same policy position on East Timor as successive
Australian governments had done before it, and not only ignored what was a failed policy, but
chose to embrace it and ignore a vocal domestic audience. The government did this in order to
continue a policy of appeasement and strengthen the relationship with Indonesia. Keating
believed that the relationship with Indonesia was more important than the issue of East Timor and
he was not prepared to place Australia’s relationship with Indonesia in jeopardy over the issue.
Unfortunately, by adopting this policy position he inevitably placed the relationship in jeopardy,
the very objective he was attempting to avoid.
What Keating and Evans failed to grasp was that if, as a government, you are going to espouse
notions of realist-pragmatism over liberal-morality, then you are at risk of accusations made
against you of inconsistency in the application of principles of human rights. As with the Whitlam
government’s policy position, the Keating government was increasingly vulnerable to discarding
moral principles over the East Timor issue. While in the government’s defence it might be argued
that their approach through quiet diplomacy was effective and that constructive engagement
through dialogue improved the situation for the East Timorese, there is no evidence to support
this. Evans claimed that Australia had attempted to produce actual results rather than rhetoric for
the East Timorese. While he claimed that Australia had tried to produce results rather than
rhetoric, the question needs to be asked why then, after sixteen years, human rights abuses were
still occurring? Obviously the “actual results” that Evans was talking about became nothing more
than rhetoric.
One could argue that Australia, through pursuing a policy of constructive engagement, may well
have given a ‘green light’ to the Indonesian government to continue its actions in East Timor. We
have a situation where violence in East Timor increased during 1991-96 and yet the Australian
government chose not to reassess the foundations and assumptions of its policy position. The
contradiction and hypocrisy between the government’s public statements and the reality would
inevitably create the storm cloud Keating was attempting to avoid. This is not to deny the very
difficult choices facing the Keating government. The policy had been set in 1974-75, and there is
a clear argument that there was little the government could do to reverse that decision. The
problem with this analysis is that the very reasons for the policy decision of 1974-75 had proved
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to be incorrect. Suharto had used force against the East Timorese and over a twenty year period
the Indonesian government had not been able to coerce the East Timorese into accepting
incorporation. The Keating government was faced with this knowledge and yet made no attempt
to redefine the assumptions of its policy. They continued to ignore the realities set out before
them.
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CHAPTER THREE - A POLICY FAILURE? EAST TIMOR AND THE
HOWARD GOVERNMENT

Introduction
When the Coalition government led by John Howard gained power in 1996 it maintained the
position of recognising Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, though it acknowledged that it
did not condone the circumstances by which Indonesia acquired East Timor. As noted in the
1997 White Paper, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, the Howard
government adopted previous government positions by confirming Indonesia as one of four
countries where Australia’s most substantial interests lie.1 While the new government also
confirmed that “Developments in East Timor would remain important in shaping Australian public
attitudes towards Indonesia”,2 there was no change of policy on Indonesia’s sovereignty over
East Timor. The White Paper simply endorsed the previous government’s policy position
whereby Australia would “encourage the protection of human rights and an internationally
acceptable solution to the problem of East Timor”.3 This position changed in 1999 when the
Howard government promoted itself as the ‘liberator’ of the East Timorese.

As some

commentators noted, this change was a part of what was seen as the ‘Howard Doctrine’4 with a
de-emphasis on establishing special relationships in the Asian region and a more activist foreign
policy agenda with the US. Though Howard never used the term the ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US,
the term gained usage within the region and played an indicative role in Howard’s actions in 1999
over the East Timor crisis.
While the Howard government did an apparent about face on the East Timor issue, I argue that
the government had no alternative. Given the events of September 1999 the government was in
a position where there was no plausible alternative other than to adopt the policy position of
supporting Habibie’s decision for a popular ballot and to play a leading role in restoring order in
East Timor following the ballot. Fortunately for the Howard government the reversal of the policy
Clause 23, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In The National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy
White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), p. vi.
2 Clause 152, Ibid., p. 62.
3 Clause 152, Ibid.
4 The ‘Howard Doctrine’ was first coined by Piers Ackerman but gained prominence by an article written by journalist
Fred Brenchley following an interview with Howard in 1999. The ‘Howard Doctrine’ was seen as a re-balance of
Australia’s foreign policy through reaffirming Australia’s ANZUS alliance with the US and advanced the idea that
Australia would play ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US in the Asia-Pacific region. Fred Brenchley, "The Howard Defence
Doctrine," The Bulletin, 28 September 1999.
1
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position won overwhelming approval on the domestic front, though it created a difficult time for
the Australia-Indonesia relationship. The Howard government’s decision to reverse the long held
policy position on East Timor met with unmitigated support within the Australian community and
Howard was able to make further political gains through Australia’s leading role in the
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). This apparently ‘positive’ change in policy,
however, does not take into account the complexities surrounding the issue of East Timor during
the period leading up to and including 1999 and the ongoing relationship with Indonesia following
the INTERFET intervention. The outcome of the period of the Howard government and the
circumstances and choices that were made by the government will impact on Australia’s
continued relationship with Indonesia and its responsibility to East Timor for some time to come.
Although the policy decisions in this period may have initially adversely affected the AustraliaIndonesia relationship, events occurring in Indonesia and the wider international arena since the
East Timor issue have assisted in improving the relationship.
In this chapter I largely rely on two important reports on East Timor as a basis for my discussion
of the East Timor issue during the period of the Howard government. One report was written by
DFAT titled East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, and the other
was the final report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee
titled East Timor. The reports provide an in-depth understanding of the Howard government’s
actions leading up to East Timor’s vote for independence in 1999. In this chapter I review these
two reports together with parliamentary discussions, and I provide analysis of the degree to which
there was a policy change by the Howard government, the impact of the Howard government’s
actions on the ongoing relationship with Indonesia, and how the crisis in East Timor became a
stimulus for a change of direction in terms of the Howard government’s foreign policy focus. I
argue that given the Howard government’s rebalance of Australian foreign policy toward the US,
the government’s role in the lead up to the crisis in 1999 and its subsequent role in INTERFET,
there is a considerable change in the relationship with Indonesia from that experienced when
Keating was Prime Minister. I will further argue that while Howard was able to claim that his
government had taken the moral high ground over East Timor, the actions leading up to the
events of 1999 reveal a failure of Australian policy and diplomacy that may very well leave the
Indonesian government suspicious in relation to Australian government actions in the future.
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The Events of 1996-1999
When the Coalition government came to power in March 1996, they continued with the Keating
government policy on East Timor in their first term in office. The Leader of the government in the
Senate, Senator Robert Hill, stated on 16 October 1996:
There has been no change to the government’s policy on East Timor, including the East Timorese right to
self-determination. The position means greater autonomy, as it did under the previous government. From
the outset, 1975-76, Australia made it clear that it did not approve of the way in which Indonesia
incorporated East Timor, but we acknowledge that any form of self-determination will need the cooperation
of the Indonesian government…the best means to bring about positive change in East Timor and
encourage peace is by recognising the reality of Indonesian sovereignty.5

However, change did begin to take place in 1997. First, there was the revised policy of the ALP,
which was adopted at the ALP National Conference on 22 January 1998. The policy change had
been announced by Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman, Laurie Brereton, in August 1997 and
was confirmed in the Senate on 24 June 1998 by Senator Cook:
…no lasting solution to the conflict in East Timor is likely in the absence of a process of negotiation through
which the people of East Timor can exercise their right of self-determination. This approach was endorsed
unanimously by Labor’s national conference in January.6

This represented a major change by the ALP from previous Labor governments, who had not only
been instrumental in developing a policy position of support for Indonesian incorporation, but had
given de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. But it was not only the ALP
that revised policy. Members of the Coalition government were also calling for the East Timor
issue to be resolved. As National Party Senator, Julian McGauran, stated in the Senate on 25
November 1998:
…it has never been more timely for Australia to reassess its foreign policy regarding East Timor. I urge a
reassessment involving a stronger stance for a free East Timor – one that is more aligned to the
international community and more particularly, the United Nations.7

Robert Hill, Question without Notice: East Timor (Senate Hansard, 16 October 1996), p. 4267.
Peter Cook, East Timor: Motion (Senate Hansard, 24 June 1998), p. 3975.
7 Julian McGauran, Adjournment: Indonesia (Senate Hansard, 25 November 1998), p. 683.
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Changes in foreign policy are often prompted by events that a country has no control over and
these events provide a window of opportunity for a change of policy to take place.8 On the issue
of East Timor such an opportunity provided itself through events within Indonesia in 1998. These
events were the collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998 and Suharto’s replacement by Dr
Habibie as President. After Habibie took office he declared he was prepared to consider some
form of special status or autonomy package for East Timor.

The Australian government

welcomed Habibie’s declaration as a positive step in handling the crisis of East Timor. The
Howard government believed that two significant benefits could result from Habibie’s declaration
of an autonomy package:
1. In terms of Australia’s national interests it provided the opportunity for the major irritant in
the Australia-Indonesia relationship, that is, the issue of East Timor, to be addressed.
2. The Australian government would be able to respond to the concerns of the Australian
public which it was hoped would strengthen Australian public support for a closer
relationship with Indonesia.
Unfortunately results were otherwise. While the situation assisted in gaining public support for
finding a solution to the continued violence in East Timor, it aggravated the relationship with
Indonesia.
The autonomy deal offered by Habibie gave the Howard government the opportunity to review
and modify its policy. DFAT identified three key questions which arose in terms of a policy review
following Habibie’s declaration:
1.

What process had the greatest potential to generate a lasting solution to the East Timor
problem?

2.

What sort of future for East Timor would be most in Australia’s national interest?

3.

And how could Australia influence events in a more positive direction?9

Policy adjustments by the Howard government began to appear during 1998 when the
government became concerned “over reports that TNI’s much-publicised troop withdrawals were

Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, Second ed. (Crows
Nest, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2005), p. 201.
9 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, p.
30.
8
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a ruse”,10 and by October 1998 there was an increase in international public condemnation of the
Indonesian government’s actions in East Timor. While this revealed a small adjustment to the
policy position of previous governments, recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor
remained.
The Howard government supported the UN Tripartite Talks11 convened to discuss Habibie’s
autonomy proposal as a step forward in solving the situation in East Timor, though they were
concerned over the lack of East Timorese representation.12 Following consultations with East
Timorese leaders conducted by DFAT, the Howard government’s assessment was that there was
a reasonable chance of an acceptance of an autonomy package. However, they were concerned
that any package was likely to fail if there was not a provision in the package for an act of selfdetermination at some time in the future. The Howard government believed that what was in
Australia’s national interests and what “could contribute to a lasting solution for East Timor”,13
was for the Indonesian government to include an act of self-determination in any autonomy
package negotiated with the East Timorese leaders. The Howard government believed that the
process that had occurred in New Caledonia and was written into the Matignon and Noumea
Accords “was a successful example of autonomous government with a self-determination review
mechanism”.14 However, this policy created some risks for the Australian government. Australia
was not a party to the negotiations and therefore it had only a superficial or marginal influence in
the process. Australia’s preference for some form of Matignon Accords approach, even if it had
been accepted by the Indonesians, may not have produced Australia’s preferred policy position of
Indonesia’s continued sovereignty over East Timor. The most significant risk for the government
though was the level of strain that a policy shift of this nature may place on the AustraliaIndonesia relationship.15 The government believed, however, that a policy shift was possible now
more than at any point since 1975. “The Government believed that the relationship with
Indonesia could now sustain such an approach, and considered that the risks did not constitute

Ibid., p. 29.
The Tripartite Talks between Indonesia and Portugal were established in 1983 under the auspices of the UN
Secretary-General, however, for fifteen years these talks made very little progress. It was through the appointment
of Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General in 1997 and his determination for a resolution to the East Timor issue that
the talks gained a fresh momentum in June 1998 after Habibie had become President of Indonesia. Ibid., pp. 4-5 and
298.
12 Ibid., pp. 26-9.
13 Ibid., p. 30.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 31.
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adequate grounds for not pursuing this strategy”.16 Therefore, on 19 December 1998 Howard
wrote to Habibie and acknowledged that President Habibie’s:
…offer of autonomy for East Timor was a bold and clear-sighted step that has opened a window of
opportunity both to achieve a peaceful settlement in East Timor and to resolve an issue that has long
caused Indonesia difficulties in the international community. A settlement would enable you to put the
issue behind you.17

Howard reiterated Australia’s support for Indonesian sovereignty as being in the interests of
Australia, Indonesia and East Timor, but also stated his concern over the lack of progress in the
UN Tripartite Talks and the toughened attitude in East Timor toward self-determination. Howard
points out in the letter that these issues may create the possibility that the developments offered
by Indonesia in relation to East Timor may be lost and that the position in East Timor could
deteriorate. Howard urged Habibie to enter into negotiations with representative leaders of the
East Timorese with the aim of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement.18 Howard also raised
his concern that the advice he had received from the East Timorese was based on a desire for an
act of self-determination and went on to suggest that:
It might be worth considering, therefore, a means of addressing the East Timorese desire for an act of selfdetermination in a manner which avoids an early and final decision on the future status of the province.
One way of doing this would be to build into the autonomy package a review mechanism along the lines of
the Matignon Accords in New Caledonia. The Matignon Accords have enabled a compromise political
solution to be implemented while deferring a referendum on the final status of New Caledonia for many
years.19

In effect Howard’s letter had advised Habibie that it was the preference of the Australian
government “for a long transition period before a decision is taken on East Timor’s final status”.20
In a meeting with the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, John McCarthy, on 22 December
1998 following Howard’s letter, Habibie rejected any notion of a Matignon Accord arrangement for
East Timor. “He found the choice of a colonial example unpalatable, and made it clear that he
Ibid.
Text of Prime Minister Howard’s Letter to President Habibie, 19 December 1998, cited as Annex 2 in Ibid., p. 181.
18 Text of Prime Minister Howard’s Letter to President Habibie, 19 December 1998, cited as Annex 2 in Ibid.
19 Text of Prime Minister Howard’s Letter to President Habibie, 19 December 1998, cited as Annex 2 in Ibid., p. 182.
20 DFAT submission (March 1999), pp. 3-4, cited in Clause 7.88, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East
Timor, ed. Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), p.
177.
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wanted to resolve the issue quickly: rapid independence for East Timor would be preferable to
letting the issue drag on”.21 He stated that any autonomy package which included a review
procedure “was tantamount to leaving a ‘time bomb’ for his successor”.22 In addition, given
Indonesia’s financial position following the Asian financial crisis and the bailout from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), any solution which resulted in an extension of funding to
support East Timor would not have been acceptable to the IMF which was wanting less control
from Jakarta over the provinces. As Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, stated any proposal
for an autonomy package of five to ten years “would require Indonesia to continue funding all but
7 per cent of East Timor’s budget during what might turn out to be no more than a transitional
period”.23
On 12 January 1999 the adjustment to Australia’s policy position was announced by the
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, as an historic shift in Australian
government policy. He advised:
I am pleased to announce that, following a careful review of our policy towards East Timor, the Australian
Government has decided to make a significant adjustment to that policy.
I am of the view that the long term prospects for reconciliation in East Timor would be best served by the
holding of an act of self-determination at some future time, following a substantial period of autonomy.
In the meantime this adjustment to Australian policy does not alter the Government’s position which
continues to recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.24

The government believed that the shift in policy took account of Indonesia’s uncertain political
process and that despite these uncertainties the Habibie Presidency offered the chance of a real
change to the East Timor issue that may actually provide “a peaceful and democratic resolution to
the issue that could be accepted by all sides”.25

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, p.
32.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 38.
24 Media Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, 12 January 1999 cited as Annex 3 in Ibid., p. 183.
25 Ibid., pp. 36-7.
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As would be expected, the Indonesian Foreign Minister responded to journalists in Jakarta on 13
January 1999 by stating that Indonesia was:
…concerned and deeply regret[ted] that the Australian Government has changed its policy on East Timor
which constitutes a substantial change on its earlier position. This decision pre-judges the ongoing
negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the UN Secretary General which
recently have shown some progress and furthermore it will have an adverse effect on the search for a just,
comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution.26

This announcement was followed by a media announcement on 27 January 1999 by Habibie’s
Information Minister, Yunus Yosfiah, and Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Alatas, in which they
announced that:
A regional autonomy plus will be awarded to East Timor. If this is not accepted by the mass in East Timor
we will suggest to the new membership of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), formed as a result
of the next elections, to release East Timor from Indonesia.27

Alatas expanded on Yosfiah’s announcement stressing that the special autonomy package under
negotiation through the UN Tripartite Talks presented the best scenario for a peaceful resolution
of the matter. If the offer of special autonomy was not acceptable to the East Timorese, however,
then the second alternative of separation of East Timor from Indonesia would be given to the
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - Indonesian Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) for
consideration.28
Following the Indonesian announcement on 27 January new momentum was given to the UN
Tripartite Talks process. Further talks took place in New York in January and February on a
process by which the East Timorese would decide whether they wished to become independent
or accept an autonomy package.29 Though Australia was not a principal player in the negotiation
process it was aware that any developments in relation to East Timor would have consequences
for Australia’s future national interests and inevitably the security of the region, particularly if the
process of the negotiations broke down. It was therefore committed to taking an active role in
Ibid., p. 35.
Ibid., p. 38.
28 Ibid. and Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor, p. 178.
29 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, pp.
38 and 71-2.
26
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alleviating the potential adverse consequences that may occur in East Timor and on this basis
Australian Ministers agreed to a response that would include:

•

stepped up engagement with the parties principal to the issue (Indonesia, Portugal, the UN and
the East Timorese);

•

efforts to promote intra-East Timorese dialogue and reconciliation;

•

diplomatic activity aimed at forging a common international approach;

•

increased humanitarian and development assistance to East Timor; and

•

pressing Indonesia to allow Australia to open a consulate in Dili to assist with Australia’s
programme of support.30

On 5 May 1999 an agreement was formally signed by the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia
and the UN that requested:
…the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed constitutional framework providing for a special
autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both inside
and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular consultation
on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot.31

The agreement included the establishment of a UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)32 to carry
out the popular consultation ballot and after some debate security was to be left in the hands of
the Indonesian government.33 With 5 May 1999 Agreement and the establishment of UNAMET
the Australian government immediately committed $10 million to the UN Trust Fund and “pledged
a further $10 million of in kind logistical support to the United Nations”.34
Following the announcement by Habibie of the Indonesian government’s policy change and the
May announcement of a popular consultation ballot, pressure from the Australian public was
brought to bear on the Australian government over the need for a peacekeeping force in East
Timor to ensure the safety and security of the East Timorese. The Australian government had
become increasingly concerned with the security situation in East Timor and the escalating

Ibid., p. 44.
“Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor”, cited
as Annex 7 in Ibid., p. 193.
32 A full discussion of Australia’s role in UNAMET is given in Ibid.
33 “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor”, cited
as Annex 7 in Ibid., p. 194.
34 Alexander Downer, Questions without Notice: East Timor: Consultation Process (House Hansard, 11 May 1999),
p. 4997.
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violence from mid 1998, particularly following Habibie’s 27 January 1999 announcement. The
government was receiving reports of “TNI involvement with the militia in the territory” and was
concerned with TNI’s obvious refusal to restore order in the province.35 It was evident from all the
information that was being given to the government that the TNI would not give away their
interests in the region easily:
By March [1999], Australia started seeing the evidence of a dual policy at work: a declaratory policy of
neutrality consistent with Habibie’s commitment to a free ballot, and a covert policy that sought to ensure
an outcome in favour of autonomy. There was a belief that intimidation would be an effective means by
which to influence the way in which the East Timorese would vote and, by the middle of the year, it was
evident that TNI was encouraging and supporting militia groups in pursuit of this goal.36

Representations were made to the Indonesian government on a regular basis over the obvious
breakdown of security and the need for a peacekeeping force. The Indonesian government had
resisted all notion of any UN presence in terms of peacekeeping in the territory and did not
acknowledge any involvement of the TNI in the escalating violence.37 The Australian government
also sought cooperation from the US in which they:
…highlighted the dilemma associated with Indonesia’s continued resistance to an international presence in
East Timor and underscored Australia’s view of the need to persuade Indonesia that an early, even if only
small, UN presence in East Timor would serve to stabilise the situation on the ground.38

Both the Australian and US governments sent a clear message to the Indonesian government
that they believed the Indonesian government had not taken sufficient action to restore order in
the province and provide stability, particularly for the forthcoming ballot. Howard pressed Habibie
at the Bali Summit39 in April 1999 to accept a peacekeeping operation, however, Habibie was
quite clear in his refusal of such an action. The Indonesian government was very sensitive to any
form of international presence in East Timor with the exception of the small delegation working as
part of UNAMET. As was noted in an ABC TV Four Corners interview on 14 February 2000 with

35 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, p.
61.
36 Ibid., p. 57.
37 Ibid., pp. 47-8 and 55-70.
38 Ibid., p. 51.
39 The Bali Summit was a bilateral leaders meeting between Habibie and Howard on 27 April 1999. This meeting
was agreed upon following a phone conversation between the two leaders on 19 April 1999. The two leaders were
accompanied by their Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers “as well as [the Indonesian] Secretary of State, Akbar
Tanjung, and Habibie’s international advisor, Dewi Fortuna Anwar”. Ibid., p. 78.
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Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Assistant to State Secretary for Foreign Relations/Spokesperson for
President Habibie;
John Howard pressed a number of times and during the Bali meeting, in fact, asked explicitly: ‘Can I ask
you, President, will you accept…an international peacekeeping force’.
And the President said: ‘You can ask, but the answer is no’.
And Howard asked again. The President said: ‘You can ask, but the answer is still no’.40

While Habibie was uncompromising in declining any peacekeepers Howard was able to convince
Habibie at the Bali Summit to increase UN Civilian Police numbers.
The issue of peacekeepers became more acute for the Australian government as violence
escalated following the Liquica and Dili killings in April 1999.41 For the Australian government the
continued violence “shaped significantly the Australian Government’s understanding of what was
happening in East Timor”42 and determined the contingency planning that was put in place in
terms of an international response, in the circumstances that this may be needed. The Howard
government maintained that its approach did not preclude some form of international presence to
ensure the security of the East Timorese leading up to the ballot. However, this was always on
the basis that no such force could proceed without Indonesia’s agreement.
Following the ballot on 30 August 1999, which was relatively calm, violence erupted throughout
most of the territory. On 4 September 1999 the UN announced the ballot result with a majority
rejecting Indonesia’s autonomy proposal. Following the initial calm preceding the announcement
of the ballot result violence once again erupted with the UNAMET compound in Dili coming under
fire and increased intimidation of the international presence by the Indonesian militia.43 On 5

ABC TV’s ‘Four Corners’, 14 February 2000, cited in Ibid., p. 79.
Violence erupted again following the March round of Tripartite talks. On 6 April in Liquica approximately 2000
locals sought shelter in the Liquica churchyard and the local priest’s residence. Approximately 280 pro-integration
militiamen plus an additional 700 sympathisers surrounded the church during the day and began attacking those
inside between noon and 2pm, though this timeframe is not conclusive. There is also differing reports of the number
dead and wounded. These range from 5 dead and 25 wounded to 38 dead and 37 wounded. Ibid., pp. 62-3 and 1859. The Dili killings occurred on 17 April 1999. On this day a large gathering of several thousand pro-integration
supporters met on the grounds in front of the Governor’s office. At the gathering militia ‘supreme commander’ Joao
Tavares “called on the militia to be ready to defend the people from the brutality of Xanana Gusmao”. Following the
rally “over 1000 militia circled the town firing into the air and attacking the houses of prominent independence
supporters”. The death toll from these actions again was varied ranging from 12 to 28. Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, p. 67.
42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, p.
70.
43 Ibid., pp. 121-9.
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September 1999 the UN asked Australia for assistance “to temporarily relocate to Darwin around
200-300 non-essential UNAMET staff”.44 On 12 September 1999, following several phone calls
between the UN and Habibie, and international pressure being brought to bear on the Indonesian
government, including from the US, and the IMF’s suspension of further aid to Indonesia:
President Habibie finally bowed to international pressure. He announced that he had informed the UN
Secretary-General that he had agreed to invite a peacekeeping force of ‘friendly nations’ to assist in the
restoring of security in East Timor. He said there were no conditions to this acceptance.45

On 15 September 1999 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 which:
Authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the
request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with
the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in
carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and
authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this
mandate;46

The multinational force became known as the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and
following on from a request from the UN Secretary-General on 6 September 1999 that the
Australian government lead any multinational force, Major-General Peter Cosgrove MC AM, was
announced as Commander of INTERFET.47
Australia’s role in INTERFET, along with the government’s announcement on 10 September 1999
to review the defence relationship with Indonesia, resulted in the cancellation on 16 September
1999 of the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security by the Indonesian government.48 This
marked a major interruption in the defence relationship between Indonesia and Australia that had
been ongoing since the 1960s. It had a detrimental effect on the relationship.49

Ibid., p. 130.
Ibid., p. 137.
46 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1264 (1999)," (15 September 1999).
47 A full discussion of Australia’s role in INTERFET can be found in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East
Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge.
48 Clauses 8.2 and 8.48, Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, East Timor, p. 195 and
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49 James Cotton, "The East Timor Commitment and Its Consequences," in The National Interest in a Global Era:
Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000. ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, (South Melbourne: Oxford University
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A Critique of the Howard Government’s policy actions
Much has been written about Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis of 1999 and the effect this
had on the ongoing relationship with Indonesia. The following provides some analysis of the
major issues in terms of the Howard government’s role in the crisis, the change of policy and the
effect this had on the Australia-Indonesia relationship.
Howard’s Letter
Howard’s letter to Habibie provoked much controversy over the level of influence it had in relation
to Habibie’s subsequent announcement. This controversy was based around the argument that
the letter was instrumental in provoking Habibie to offer a ballot on a special autonomy package
or independence, against an opposing view that suggested that the letter did not play a major role
in Habibie’s decision and that the financial crisis in Indonesia and the continued pressure from the
US and the European Union were more important considerations in Habibie’s decision.50 Clearly
the pressure that the US could exert in terms of financial assistance to the Indonesian
government was likely to be a major consideration in Habibie’s decision. The cost of maintaining
the territory together with problems that it may have generated in other parts of the archipelago
would also have had a bearing on his decision.
In terms of resolving the issue of East Timor and Australia’s relationship with Indonesia there are
a number of issues that arise from Howard’s letter. They reveal misjudgements on the part of the
Howard government. First, I cite Australia’s lack of appreciation of Indonesia’s strong opposition
toward any form of colonialism. As the Senate References Committee Report noted, “Indonesia’s
opposition to colonialism was written into its constitution, and the Indonesian Republic had come
into being after a bitter struggle against Dutch colonialism”.51 In effect Howard’s letter, while it
suggested an act of self-determination as a way forward, also suggested that providing a built-in
review mechanism as part of an autonomy package would allow time for the Indonesian
Some discussion of this issue can be found in Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the
Independence of East Timor (Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2004)., Clinton Fernandes, "Interpreting the
Past [An assessment of the coverage of Alexander Downer and John Howard's role in campaigning for East Timor's
independence in Paul Kelly's new book about recent Australian political history.] " Dissent, 31 (2009-2010)., John
Howard, East Timor (House Hansard, 21 September 1999)., John Howard, Questions without Notice: East Timor:
Independence (House Hansard, 29 August 2002)., Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia.
51 Clause 7.91, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor, p. 178. The preamble to the Indonesian
constitution states: “Independence being the right of every nation, colonialism in this world must be abolished as
being inconsistent with humanity and justice [Bahwa sesungguhnja kemerdekaan itu ialah hak segala bangsa dan
oleh sebab itu, maka pendjadjahan diatas dunia harus dihapuskan, karena tidak sesuai dengan peri kemanusiaan
dan peri keadilan]” cited in footnote 133 in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor, p. 178.
50

86

government to convince the East Timorese of the benefits of autonomy. This is despite the fact
that the East Timorese had maintained resistance to Indonesian rule for a quarter of a century.
Howard’s objective was to remove a longstanding irritant in the Australia-Indonesia relationship
by providing a lasting solution to the East Timor issue, but one which best served Australia’s
interest, which the government believed was for East Timor to remain a part of Indonesia. As
Greenlees and Garran note, “The intention was not to provoke an immediate referendum on selfdetermination – rather to encourage a gradual process of autonomy that would legitimise the
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia”.52
I argue that the suggestion of a review mechanism was just another form of colonialism which
maintained Indonesia’s control over the territory while giving an appearance of choice. It was a
way of legitimising Indonesia’s actions in 1975 and removing East Timor’s status as a UN nonself-governing territory due to a lack of self-determination. Further it was contrary to the
objectives Howard had expressed in the letter.

He had advocated continued Indonesian

sovereignty over East Timor. Howard’s letter also suggested it would allow time for the East
Timorese to accept the benefits of autonomy and therefore confirm Indonesia’s continued
sovereignty over East Timor at some later date when an act of self-determination occurred. This
was a false and overly optimistic expectation given twenty five years of continued resistance to
Indonesian rule by the East Timorese, and was not likely to lead to a satisfactory conclusion to
the situation.
Second, the proposal misread the internal issues facing Indonesia at the time. With the regional
economic crisis in July 1997 resulting in a collapse of the Indonesian economy and Suharto’s
resignation in May 1998, Habibie had acceded to the Presidency. Under his Presidency
“Indonesian Government policies and attitudes…became open for review”,53 including the
continued instability in East Timor and on 9 June 1998, Habibie announced that he was prepared
to grant East Timor special status.54

Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom (Sydney:
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As Alatas had already advised Downer in a meeting in July 1998:
…it was important that a settlement on the nature of the autonomy package be negotiated immediately
because the window of opportunity in the Indonesian political cycle would not last beyond the next
elections. Future Indonesian governments would be far less able to deal with issues of this character,
given the diffusion of power away from the executive and the obstacles inherent in democratic
parliamentary arrangements.55

He also advised that there were several arguments against any package that enabled some
future act of self-determination to occur in relation to East Timor. He believed that “it would
prolong the agony”, but also that it would be extremely difficult to sell to the military.56 Howard’s
letter though, ignored Alatas’ warning that any review at some later stage would not be feasible
given the political changes occurring in Indonesia, particularly in terms of a diffusion of powers
away from the Executive. There was a need for swift action in terms of the negotiation of the
autonomy package as the lack of an agreement on the framework and content of the autonomy
package might well result in no package being finalised. Additionally the TNI had become, “the
real power in the territory and its influence was felt in all sectors. Few businesses prospered
without TNI sponsorship and indeed many TNI officers, retired and serving, had developed
successful businesses of their own”.57 Promoting an act of self-determination as Howard did in
his letter was inevitably going to result in an adverse reaction from the TNI who were never likely
to leave East Timor quietly.
The third issue that the letter reveals was the continuation of the contradiction inherent in the
policy position set by the Whitlam government in 1974-75 and endorsed by successive Australian
governments. This contradiction in policy reveals the disjoint between recognising Indonesian
sovereignty over East Timor and at the same time acknowledging East Timor’s right to an act of
self-determination.

The inherent contradiction in this was raised by advisors in both the

Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence during the Whitlam government
and seemed clear to the Indonesian government at the time and yet we have consecutive
Australian governments maintaining what were essentially two incompatible policy positions.
Considering that the Fraser government had granted de jure recognition in 1979 and subsequent
governments had endorsed this, there could be no act of self-determination unless the
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 56.
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Indonesian government granted such a ballot to the East Timorese. Senator Hill acknowledged
in his statement to the Senate that any form of self-determination would require the cooperation
of the Indonesian government. However, we still see the contradiction in the policy position of the
Howard government. How does a government make a ‘significant adjustment’ to policy by stating
the need for an act of self-determination and then also state that the government’s position had
not changed. It still recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor. The contradiction is
part of the policy critique I have made in the previous two chapters and the situation continues
under the Howard government.
A fourth issue is that by recommending a position of autonomy with a review mechanism, East
Timor’s desire for independence was ignored. The government was aware of not only East
Timor’s desire for independence but also their distrust of the Indonesian government, particularly
the TNI. While the government may argue that a review mechanism at sometime in the future
was responding to the East Timorese desire for independence, this was not what the East
Timorese wanted.

Howard’s recommendation in his letter for a review mechanism was

attempting to achieve two things. He wanted to win domestic support as he was aware that
public opinion believed that something had to be done in East Timor, but at the same time he
sought to maintain the relationship with Indonesia. As “Calvert said an ‘important advantage’ for
Howard and Downer…would be the ‘much stronger’ alignment of their position with the Australian
public”.58 This begs the question as to whether the government’s desire for responding to the
needs of the East Timorese was driven by domestic politics or the relationship with Indonesia.
The dichotomy itself was a policy failure.
Another issue is that the letter sends an unclear message to the Indonesian government. By
acknowledging in the Senate that there had been no change in the government’s policy position,
effectively the Howard government was sending a clear message to the Indonesian government
that it was ‘business as usual’. Considering that previous Australian governments had given de
jure recognition to Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor and Senator Hill’s announcement of
the continuation of that policy, it would be accurate to suggest that the Indonesian government
believed that the Howard government fully supported Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor,
and that the policy position of self-determination was to placate the Australian public more than a
clear statement of Australia’s intent. Howard’s letter though turns this on its head. While the
58 Ashton Calvert note to Alexander Downer, 30 November 1998 as noted in Kelly, The March of Patriots: The
Struggle for Modern Australia, p. 487.
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words of the letter itself seemed to be a diplomatic gesture as a way forward in resolving the
continued issue of East Timor, the letter also signalled to the Indonesian government that a major
policy shift had taken place. For twenty five years the Indonesian government had heard the
rhetoric from the Australian government over the need for an act of self-determination, but at no
time was there any clear signal of a change in policy from recognition. In this context it would be
fair for the Indonesian government to have surmised that they could rely on Australia’s support in
any proposal made on the content of an autonomy package.
As is noted in the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Report:
Having been one of the few countries to give de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East
Timor, and having supported Indonesia over East Timor since incorporation in 1976, Australia was
regarded by Indonesia as a staunch supporter. It was, therefore, perhaps irksome, from an Indonesian
point of view, for Australia to be in the forefront of moves that led eventually to East Timor’s
independence.59

By placing on record the notion of an act of self-determination, the Howard government changed
the Indonesian government’s perceptions of the Australian government’s policy position. Howard
was attempting to play both sides. He wanted to win public support and maintain the relationship
with Indonesia. Ultimately this resulted in mixed messages that would lead to the decline in the
relationship, which was a significant risk for the government and one they were aware of before
sending the letter. It also ignored the clear message coming from the Indonesian government
that an act of self-determination was not an option.
Finally, Howard’s letter to Habibie represented a policy shift from previous Australian
governments. Given Senator Hill’s statement in the Senate on 16 October 1996, where the
Howard government recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, the suggestion in
Howard’s letter for Habibie to consider an act of self-determination changed significantly what
previous government positions on East Timor had been. However, there is a certain degree of
populism in this statement because Howard was well aware of the very vocal support on the
domestic front for independence for East Timor. As noted in the DFAT report the policy change
“also took heed of public aspirations in Australia concerning self-determination for the East

59
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Timorese”.60 The suggestion of an act of self-determination at sometime in the future was an
attempt to both draw support from the Australian public, but also an attempt to maintain the
relationship with Indonesia. I argue that while this was a successful policy decision on the part of
the Howard government in gaining support on the domestic front, it was a diplomatic failure in
terms of how this change of policy was viewed by the Indonesian government and the wider
Asian region. As Leaver notes, Howard’s letter and Australia’s role in INTERFET “helped create
an impression that Australian policy might be irreducibly opportunistic, willing to change course
suddenly and dramatically when favourable circumstances presented themselves”.61

This

inevitably would make it more difficult for the Indonesian government to have confidence and trust
in re-establishing a strong relationship with Australia, particularly given that Indonesians may
believe this to be an indication of Australia’s support for secessionist movements in Indonesia.

Continued violence and the issue of peacekeepers
The continued violence in East Timor, which raised the question of a peacekeeping force,
became a political problem for the Howard government both domestically and internationally. As
Clinton Fernandes notes in terms of how the government responded to the reports of violence in
East Timor:
It [the Howard Government] typically deployed four arguments in defence of the Indonesian military’s
atrocities in East Timor:
•

Deny the atrocity, and say that the facts are unclear.

•

When proof of the atrocity is provided, say that there was violence on both sides.

•

When it becomes clear that only the Indonesian military was engaging in violence, claim that it
was ‘rogue elements’.

•

Continue to insist that the military is only ‘keeping the warring factions apart’.62

Discrepancies as to who was responsible for the violence and Australian support or otherwise for
a peacekeeping force began to surface between government reports and media accounts.
Rather than considering all the media accounts of these discrepancies I will focus my discussion
on the discrepancies that appear in the DFAT report and the final report of the Senate
References Committee and the interviews and submissions made to the Committee.
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The discrepancies became pronounced following a leaked record of the meeting between
Australian and US officials in which the media depict Australian policy as being in opposition to a
peacekeeping force. The DFAT report stated that this was not correct and that Australia had told
the US “that Australian planners had been giving close attention to the possibility of a worst-case
scenario in East Timor that included an international military response involving Australian
troops”.63 Australia advised the US that their preference was to avoid a ‘worst-case scenario’ and
work with the international community to urge the Indonesian government to provide stability on
the ground in East Timor.64 The Senate References Committee Report notes a slight difference
in the record of the meeting between Dr Calvert, Secretary of DFAT and Mr Stanley Roth, US
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. As noted in the Report:
The record of conversation of that meeting indicated that the major point of difference with the United
States was on the issue of peacekeeping, with Dr Calvert stating that Australia’s position was, ‘to avert the
need for recourse to peacekeeping’ in East Timor.65

Leaver states that the US was clear that “the maintenance of an atmosphere free of intimidation
and political violence” could only be achieved through the presence of UN peacekeepers.66 He
further states that: “Roth pressed Australian officials from DFAT and the Prime Minister’s
Department on this point, and was repeatedly assuaged by a variety of counter-arguments”.67
Tiffen also notes that the Australian officials “argued against the US assessment of the need for
international peacekeepers”.68 However, Paul Kelly notes in The March of Patriots: The Struggle
for Modern Australia, that in an interview he conducted with Roth in June 2008, the presence of
UN peacekeepers “was not a US Government position” and Kelly notes in terms of Roth’s
meeting with Calvert, “Roth expressed a personal view. It was neither Albright’s position nor the
Clinton administration’s position. There was no support within the Pentagon, the US military or
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the White House for a peacekeeping force in East Timor before the ballot”.69 The DFAT report is
silent on Roth’s desire for UN peacekeepers and the official US position.
Here we begin to see the differences between the two accounts emerging. One suggesting that
the government was not against peacekeeping, while the other suggesting that the government
did not want to take the path of peacekeeping and would do everything to prevent this. The
DFAT Report contradicts itself, as is noted in an address to the Australia-Asia Institute on 1
March 1999 by Downer in which he stated:
At this stage, we do not favour a United Nations peacekeeping force of the kind in Cambodia. Indeed,
none of the actors in this drama are calling for that. After all, Indonesia and the East Timorese must bear
the primary responsibility for working out arrangements that not only provide for a peaceful transition but
which lay the groundwork for a peaceful and productive long term relationship. What would be more
realistic would be the provision of United Nations-based administrative support, a confidence-building
presence and - if independence is the preferred choice of the East Timorese - some police presence
alongside the East Timorese police.70

This position was reinforced by Senator Alston in the Senate on 22 April 1999 when he stated
that the government supported a UN presence to prepare for the ballot, but that this did not mean
an armed UN military presence.71 The Howard government’s position on peacekeepers was
further reinforced through the leak from the meeting between Calvert and Roth. John Lyons
argued:
Key diplomatic and intelligence cables reveal that the Australian Government resisted the deployment of
peacekeeping troops in East Timor. Information obtained by the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
(ASIS) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) proved that Indonesia’s special forces, Kopassus,
was funding, training and co-ordinating the militia…The United States (US) had asked Australia for the
information. (US) officials had wanted to confront the Indonesians with such evidence, so as to prevent the
Indonesian military from carrying out its threat to ‘scorch’ East Timor in the event of a vote for
independence. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, has denied that Australia repeatedly argued
against the use of peacekeepers.72
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It was obvious that the Howard government was pressing the US to believe that the East
Timorese and the Indonesian government could find solutions to the issue of continued violence.
Given this had been an issue on the international stage for the past quarter of a century and that
according to the DFAT Report “Australia was increasingly concerned about the deteriorating
security situation”,73 it seems a total misjudgement by the Howard government to believe that the
East Timorese and the Indonesian government could find a solution to this problem. As I already
note, the Howard government believed that the TNI did not have control over order on the ground
in East Timor, so why this apparent faith that stability could be resolved between the two parties?
The Howard government believed that it had done all it could by making representations to the
Indonesian government “on about 120 occasions regarding security and violence in East
Timor”.74 It believed that due to the Indonesian government’s strong stance during the Tripartite
Talks where the Indonesian government stated that “no UN presence would be allowed until after
agreement had been reached on the autonomy proposal” and given the government’s
“refusal…to countenance any peacekeeping presence”,75 any UN military presence in terms of
peacekeeping could not be on the agenda. As John Dauth, Deputy Secretary of DFAT at the
time, stated in an interview before the Senate References Committee: “But the notion that at that
time we would have been able to achieve the sort of international intervention which subsequently
occurred with Interfet was, of course, absurd”.76 In a subsequent interview he stated; “in respect
of the proposition that we should have insisted that a peacekeeping operation be deployed in
East Timor earlier than it was, we no more than any other country in the world were prepared to
go to war with Indonesia to do that”.77
Given Downer’s address and the leaked record of the meeting between Calvert and Roth, I argue
that the Howard government’s intention was to avoid a peacekeeping force at all costs in order to
avoid any tension in the relationship between Indonesia and Australia and that the DFAT Report
was misleading in this regard.
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The government also maintained that its approach was not to preclude a peacekeeping force and
that they had “worked hard to create an environment where this would not be necessary”.78
Further, they “gave detailed consideration to worst-case scenarios in East Timor”79 and put in
place contingency planning on this basis. This contingency planning though was in no way
preparing for a peacekeeping operation, but rather there were three exercises planned. The first
was called Operation Concord which was for “ADF logistic support to the international
consultation processes…under the auspices of the United Nations”80 as part of 5 May 1999 UN
Tripartite Agreement. The second operation was Operation Spitfire which was an evacuation
operation in the event that violence erupted and UNAMET staff, Australians and other nationals
needed to be evacuated.81 The third operation was Operation Faber which was described by
Defence “as the possible involvement of the ADF in contingencies in East Timor”.82 However, the
exact form of that involvement was not apparent at the time defence planning began.83 The
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) Report notes that “maintaining good relations with
Indonesia and establishing a sound Australia-East Timor relationship were key objectives in the
planning”.84 As is noted in the Report:
Defence had no mandate for planning, nor did it plan, for peace-keeping operations in East Timor which did
not assume agreement by Indonesia’s Government for such operations…There was no government
strategic requirement for the ADF to be able to form or lead an international peace-keeping coalition
force.85

Again the DFAT Report is misleading and the ANAO Report would suggest it is incorrect, as the
DFAT Report indicates that the contingency planning was for a peacekeeping operation.
However, there did not appear to be any planning of the type required for a full-scale
peacekeeping force particularly that required when INTERFET was established.
Parliamentary discussions also do not provide any conclusive evidence of the DFAT Report’s
notion that the government was not against peacekeeping. During sittings of the House of
78 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, p.
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Representatives and the Senate, the issue of the continued violence in East Timor and the need
for peacekeepers was constantly raised from as early as March 1999. It was regularly noted that
the TNI was complicit in the violence in East Timor and there was a call on the government to
request Habibie to bring stability on the ground, and in the absence of this to recognise the need
for a peacekeeping force.86 However, the government’s position was clear. They would not
participate in a peacekeeping exercise without the agreement of the Indonesian government.87
In the sittings of both Houses of Parliament immediately following the INTERFET intervention,
discussion was dedicated to the East Timor issue. This began as a result of a motion to both
Houses noting the ballot result, the UN Security Council Resolution 1264 and the endorsement of
the Australian government’s agreement to lead and contribute to INTERFET.88 The speeches
over the next week, of which there were many, all supported the motion wholeheartedly and
wished the Australian troops a safe return. There were, however, a considerable number of
speeches, mainly from opposition parties, declaring that the government’s actions over not
responding to the intelligence warnings and the continued violence in East Timor amounted to a
policy failure.89 In addition a number of petitions were brought to both Houses calling for a UN
sponsored peacekeeping force.90 Given the parliamentary discussion and debate on this issue
the government still maintained the position that it would not endorse a peacekeeping force.
So the question that is obviously raised given the discussion on peacekeepers is whether the
Howard government, and the international community, could have prevented the subsequent
violence that occurred not only during the lead up to the consultation ballot, but also the violence
that occurred following it? There had been ample warning that violence might escalate as indeed
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happened following the collapse of Suharto’s New Order and Habibie’s announcement of special
autonomy for East Timor. However, the TNI had never been able to suppress the small, but
strong resistance movement in East Timor. Given these circumstances it would be fair to assess
that the TNI would not be reconciled to Habibie’s announcement of a popular consultation ballot
and the strong possibility of independence in East Timor.
Intelligence leaks over subsequent months revealed that the Australian government had been
warned by the Defence Intelligence Organisation of the level of violence by the militia and TNI
before and after the ballot. As Tiffen notes these leaks were first published in the Australian
Financial Review on 11 September 1999 followed by two stories written by John Lyons in The
Bulletin on 12 October 1999 and 30 November 1999.91 Kim Beazley also noted in the House of
Representatives on 21 September 1999:
We had reports from the Defence Intelligence Organisation from 4 March this year, which said: ABRI could
apprehend or easily control pro-Indonesian militias but has not chosen to do so….unless Jakarta takes firm
action, ABRI elements will continue to support intimidation and violence…92

When interviewed by the Senate References Committee, Hugh Smith stated:
…looking at the public record and perhaps reading between the lines, it seems that the intelligence
agencies were predicting a very adverse reaction by the militia and TNI before the referendum, so there
was no intelligence failure as such. Where problems may have arisen is in the use or the lack of use of
that intelligence at the political decision making level.93
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Others interviewed by the Committee endorsed this view. As Robert Lowry stated to the
Committee:
My feeling is that the junior levels in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade understood the
intelligence and understood what appropriate policies may be. I have a feeling that the middle and senior
level leadership of DFAT were still locked in a mind-set of the past where the primary thing from their
perspective was to ensure that there was a democratic transition in Indonesia. East Timor was a
secondary consideration and they were not prepared to take the measures that were necessary to make
sure that the process went smoothly.94

Given that Australian intelligence agencies had warned the Australian government of the likely
scale of violence and given the Liquica and Dili killings, why did the Australian government:
1. Ignore the intelligence warnings, and
2. Could they have prevented the scale of the violence that took place?
It is not clear from the documents that intelligence was ignored. As with any decision that is
made by policymakers, the issues surrounding those decisions are complex and sensitive and
none more so than in the situation facing the Howard government over the issue of East Timor.
The Howard government was well aware that it was in Australia’s national interests to ensure a
politically stable Indonesia and that by maintaining a good relationship with Indonesia, Australia’s
security would be improved. This therefore means that policy decisions cannot just be made on
the intelligence reports given to the government, but that other factors may be equally important
in making policy decisions. As Philip Flood suggests:
For all its value, intelligence is only one of a range of factors that influences the policy decisions of
governments, and it is rarely the decisive factor. Commentators can sometimes ascribe an importance to
intelligence as a factor in decision-making that fails to recognise the range of broader considerations, such
as strategic issues, political and economic objectives, long-standing alliance relationships, legal
considerations or other interests that might determine policy.95
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Ball points out that the intelligence reports being given to the government were unwelcome as
they:
…contradicted several of its key policy themes: that the violence was unorganized; that any ABRI
involvement was limited to ‘rogue elements’; that neither General Wiranto nor any other senior ABRI
commander was involved; and that Canberra’s special relationship with Jakarta, manifested in the myriad
of defence and intelligence cooperation arrangements, would ensure that the Indonesian authorities
remained both frank and responsive in their dealings with Canberra over East Timor.96

The government was in a difficult position. If it acted on the intelligence then this may well do
damage to the relationship with Indonesia. If it did act on the information what form of action
would this take? Could it jeopardise the popular consultation ballot, as any form of action may
well have resulted in a postponement of the ballot? As indicated, the Indonesian government had
already given a definite no to a peacekeeping force and it was both Australia and Portugal’s belief
that reopening 5 May 1999 Agreement in relation to security would jeopardise the ballot itself.
Even though it was a risky endeavour it was believed to be more important to allow the ballot to
go ahead even at the risk of the loss of lives in East Timor. In addition, any intervention outside
renegotiating 5 May Agreement would have required a UN Security Council mandate and as
agreement was unlikely, this was not a possible alternative.
The difficulty with the Australian position lay in denying the intelligence warnings, and more
importantly, in downplaying the intelligence information in discussions with the US. If, as the
Howard government believed, it only had “a marginal capacity”97 to influence the East Timor
issue, then as Cotton notes, and is ignored in the DFAT Report, “they must have regarded others
as having more influence”.98 Two issues come from this. One that the Howard government
misjudged the amount of influence it could have used with the Indonesian government, and
secondly if others had more influence then why not use that influence to pressure the Indonesian
government to allow a peacekeeping force into East Timor? The Howard government should
have used the intelligence reports to mobilise support from the US to apply pressure on the
Indonesian government to allow a peacekeeping force in the territory when it was obvious that the
TNI was not maintaining order on the ground, particularly as Roth had favoured peacekeepers.
In addition both the US and the Howard government could have used their influence in terms of
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the financial crisis facing Indonesia. As Maley noted in the Senate References Committee
Report:
I have no doubt that the reason Indonesia agreed on 12 September 1999 to the deployment of Interfet was
that the government had been warned that the rupiah was likely to melt down in the foreign exchanges the
following day because of the postponement of the visit by the International Monetary Fund delegation.99

Further, he noted that as far back as the Bali Summit Australia failed to use the full weight of the
economic assistance that had already been given to the Indonesian government. As he states:
At that time, Indonesia probably needed Australia more than Australia needed Indonesia. Australia had
been a generous contributor to economic assistance to Indonesia following the financial crisis, and the
Indonesian economy, particularly its floating currency, made Indonesian policy circles vulnerable to
external pressure. Yet no serious attempt was made to orchestrate the kind of pressure that would be
needed to get the policy settings right in order to secure the situation on the ground for the East Timorese
in the run-up to the ballot.100

Unfortunately the full details of the intelligence reports were not given to the US to allow pressure
to be placed on the Indonesian government. The Australian government believed that the
Indonesian government could, and would, control security on the ground and turned a blind eye
to the violence occurring in the territory. Given the power the TNI had in the territory it was
unlikely that even if the Indonesian government had given more assurances on securing the
territory, these would have been honoured by the TNI. It was a major policy failure by the
Howard government to believe that stability would be maintained when all evidence contradicted
this. This policy failure is further evidenced in a question to the Senate on 14 March 2002 when
Senator Nick Bolkus asked Senator Hill, Minister for Defence:
Why did the Howard government, throughout 1999, attribute militia violence in East Timor to so-called
‘rogue elements of TNI’, when ministers knew for a fact that such violence was being orchestrated by high
levels of Indonesian military and government? Why did the foreign minister, and the then defence minister,
make public statements on this issue contradicting the government’s own information available to it through
its own intelligence sources?101
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Senator Hill’s reply was that he was not able to “reach conclusions from alleged intelligence and
security material”.102 He further stated that, “It would be a mistake for him to assume the factual
basis of his question”.103

Even two years after the leak of the intelligence material the

government was still denying its existence.
While the Howard government could deny the intelligence warnings, or could justify their decision
to not act on the intelligence reports in terms of acting in Australia’s national interests, this does
not recognise that often governments “can conflate the national interest with the government’s
interest, and claim immunity when their own rather than national interests are threatened”.104 As
Camilleri states, “In practice, governments are just as likely to use the rhetoric of national interest
for purposes of propaganda, political point-scoring, or legitimisation of policies otherwise
derived”.105
I argue that there were a number of policy failures by the Howard government in all this. First, in
terms of ignoring the obvious intelligence warnings of likely violence given to the government by
their own agencies. The government were advised beforehand of the TNI’s continued violence in
the territory and while a sensitive issue in terms of its bilateral relationship with Indonesia, chose
to ignore those warnings.

Second, that denying the intelligence warnings was in the

government’s interests, while disguised in terms of Australia’s national interests. There is no
clear indication that it was in Australia’s national interests to deny the intelligence that violence
would take place in East Timor. If anything this would create more instability and therefore raise
concerns in terms of Australia’s national interests. This was a situation where a decision was
made in the government’s interests to legitimise their lack of action on this issue. The final issue
lay in their assessment of their capacity to influence the Indonesian government. Australia’s
capacity to influence Indonesia, or to enable other larger powers to influence Indonesia, was
under-rated given the international issues faced by the Indonesian government.

A more

concerted effort on the government’s part was required.
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Conclusion
In September 1999 Howard stated: “My letter and the policy changes embodied in it therefore
represented a significant change, after a quarter of a century, in the policy approach of this
government towards Indonesia in relation to East Timor”.106 However, this change occurred as a
result of the events happening in Indonesia rather than any concerted attempt on the part of the
Howard government to reverse a policy position that had been adopted by all Australian
governments since 1975. The aim of the Howard government was to remove the hindrance in
the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. However, the result of the decisions made by
the Howard government were the most “significant development in Australian policy towards the
Asia Pacific region and especially towards Indonesia since the Vietnam war”.107 It resulted in a
deterioration in the bilateral relationship with Indonesia: a relationship of strategic importance to
Australia. Paradoxically, the very reason for Australia’s acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty
over East Timor, that is, the bilateral relationship between the two countries, resulted in a decline
in the relationship with Indonesia’s loss of East Timor.
It would appear that the previous policy position and the new policy approach adopted by the
Howard government both failed. While the previous policy position of recognition of Indonesia’s
incorporation of East Timor pleased the Indonesian government, it did not gain support from the
Australian public. The reverse can be said in relation to the new policy approach which
displeased the Indonesian government, but won support in terms of the Australian public. The
new policy removed the irritant in the relationship, namely East Timor. However, Australia is
likely to have a continuing obligation to East Timor for some time to come. Further, the level of
trust in the bilateral relationship prior to 1999 will be difficult to restore due to Indonesia’s distrust
of Australia’s intentions following its actions in East Timor. While Howard clearly stated his
commitment to Indonesian sovereignty, there was a need for Australia to understand the
economic and political fragility in Indonesia and the impact Australia’s actions in East Timor would
have, not just on the bilateral relationship, but also in ensuring a stable Indonesia.
Given the change in policy indicated in Howard’s letter and Australia’s role in INTERFET, it was
inevitable that the relationship would come under a great deal of strain and in fact was probably
put under the most strain since the 1960s. As Howard noted in the House of Representatives on
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9 May 2000, “the relationship in the future would not be what it was in the past”,108 and as is
noted by DFAT in the Senate References Committee Report, “there was a sound working
relationship with Indonesia at many levels but, at the political level, the strains were evident and
were not going to be resolved quickly”.109
The Howard government’s policy on East Timor can best be described as one of ambivalence
and contradiction. While Howard proclaimed it as a major success, particularly in terms of
Australia’s position on the international stage,110 it resulted in a diplomatic and policy failure and I
argue left the Indonesian government questioning the Australian government’s view of the
importance of the future relationship. Howard’s method of presenting East Timor’s transition was
as much a problem as the government’s involvement. He stated: “It [had] been left to a Coalition
Government to reverse 25 years of over-accommodation to Indonesia”111 and declared the
government had liberated the East Timorese. This was a diplomatic blunder as it failed to
acknowledge the changes occurring in Indonesia and the respect that was owed to them in terms
of Indonesia’s democratic transition. As Jamie Mackie notes, Australia’s political leaders needed
to avoid taking advantage of “issues in contention between the two countries for purposes of
political points-scoring”.112
While Howard would suggest that his letter to Habibie led to a change in the Indonesian
government’s policy position113 there is no clear evidence to indicate the impact the letter had on
Habibie’s subsequent decision. From an Australian position it certainly won the support of a
vocal domestic audience.

However, the letter also ignored the historical foundations of

Indonesia’s independence, the issues facing Indonesia during 1998, Indonesia’s transition to
democracy and the inherent contradiction within the policy position. Equally the continued denial
of the intelligence warnings of the TNI’s involvement in the perpetration of violence in East Timor
was a major policy failure. There was more that the Howard government could have done to
apply pressure on the Indonesian government, which may well have meant the atrocities that
occurred following the ballot could have been avoided. Furthermore, the government’s continued
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claim that a peacekeeping force would be a declaration of war totally denied the influence that
Australia could have exerted.
The Australian government’s policy position since 1974 had been one driven by its national
interest and the importance of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia at the expense of more
moral considerations. This may not be an incorrect position to take, however, it was adopted at
the cost of the East Timorese and even though Howard would state they reversed this policy, it
remained at the cost of the East Timorese. The Howard government’s legacy was a strained
relationship with Indonesia, Australia’s most important strategic relationship, though this improved
following the Bali bombings. While East Timor is not an immediate problem in the bilateral
relationship between Australia and Indonesia, it is probably too soon to say that it is no longer ‘a
pebble in the shoe’ as Australia has an obligation for East Timor that may well last for some time
in the future. This is not a policy position that could be described as a major success in
Australian foreign policy and the policy position of consecutive Australian governments is one that
has not been in Australia’s long-term interests.
In assessing a review of the policy, DFAT identified three key questions which have already been
mentioned, namely to find a lasting solution to the East Timor problem, what was in Australia’s
national interest and how could Australia influence the events in a positive way. These three
issues reveal a strong pragmatic-realist approach taken by DFAT in terms of foreign policy
development. Unfortunately considering these three key questions, I must argue that the realist
approach was a failure in terms of meeting the government’s objectives. While East Timor has
gained its independence there is no lasting solution to the problems it faces and as I have noted,
Australia has an obligation for East Timor that may well last for some time which can hardly be in
Australia’s national interests. Finally, Australia’s influence over the events leading up to East
Timor’s independence can hardly be described as positive given the violence that erupted both
before and after the independence vote.

Postscript
Howard stated in the House of Representatives on 21 September 1999 that the government’s
policy approach in relation to East Timor had significantly changed. In his book Lazarus Rising: A
Personal and Political Autobiography, Howard argued that the policy had changed due to the
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events in Indonesia, particularly as Habibie, the new President, was not committed to the
retention of East Timor. This was an opportunity that the Howard government felt they could not
ignore. They could resolve an irritant in the Australia-Indonesia relationship.114
In an interview conducted by Peter Mares with former Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, in
July 2008, Downer stated that “we changed our policy…we were really the key player in what
ultimately led to the independence of East Timor”.115 Paul Kelly in his book The March of
Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, states that “in early 1999 Howard and Downer
recognised that an independent East Timor was likely and they worked to achieve this result in an
extraordinary reversal of Australian foreign policy”.116 Kelly also states that Howard felt his letter
to Habibie in December 1998 had been influential in terms of Habibie’s announcement that
Indonesia would conduct a ballot of the East Timorese on a special autonomy package.117
Further, Downer states in the interview with Peter Mares that the most significant thing he did as
Foreign Minister was to convince Habibie to ask the East Timorese what they wanted,
independence or autonomy.118
The central argument that Kelly makes is that Howard and Downer were secretly attempting to
gain East Timor’s independence119 and certainly one could read this analysis from Downer’s
interview and Howard’s comments regarding the reversal of the policy position. The documents
that I have examined, however, do not support this position. While it might be argued that
Howard and Downer did not want to alert the Indonesians to such a major change in Australia’s
policy position, the actions of the government do not support this interpretation. Howard’s letter
suggested an act of self-determination at some time in the future following a period of autonomy.
While this was a policy shift it was not a radical reversal of previous Australian government’s
policy position. As White states, “Australian governments had supported the principle of selfdetermination for East Timor, but they had never proposed the holding of any form of act of free
choice to bring it about”.120 I think that the central argument proposed by Kelly clearly reflects
what White labels a “post-facto rationalisation of outcomes which were contrary to Australia’s
John Howard, Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 341.
Peter Mares, "Alexander Downer's controversial life in politics," ed. The National Interest (ABC Radio National, 11
July 2008), p. 2 of print view.
116 Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, p. 482.
117 Ibid., p. 492.
118 Mares, "Alexander Downer's controversial life in politics," p. 2 of print view.
119 Kelly, The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia, p. 482.
120 Hugh White, "The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor,
December 1998-September 1999," Security Challenges, 4, no. 1 (2008): p. 72.
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original intentions, but for which the government was later keen to claim credit”.121 There is little
evidence in the documents I have examined, or even in Howard’s autobiography, that suggest
that independence was Howard and Downer’s secret goal. What the documents do suggest is
that Howard and Downer responded to two things: the political pressure applied by Laurie
Brereton as Labor’s spokesperson on foreign affairs following the Labor Party’s reversal of what
had been a bi-partisan policy of incorporation of East Timor by Indonesia122, and secondly, both
Howard and Downer took advantage of events happening in Indonesia. This gave them the
opportunity to reverse the policy position that had been reaffirmed by the Howard government in
1996.
The statements made by Howard and Downer after the event need to be assessed in terms of the
motives behind the statements. I believe they reflect self-serving explanations made to claim
credit both domestically and internationally for the government’s actions, particularly their role in
INTERFET.

Ibid.: p. 73.
Fernandes, "Interpreting the Past [An assessment of the coverage of Alexander Downer and John Howard's role
in campaigning for East Timor's independence in Paul Kelly's new book about recent Australian political history.] ": p.
9.
121
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SECTION 2 – THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Security issues have always been at the centre of Australia’s political and strategic relationship
with Indonesia. For successive Australian governments issues of security have been of major
importance in developing Australia’s foreign policy toward Indonesia and this is reflected in the
focus of foreign policy decisions during the periods of the Keating and Howard governments.
Australia’s geopolitical position in the world has produced a sense of vulnerability in terms of its
security and a perceived need to ensure a continued reliance on a powerful ally. Consecutive
Australian governments have taken the view that Australia’s location in the Asia-Pacific region left
it geographically isolated in terms of any attempt to find “common security”1 within the region.
The perception was amplified by the diverse and different cultures and histories of Australia’s
neighbours. In terms of Indonesia this has resulted in what could best be described as a sense of
unease and an ‘imagined fear’ of Indonesia as a neighbour. During Sukarno’s Presidency and
the environment of the Cold War the idea of Indonesia as a threat was clearly evident. However,
some of this concern was alleviated when Suharto came to power following the events of 1965.
Suharto was seen by the West as anti-Communist in contrast to Sukarno’s socialist leanings.
More recently Australian governments have recognised that “Australia’s interests…are served by
a strong, stable Indonesia which meets its own requirements and contributes to the stability of the
region”.2 It has been recognised that there is a convergence between Australian and Indonesian
interests through maintaining stability within the South-East Asian region.
Australia’s geographic position in relation to Indonesia is also important in terms of providing
secure transit through Indonesia’s sea lanes as more than half of Australia’s export and import
trade is conducted through Indonesian waters. This makes a strong and stable Indonesia
immensely important not just to Australia’s security, but also its prosperity. In addition, the events
of September 11 and the Bali bombings of 2002 have increased the importance of a strong
bilateral relationship. However, there has always been a sense of anxiety in terms of the defence
relationship. For Australian governments there has been an awareness that Indonesia can

The notion of common security was coined in the early 1980s. Its central idea was that security was to be found
with other nations rather than against them and that rather than security being found in an increase in military might,
security was to be found in finding commonality with other states to build a commitment to the survival of all. Evans
and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, p. 80.
2 Clause 6.2.2, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with Indonesia,
ed. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993),
p. 68.
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provide both a potential threat but also a possible defence. As defence strategist Hugh White
notes:
Indonesia impinges on Australia’s deepest strategic preoccupations in two ways. It is the only large
country within easy range of Australia; because of its proximity and sheer size, it has the strategic potential
to pose a serious military challenge to Australia directly. And it is also the only one strong enough to help
defend our neighbourhood against an intruder. Whether it is strong or weak, Indonesia therefore offers
both potential protection and potential threats to Australia.3

This sense of uncertainty is acknowledged by Paul Dibb in his Review of Australian Defence
Capabilities where he states it is “from or through Indonesia” that a potential threat was most
likely to occur.4
The development of a defence relationship has also been complicated by the different
approaches taken by Australia and Indonesia in terms of the defence forces. This difference can
be seen in terms of the TNI’s role in the political system of Indonesia whereas the Australian
Defence Forces (ADF) have no role or a limited role in the Australian political system. The
difference is also seen in terms of the TNI’s role in East Timor. While these issues have largely
been resolved, there remains an enduring sense of difference between the two defence forces
that creates some ambivalence in terms of building a strong defence relationship.
The importance of Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia is reflected in the bilateral
relationships developed during both the Keating and Howard government periods when both
governments focussed on shared interests in the security relationship.

For the Keating

government the importance given to viewing Australia’s security in Asia is reflected in the signing
of the Agreement on Maintaining Security and the joint training exercises, along with participation
in multilateral agencies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. However, it also echo’s Evans’s
desire for building a cooperative security agenda in the Asia-Pacific and particularly with
Indonesia.

Hugh White, "The New Australia-Indonesia Strategic Relationship: A Note of Caution," in Different Societies,
Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region. ed. John Monfries, (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2006), p.
45.
4 Paul Dibb, Review of Australian Defence Capabilities, ed. Department of Defence (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1986), p. 48.
3
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For the Howard government the focus of Australia’s security was largely to be found outside Asia.
The security relationship with the US was viewed as the most important relationship. Australia’s
security relationship with Indonesia was damaged following the crisis in East Timor. However,
the events of September 11 and the Bali bombings have assisted in rebuilding the AustraliaIndonesia security relationship, particularly in areas of counter-terrorism.

A number of

Memorandums of Understanding in 2002 have been formalised and in 2006 the Indonesian and
Australian governments signed an Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation.
However, while there has been an improvement in the defence relationship over recent years, it
has not recovered the same level of cooperation as that seen prior to the East Timor crisis in
1999.
The security relationship largely reflects the dichotomy in foreign policy between realistpragmatism and liberal-moral values. Australia’s engagement with Indonesia on security matters
reflects a realist paradigm whereby Australia’s national interests are most concerned with
territorial security and the security of the region at large. While the security relationship was reestablished by the Howard government following September 11, this has mainly been driven by
Australia’s primary security focus of counter-terrorism.
Chapters Four and Five make up Section Two of my thesis. In these two chapters I will consider
the security agenda between Australia and Indonesia from 1991-2007. I will identify the change
in focus of security policy between the two governments and the degree to which these changes
were a part of the changing international security agenda, first following the end of the Cold War
and second, following September 11. I will also consider the future implications of the security
agenda as part of Australia’s foreign policy with Indonesia. My two chapters offer a discussion of
the changing nature of the security relationship from 1991-2007. I examine the Defence White
Papers and bilateral arrangements established during this period. The documents will be
understood as providing evidence in determining the changes in the security policy toward
Indonesia from the Keating to the Howard governments, and as far as is possible, will provide a
way to ascertain the reasons the changes were made at that time. I recognise that this relies
heavily on a literal interpretation of the documents, and while I understand the limited application
of this approach, I consider that the White Papers remain a rich source of information that enable
me to provide a succinct discussion of the continuities, changes and challenges in the security
relationship with Indonesia during the period of the Keating and Howard governments.
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In chapter four I provide a broad overview of the security relationship of both the Keating and
Howard governments and the interrelationship between Australia’s foreign and security policy
toward Indonesia. I argue that Australia’s security policy from the Keating to the Howard
governments changed the nature of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, and that the
approaches of the two governments in terms of the importance given to Australia’s relationship
with Indonesia, and Asia more generally, revealed a refocus of the security relationship away
from Asia. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the first security agreement negotiated with
Indonesia and signed during the period of the Keating government, and follow with a discussion
of defence cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, in particular the joint training exercises.
I argue that the establishment of the Agreement on Maintaining Security and the joint training
exercises conducted with the TNI ignored a vocal public within Australia that were concerned with
human rights abuses supported by the TNI.

They were apprehensive that Australia was

enmeshing itself with a military dictatorship and by doing so legitimising the actions of the
Indonesian government.
In chapter five I discuss the second security agreement negotiated with Indonesia and signed
during the period of the Howard government. The Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation was signed seven years after the abrogation by Indonesia of the Agreement on
Maintaining Security due to Australia’s change of policy in relation to East Timor. I also offer a
discussion of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Combating International Terrorism
and the importance of the MoU in terms of counter-terrorism as Australia’s primary security focus
in the 21st century. I argue that as much as the security relationship has developed during the
third and fourth terms of the Howard government following the strain in the relationship in terms of
East Timor, this rests on Australia’s focus on counter-terrorism and does not provide extensive
evidence of a strengthening in the political relationship.
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CHAPTER FOUR – A SECURITY OVERVIEW

Introduction
When Keating became Prime Minister in 1991 his government adopted the approach of
cooperative security which promoted a strategy of reassurance and the security of individuals as
a priority. For Keating and Evans this led to new thinking in foreign policy discourse through the
development of the ASEAN Regional Forum1 and bilateral regional defence cooperation. As
Keating stated, Australia needed to look “for security in Asia, not security from Asia”.2 The move
to joint military training exercises with Indonesia and the development and eventual signing on 18
December 1995 of the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining Security3 were part of Australia’s new approach to
security where Australian security was seen in terms of the Asia-Pacific region and in developing
stronger relations between Indonesia and Australia. The agreement was significant as it was the
first security instrument ever established by Indonesia with another country. It was also an
example of Keating’s intention to establish a strong structural foundation in order to achieve a
closer relationship between the two countries. Very few people either within or outside the
government would have suggested that an agreement which adopted Evans’s concept of
cooperative security could have been concluded between Australia and Indonesia.

The

agreement was an indication of the level of diplomacy and reassurance that had been developed
in the relationship between the two countries.
When the Howard Coalition government gained power in 1996 the government made a
commitment to release a new Defence White Paper during its first term. In 2000 the Howard
government released Australia’s first White Paper on Defence Strategy since 1994. In this White
Paper the focus of Australia’s defence changes moved from one where Australia’s security was to
be found in Asia to one where it was to be found from Asia, and a refocusing on the importance of
Australia’s alliance with the US. While the 1994 Defence White Paper recognised the interlinking
of Australia’s security and prosperity with Asia’s security and prosperity, the 2000 Defence White
The ASEAN Regional Forum included the six ASEAN nations (Indonesia, The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore and Brunei), the seven dialogue partners from the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (USA, Canada,
Japan, The Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand and The European Union) together with Russia, China,
Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea.
2 Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, p. 41.
3 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining
Security, ATS 13, 1995, (Enacted on 18 December 1995: Entered into force on 15 July 1996). Hereinafter referred to
as the Agreement on Maintaining Security or Agreement.
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Paper changed the focus of Australia’s defence policy underscoring the point that Australia’s
security was to be found outside of Asia. It was obvious in the White Paper that the Howard
government was not confident of building a regional security community as the government
believed that cultural differences would inevitably create tension in the relationship. As stated in
an Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report titled Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia,
“the Coalition government…led by John Howard, assigned precedence to correcting what it
viewed as an imbalanced and ineffective approach favouring Asia over the US alliance”.4 This is
in sharp contrast to the Keating government which believed in the necessity of regional security
building.
In terms of the relationship with Indonesia, the 2000 Defence White Paper recognised the
continued importance of Indonesia to Australia and the need to continue to develop a new
defence relationship over time. Unfortunately other events, namely East Timor, interrupted the
development of the security relationship between Australia and Indonesia with Australia
announcing in September 1999 that it would review the defence relationship. This situation,
along with Australia’s role in East Timor in 1999, resulted in Indonesia revoking the Agreement on
Maintaining Security and the cancellation of the joint training exercises between the ADF and
Kopassus. The events of September 11, 2001, however, dramatically changed the security
relationship between the two states. The security agenda became much more focussed on the
“war on terror” and intra-state security, rather than on conflicts between states. September 11
created a level of strategic uncertainty for the Howard government as noted in Australia’s
National Security: A Defence Update 2003:
…certainty and predictability have decreased because the strategic advantage offered by our geography
does not protect Australia against rogue states armed with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles. Nor
does it protect Australia from the scourge of terrorism.5

Order was the prevalent notion of security in the late 1990s and into the 21st century. It was the
view of both the Keating and Howard governments that an unstable region would be detrimental
to Australia’s security. This notion was not the fear that another nation would ‘invade’ Australia,
but rather that an unstable or failed state within the region would attract international crime and

William T Tow, "Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia," ed. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited
(ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2008), p. 8.
5 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003 (Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 2003), p. 9.
4
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following September 11, terrorism. The unease in the West regarding terrorism created a major
focus for Australia’s security agenda and has largely driven Australia’s security policy in the 21st
century. The unease created by September 11 developed a new security agenda between the
Australian and Indonesian governments, even more so after the Bali bombings in 2002.
In this chapter I consider the general security framework of both the Keating and Howard
governments in terms of Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994,6 the 2000 Defence
White Paper, titled Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force,7 and the 2003, 2005 and 2007
Defence Updates. I will also discuss the White Papers in terms of the security relationship
between Australia and Indonesia. Finally, I will consider the first security agreement made
between Australia and Indonesia, namely the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security and
provide a brief discussion of the training exercises between the ADF and the TNI, and the extent
to which the joint training exercises caused problems for Australia both domestically and in terms
of the political relationship with Indonesia. In the second chapter on security issues (Chapter
Five), I provide a discussion of the second security agreement signed by the Howard government
in 2006. I will also provide a discussion of Australia’s MoU with Indonesia on Combating
International Terrorism in this chapter and a brief discussion of the MoU on Combating
Transnational Crime and Developing Police Cooperation.

General Overview of the Security Relationship
The defence policy inherited by the Keating government in 1991 was that which was set by the
Hawke Labor government in the 1987 Defence White Paper, The Defence of Australia 1987.8
The policy as stated in the 1987 Defence White Paper was that Australia was responsible for its
own defence as Kim Beazley, the then Minister for Defence noted in the Preface:
For Australia, defence self-reliance must be set firmly within the framework of our alliances and regional
associations.9

Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 (Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1994). Hereinafter referred to as the 1994 Defence White Paper.
7 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra,
2000). Hereinafter referred to as the 2000 Defence White Paper.
8 Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987, ed. Department of Defence (Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987). Hereinafter referred to as the 1987 Defence White Paper.
9 Preface, Ibid., p. vii.
6
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While the theme of self-reliance was not new in defence planning, the 1987 Defence White Paper
recognised that it was an overwhelming task given the size of the Australian continent and the
extent of the Australian coastline. In terms of Australia’s defence relationship with Indonesia, the
White Paper acknowledged the need for Australia “to maintain a sound and constructive defence
relationship with Indonesia. The Australian government considered that such a relationship
should recognise fundamental features of our respective political and social systems”.10 The
1987 Defence White Paper stated that Indonesia’s stability was “an important factor in its own
security”11 and was important in strengthening the strategic interests between not only Australia
and Indonesia, but also the wider region. Given that the 1987 Defence White Paper was written
in the period of the Cold War, the defence relationship with the US was still of paramount
importance and while defence arrangements had been established with other countries within the
South-East Asian region, namely the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA),12 there had
been no formal agreement established with Indonesia other than joint training exercises.
However, the 1987 Defence White Paper revealed a shift in defence policy and gave reassurance
to Indonesia that Australia did not see Indonesia as a threat but rather an important part of
Australia’s security.
During the late 1980s and following the end of the Cold War, Evans as Minister for Foreign Affairs
promoted the idea of ‘cooperative security’ in terms of Australia’s strategic agenda. Evans’s
concept of cooperative security was a multidimensional approach that “emphasise[d] reassurance
rather than deterrence, [was] inclusive rather than exclusive, favour[ed] multilateralism over
bilateralism, and [did] not advance military solutions over non-military ones”.13 Evans was
attempting to change the mindset of policy makers from one of traditional realism that viewed the
region in terms of distrust, competition and conflict to one of reassurance, and in addition
expanding the notion of security to include economic and social cooperation. While it was
acknowledged that states were the principal actors in international security it also recognised that
non-state actors have a role to play. While the historical and cultural differences within the region
may have resulted in a difficulty in building a cooperative security agenda in the Asia-Pacific,
Evans believed that there was no reason why a security community within the Asia-Pacific, and
Clause 2.37, Ibid., p. 16.
Clause 2.35, Ibid., p. 15.
12 The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established in 1971 involves Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore consulting together in terms of any attack against Malaysia and Singapore. The
FPDA does not provide any concrete guarantees to Malaysia and Singapore only an agreement that consultation will
occur in terms of deciding any measures to be taken either jointly or separately should any threat occur.
13 Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, p. 102.
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particularly with Australia’s closest neighbour, Indonesia, could not be achieved. As noted by
Evans and Grant the primary focus of Gareth Evans’s Ministerial Statement of December 1989,
Australia’s Regional Security, was that Australia’s security was tied to that of the Asia-Pacific.14
In February 1994 Senator Ray, then Minister of Defence, tabled the Strategic Review 199315
document in the Senate. He stated that: “The clear message of this review is that Australia’s
security – like its economic future – lies in and with our region”16 and that it was the government’s
intention to expand the strategic relationship with the South-East Asian region. The Strategic
Review 1993 document was the first part of what was seen as a two-stage process by the
Keating government with the second part being a defence white paper. In 1994 the Keating
government issued the 1994 Defence White Paper which recognised that the foundation of
Australia’s defence policy was self-reliance and that “new trends [had] emerged which [would]
transform Australia’s strategic environment”.17

The changes that had occurred since the

establishment of the 1987 Defence White Paper were the end of the Cold War and the reduced
global threats. However, with this change there was also an increased need to develop strategic
relationships within the region “to take account of a more complex and changeable strategic
environment”.18 It was recognised that “Australia’s future security – like [its] economic prosperity
– [was] linked inextricably to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific”.19 This was in
keeping with the government’s Strategic Review 1993 and Senator Ray’s statement in the Senate
in February 1994.
The 1994 Defence White Paper further stated that Australia’s “defence relationships underpin the
development of closer links in other fields”.20 It was recognised that the Asia-Pacific region was
one of immense vitality both economically and strategically and to this end the highest priority
would be given to the defence approach taken by countries within the region in order to meet
Australia’s national interests.21 While the 1994 Defence White Paper refers to the importance of
Australia’s continued ties with the US, it gave less weight to the traditional alliance than previous
Ibid., p. 104. For a full discussion of Australia’s regional security perspective as outlined by Gareth Evans see
Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security: Ministerial Statement, ed. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989).
15 Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, ed. Department of Defence (Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 1993).
16 R.F. Ray, Ministerial Statements: Defence Strategic Review (Senate Hansard, 21 February 1994), p. 800.
17 Preface, Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p. iii.
18 Clause 2.19, Ibid., p. 11.
19 Clause 1.4, Ibid., p. 3.
20 Clause 1.4, Ibid.
21 Clause 1.6 and Clause 8.7, Ibid., p. 4 and 86.
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White Papers and much more weight was given to strategic engagement with states in Australia’s
immediate region. As Brown stated the 1994 Defence White Paper “builds ‘regional engagement’
into a central policy component along with self-reliance and alliance relationships”.22 Thus the
1994 Defence White Paper, while not removing Australia’s need for its traditional alliances in
terms of defence, moved Australian defence policy to favour building regional defence and
security relationships. Evans’s 1989 Ministerial Statement, Australia’s Regional Security, and the
1994 Defence White Paper reflected the changing nature of the international environment given
the breakdown of communism and the end of the Cold War. Both the Ministerial Statement and
the 1994 Defence White Paper emphasised the need for Australia to advance its security
interests by developing strategic partnerships with its regional neighbours.
In terms of Indonesia, Senator Ray stated in February 1994 that Indonesia was central to
Australia’s regional engagement.23 In the 1994 Defence White Paper it was recognised that
Indonesia’s developing economy was “potentially the most important strategic development in
South-East Asia over the coming decade and beyond”,24 and with this increased economic
development there would be the continued development of Indonesia’s armed forces in terms of
both “capabilities and professionalism”.25 The 1994 Defence White Paper stated that the defence
relationship with Indonesia was “our most important in the region and a key element in Australia’s
approach to regional defence engagement”.26 It was acknowledged that the defence relationship
had developed over the years and committed both states to furthering the relationship through
annual meetings of the Defence Ministers from both Indonesia and Australia, which were parallel
to the regular meetings as part of the AIMF.27 In addition, the bilateral defence relationship was
to be strengthened by developing the capability of both the Indonesian and Australian Defence
Forces through increasing the number of joint exercises involving “naval, land and air forces,
including special forces”.28 While the 1994 Defence White Paper recognised the need for shared
defence cooperation there was no mention of any formal agreement between Australia and
Indonesia, even in terms of consultation, such as the FPDA.

22 Gary Brown, Defending Australia: Issues in Australia's Post-Cold War Defence Policy, ed. Parliamentary Research
Service: Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Group (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), p. 8 of print
view.
23 Ray, Ministerial Statements: Defence Strategic Review, p. 800.
24 Clause 2.16, Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p. 10.
25 Clause 2.16, Ibid.
26 Clause 8.11, Ibid., p. 87.
27 Clause 8.12, Ibid.
28 Clause 8.14, Ibid.
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In 2000 the Howard government announced the fourth Defence White Paper since 1976 and the
first since 1994. The 2000 Defence White Paper recognised that security was a key state priority
in international affairs and stated that the armed forces would be the key to achieving a stable
and secure international environment. Importantly it recognised the high risk of security in the
Asia-Pacific region and the importance in ensuring a defence strategy that would take account of
this potential risk in Australia’s region.29 The 2000 Defence White Paper also identified new
demands faced by the Armed Forces in terms of “humanitarian relief, evacuations, peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement” and recognised other non-military threats that the Armed Forces may
well be involved with in terms of “cyber attack, organised crime, terrorism, illegal immigration, the
drug trade, illegal fishing, piracy and quarantine infringement”.30 Further, the 2000 Defence
White Paper outlined the role globalisation plays in the global strategic environment. This was
presented in terms of the US’s strategic dominance in defence. This interrelationship of both
globalisation and US dominance sent a clear message that the Howard government viewed the
relationship with the US as Australia’s highest priority. It pointed to the direction that the
government would take in terms of Australia’s national interests. Clearly the government’s focus
was on embracing globalisation and also on strengthening and deepening its alliance with the US
in terms of Australia’s national interests. The White Paper acknowledged ASEAN’s role in
developing a closer understanding within the region and also acknowledged a number of security
issues that would need to be managed if security in the region was to be maintained. It noted
particularly that Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the island states of the
Southwest Pacific “face large economic and structural challenges”31 and that these challenges
could have implications for regional security.
From the 1994 Defence White Paper to the 2000 Defence White Paper a different picture
emerges in terms of the priority of security. While the Keating government in 1994 perceived
Australia’s security as intertwined with the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, the
Howard government viewed the Asia-Pacific region as one of high risk to Australia. The
language had changed from that of the 1994 Defence White Paper, particularly Keating’s focus
on viewing Australia’s security in Asia. The 2000 Defence White Paper viewed the Asia-Pacific
as of high risk to Australian security and this was the basis for the view that Australia’s security
was to be best served from outside the region. As is noted in the 2000 Defence White Paper,

Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. viii.
Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. ix.
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Australia’s ‘strong’ alliance with the US was Australia’s most important strategic relationship. In
terms of the Asia-Pacific, outside the alliance with the US, its objective was to develop “bilateral
dialogues with key countries in the region”.32 The White Paper further stated: “In Southeast Asia,
we will maintain and develop strategic relationships to encourage regional cooperation and help,
where we can, in the development of appropriate military capabilities”.33 While the 2000 Defence
White Paper noted the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, Australia’s alliance with the US was
first and foremost the priority and the government’s position was that this alliance would “support
our bilateral, regional and global interests over the next decade and beyond”.34
The question to ask is - To what extent is the refocus of Australia’s alliance with the US as the
priority in terms of Australia’s national security interests during the period of the Howard
government a change from the period of the Keating government, which viewed Australia’s
security as irrevocably linked to that of Asia? Since the Second World War all successive
Australian governments have affirmed the importance of Australia’s alliance with the US. Even
after 1991 when the Keating Labor government came into power the US alliance was still of major
importance as was noted in the 1994 Defence White Paper: “Our alliance with the United States
remains a key element of our defence policy”.35 However, of equal importance for the Keating
government was the point that Australia’s security was linked to Asia and the Pacific36 and further
that “Australia’s defence relationship with Indonesia [was] our most important in South-East Asia
and a key element in Australia’s approach to regional defence engagement”.37
The language of the 2000 Defence White Paper, however, suggests a rebalancing of Australia’s
strong alliance with the US and a recognition that the Asia-Pacific region was less important than
the US security relationship. While the White Paper stated that relationships were important
within the region, “developing bilateral dialogues” seems a downgrade of the relationship with the
Asian region compared with the Keating government’s approach where Australia’s security was
inextricably linked to the Asia-Pacific region. The language suggests not only that the Howard
government were committed to strengthening and maintaining a strong alliance with the US, but
also that the security relationship with the Asia-Pacific was less important. While the 2000
Defence White Paper committed the government “to working with the Indonesian government to
Ibid., p. x.
Ibid., p. xi.
34 Ibid., p. x.
35 Clause S.26, Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p. 157.
36 Clause 1.4, Ibid., p. 3.
37 Clause S.23, Ibid., p. 157.
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establish, over time, a new defence relationship that would serve our enduring shared strategic
interests”,38 the emphasis given by the Keating government to developing a strong strategic
relationship with Indonesia had lost some of its importance during the period of the Howard
government. The commitment to a new defence relationship with Indonesia seemed to simply
recognise the proximity of Indonesia to Australia and the need to rebuild a strategic security
relationship that had been severed by the events in East Timor in 1999. While the Howard
government was committed to working with the Indonesian government, the level of this
commitment was not clear in terms of the 2000 Defence White Paper and showed that the
Australia-Indonesia security relationship had become less important. The language of the White
Paper shows clearly that regional security relations were not the Howard government’s first
priority and that the focus of the security relationship was strengthening defence cooperation with
the US.
In 2003 the Howard government issued what was to be one of three Defence Updates, titled
Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003. This was the first update since the 2000
Defence White Paper when the security focus begins to change. This change was inevitable
given the events of September 11 and the level of strategic uncertainty that was brought to bear
on the international community and particularly on nations of the West. The two issues of most
relevance were terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) along with what the Defence
Update called “adverse trends”39 in our immediate neighbourhood. What the 2003 Defence
Update referred to were the “major economic, political, governance and social challenges”40
faced by a number of countries within Australia’s immediate neighbourhood, particularly
Indonesia. As the Update states:
…diverse internal and transnational problems are still likely to produce non-terrorist related security
challenges [in South-East Asia]. People smuggling, illegal fishing and money laundering feed off and
exacerbate existing difficulties. Corruption, population and environmental pressures add to the troubles.
Together, these challenges leave our nearer neighbours vulnerable to transnational threats.41

While these challenges were recognised in the 2000 Defence White Paper, the 2003 Update was
concerned at the lack of progress in terms of these challenges. As the 2003 Defence Update
noted, “some of these countries have made little progress against the daunting economic, political
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. xi.
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003, p. 7.
40 Ibid., p. 18.
41 Ibid., pp. 18-9.
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and social challenges they faced in the year 2000”.42 The 2003 Defence Update was significant
in the sense that it raised more specifically the increased lack of strategic certainty for Australia’s
security agenda. In an attempt to meet this uncertainty the Update translated this into a need for
“flexibility and adaptability”.43
The threat of global terrorism was a major feature of the 2003 Defence Update and while it was
recognised in the Update that terrorism had occurred prior to September 11, the significance of
September 11 was that it changed the degree to which organisations, such as Al Qaida,44 were
willing to inflict large numbers of casualties on civilian targets. Terrorist organisations used the
very processes of globalisation which Australia had signalled as likely to play a significant role in
the strategic agenda: namely the ability to organise finances, personnel and technology across
open borders, to achieve their objectives.

The Bali terrorist attacks further highlighted a

significant change in this strategic uncertainty. The Bali attacks confirmed the links between
existing regional extremist groups and global Islamic terrorism. Australia’s response to this in
terms of its strategic focus was in effect two-fold. One, it strengthened its alliance arrangements
by supporting the US in its “war on terror”. Second, it highlighted the need for cooperation within
the region as the Bali attacks brought the terrorist threat much closer to Australia and Australians
given that eighty eight of the two hundred and two killed were Australian citizens. This resulted in
Australia entering into a MoU on Combating International Terrorism with Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand and as noted in the 2003 Defence Update, negotiations were underway with other
governments within the region.45 I will discuss the MoU with Indonesia in more detail in the next
chapter.
In 2005 the Howard government issued a second update titled Australia’s National Security: A
Defence Update 200546 which further endorsed the 2003 Update in which terrorism and
countering the proliferation of WMDs was the most important issue facing Australian security.
While the 2005 Update recognised terrorism and WMD proliferation as a major threat to
Australia’s strategic environment, it also raised the issue of failing states as one of “significant
concern because the insecurity they face can easily move beyond their borders”.47 While it was
Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 9.
44 The author has used the spelling that DFAT use in their publications.
45 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003, pp. 11-4.
46 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005, ed. Department of Defence
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2005).
47 Ibid., p. 3.
42
43

121

recognised that some protection was afforded to Australia as an island state, the issue of failing
states was seen as a new security threat for Australia. As noted in the 2005 Update:
Failing states may provide the opportunity for recruiting, training and deploying terrorists. A vacuum of
governance and law and order creates an environment within which these groups can flourish…
The risk of convergence between failing states, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD remains a major
and continuing threat to international security.48

In terms of Defence Policy, the 2005 Update maintained the alliance with the US as the most
important security relationship for Australia. This maintained the position of both the 2000
Defence White Paper and the 2003 Defence Update where Australia’s relationship with the US
was seen as the cornerstone of Australia’s security.
In terms of the security relationship with Indonesia, the 2005 Defence Update stated that
“Australia attaches high priority to working with Indonesia on common security issues, particularly
terrorism and border security”.49

The 2005 Update reaffirmed and continued the security

priorities of the 2003 Update by focussing Australia’s security relationship on the continuing threat
of terrorism, particularly following terrorist attacks in Jakarta and Bali. It also stated, however,
that the focus of the relationship with Indonesia would be developed “at a pace comfortable to
both countries”.50 The lack of urgency in the 2005 Defence Update shows a lack of interest in
increasing the pace and level of any formal arrangements with the Indonesian government, and in
terms of identifying Australia’s key defence relationships, Indonesia is not mentioned as one of
Australia’s key defence relationships. This is despite the 2005 Defence Update stating that
“Indonesia’s importance to the Asia-Pacific region and to Australia should not be
underestimated”.51 For the Howard government, while Indonesia was seen as important to
Australia’s security in terms of the critical role it played in counter-terrorism, the importance given
to Indonesia had decreased by 2005 and the relationship was only discussed in terms of
Australia’s relationships within South-East Asia. This was even a change from the 2000 Defence
White Paper where “developing bilateral dialogues” was reduced to Indonesia being mentioned
as part of the South-East Asian region. This was a change to the relationship that was seen as
most important during the Keating government where Australia’s security was linked with Asia’s
security and prosperity and Indonesia was viewed as the most important strategic relationship
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 14.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 8.
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within South-East Asia in achieving this objective. There was also a notable difference from the
2000 Defence White Paper where “bilateral dialogues” with key regional countries, of which
Indonesia would have been one, were still viewed as important to one where Indonesia was only
considered as a part of the South-East Asian security community more broadly.
In 2007 the Howard government issued what was to be their final Defence Update titled
Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2007.52 As in the previous two updates both
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD remained the most important immediate threats to
Australian security alongside the risks associated with fragile states which had been recognised
in the 2005 Defence Update. The US-Australia alliance also remained the most strategically
significant relationship in terms of Australia’s security and the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
In terms of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, terrorism and border security remained the
major threats and the conclusion of the Agreement between Australia and the Republic of
Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation signed in 2006 recognised the renewal of
defence ties with Indonesia. I will discuss this agreement in more detail in the next chapter. The
Agreement largely reflects the Howard government’s belief that the security relationship with
Indonesia was critical only in terms of counter-terrorism cooperation and combating transnational
crime. It did, however, signal a renewal of the security relationship that had been disrupted
following the crisis in East Timor in 1999.
The most significant difference between the Keating and Howard governments in terms of
defence policy was not so much in terms of the US alliance as both governments recognised the
strategic importance for Australia to maintain a close relationship with the US. Rather, the
difference becomes visible in the two governments’ view of Asia and specifically Indonesia. For
the Keating government, Australia’s security was closely associated with prosperity and security
in Asia and the relationship with Indonesia was fundamentally important in terms of South-East
Asia. For the Howard government, Australia’s security was to be sought from Asia. The Howard
government did not view the potential threats to Australia’s defence in terms of a threat to
Australian territory, but rather in terms of terrorism and instability within countries in the Asian
region and particularly South-East Asia. The Howard government took the view that the most
effective solution to these potential threats was to maintain and increase Australia’s alliance with
the US. While the relationship with Indonesia was important, and certainly the completion of the
52 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007 (Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 2007).
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Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation established a sense of revitalisation of the
defence ties that had been severed in 1999, this Agreement was mainly concerned with issues
such as terrorism, people-smuggling and illegal fishing as areas of common concern. This did
not change the fundamental focus that Australia’s security was to be sought from Asia. It is
instructive, then, to compare the Agreement negotiated by the Howard government in 2006 with
that negotiated by the Keating government in 1995. The 1995 Agreement on Maintaining
Security is the focus of my argument in the next section.

The Agreement on Maintaining Security
Defence cooperation between Australia and Indonesia was seen as strategically important to the
Keating government and this was confirmed by Senator Ray, the then Minister for Defence, when
asked in the Senate on 10 December 1992 whether the Australian government would cancel all
defence cooperation due to the human rights violations by the Indonesian military in East Timor.
In his reply Senator Ray stated:
No. A close defence relationship between Australian and Indonesia is in Australia’s strategic interests.
This defence relationship is based on a recognition that both countries have a common interest in the
maintenance of security and stability in the South East Asian region. Therefore, cooperative defence
activities, such as training, study visits and joint exercises, are directed towards the development of wide
ranging contacts between members of the armed forces of each country. This increases knowledge and
understanding between the two defence establishments and promotes a greater appreciation of our shared
interests.53

This confirmed the Keating government’s position that the defence relationship with Indonesia
remained Australia’s most important in the region and would include the continuation of joint
training exercises despite the continued human rights abuses by the Indonesian military.
In terms of security and defence, a number of initiatives were developed during the period of the
Keating government that reflected the government’s approach to cooperative security and
Keating’s stated view that Australia needed to seek security “in Asia”.54 The development and
eventual signing in December 1995 of the Agreement on Maintaining Security was part of
Australia’s new approach to security where Australian security was seen in terms of the AsiaPacific region and in developing stronger relations between Indonesia and Australia. As Keating
53
54
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notes, Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas had developed a broad agreement “that would cover basic
principles of the relationship in all its dimensions, including defence”, however, he “was decidedly
unenthusiastic about it”.55 Keating believed that what was required to strengthen the relationship
was a “strong strategic foundation”.56 For Keating, the development of a security agreement was
part of his desire for building ‘ballast’ in the relationship and a way in which Australia and
Indonesia could “declare our common strategic interests and agree to consult in the event of any
strategic threat”.57
The agreement was negotiated in secret and provided a framework for Australia and Indonesia to
discuss and guide the security issues that were likely to emerge within the region in the 21st
century.58 The agreement committed both governments to:
-…consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to
develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and that of the region.
-…consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests
and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly…
-…agree to promote…mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field…59

The provisions of the agreement were largely self-explanatory. While regular ministerial meetings
had already been established under the AIMF, the Agreement on Maintaining Security
established a new round of dialogue at Ministerial level on security matters and can only be
viewed as a positive step in the political relationship. In terms of consulting on ‘adverse
challenges’ this in no way required either party to do anything more than consult. There was no
obligation on the part of either Australia or Indonesia to take any action in terms of ‘adverse
challenges’ to the territory of either party. This was consistent with other security arrangements
that Australia had established and more closely resembled Australia’s obligation under the FPDA,
the Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea
and the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America
(ANZUS). While there is an obligation on the parties to more than consult under ANZUS, the
Treaty does not necessarily impose an obligation to do more than this. The final part of the
Agreement on Maintaining Security simply represents the cooperative relationship that had
Ibid., pp. 139-40.
Ibid., p. 140.
57 Ibid., p. 141.
58 Bhakti, "Facing the 21st Century: Security Cooperation," p. 60.
59 Articles 1-3, Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on
Maintaining Security. A copy of the Agreement can be found in Volume Two - Appendices.
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already been established between Australia and Indonesia in terms of training exercises at all
areas of the defence force. Essentially, the Agreement formalised the increased level of bilateral
cooperation that had been developed through other aspects of the relationship.
While largely symbolic, the Agreement was, however, significant as it recognised the shared
strategic interests that both Australia and Indonesia had in South-East Asia and confirmed the
willingness of both governments to cooperate to advance and defend those interests. For
Indonesia, it was the first security instrument ever established with another country and signalled
a revision of Indonesia’s preference “to pursue a ‘free and active’ foreign policy”.60 However, the
Agreement was a surprise to Indonesia’s ASEAN partners and was greeted with some criticism in
Australia. The signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security in 1995 formed part of Evans’s
concept of cooperative security and the need for comprehensive engagement with countries
within the Asian region on security issues.

For Australia the Agreement represented an

acknowledgement of the need for a strong strategic relationship with Indonesia in terms of
Australia’s security, and the strengthening and consolidation of a relationship that had often been
marked by controversy. It was an example of Keating’s desire to establish a strong structural
foundation to the relationship that would overcome misunderstandings that occurred within it. As
Keating noted, “The underlying force of the agreement lay in recognition by Australia and
Indonesia that each had a fundamental interest in the security of the other, and was prepared to
cooperate to protect this interest”.61 The Agreement also meant that Australia had concluded
formal arrangements with all its major close neighbours and as Keating noted: “An arc of friendly
countries across Australia’s north provided Australia’s best protection against threat from any
country within the arc or beyond it”.62

Gary Brown, Frank Frost, and Stephen Sherlock, The Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement - Issues and
Implications, ed. Parliamentary Research Service: Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Group (Parliament of Australia,
1995-96), p. 2 of print view.
61 Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, p. 144.
62 Ibid., p. 146.
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Very few people either within or outside the government would have suggested that an
agreement, which adopted Evans’s concept of cooperative security, would have been achieved
between Australia and Indonesia. As is noted in Australia’s Strategic Policy:
The AMS [Agreement on Maintaining Security] would suggest that Indonesia now sees its security interests
and ours more closely aligned and is prepared to work with Australia in pursuing common objectives. This
provides an important opportunity to strengthen further our relationship”.63

The Agreement was an indication of the level of diplomacy of reassurance between the two
countries and while the language of the Agreement may have been somewhat vague, it was a
strong symbolic acknowledgement of the level of trust that had developed between the Keating
and Indonesian governments.
The Agreement was important to both governments, though as already noted it was more
significant in its symbolic importance than in the actual terms of the Agreement. The underlying
symbolic importance was that Australia had no need to perceive any threat from Indonesia as had
occurred in the past.

From Australia’s perspective the Agreement established a positive

relationship and strengthened the broader bilateral relationship that had been developed between
Indonesia and Australia. It lent weight to Evans’s idea of cooperative security and established a
strategy of reassurance. The Agreement was also an attempt to signal to ASEAN that Australia
was committed to security cooperation and stability within the region and it reflected the
recognition by Indonesia and Australia that they shared a strategic interest in maintaining stability
in South-East Asia.
For Indonesia, the Agreement reflected five points of long-term interest to the Indonesian
government.

First, the Agreement indicated to the Australian government and the wider

Australian community that Indonesia was not a threat to Australian security. Second, the
Agreement was a symbolic declaration of Australia’s importance to Indonesia. Both these
interests, while serving Indonesia’s long-term interests also formed part of Australia’s cooperative
security agenda of reassurance. Third, it signalled that Australia was a friendly country and had
developed a high level of technical competence in military training and defence.

Fourth,

63 Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, ed. Department of Defence (Commonwealth of Australia,
1997), p. 22.
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Indonesia wished to acquire certain benefits from Australia’s technologically advanced defence
industry. Finally, the Agreement reflected Indonesia’s need for Australia’s diplomatic effort and
support in reducing anti-Indonesian feeling within Australia and internationally, particularly given
Indonesia’s actions in East Timor and Irian Jaya.64
While the Agreement was perceived by Keating as the pinnacle of the close and trusting political
relationship that had developed between Indonesia and Australia, there were others who had
major criticisms of the Agreement. The first concern went to the public’s perception of Australia’s
traditional alliances with the US and the United Kingdom as being of major importance to
Australia’s national security interests. With the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security,
Australia had established a security alliance with a country that had not been perceived as an
ally. The government made the assumption that the public would accept the sharing of defence
knowledge and a new security alliance with a country that had in the past been perceived with
varying degrees of suspicion, particularly with a regime that had invaded and occupied East
Timor with the use of protracted force. While the Agreement in and of itself did not commit
Australia to any defence action in support of Indonesia, it did commit Australia to consult on
matters of common security and develop areas of defence cooperation with a state which had
been invariably perceived as a threat in the Australian imagination. Brown, Frost and Sherlock
from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group suggested that one of the major benefits of
the Agreement lay “in its ability to assuage some of these fears by presenting Indonesia as an
‘ally’ rather than an ‘adversary’”.65 However, the 1999 survey which stated that sixty two percent
of Australians perceived Indonesia as posing a potential threat to Australia,66 suggests that the
Agreement did not meet this goal and the continued use of force in East Timor did not change
this perception.
The second criticism related to the growing opposition within Australia in relation to Indonesia’s
human rights abuses, particularly in East Timor, but also in other parts of the archipelago, such
as Aceh. The Australian public’s opposition to the continued human rights abuses in East Timor
backed by the Indonesian military had grown over a period of twenty years and Keating was well
aware of this opposition and the opposition within his own party. The Agreement indicated to
opponents of the Indonesian military that Australia had entered into a security agreement that
Bhakti, "Facing the 21st Century: Security Cooperation," pp. 62-4.
Brown, Frost, and Sherlock, The Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement - Issues and Implications, p. 9 of print
view.
66 Brown, Military Threats Versus Security Problems: Australia's Emerging Strategic Environment, p. 2 of print view.
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would “lend respectability to a military dictatorship that shows no sign of moving toward
democracy”,67 and further that the Agreement gave legitimacy to those activities. For opponents
of the Agreement it enmeshed Australia with an authoritarian regime and legitimised the
repressive actions of that regime. In formalising the Agreement on Maintaining Security the
Australian public were left with the view that in order to maintain a lasting relationship with
Indonesia the government would take a pragmatic rather than a principled approach to human
rights based on what was perceived to be in Australia’s national interests. This was nothing new
as successive Australian governments since 1975 had taken the same stand where East Timor
and Indonesia were concerned.

However, the security initiatives taken by the Keating

government drew further criticism as they signalled a higher level of legitimacy to the internal
security actions of the Indonesian military.
A third criticism concerned the secrecy of the negotiations. As Brown, Frost and Sherlock noted:
“A number of commentators and political figures were critical of the fact that the Agreement was
negotiated privately and signed without public or Parliamentary scrutiny”.68 Keating defended the
secret negotiations on the basis that early revelations of the negotiations would have resulted in
no Agreement, and that the general direction of the government’s policy on Indonesia had been
well known in the public arena.69 In March 1994 Keating gave one example of the government’s
policy position:
Changes in Australia and Indonesia and in the world since the end of the Cold War should compel us to
take a fresh look at our strategic relationship.

I believe great potential exists for further defence

cooperation between Australia and Indonesia…If we are to turn into reality our policy of seeking defence in
and with Asia, instead of against Asia, Indonesia is the most important place it will have to be done. 70

While Keating may have believed that this pointed to the government’s policy being well known, it
hardly translates into public knowledge of the negotiation of a new security agreement. There is
another issue here in relation to the secrecy of the negotiations that rests on the potential abuse
of executive power in terms of the national interest. If Keating is to be believed, any earlier
announcement of the negotiations of the Agreement would have resulted in no Agreement and
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therefore it was in Australia’s national interest for the government to continue with the negotiation
of the Agreement in secret. However, as Burton noted this “can also be seen as the executive’s
attempt to protect its own interests through a cynical appeal to the public’s fear and insecurity”.71
Keating suggested that the negotiation of the Agreement may have produced a negative reaction
for the government. However, in terms of open government and the importance of issues that are
viewed in Australia’s national interest, “it is proper and legitimate that the government’s
formulation [of national interest] be subjected to sustained and continuous debate”.72
Considering the significance of the potential Agreement in terms of domestic acceptance, there
was a need for the government to give voice to its intentions and allow broader discussion of
those intentions to take place. While it is conceivable that the content of the talks should remain
secret, the public and Parliament should have been advised that talks were proceeding and an
examination should have been undertaken by Parliament prior to the Agreement being finalised.
This would have allowed for more sustained debate and would have legitimised the government’s
actions in terms of what was in the national interest.
A fourth criticism stems from the timing of the signing of the Agreement by Keating. Keating is
seen to have taken advantage of domestic political considerations. He stated that he had not
pursued the Agreement for domestic political considerations and believed in fact that the
Agreement may have been detrimental to the government.73 Dalrymple notes, however, that
“when the Agreement was announced it appeared to be quite well received in Australia”,74
suggesting that Keating’s assessment that it might have been detrimental can be questioned.
Duncan Campbell noted that, “Treated suspiciously, the sniggers from the inner circle of Foreign
Affairs and Defence negotiators in the loop that it would win the coming election against John
Howard made it disgraceful diplomacy dishonestly presented”.75 This suggests that Keating was
attempting in his book, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, to make a retrospective
justification for the timing of the Agreement and that it was timed for domestic political
consideration. In retrospect the announcement of the signing of the Agreement came as a real
surprise to the Australian public. The government had done little to foreshadow such a radical
step.76
Burton, Scrutiny or secrecy? Committee oversight of foreign and national security policy in the Australian
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A final criticism relates to the international reaction to the Agreement, particularly in South-East
Asia. The secrecy of the negotiations meant that members of ASEAN were not informed of the
negotiation of the Agreement. While some members “extended the ‘diplomatic courtesy’ of
describing the agreement as ‘positive’ and ‘good’”,77 in some respects the lack of enthusiasm and
the fact that Indonesia had kept ASEAN members in the dark over the Agreement, leads one to
suspect that the Agreement may not have led to Australia being seen to belong in Asia. It is likely
to have fuelled suspicions of Australia’s agenda in securing the Agreement within the wider
context of cooperative security with Asia.
The Agreement did not achieve what Keating had hoped it would achieve, namely lay strong
foundations for the future relationship. While the Howard government upon gaining office in 1996
reaffirmed the Agreement, the Indonesian government withdrew from the Agreement on 16
September 1999 following Australia’s announcement on 10 September 1999 to review the
defence relationship with Indonesia and its role in East Timor’s independence in 1999. This
marked a major interruption in the defence relationship between Indonesia and Australia that had
continued from the 1960s, and “reduced the level of mutual confidence in the defence
relationship”.78 Hugh White notes that the interruption in the defence relationship was not just
Indonesia’s aggravation with Australia but also; “Anger in Australia, including within the Australian
Defence Force (ADF), over the conduct of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) in East Timor
raised doubts about the value of the defence relationship”.79

While Australia’s defence

relationship with Indonesia was never completely severed by the East Timor crisis, it certainly
created a major interruption in the defence relationship and had a detrimental effect on the overall
relationship.
The signing of the MoU between Australia and Indonesia on Combating International Terrorism in
February 2002 assisted in restoring a level of defence involvement between the two nations and
provided the imperative for the security relationship to progress. The issue of counter-terrorism
played a major role in a restoration of some aspects of the relationship following 1999 and
resulted in the signing of the MoU and the 2006 Agreement on the Framework for Security
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Cooperation which largely focuses on security cooperation in relation to counter-terrorism, people
smuggling and border control. I will discuss both the MoU and the Agreement on the Framework
for Security Cooperation in the following chapter.

Security Training
A discussion of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia in terms of security is not complete without
a brief discussion of the issues associated with cooperative defence training. Joint security
training exercises, particularly the joint exercises between Australia’s Special Air Service
Regiment and Kopassus, have created adverse reactions from the Australian public resulting in
problems for the political relationship between Australia and Indonesia. Defence cooperation
between Australia and Indonesia had been ongoing since the early 1970s and as identified in the
JCFADT Report, Australia’s Relations with Indonesia:
From the early 1970s, the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) was the framework for cooperative
defence activities. These emphasised assisting the development of Indonesia’s capabilities and included,
at various times, provision of Sabre aircraft, Attack-class patrol boats and Nomad aircraft, together with
assistance in surveying and mapping the archipelago.80

Due to problems in the political relationship between Australia and Indonesia following the
publication in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1986 of an article by David Jenkins that focussed on
the financial dealings and corruption of Suharto and his family, the program was cancelled at
Indonesia’s request in 1988.81

However, in the 1990s the two nations resumed defence

cooperation and undertook a range of security activities that emphasised practical cooperation of
mutual benefit, including security training in a wide range of security and military disciplines. As
Senator Ray stated in the Senate on 24 March 1992, training occurred “in a wide range of
technical and military disciplines”.82 Keating himself told Parliament in May 1992, following his
first visit to Indonesia as Prime Minister, that he had told both Suharto and the then Indonesian
Defence Minister Murdani that Australia had an “interest in expanding contacts [defence contacts]
such as high-level consultations, joint exercises, and training exchanges”.83 In February 1994
Senator Ray confirmed in the Senate that priority would be given to joint exercises and training.84
Clause 6.2.5, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
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As Allan Behm noted, while the resumption of security cooperation was at first quite tentative in
the early 1990s, by 1993 defence activities between the two countries had accelerated and the
Special Air Service Regiment and Kopassus had resumed cooperative defence activities, though
this was limited.85 With the renewal of training exercises between Australia’s Special Air Service
Regiment and Kopassus in 1993, DFAT undertook a review of the exercises and stated that they
were intended “‘to foster our regional defence relationship’ and not ‘to improve the capability of
the Indonesian armed forces to deal with internal security matters’”.86 Roderic Pitty also noted
that staff at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta believed that defence connections with Kopassus
were essential and described the relationship “as presently the centre point of the army to army
relationship”.87 While suggesting this they did, however, note that:
…the major risk of the developing relationship with Kopassus is that Kopassus may become involved in
unsavoury activity open to allegations of breaches of human rights and that Australia, through its contacts
with Kopassus, be associated with that activity.88

While the Embassy was aware of the potential risk to Australia, and that Kopassus was
responsible for human rights violations in East Timor and Aceh, they “argued that Australia
should continue to provide ‘counter terrorist training facilities’ to Indonesia, in order to maintain
access to top Indonesian leaders”.89 The continued defence cooperation was also confirmed in
the 1994 Defence White Paper as an important element in strengthening the bilateral
relationship.90
However, with the violence occurring in East Timor between the 1980s and 1990s the continued
defence training exercises were questioned by an increasingly vocal Australian public and
members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. All were horrified by the abuse
that they believed was instigated by the Indonesian trained militia. In the Senate in 1992 in a
response to a question regarding defence equipment from Australia being used in East Timor,
Allan Behm, "Cooperation With Kopassus? Take Care!," Agenda, 10, no. 1 (2003): p. 14. “Allan Behm was
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Senator Ray stated that Australia had “not provided any arms, ammunition or equipment to
Indonesia which would be directly relevant to the kind of military operations conducted in East
Timor”.91 When questioned about the training given to the Indonesian Armed Forces personnel in
Australia and the continued cooperative training exercises between the ADF and the Indonesian
equivalent in the JCFADT inquiry, Lieutenant-General Baker advised the Committee that:

•

training only goes ahead when there are common interests and there are areas where there
would not be any benefits to either country, and

•

therefore, what is provided has very little relevance to the internal or security function carried out
by ABRI [Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia].92

The Report, however, noted that:
While accepting this argument, and the statement that the killings in Dili resulted from a breakdown in the
ABRI command system, the Committee was uneasy about his [Lieutenant-General Baker’s] further
statement: that the skills being taught are not applicable to crowd control or riot control.93

The JCFADT Report further stated that the committee was concerned over reports that Kopassus
troops had received two weeks training in Australia and that troops from the Kopassus regiment
had been linked to human rights abuses in Aceh where it was reported that 2000 people had
allegedly been killed since 1989.94 The concern with the continued joint training exercises with
Indonesia, particularly in light of the continued violence in East Timor, and the concern that the
training was potentially used for internal security within Indonesia, became major concerns for the
JCFADT:
It may be true that Australia’s cooperative training program with Indonesia is directed towards those areas
where there are interests in common. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the skills and training passed on
can be used even in the most general way as part of the internal security role of most of ABRI. While there
can be no exception taken to training which enhances Indonesia’s ability to defend itself against external
aggression, Australian training which could be used against other Indonesians is another matter.95

Ray, Answers to Questions - Indonesia, p. 1011.
Clause 6.3.3, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 72.
93 Clause 6.3.4, Ibid.
94 Clause 6.3.5, Ibid.
95 Clause 6.5.9, Ibid., p. 77.
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The concern with the continued joint exercises with Indonesian troops also became an issue in
both Houses of Parliament, and in the Senate on 27 September 1993 Senator Evans was asked
to give justification for increasing training with Kopassus in light of the human rights abuses in
East Timor. In reply Senator Evans stated that: “Australian training for Indonesian military
personnel aims to enhance Indonesia’s self-defence capability and is not directed to the
Indonesian Armed Forces internal security function, whether in East Timor or elsewhere in
Indonesia”.96
In light of the JCFADT concern the Committee recommended that:
…the Department of Defence review the appropriateness of training provided to Indonesian military
personnel to ensure that:

•

training in international standards of human rights behaviour is provided as an integral part of the
defence cooperation program; and

•

training which is provided is directed towards the acquisition of operational military skills and not
those which should more appropriately be given to civil police.97

In response to this recommendation Senator Evans stated in the Senate on 2 June 1994:
The ADF does not provide training or undertake other cooperative activities with the Indonesian Armed
Forces in skills designed to enhance internal security or counter-insurgency capability. The limited
cooperation that has occurred between the ADF and Indonesian Special Forces (KOPASSUS) forms a
very small part of the wider defence relationship with Indonesia.98

Public opposition in Australia to the defence cooperation between Australia and Indonesia,
particularly with Kopassus, continued in the 1990s, and in the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade References Committee Report East Timor of 2000, this concern was expressed by a
number of witnesses before the Senate Committee. These witnesses expressed concern that
Australia was engaging in joint exercises and training with Kopassus who were responsible for

96 Gareth Evans, Question on Notice: Defence Force: Indonesia (Senate Hansard, 27 September 1993), p. 1239.
Further concern on the issues of joint training and the links to human rights abuses internally in Indonesia were also
expressed in the Senate for example, J Woodley, Ministerial Statements: Defence Strategic Review (Senate
Hansard, 21 February 1994), p. 811.
97 Clause 6.5.13, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 78.
98 Gareth Evans, Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: Report: Government response
(Senate Hansard, 2 June 1994), p. 1232.
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human rights abuses in Indonesia against their own people. Further, the witnesses called for a
total review of the defence cooperation program to ensure that Australia was not involved in joint
activities that contributed to Indonesia’s internal security.99
On the other side though, there were those from a number of government sources who defended
Australia’s activities in relation to cooperation with Kopassus, pointing out that cooperation with
Kopassus had been limited to basic skills training and training in counter-terrorism and counterhijack methods.100 Lieutenant-General John Sanderson from the ADF defended Australia’s
position in training Indonesians in military cooperation and stated that there was no reason to
believe that the training given to the Indonesians had led to human rights abuses in East Timor or
in other internal security operations.101
However, with Australia’s decision to review the defence relationship with Indonesia, and further
its role in East Timor’s independence in 1999, the concern over Australia’s links with Kopassus
were temporarily assuaged when the bilateral defence cooperation was partly suspended with “a
significant scaling back across a wide range of activity”.102 The announcement of the review and
the subsequent abrogation of the Agreement on Maintaining Security due to the East Timor crisis
damaged the defence relationship and resulted in many of the previous activities jointly
undertaken being downgraded or cancelled, one of these was training exercises between ABRI
and the ADF.103 Nevertheless, the strategic uncertainty created by September 11 and the Bali
terrorist attacks stimulated the need for resumption of security cooperation between Australia and
Indonesia including a resumption of links with Kopassus. This is confirmed in the JCFADT
Report Near Neighbours – Good Neighbours as the Committee was advised that the government
had directed the Department of Defence to “seek to further restore confidence in the relationship
through senior level dialogue and by increasing the level of training and advisory assistance
provided to the TNI”.104 The Report further noted that the Department of Defence advised in its
submission to the JCFADT that: “discussions have commenced with Indonesia about ‘how best to
resume limited defence cooperation to combat terrorism specifically in the areas of hostage

Clauses 8.33, 8.34 and 8.36, Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, East Timor, pp.
202-3.
100 Clauses 8.37, 8.38 and 8.39, Ibid., p. 203.
101 Clause 8.43, Ibid., p. 205.
102 Clause 8.48, Ibid., p. 206.
103 Clause 3.15, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours - Good
Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, p. 38.
104 Clause 3.17, Ibid.
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recovery and counter-hijack’”.105 The Department of Defence advised the JCFADT that the
justification for doing this was on the basis that Kopassus was the most capable agency in
dealing with counter-terrorism in Indonesia and for this reason cooperation in terms of the
counter-terrorism unit was appropriate.106 DFAT also advised the committee that Kopassus were
the most capable defence entity for dealing with terrorist issues. However, “the Government
[was] committed to limiting our cooperation to exclude those people we know have been involved
in serious human rights abuses”.107 How DFAT believed they were going to achieve this is
questionable when they have no control over the personnel in the Armed Defence Forces of
another country.
The re-engagement of the defence relationship was, however, one of the most controversial
issues raised in the inquiry, particularly the prospect of resumption of engagement with
Kopassus. It was evident that the Committee was concerned about the limitations embedded in
cooperating with Kopassus. While the JCFADT identified difficulties for the Howard government
in balancing the government’s responsibility to protect the safety of Australian citizens against the
government’s hesitation to be seen to be supporting Kopassus, and had doubts about
cooperation with Kopassus, the JCFADT strongly endorsed “Australia’s efforts to rebuild the
defence relationship with Indonesia”.108 While some dissented from this view in the JCFADT,
overall the committee seemed to take the view that the cooperation between the ADF and the TNI
that had been evident following the Bali bombing meant that it was extremely important that there
was open communication and recognition of the changing nature of the role of the Indonesian
military.109 Given the continued issues of violence within the internal territory of Indonesia and
the widespread public opinion focussing on the ongoing issues of human rights abuses in relation
to Kopassus, it was difficult for the Australian government to substantiate its position of continuing
training exercises with Kopassus. This was further complicated by knowledge that Kopassus had
provided support and assistance to terrorist groups within Indonesia.110
Both the Keating and Howard governments continued the defence cooperation with Kopassus,
even though both governments were aware of the human rights issues linked to Kopassus in East
Clause 3.21, Ibid., p. 39.
Clause 3.22, Ibid.
107 Clause 3.23, Ibid.
108 Clauses 3.31 and 3.32, Ibid., p. 41.
109 Clauses 3.33 and 3.36, Ibid., pp. 41-2.
110 Behm, "Cooperation With Kopassus? Take Care!," p. 16., Anthony Burke, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence:
War against the Other (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 118., Alan Dupont, "The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia
Re-engage?," Agenda, 10, no. 1 (2003): p. 19.
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Timor and Aceh. Further, the Howard government was prepared to resume joint activities with
Kopassus on the basis of its capability in terms of counter-terrorism. It seems that both
governments had not learnt the lessons of the past in terms of denying moral considerations in
foreign policy in favour of a narrow set of national interests. The realist approach to policy
making had continued and was dominant.

It was unrealistic of the Keating and Howard

governments to believe that Kopassus would not use the skills carried out in the cooperative
security exercises in internal security issues. There was no possibility of Australian governments
being able to control the activities of the TNI or Kopassus. The Australian Embassy in Jakarta
stated that it was desirable to maintain contact with Kopassus on the basis that it gave Australia
access to top leadership within the Indonesian Defence Forces and the government.111 However,
this did not licence Australia’s continued involvement with defence forces that were known to be
involved in human rights abuses against their own people and support for terrorist groups, the
very groups that Kopassus was meant to be opposing.112 Australian governments cannot sustain
the argument for supporting continued association with an organisation which operates outside
the precincts of international law and expect domestic support for its position.
Alan Dupont argues that:
Moral foreign policies are fine in principle, but fraught with practical difficulties. Aside from the obvious and
unanswerable question of whose moral standards should apply, Jakarta is unlikely to accept a sectoral
approach to defence relations whereby Kopassus is quarantined or kept at arm’s length.113

Dupont argues that such a policy would raise questions regarding the bilateral relationship and
that while bilateral police cooperation had increased since Bali, Kopassus remains the most
capable counter-terrorist organisation in Indonesia. He argues that “those who argue that
Australia’s counter-terrorist cooperation should be confined to the Indonesian police ignore this
reality and evince a well meaning, but ill conceived, moral relativism”.114 I argue, however, that
Dupont is taking a realist approach over liberal-moral considerations and does not take sufficient
account of the limited control that the Indonesian government has over Kopassus.

Cablegram O.JA814, Jakarta to Canberra, 20 August 1993, A9737, 92/051891 part 5, NAA cited in Pitty,
"Strategic Engagement," p. 73.
112 Behm, "Cooperation With Kopassus? Take Care!," p. 16. and Dupont, "The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia
Re-engage?," p. 19.
113 Dupont, "The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia Re-engage?," p. 22.
114 Ibid.
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As Behm notes:
…are the controls on Special Forces and their capabilities by their own government and its military
commanders sufficiently strong to ensure that there could be no para-legal or illegal use of such forces,
either domestically or internationally?115

Behm is arguing that there is a question as to the level of control the Indonesian government has
over Kopassus. As he states: “Dominating the Indonesian command chain as it does, Kopassus
is well able to employ the very specific skills it might learn or reinforce from Australia against its
own government”.116 Australian governments must accept the consequences of cooperation, or
resist that cooperation, on the basis that the ability Kopassus has to dominate internal activities in
Indonesia presents far more serious concerns for Australia. There is the potential to use those
forces against the Indonesian government itself.117
The realist and particularly neo-realist view argues that the business of state is to protect its
citizens and therefore as both the Keating and Howard governments adopted a realist position in
relation to foreign and defence policy it could be argued that they were correct in continuing
defence cooperation with Kopassus. I argue, however, that the application of inconsistent moral
considerations in terms of Australia’s political relationship with Indonesia by both the Keating and
Howard governments has not decreased the continuation of violence by Kopassus forces.
Neither government has learnt from the errors of the past. This therefore leaves Australia with
the continuing dilemma of cooperation with the TNI and of condoning the internal activities of
Kopassus.

Conclusion
The importance of a strong defence relationship with Indonesia cannot be denied and both
governments have sought such a relationship to varying degrees. The defence relationship
though has also revealed differences between the two states in terms of the influence the military
play in the political decisions of each government. For Australian governments the defence
relationship with Indonesia has also been complicated by the Australian public’s view of
Indonesia. As noted in the JCFADT report Australia’s Relations with Indonesia: “There will

Allan Behm, "Cooperation With Kopassus? Take Care!," Ibid.: p. 13.
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117 Ibid.: pp. 13-7.
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probably always be some Australians who see threats from neighbouring countries which, like
Indonesia, are ‘different’, large and unknown…Indonesia has repeatedly made it clear it is no
more a threat to Australia than we are to Indonesia”.118 While governments should not develop
defence policy on the basis of what could be termed an ‘imagined fear’ by a public with little
expertise in determining the likelihood of threats to Australia’s national interests, it could be
argued that the policies adopted by the Keating and Howard governments were indirect
responses to this idea of threat. For the Keating government the unease that the public felt
regarding Indonesia was largely ignored in terms of the 1994 Defence White Paper where
security was seen to be found in Asia. For the Howard government, however, this unease
endorsed its agenda to refocus Australia’s security away from Asia and a renewal of Australia’s
alliance with the United States. This strategic focus on security in Asia versus from Asia forms
the foundation of the security relationship with Indonesia and the differences that emerge in terms
of the security relationship between the Keating and Howard governments. It is this ambiguity in
terms of security and Australia’s geo-political reality that creates a level of misunderstanding and
distrust and this is a perception from both states. As noted in Near Neighbours – Good
Neighbours in a JCFADT visit to Indonesia, the committee was told by the Indonesians that in
terms of foreign policy the US and Australia were the countries most disliked in a recent
recruitment round in Indonesia.119
While the defence relationship is seen as an important aspect in the bilateral relationship it is, and
has always been, a very sensitive relationship as: “Differences in the culture and role of the
military in the two countries create the potential for misunderstanding and tension”.120 In terms of
the Indonesian military a vocal section of the Australian public saw TNI’s role in Indonesia’s
internal security, particularly in East Timor as problematic. However, as is noted in Australia’s
Strategic Policy, both the Keating and Howard governments recognised the “need to resist efforts
to make this strategically important relationship hostage to individual incidents”.121 Rather, both
governments maintained the need to focus on a security relationship that enhanced shared
strategic interests. The difference between the two governments is the focus of those shared
strategic interests. Security for the Keating government was sought in Asia through building a
strong regional security community, whereas the Howard government sought security from Asia.
Clause 6.5.2, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 75.
119 Clause 3.1, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours - Good
Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, p. 35.
120 Clause 3.14, Ibid., p. 38.
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This resulted in the desire for strong security cooperation with Indonesia as an important part of
the political relationship during the Keating government. During the period of the Howard
government the security relationship was defined on the basis of immediate threats of terrorism
and transnational crime and this resulted in the development of defence cooperation between the
two states around these key areas. However, the priority focus of security for the Howard
government was a rebalance toward Australia’s most important ally the US.
The development of the Agreement on Maintaining Security and security cooperation in terms of
joint exercises and training reveals the complexity of making foreign and defence policy in terms
of building the Australia-Indonesia political relationship. This complexity comes from those who
take a more liberal view of international relations against those who take a more realist view.
Realists would argue that security concerns are the primary focus of a country’s national interest
and therefore maintaining a close security relationship with Indonesia is of primary concern for
Australian governments. I argue that both the Keating and Howard governments maintained this
position through the Keating government’s signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security and
the joint training exercises conducted by both governments in terms of Australia’s national
security. Both governments adopted the position that moral concerns in relation to the joint
training exercises, for example, were fundamentally incompatible with their country’s national
interests. However, I argue that in taking this position and denying moral considerations, both
governments continued the failed policy of the past and indirectly condoned the actions of the
Indonesian Special Forces, Kopassus.
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CHAPTER FIVE – SECURITY ISSUES

Introduction
With the Howard government gaining office in 1996 security remained the most important issue in
the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. There was a recognised need to continue to
develop the defence relationship.

The Howard government endorsed the Agreement on

Maintaining Security that had been developed during the period of the Keating government. It
represented the government’s preference for bilateralism over multilateralism. However, the
relationship was not given the same sense of priority as it had been during the Keating
government when Australia’s security was seen to be linked to the stability and prosperity of Asia.
For the Howard government, while relationships within the region were important and the
endorsement of the Agreement on Maintaining Security was a reflection of this, the foreign policy
emphasis was on renewing its relationships with major powers beyond Asia, in particular with the
US.
With the East Timor crisis in 1999, Australia’s announcement of a review of the defence
relationship with Indonesia, and Indonesia’s subsequent abrogation of the Agreement on
Maintaining Security, the fragility of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia was revealed. The
Indonesian government viewed Australia’s decision to review the defence relationship and
suspend military cooperation as a decision that undermined the bilateral relationship. Australia’s
decision to review the defence relationship was understandable in terms of public outrage over
human rights issues in East Timor. However, in terms of the priority given to building regional
security relationships through bilateralism, it also confirmed the changing nature of the Howard
government’s defence policy in terms of rebalancing the security relationship from one of regional
engagement to the US.
The abrogation of the Agreement on Maintaining Security and Australia’s decision to suspend
military cooperation demonstrated the sensitivity associated with developing any defence
relationship with Indonesia due to the cultural and political differences between the two states and
the role of the military. Two events though assisted in renewing the defence relationship and
significant cooperation developed between the Indonesian government and the Howard
government. The first was the events of September 11 and the second was the Bali bombings in
2002. The events of September 11 highlighted the need for Australia and Indonesia to cooperate
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on issues of counter-terrorism, particularly as September 11 seemed to draw attention to the
issue of radical Islam. With Indonesia being the largest Muslim country in the world and
Australia’s closest neighbour, the need for cooperation with Indonesia in terms of Australia’s
security was paramount. Australia’s support of the US in terms of its “war on terror”, however, did
not prove overly popular in Indonesia and Australia’s decision to support the US in Iraq was met
with some concern among members of the Indonesian government. Nevertheless, with the Bali
bombings in 2002 there was an acceptance by the two governments of the importance in
cooperating on issues of counter-terrorism. The priority given to counter-terrorism cooperation
though had been recognised prior to the Bali bombings with the signing in 2002 of the MoU with
Indonesia on Combating International Terrorism and the signing of the MoU on Combating
Transnational Crime and Developing Police Cooperation. The development of police cooperation
was evident following the Bali bombings and three other bombings that took place at the Marriott
Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, the Australian Embassy in 2004 and the second Bali bombing in 2005.
While there had been a major disruption in the security relationship following the East Timor crisis
in 1999 the security relationship gained some strength through the cooperation on issues of
counter-terrorism and transnational crime and the renewal of security cooperation also had a
positive impact on the political relationship. In this chapter I discuss the MoU with Indonesia on
Combating International Terrorism. I also briefly discuss the MoU on Combating Transnational
Crime and Developing Police Cooperation, and the eventual signing of the Agreement on the
Framework for Security Cooperation in 2006. While these documents demonstrate a renewal of
the bilateral security relationship, I argue that the security relationship evolved around the Howard
government’s security priority on counter-terrorism and that this did not reflect a full-scale refocus
of Australia’s security in terms of the Asian region. Further, while the cooperation on counterterrorism restored a level of confidence to the political relationship between Indonesia and
Australia, this did not result in a broader political relationship. While the government may argue
that this was a renewal of the political relationship with Indonesia that had been damaged by the
events in 1999, they were motivated by traditional national interests in terms of Australia’s
security and stability within Indonesia rather than motivated by a view of Indonesia and the Asian
region as a priority in terms of Australia’s national interests. The security relationship was further
complicated by the anxiety expressed by Indonesia over Australia’s intentions with regard to
Indonesian sovereignty, particularly following East Timor, but also over the issue of West Papuan
asylum seekers and Howard’s announcement of pre-emptive strike action. While the Agreement
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on the Framework for Security Cooperation attempted to restore some trust with regard to
Australia’s intentions, this anxiety still exists.

Terrorism and Transnational Crime
The significance of September 11 and the Bali bombings of 2002 resulting in the increased lack
of certainty and the threat of global terrorism addressed by the government in the 2003 Defence
Update, changed Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia. Following the major interruption
to the defence relationship with the East Timor crisis, the events of September 11 and the Bali
bombings assisted in restoring a degree of defence cooperation. In 2002 two MoUs were signed
between Australia and Indonesia that signalled the new global security threat and the indirect
implications this had in terms of transnational crime. The new security focus of global terrorism
and transnational crime recognised the new challenges facing the defence and security
community and resulted in the signing in 2002 of the MoU with Indonesia on Combating
International Terrorism and the MoU on Combating Transnational Crime and Developing Police
Cooperation. The signing of the two MoUs reflected the change of focus in the 2003 Defence
Update where global terrorism was Australia’s main security concern. There was a recognised
need for regional cooperation to address this issue, particularly cooperation with Indonesia. As
identified in the first White Paper on terrorism in 2004, titled Transnational Terrorism: The Threat
to Australia: “The government attaches a high priority to strengthening counter-terrorism
cooperation with our regional partners. It is one of our best means of protection”.1 Further
evidence of the significance of combating terrorism in terms of Australia’s national interests was
confirmed in Australia’s 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Advancing the National
Interests, where it stated: “Even before the Bali bombings, the Government had identified
Indonesia as being critical to the response to terrorism in the region”.2 Further, the highest
priority in terms of Australian security was “strengthening counter-terrorism links with South-East
Asian nations” and those “countries whose capabilities are crucial for the international war against
terrorism”.3

Commonwealth of Australia, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia (Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 2004), p. 85.
2 Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, p.
38.
3 Ibid.
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The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and
the Government of Australia on Combating International Terrorism4 was signed on 7 February
2002. The MoU stated that it would “provide a framework for cooperation in preventing,
suppressing and combating international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information
and intelligence. If need be, the existing forms of cooperation could lead to the establishment of
a joint operation”.5 In terms of the scope of cooperation, the MoU stated that each government
would engage in any or all of the following activities:
(i)

intelligence information sharing.

(ii)

further enhancing cooperation between the two countries’ law agencies.

(iii)

strengthening capacity building and capabilities through networking and programs of training and
education, exchange of visits of high officials, analysts and field operators, seminars,
conferences and joint operations, as appropriate.6

Recognising the importance of the new security threat, each government designated a large
number of agencies to operate within the scope of the MoU including “police, military, intelligence,
other law enforcement agencies and other concerned agencies, including customs, immigration,
and justice/attorney-general’s departments”.7 The term of the MoU was originally for 12 months
with renewal each year. On 7 February 2008 the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Smith,
in the new Labor government, announced that Indonesia and Australia had agreed to extend the
MoU for a period of three years. As he noted in a Press Conference:
This is very important. We previously had memorandums of understanding in respect of combating
terrorism, which have been of one year’s duration. Now that we have the Lombok Treaty framework in
place, we believe and have agreed that it’s appropriate to extend the Memorandum of Understanding, so
far as counter-terrorism is concerned, for a three year period. And this reflects the importance that we
place on counter-terrorism measures.8

Hereinafter referred to as the MoU on Combating International Terrorism or MoU.
Clause 1, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the
Government of Australia on Combating International Terrorism, (Enacted on 7 February 2002).
6 Clause 2, Ibid.
7 Clause 3, Ibid.
8 Stephen Smith and Hassan Wirajuda, Joint Press Conference with the Indonesian Foreign Minister (Australian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 February 2008), pp. 1-2 of print view.
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The conclusion of the MoU and the joint cooperation established under the MoU was recognised
as laying the foundations “for the successful joint investigation into the Bali attacks”.9 Following
the Bali bombings in 2002 the Australian government increased its diligence and concentration on
the issue of terrorism within the region. As the 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper,
Advancing the National Interests, stated:
The Government is strengthening counter-terrorism links with South-East Asian nations. South-East Asia
is where the threat of terrorism to Australian interests is most acute…Terrorism is jeopardising South-East
Asia’s stability and Australian interests in this. South-East Asia is where Australia, drawing on its strong
ties with the region, can make a significant contribution to the war against terrorism.10

The importance of establishing cooperative arrangements with Indonesia was further enhanced in
October 2002 through Australia’s commitment of $10m over 4 years for a program to assist the
Indonesian police force build its counter-terrorism capability, to restrict terrorist finance capacities
and to improve Indonesian travel security.11
In line with Australia’s focus on terrorism as a primary security concern, the Australian and
Indonesian governments also announced in February 2004 the establishment of the Jakarta
Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). In announcing the establishment of the
JCLEC, Alexander Downer stated in a speech to the Regional Ministerial Meeting on CounterTerrorism on 4 February 2004 that:
A tangible demonstration of [cooperation over the Bali bombings] will be the Australia-Indonesia initiative to
establish the Indonesia Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation.
This Centre will enhance the operational expertise of law enforcement agencies in dealing with
transnational crime, with the main focus on improving counter-terrorism skills…
In a sense, it will institutionalise the cooperation we had following the Bali bombings.12

Further, in the 2004 White Paper on terrorism the establishment of the JCLEC followed on “from
the successful collaboration between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Indonesian

Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, p.
38.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 39. and Commonwealth of Australia, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, p. 92.
12 Alexander Downer, Speech to the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism (Minister for Foreign Affairs,
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National Police in investigating the Bali and JW Marriott Hotel bombings”.13 This collaboration
was underpinned by both of the MoUs signed in 2002. The establishment of the centre was
further evidence of the Australian government’s view that South-East Asia was a primary focus in
terms of combating terrorism and transnational crime. As noted on the JCLEC website, the
centre was “intended as a resource for the South East Asia region in the fight against
transnational crime, with a focus on counter-terrorism and will coordinate and facilitate a range of
training programs, including seminars and workshops”.14 In announcing the establishment of the
JCLEC the Howard government also announced its commitment of $36.8m to the centre’s
development and operations over five years.15

Further, in February 2004, Australia and

Indonesia co-chaired a Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism that reinforced the
seriousness of the threat of terrorism in terms of Australia’s national interests and created a
number of outcomes in crucial areas of “law enforcement, information sharing and legal
frameworks”.16
The importance of terrorism in terms of Australia’s national security interests was further
confirmed in the 2004 White Paper on terrorism. In introducing the white paper the then Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, stated that the purpose of the White Paper was to provide
a “deeper understanding and awareness of the nature” of the terrorism threat to Australia and its
international interests.17 The White Paper represented the Howard government’s understanding
of the level of the security threat in terms of transnational terrorism and its response to that threat.
The initiatives established with Indonesia and the wider South-East Asian region were a part of
the Howard government’s response to what they viewed as the new security threat with SouthEast Asia the key focus in combating terrorism.
What began as an understanding between the two states of the need to work together on issues
of counter-terrorism, the Bali bombings also established a high level of cooperation between the
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Indonesian Police. This has formed the basis for a new
level of cooperation between the two states that has assisted in building stronger foundations in
the Australia-Indonesia relationship.
Commonwealth of Australia, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, p. 90.
Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, About JCLEC: Introduction ([cited 23 September 2009);
available from http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=28.
15 Commonwealth of Australia, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, p. 92. and Jakarta Centre for Law
Enforcement Cooperation, About JCLEC: Introduction.
16 Commonwealth of Australia, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, p. 97.
17 Ibid., p. v.
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As Downer stated in 2004:
Indonesia and Australia have together learnt an important lesson about defeating terrorism following the
despicable acts of October 2002…That is, the crucial importance of police forces working together…
Traditionally we have considered law enforcement as separate from national security…
This distinction has, however, become less rigid – driven by the global security circumstances we face
today.18

In addition to the signing of the MoU on Combating Terrorism in February 2002 and in recognition
of the importance of police forces working together, the Australian and Indonesian governments
also signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia and the Government of Australia on Combating Transnational Crime and Developing
Police Cooperation.19 The MoU was signed in June 2002, renewed on 18 November 2005 for
three years and was subsequently renewed again on 13 November 2008 for a further three
years.20 This MoU provided the formal framework for cooperation between the two countries on
law enforcement and built on a 1997 MoU on police cooperation. The aim of the MoU was to
provide a foundation that would build on the existing arrangements that had been established
between Australia and Indonesia in terms of transnational crime, counter-terrorism and other
police cooperation arrangements.21 The primary focus of the MoU was the cooperation and
coordination of a number of joint activities aimed at combating transnational crime and increasing
police cooperation between the two countries.22 The types of crime included in the MoU were
those relating to terrorism, trafficking, people smuggling, money laundering, arms smuggling and
illegal fishing.23
In announcing the MoU in June 2002 the then Federal Minister for Justice and Customs, Senator
Chris Ellison, advised: “The MOU provides a framework for ongoing collaboration in preventing,
investigating, disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal activity impacting on either or both

Downer, Speech to the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, pp. 2-3 of print view.
Hereinafter referred to as the MoU on Transnational Crime and Developing Police Cooperation or MoU.
20 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of
Australia on Combating Transnational Crime and Developing Police Cooperation, (Originally enacted in June 2002.
Renewed on 18 November 2005 and again on 13 November 2008). The author was unable to refer to the previous
MoUs as these were out of date, therefore the discussion is based on the JCFADT Report of 2004 and the MoU
renewed in 2008.
21 Clause 3 “Aim and Purpose”, Ibid.
22 Clause 4 “Scope and Field of Cooperation”, Ibid.
23 Paragraph 6 “Priority Crime Types”, Ibid.
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countries”.24 The MoU recognised Australia’s assessment of the links between terrorism and
transnational crime and the need for broader cooperation and strengthening of the Indonesian
Police Force. The JCFADT noted that the relationship between the AFP and the Indonesian
Police had been “a key factor in establishing the successful cooperation between both police
forces in response to the Bali bombings in October 2002”.25 A key issue identified within the MoU
on Transnational Crime and Developing Police Cooperation was the issue of people smuggling
and in 2002 Australia and Indonesia co-chaired a regional conference on People Smuggling with
a follow up conference in 2003. These conferences contributed to regional cooperation on border
control issues. While other aspects of the relationship have been formalised through treaties,
agreements and MoUs the issues of people smuggling and border control have largely been
undertaken through informal arrangements, though in 2006 Australia and Indonesia established
an MoU concerning Cooperation on Migration and Border Control Management.
The MoUs on Combating Terrorism and Transnational Crime are important areas of cooperation
that have strengthened the bilateral relationship and in terms of Australia’s national interests, they
are a priority for the defence relationship. Considering the difficult political relationship that
occurred following Australia’s leadership in the INTERFET operation in East Timor in 1999, the
cooperation on areas of counter-terrorism represented the beginnings of a renewal of the security
relationship. The cooperation between Australia and Indonesia on issues of counter-terrorism,
transnational crime and police cooperation, however, needs to be placed within the broader
aspects of the political relationship. Certainly these developments represented a renewal of the
defence relationship that had been severed by the East Timor crisis. However, the increase in
defence cooperation through issues of combating terrorism must not be viewed as a renewal of
the bilateral relationship on the same terms as that experienced prior to the East Timor crisis.
Security is only one aspect of developing a strong political relationship and without a serious
commitment by Australian governments to the importance of the bilateral relationship across a
broader agenda then misunderstandings have the potential to cause strain in the relationship.
While the 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper noted Australia’s commitment “to working
with Indonesia to deal with terrorism” and to continue its efforts to build the political and economic

Australian Federal Police, "National media release: Indonesia and Australia Working Together to Combat
Transnational Crime," (14 June 2002).
25 Clause 3.59, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours - Good
Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, p. 47.
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relationship,26 the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Report,
The (not quite) White Paper, noted that there was no serious commitment to understand the
particular challenges Indonesia was facing or how Australia could support those challenges. It
was purely a statement of what was in Australia’s interest.27 As identified in the Report: “The
Committee agrees that, particularly in the aftermath of the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings, there
has been a substantial improvement in the relationship between Australia and Indonesia based
on mutual security concerns”.28 However, this hardly represents a broader political strategy of
cooperation.29
There are some important issues that come out of the MoU on Combating Terrorism that have
the potential to cause tension in the political relationship and they need to be sensitively
managed. The Howard government’s decision to support the US in the “war on terror” reaffirmed
the government’s position in the 2000 Defence White Paper and Defence Updates of a rebalance
of Australia’s relationship to the US and the significance of terrorism in terms of Australia’s
security. This sent a clear message to the Asian region that Australia’s foreign policy was more
centred on the requirements of the US than the importance of Australia’s relationship with the
region and Indonesia as Australia’s closest neighbour. Considering Australia’s geopolitical
position and that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, the Howard
government’s strong support of the US’s “war on terror” showed little sensitivity to concerns of
Indonesian Muslims and the Indonesian government’s position on the war in Iraq. While the
Howard government reassured the Indonesian government that its actions were not directed
against them, Australia’s involvement in the Iraq war did not take account of Indonesian
sensitivities in this regard. While it was entirely appropriate for Australia to enhance its security
relationship with Indonesia in terms of combating terrorism, Australia also needed to be mindful of
the level of support given to the US. In addition, the Howard government’s lack of sensitivity in
terms of media statements of pre-emptive strike action30 in the region against attacks on Australia
served to reinforce the perception of Australia’s support and ‘deputy sheriff’ role to the US.

Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, p.
81.
27 Clause 4.41, Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, The (not quite) White Paper:
Australia's foreign affairs and trade policy, Advancing the National Interest, ed. The Parliament of the Commonwealth
of Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), p. 53.
28 Clause 4.42, Ibid., p. 54.
29 Clause 4.43, Ibid.
30 Howard announced in 2002 that he would take pre-emptive strike action against terrorists in another country if
there was evidence of an attack against Australia. Refer to my discussion on the Agreement on the Framework for
Security Cooperation for further discussion of this issue.
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Further by stating that: “Australians have become targets because of the values we represent”,31
rather than that the cause may be the actions of the government in supporting the US in Iraq, did
not display any sensitivity to Indonesia’s unwillingness to support the intervention in Iraq.
The Howard government’s position on terrorism and the bilateral cooperation through the MoU
also raised the issue of training cooperation between Kopassus and the ADF. With the increased
security focus on terrorism and the need for bilateral defence cooperation there were renewed
requests for resuming defence cooperation with Kopassus as the key agency responsible for
counter-terrorism in Indonesia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, any renewed defence
cooperation with Kopassus then raised the issue of human rights abuses conducted by Kopassus
elements in Indonesia, and Australia’s role in cooperative training exercises with Kopassus where
skills honed in those exercises may be used internally. This was further heightened by the belief
that Kopassus supported the very terrorist groups they were meant to be fighting against. The
call for renewed ties with Kopassus once again renewed concern regarding pragmatism versus
moral issues in foreign policy decision making. While it may be recognised that Kopassus is an
integral agency in Indonesia’s counter-terrorism structure, Australian governments cannot allow
themselves to be again subject to accusations of moral bankruptcy by the Australian public and
human rights groups both nationally and internationally. While it cannot be denied that Australia
must attach a high degree of importance to the bilateral relationship regarding counter-terrorism
with Indonesia, it cannot afford to again be seen to place Australia’s national interests ahead of
moral issues. Therefore, the government needed to be very sensitive to any suggestion of
resumption of ties with Kopassus and as an alternative extend and improve the effectiveness of
the working relationship with law enforcement agencies in Indonesia.
The MoUs were an important indicator of the priority given to combating terrorism and
transnational crime and renewed a level of security cooperation with Indonesia. This led to
further security cooperation in terms of the signing in 2006 of the Agreement on the Framework
for Security Cooperation, though this agreement largely reflected the priority given to combating
terrorism as announced in the 2003 Defence Update. However, basing the defence relationship
around issues of terrorism does not provide a strong foundation for the broader political
relationship. The Howard government’s actions in the “war on terror” created difficulties for the
government as there is a tendency for the Australian public to conflate issues of terrorism with
31

xi.
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Islam and given the proximity of Indonesia to Australia as the largest Muslim nation, this incites
powerful emotions in both countries. While this has not led to insurmountable problems it has the
potential to do so if either state manages the situation inefficiently and insensitively, particularly
as Howard did over announcing pre-emptive strike action.

Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation
Following the crisis in East Timor the security relationship was progressively restored on the
basis of Australia and Indonesia’s cooperation measures on counter-terrorism, police cooperation
and the funding of the JCLEC. These measures created opportunity for discussions to begin
between the Howard government and the new Indonesian government in 2005-6 on reviving the
Agreement on Maintaining Security which resulted in the establishment of the Agreement on the
Framework for Security Cooperation. This agreement played a vital role in the rebuilding of the
relationship following the crisis between the two governments regarding the West Papuan asylum
seekers which I discuss later on in this chapter.
The Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security
Cooperation was signed on 13 November 2006.32 The agreement entered into force on 7
February 2008 and provides a framework for strengthening bilateral security cooperation and
consultation on areas of common security.
The main objectives of the Agreement are:
1.

to provide a framework for deepening and expanding bilateral cooperation and exchanges as
well as to intensify cooperation and consultation between the Parties in areas of mutual interest
and concern on matters affecting their common security as well as their respective national
security.

2.

to establish a bilateral consultative mechanism with a view to encouraging intensive dialogue,
exchanges and implementation of cooperative activities as well as strengthening institutional
relationships pursuant to this Agreement.33

Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, ATS 3,
2008, (Enacted on 13 November 2006: Entered into force on 7 February 2008). Hereinafter referred to as the
Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation or Agreement. A copy of the Agreement can be found in
Volume Two – Appendices.
33 Article 1, Ibid.
32
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The scope of the Agreement covers cooperation in Defence, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, Intelligence, Maritime Security, Aviation Safety and Security, Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Emergency, Cooperation in International Organizations on Security-Related
Issues and Community Understanding and People-to-People Cooperation.34 In line with the 2003
Defence Update and the MoU on Combating International Terrorism the Agreement on the
Framework for Security Cooperation raises the issue of the importance given to law enforcement
and counter-terrorism in terms of Australia’s defence relationship with Indonesia. These areas of
security are seen as two areas that impact the most on Australia’s security.
Since Indonesia had abrogated the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security over Australia’s role
in East Timor, the issue of non-intervention had become paramount for Indonesia. As identified
in the JCFADT Report, Near Neighbours – Good Neighbours, there was an underlying concern in
Indonesia regarding Australia’s intentions in terms of territorial ambitions, particularly following the
misunderstandings created by Australia’s involvement in East Timor’s independence. Until these
misunderstandings were addressed Indonesia would maintain some reservations in terms of
Australia’s assurance of Indonesia’s territorial integrity.35 The signing of the new Agreement on
the Framework for Security Cooperation confirmed Australia’s assurances of Indonesia’s
territorial integrity and defined a new phase in Australia’s efforts to consolidate and stabilise
relations with Indonesia. This can be seen in the foreword to the Agreement where both parties
reaffirmed; “the commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of
both Parties, and the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in
the internal affairs of one another”.36 The importance of providing a commitment to Indonesia’s
territorial integrity and the fear by the Indonesian government as to Australia’s intentions is made
clear in terms of Article 2 of the Agreement which states:
The Parties, consistent with their respective domestic laws and international obligations, shall not in any
manner support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability,
sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for
encouraging or committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other Party.37

Article 3, Ibid.
See Clause 3.43 – 3.49, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours Good Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, pp. 44-5.
36 Foreword, Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security
Cooperation.
37 Article 2, Clause 3, Ibid.
34
35

153

The Agreement was an obligation on behalf of the Australian government to maintain and respect
Indonesian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Given that it was signed after the crisis over the
West Papuan refugees, it also ensured that Australian governments would deny separatist
elements in Indonesia, though the Howard government was able to ensure that: “Nothing in this
Agreement shall affect in any way the existing rights and obligations of either Party under
international law”.38 The inclusion of this clause ensured that Australia’s obligations in terms of
refugees in both domestic and international law would not be reduced.
A National Interest Analysis in 2006 stated that the Agreement “provides a strong legal framework
for encouraging bilateral dialogue, exchanges and implementation of cooperative activities, and
provides a firm basis for the conclusion of separate arrangements in specific areas”.39 Further,
the analysis noted that the reasons for establishing the new security cooperation framework were
that:
Both countries are committed to strengthening further bilateral relations based on respect for each other’s
territorial integrity and unity and consolidating and advancing cooperation in key areas, including security,
counter-terrorism and other non-traditional security threats including avian influenza, disaster management,
and illegal fishing.40

The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, declared the Agreement to be of
historical significance and stated in media releases: “We can’t avoid problems but we now have a
treaty to provide the bedrock for the security relationship”.41 The Labor Party also welcomed the
Agreement, however, at the same time reserved judgement until there was “a detailed
assessment of the precise terms involved”.42
In keeping with the 2003 Defence Update, the Agreement recognised the threat of global
terrorism as a priority for both Australia and Indonesia and the need for continued cooperation to
combat terrorism. In addition, priority was given to establishing bilateral cooperation on issues of
“transnational crime and non-traditional security threats, especially in areas such as people

Article 2, Clause 6, Ibid.
Clause 5, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia
on the Framework for Security Cooperation: National Interest Analysis [2006] ATNIA 43 (Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 2006).
40 Clause 6, Ibid.
41 Cited in Frank Frost, "Perspectives on Australian foreign policy 2006," Australian Journal of International Affairs,
61, no. 3 (2007): p. 409.
42 Kevin Rudd cited in Ibid.: p. 410.
38
39

154

smuggling, narcotics, money laundering, aviation and maritime security, and outbreaks of
disease”.43 The importance of these issues in the Agreement was confirmation of the formal
arrangements that had already been established between Australia and Indonesia in terms of the
MoU on Combating International Terrorism and the MoU on Combating Transnational Crime and
Developing Police Cooperation established in 2002.
While the Agreement in itself is not specific, as in essence it only provides a framework to
encourage dialogue and consultation, it does provide a framework for the “implementation for
cooperative activities”44 and the conclusion of further arrangements in specific areas expressed
under the Agreement, particularly in areas of counter-terrorism and transnational crime. At the 8th
meeting of the AIMF it was noted that “Ministers agreed there would be value in the Framework
Agreement for Security Cooperation providing a treaty-based expression of strong support for
each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Indonesia’s sovereignty over
Papua”.45 The issue of recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is of
particular importance in this Agreement in light of Indonesian concerns over Australia’s actions in
East Timor. With the Agreement coming into force on 7 February 2008, following the Howard
government losing office in November 2007, at the 9th meeting of the AIMF on 12 November
2008,
Ministers…recognised the important treaty-level obligation within the Lombok Treaty to respect and support
each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity…Ministers welcomed practical implementation of the
Lombok Treaty through a Plan of Action outlining priority areas for further security cooperation…46

The Howard government viewed the Agreement as a new era in the bilateral relationship and
believed that it would contribute to the stability of both countries. With the focus in the Agreement
on counter-terrorism and transnational crime, the Agreement reinforced and strengthened the
commitments made by the two governments in 2002 with the conclusion of the MoUs. There is
no doubt that the Agreement expressed two key concerns that Indonesia and Australia wanted to
address. First, in terms of Indonesia seeking assurance from Australia in a concrete way on its
43 Clause 8, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia
on the Framework for Security Cooperation: National Interest Analysis [2006] ATNIA 43.
44 Article 1, Clause 2, Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security
Cooperation.
45 Clause 9, Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Statement: 8th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, p. 2 of
print view.
46 Clause 7, Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement - 9th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial
Forum, p. 2 of print view.
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territorial integrity and second Australia’s objective in terms of combating terrorism. For the
Howard government the issue of terrorism was seen as Australia’s most important security threat
and renewing security cooperation with Indonesia was strategically important in terms of
combating terrorism in the South-East Asian region.
This cooperation though could only be secured if Indonesia could be assured of Australia’s
commitment to Indonesian sovereignty. The issue of territorial integrity was questioned by the
Indonesian government following Australia’s actions over the independence of East Timor, the
change of policy on East Timor and the arrival in 2006 of forty three asylum seekers from West
Papua. Following the change of policy in East Timor there was a growing concern about
Australia’s motives in terms of ‘liberating’ East Timor. This fear of Australia’s intentions towards
Indonesia’s territorial integrity, following on from the East Timor crisis, was compounded by
Howard’s statement in an interview on a Channel 9 program on 1 December 2002 over whether
he “would launch a pre-emptive strike against terrorists in another country if he had evidence they
were about to attack Australia”.47 He stated:
Oh yes, I think any Australian Prime Minister would. I mean, it stands to reason that if you believed that
somebody was going to launch an attack against your country, either of a conventional kind or of a terrorist
kind, and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternative other than to use that capacity then of
course you would have to use it.48

While Howard stated in the House of Representatives on 2 December 2002 that this was in no
way directed at countries in the region, the Indonesians viewed it as another example of
Australia’s lack of respect for Indonesian sovereignty. As Hugh White noted:
A new element [had] been brought into the strategic relationship between Canberra and Jakarta – the fact
that some Indonesians now see Australia as a threat. We Australians have a real problem of selfperception in responding to this. We find it hard to take seriously the idea that another country – especially
one as big as Indonesia – regards us as threatening…We have not worked out how to respond…But we
should not allow ourselves to be too complacent. My sense is that beneath the politics there is a real
concern about Australia’s strategic objectives towards Indonesia.49

Catherine McGrath, "PM supports action through pre-emptive strikes," ed. AM Program (ABC Local Radio, 2
December 2002).
48 John Howard, Questions without Notice - National Security (House Hansard, 2 December 2002), p. 9259.
49 White, "The New Australia-Indonesia Strategic Relationship: A Note of Caution," p. 49.
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This idea was confirmed by Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Marty Natalegawa in an
interview in Vientiane following Australia’s announcement that it would sign the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation. He stated:
From Indonesia’s perspective, if Australia was to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, this is
extremely important, not only symbolically but also substance-wise about Australia’s peaceful intent and
interaction with the region. I can think of no other instrument the Australian Government can accede to that
shows, in an absolutely clear manner, that Australia is a country that is interacting peacefully with the
region and has no hostile intent whatsoever.50

While the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by the Howard government gained
approval in Indonesia, the arrival of forty three asylum seekers from West Papua on 18 January
2006 claiming human rights abuses by the Indonesian military, and the subsequent granting of
temporary visas to forty two of the asylum seekers created another ‘pebble in the shoe’ of the
Australia-Indonesia relationship. Once again Australia was caught between maintaining the
momentum in rebuilding the political relationship with Indonesia against the pressure from the
Australian public to grant asylum on the basis of persecution by the Indonesian military. Australia
could not ignore its obligations under the Refugee Convention and duly processed the asylum
seekers, though this caused outrage in Indonesia and the Indonesian government subsequently
recalled its Ambassador to Australia on 25 March 2006 for consultations.

The Howard

government proceeded to introduce into the House of Representatives the Migration Amendment
(Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 which proposed “to amend the Migration Act 1958
(the Act) to expand the offshore processing regime introduced in 2001 currently applying to
offshore entry persons and transitory persons”.51 This meant “that all persons arriving at
mainland Australia unlawfully by sea (even those airlifted to Australia at the end of a sea journey)
on or after 13 April 2006 [would] be treated as if they had landed in an excised place”.52 The Bill
attracted a significant amount of criticism, with critics viewing it as representing a “flawed foreign
policy in terms of a perceived ‘appeasement’ of Indonesia”53 by the Howard government and an
attempt to mend the relationship with Indonesia at the expense of the West Papuans. Support for
the Bill came from those who believed that the relationship with Indonesia was more important
than other obligations Australia may have.54
Quoted in John Kerin, "Australia 'will sign' pact with ASEAN," The Australian 26 July 2005.
Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, 138, 2005–06.
52 Ibid. p. 1.
53 Ibid. p.5.
54 Ibid.
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The incident I outline above had again displayed Indonesia’s sensitivity over territorial issues and
the perception that Australia posed a potential challenge to Indonesian sovereignty in the
province. Further, it had the potential to again raise the dilemma that Australian governments
had faced over the East Timor issue, namely public pressure to ensure that assistance was given
to the West Papuans who were perceived as victims of Indonesian violence. Again the Howard
government chose to limit the fallout from the issue of the West Papuan asylum seekers by
subsequently introducing legislation, though this never progressed. The approach of realpolitik
was taken to avert further disruption to the relationship.
The issue of recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by Australian governments is crucial in the
bilateral relationship. As Jamie Mackie notes: “Virtually all Indonesians, with relatively few
exceptions…, strongly favour the maintenance of their country’s national unity and territorial
integrity (kesatuan dan keutuhan negara) and regard it as a matter of the utmost national
importance”.55 The inclusion of clauses in the Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation that commit Australian governments to respect Indonesian sovereignty and
Australia’s acceptance of these recognises the importance of this to Indonesia and the problems
that can arise for Australian governments where Indonesia’s territorial integrity is not recognised.
However, it raises the question of what is in Australia’s national interest? Most governments
would make an assessment that the fragmentation of the Indonesian archipelago would not be in
Australia’s national interests and that what is in Australia’s interests is a strong, stable and
democratic Indonesia. Jamie Mackie states that:
…asserting a universal principle that gives higher priority to the rights of minorities than to the authority of
legitimate national states backed by large majorities just for the sake of our own moral code and values
would be an absurdly counterproductive denial of other more important national interests. Where would we
ever draw the line about intruding into the internal affairs of other countries anywhere? Here as elsewhere
with Indonesia we have to strike balances. Our aim should be to work towards helping Indonesia to
become a better place, as its people want it to be, not to have it broken up into something worse.56

There is, however, a counter-argument here over the rights of minorities, such as the West
Papuans, and the need for Australian governments to take a liberal-moral approach that
maintains moral principles such as human rights. While Australia has a legal obligation to
55
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recognise the legitimate authority of the state and the principle of non-intervention, Australian
governments must also exercise their legal obligation to asylum seekers. While this may cause
difficulties in Australia’s relations with those countries involved, as it did with Indonesia over the
West Papuan asylum seekers, this does not mean that governments should withdraw from moral
obligations.
This issue again raises the difference between those who support a realist-pragmatic position and
those who support a more liberal approach to foreign policy. Given the Howard government’s
recognition of Indonesia’s territorial integrity in the Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation one could argue that the government was taking a realist position in terms of what
was in Australia’s national interests. However, it may not be as simple as an either/or situation.
The Agreement also sets out Australia’s rights and obligations under international law so in effect
the government, in signing the Agreement, has attempted to recognise both Indonesia’s concerns
in terms of sovereignty and to also recognise Australia’s liberal-moral principles under
international law. The issue of separatist movements in Indonesia, such as in West Papua,
reveals the complexity of foreign policy between the two states, particularly in terms of underlying
fears in Indonesia over Australia’s intentions. It is not in Australia’s interests to have an unstable
Indonesia. On the other hand, Australia needs to recognise its moral obligations in international
and domestic law and not deny these when issues between Australia and Indonesia become
difficult. History has shown when Australian governments have taken steps to counter difficulties
in the relationship with Indonesia over issues of morality versus pragmatism, the relationship has
been more difficult in the long-term. Mackie is correct to assert that Australia must assist
Indonesia to work toward democratic principles of justice and freedom. However, by attempting
to appease the Indonesian government as they did over the West Papuan asylum seekers by
introducing a bill to amend the Migration Act was not the solution. As Australia’s history on the
East Timor issue tells us, an appeasement policy in relation to Indonesia does not necessarily
avert a strained relationship.
The Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation was an attempt by the Australian
government to reassure the Indonesian government of Australia’s desire to respect the territorial
integrity of Indonesia and that it could be relied on to do so. This was a desire to rebuild the
bilateral relationship to meet Australia’s security priorities in terms of the new security threats as
outlined in the 2000 Defence White Paper and the subsequent Defence Updates. Further,
through securing the Agreement it would strengthen regional security and thereby improve
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Australia’s security position. However, there remains the question of the extent to which the
Agreement brought in a new era in the relationship? While the Agreement represents the
government’s intention to rebuild a long-term relationship with Indonesia, the Agreement seems
to reflect only part of that relationship, namely reengagement in terms of a security relationship
and in particular Australia’s concerns over terrorism.
While the Agreement reflects the fundamental importance of Australia’s security interests,
particularly in ensuring stability in Indonesia, it reflects a continuing realist position in terms of
Australia’s foreign policy. It does not necessarily reflect the need to rebuild a strong political
relationship, nor does it change the Howard government’s security priorities, where the priority for
security engagement is viewed in terms of the US. While security links with Indonesia and the
South-East Asian region are important they are not seen as the primary concern. The Agreement
reflects an acknowledgement that counter-terrorism is Australia’s highest security priority and the
need to reengage with Indonesia and the South-East Asian region is seen as Australia’s primary
security risk in terms of counter-terrorism. While engagement with Indonesia and the South-East
Asian region on this issue is entirely appropriate in serving Australia’s national interests, it does
not of itself reflect a real desire to engage more deeply with Indonesia. While security has always
been, and I argue always will be, a primary concern for Australian governments in terms of
geopolitical reality, and therefore the need to engage with Indonesia and the region is a primary
concern, this also reflects a realpolitik response to foreign policy decision making. Again it raises
the issue of those who place more importance on Australia’s image of good international
citizenship and an obligation in terms of moral issues and those who believe that Australia’s
national interests are of paramount importance in terms of foreign policy. While security is a
central and important issue for both Indonesia and Australia, differences will continue to occur as
they did over the issue of East Timor and the West Papuan refugees. These differences are
between those who take a liberal position and emphasise the importance of moral issues in
foreign policy and those who continue to maintain a realist position. The latter believe that
Australia’s national interests are ultimately about its security.

Conclusion
The JCFADT believed that: “The terrorist threat has provided the imperative for the security
aspects of the bilateral relationship to move forward and grow. These aspects of the relationship
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have commanded a very high profile in the last two years”.57 While the two MoUs and the
subsequent signing of the Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation have assisted
in strengthening the relationship at a bureaucratic level, this hardly “constitutes a full-scale
political agenda of cooperation”.58 While it can be seen that security cooperation has increased
following the tension that was created in the political relationship with the events of 1999, this
does not constitute a complete renewal of the political relationship. Security is only one aspect of
a bilateral relationship and while both the Keating and Howard governments have both viewed
this as a priority in the relationship, other aspects of this relationship need to be given
considerable attention in a bid to overcome the tensions that inevitably arise between the two
states. While the Keating government understood the need for a strong security relationship,
there was also equal importance given to other aspects of the relationship, particularly in terms of
the political relationship. This is less evident during the period of the Howard government. The
change of policy on East Timor placed considerable strain on the relationship. The Howard
government projected the intervention in terms of Australian values and accepted the idea of
playing the “deputy sheriff” role for the US. This tension was extended with the “war on terror”.
The actions of September 11 resulted in the signing of a MoU on Combating International
Terrorism in 2002 and the further signing of the Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation in 2006. It would appear from the cooperation expressed in these documents that
the relationship was regaining a level of importance that had not been seen since the East Timor
crisis. However, there remained concern in Indonesia over Australia’s intentions in terms of the
absolute support given to the US. The issues arising from these intentions relates both to
Indonesia’s concerns over its territorial integrity, as was shown with the commitment in the
Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation following Australia’s abrupt change of
direction in policy over the East Timor crisis, the announcement of pre-emptive strike action, and
the issue of the West Papuan asylum seekers. While the Howard government attempted to
reassure the Indonesian government that its support of the “war on terror” was not directed at
Indonesia, its lack of sensitivity and diplomacy does not support that reassurance. The East
Timor crisis changed Indonesia’s perception of Australia’s intentions and while the Howard
government attempted to reassure the Indonesians, issues such as the separatist movement in
West Papua and Australia’s acceptance of the West Papuan refugees in 2006, created a sense
Clause 3.108, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Near Neighbours - Good
Neighbours: An Inquiry into Australia's Relationship with Indonesia, p. 57.
58 Clause 4.43, Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, The (not quite) White Paper:
Australia's foreign affairs and trade policy, Advancing the National Interest, p. 54.
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that Australia is a threat to Indonesia. While this is far from the truth, the Howard government
never adequately managed the Indonesian government’s perception of the motives behind
Australia’s actions. There is a need to rebuild trust in the relationship by future governments in
order to build a strong defence relationship.
Again the issue of security cooperation between Indonesia and Australia raises the tension
between foreign policy decisions based on pragmatic-realism and those who argue that liberalmoral issues are of equal importance in foreign policy decision making.

The Howard

government’s finalisation of the MoUs and the Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation was a realist foreign policy approach. The Howard government sought to further
develop its relationship with the US in terms of alliance building and negotiating bilateral
arrangements. While it could be argued that alliance building and cooperation with Indonesia in
terms of building bilateral arrangements could privilege a liberal rather than a realist position, I
argue that the motivations driving these arrangements were realist on the basis of what was
perceived to be in Australia’s national interests. Considering the focus given to counter-terrorism
and the recognition that the key focus for countering terrorism was in the South-East Asian
region, a more appropriate mechanism may well have been to establish multilateral cooperative
arrangements with states in the region. This would reflect a more cooperative approach between
all levels of government.
While Howard promoted the idea of Australian values as the reason Australia had become a
target of terrorism, those same values, values such as human rights, were apparently not viewed
as important in terms of the asylum seekers from West Papua when the interests of Australian
security were involved. While the government was required to accept the refugees, Howard
immediately attempted to placate the Indonesian government over this issue by introducing new
laws to prevent future boat people from claiming asylum, though those laws were later withdrawn.
There is no evidence that the Howard government adopted anything but a realist approach in
terms of its security relationship with Indonesia.
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SECTION 3 –MARITIME ISSUES
Australia’s proximity to Indonesia and the seas that lie between the two nations are of economic
and strategic importance in terms of Australia’s oceans policy, foreign policy and defence policy
and therefore of significance in terms of Australia’s political relationship with Indonesia. The seas
that lie between Australia and Indonesia are some of the most crucial trade routes for Australia
and the ability to control Australia’s northern approaches is critical to Australian prosperity. This
means that a strong maritime relationship with Indonesia is vital though it is very unlikely that
Indonesia would close sea lanes to Australian shipping. However, the opportunity to explore and
exploit the resources that lie in the seas to Australia’s north is important to both states. This has
been confirmed in the last thirty years by the attention given to the delimitation of maritime zones
in the seas surrounding Australia.
For the most part the outcomes of the agreements and treaties that have been negotiated
between Australia and Indonesia have produced positive results for the bilateral relationship.
However, I argue that Australia’s motivations behind the negotiations, while beneficial to the
relationship, have been primarily driven by realist concerns to guarantee Australia’s acquisition of
the potential and existing resources of the sea. This is not to deny the importance of the
negotiations in terms of the bilateral relationship and indirectly Australia’s desire for engagement
with Asia more generally. However, given the potential resources in the Arafura and Timor Seas
a realist assessment in terms of economic gain must be seen as the driving force. This realist
concern over the potential resources was emphasised by the Howard government when
announcing the finalisation of the 1997 Treaty where it was stated that it provided certainty for
resource exploration. It was also recognised that the 1997 Treaty strengthened the bilateral
relationship. This reveals a mix of both realism and liberal cooperation. Successful negotiation of
the agreements and treaties and strengthening of the bilateral relationship was important to both
states.
Chapters Six and Seven make up Section Three of my thesis. In these two chapters I explore the
importance of maritime issues to Australia both in terms of the economic benefits and security
implications of the seas to Australia’s north. The need to maintain a strong bilateral relationship
with Indonesia is self evident as the maritime areas between the two coastal states overlap.
While the seas to Australia’s north are important to Australia in terms of their resource potential,
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they are equally important to Indonesia for the same reason. I explore the agreements and
treaties that have been established between Australia and Indonesia, not only in terms of the
wider strategic and political objectives of building bilateral relations, but also in terms of fulfilling
Australia’s stated goals contained in the Oceans Policy and in establishing a broader maritime
strategy. The maritime issues bridge both international and domestic policy as the delimitation of
maritime zones, and particularly the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) falls under the jurisdiction of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

While neither state has sought

independent resolution of any disagreements between the two states on maritime zones and in
general have negotiated creative solutions to differences that had the potential to cause problems
in the political relationship, there remains uncertainty in terms of the status of the 1997 Treaty.
Further, the issue of illegal fishing and border security have the potential to create problems in the
political relationship.
In chapter six I discuss the interrelationship of Australia’s Oceans Policy and Defence Policy and
provide an overview of maritime zones as recognised under international law. I provide a brief
discussion of the 1971 and 1972 maritime boundary agreements between Australia and
Indonesia as these two agreements provide the context of the subsequent treaties negotiated
between the two states. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of arrangements on fisheries
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. I argue that while these issues may largely be
dealt with at a bureaucratic level, they have the potential to cause problems in the political
relationship, particularly as they relate to illegal fishing, border security and sustainability of
marine species. In addition, the outcome of the 1972 Agreement which left the Indonesians
believing that they had been “taken to the cleaners” had a major impact in further negotiations of
the delimitation of the maritime zones.
In chapter seven I further develop the theme of maritime issues and provide a detailed discussion
of the Timor Gap Treaty and the 1997 Treaty. I argue that while the negotiations and outcomes
of the two treaties improved the relationship between Australia and Indonesia, there remain
issues outstanding in terms of maritime boundaries that could also create problems in the future
for the political relationship. I argue that the 1997 Treaty has the potential to create problems in
the political relationship due to differences in interpretation, particularly in Article 7, and as the
Treaty is not in force this may create further difficulties if any differences occur that cannot be
resolved. Further, with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
confirming Australia’s jurisdiction over an additional 2.5 million square kilometres of seabed it will
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be important for Australia to be sensitive over the maritime boundary agreements with Indonesia,
not only in terms of maintaining the bilateral relationship, but more importantly in maintaining a
level of close cooperation on maritime issues.

166

167

CHAPTER SIX - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

Introduction
The seas that lie between Australia and Indonesia form part of one of the largest maritime areas
where the maritime zones overlap with another state. This makes the delimitation of these
maritime zones, both politically and economically, an important issue in terms of Australia’s
relationship with Indonesia. Maritime delimitation is equally important in terms of Australia’s
broader oceans policy and the development of a national maritime strategy. All Australian
governments for the past forty years have recognised the economic and strategic opportunities of
the seas to Australia’s north. The seas between Australia and Indonesia, particularly the Arafura
and Timor Seas are potentially rich in terms of fishing resources, hydrocarbons, oil and gas. In
addition, sixty per cent of Australia’s exports pass through Indonesian seas and therefore of
strategic importance to Australia in ensuring the security of vessels in the Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOCs). The strategic importance of these seas is reflected in the JCFADT
Report, Australia’s Relations with Indonesia: “The Committee recommends that the Australian
Government encourage the Indonesian Government to abide by the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)”.1

The government expanded on the

Committee’s brief statement by noting that the Australian government “conveys its expectation
that the Indonesian government will respect international navigation rights such as those set
down in the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.2
The importance of the seas surrounding Australia is emphasised again in former Prime Minister
John Howard’s opening message in a document titled, Australia’s Oceans Policy:
Our oceans contain resources of enormous potential benefit to all. These resources must be managed
carefully to ensure economic benefit exists side by side with sensitive environmental care. We have a
shared responsibility of ensuring the long term health of our oceans.3

The importance of the seas is also apparent in the recommendation of the JCFADT Report titled,
Australia’s Maritime Strategy, which stated that the government needed to develop and
Recommendation 1, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 63.
2 Evans, Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: Report: Government response, p. 1232.
3 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1998), p. 1.
1
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implement a maritime strategy,4 and that the government needed to progress “joint operations
and regional cooperation initiatives which seek to enhance the security and protection of vessels
using sea lines of communication (SLOCs)”.5 The importance of the seas is underlined in the
Report with the recommendation that the Department of Defence ensure that a “maritime strategy
includes clear and explicit reference to Australia’s Oceans Policy and explains its interrelationship
with Defence Policy”.6
Australia’s close proximity to Indonesia and the need to ensure both security and economic
benefits within and through the seas to the north results in the need to negotiate maritime zones,
not only to explore and exploit the resources within the water column and the seabed, but also in
terms of building a cooperative bilateral relationship with Indonesia. Of equal importance to the
need to negotiate maritime zones for economic benefit is the need to ensure that Australia has
sound cooperation agreements in place for the security and protection of its vessels, and to tackle
the growing problem of illegal fishing which poses risks to Australia’s marine environment and to
address the issue of immigration and Australia’s security.
In this chapter I will begin with a brief overview of Australia’s Oceans Policy and a discussion of
its interrelationship with Defence Policy and a broader maritime strategy. I will then provide a
summary of the delimitation of maritime zones, followed by a brief discussion of the 1971 and
1972 Agreements negotiated between Australia and Indonesia, which provide the context and
parameters for the discussion of the subsequent treaties.7 I will then offer a discussion of
Australia-Indonesia arrangements in relation to fisheries cooperation.

First I have a brief

discussion of the 1974 Memorandum of Understanding in Relation to Indonesian Traditional
Fishermen, followed by a discussion of the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement
Arrangement which was enacted in 1981 and came into force in 1982. I will conclude with a
discussion of the Agreement relating to Cooperation in Fisheries signed in 1992 and brought into
force in 1993. While these issues may appear to be largely administrative matters that have
implications in Australia’s domestic arena, and are largely dealt with interdepartmentally between
the two states, they have the potential to become more serious issues in relation to the political
Clause 4.124, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Maritime Strategy, ed.
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), p. 71.
5 Clause 6.37, Ibid., p. 108.
6 Clause 6.38, Ibid., p. 109.
7 Two Maps are provided. One map shows the boundaries of the 1971 and 1972 Agreements, 1974 Memorandum of
Understanding, Timor Gap Treaty and the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Line; the other is a
consolidated position of all the agreements and treaties.
4
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relationship. Issues of illegal fishing activities, border security and environmental issues are
difficult and sensitive economic and political issues. In chapter seven I provide a detailed
discussion of the Timor Gap Treaty and the 1997 Treaty.

Brief Overview of Maritime Strategy and its Importance in Foreign Policy
The Oceans Policy opens with this statement:
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Australia has rights and responsibilities over
some 16 million square kilometres of ocean – more than twice the area of the Australian continent.8

A second document titled, Australia’s Oceans Policy – Specific Sectoral Measures, identifies a
number of key factors in terms of protecting Australia’s national interests. The policy recognises
that the challenge for Australia in terms of defence is “to protect Australia’s national interests and
sovereign rights” as Australia is dependent “on maritime trade and the maintenance of freedom of
movement for all commercial shipping”.9
The Oceans Policy further explains this situation in terms of the growth of marine industries in
recent years. These industries are export oriented, large providers of jobs and are significant to
the Australian economy.10 As Australia’s Oceans Policy – Specific Sectoral Measures notes:
Offshore petroleum is a major economic use of Australia’s marine environment. It is worth approximately
$8 billion per annum, supplies 85 per cent of the nation’s petroleum demands and contributes $2.4 billion in
tax revenue each year.11

In terms of international factors the policy notes two international challenges for Australia’s
Oceans Policy.

•

To ensure that existing international ocean management regimes are effectively implemented.

•

To provide leadership and seek to ensure that future regimes meet Australia’s requirements for
responsible ocean management.12

Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy, p. 7.
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy - Specific Sectoral Measures (Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, 1998), p. 37.
10 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy, p. 8.
11 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy - Specific Sectoral Measures, p. 13.
12 Ibid., p. 38.
8
9
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It further notes that affairs in relation to the ocean are an essential component of Australia’s wider
strategic and political relations in the region and that Australia must develop both bilateral and
international arrangements in terms of addressing “transboundary ocean management”.13
Specifically the policy states that the government will “continue work to finalise delimitation of
Australia’s marine jurisdictional boundaries”.14 In terms of surveillance, the Oceans Policy
recognised that one of the challenges for Australia is: “To ensure that there is an effective and
efficient surveillance capacity for Australia’s marine jurisdictions”.15 The policy recognises that
surveillance is required for information gathering on both legal and illegal activities within
Australia’s marine jurisdictions. It is therefore important for Australia to negotiate with Indonesia
not only in terms of maritime boundaries, but also in terms of agreements on fisheries and
cooperative activities to reduce illegal forays into Australia’s marine jurisdiction.
In terms of a maritime strategy the 2000 Defence White Paper stated that: “The key to defending
Australia is to control the air and sea approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile
ships and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our forces. That means we
fundamentally need a maritime strategy”.16 The issue that the 2000 Defence White Paper did not
address, however, is the importance that maritime strategy has on more than just security. As
noted in the JCFADT Report, Australia’s Maritime Strategy, a maritime strategy would:
…enable Australia to control and develop its important offshore resources, including oil and gas. Australia
must also have the capability to control fisheries, illegal immigration, smuggling, piracy and national
security matters anywhere around our coasts or offshore islands.17

Further, the Report recognised that a wider concept of maritime strategy should include the
“nation’s economic, environmental, societal and political security”18 in order to ensure Australia’s
national interests are realised.
The importance of Australia’s maritime areas has been recognised by successive Australian
governments. The 1987 Defence White Paper, for example, noted that one of the principal
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 40.
15 Ibid.
16 Clause 6.6, Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. 47.
17 Clause 2.9, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Maritime Strategy, p. 9.
18 Clause 2.14, Ibid., p. 10.
13
14
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national defence interests is “the protection of Australian interests in the surrounding maritime
areas, our island territories, and our proximate ocean areas and focal points”.19 This position is
confirmed in the 2000 Defence White Paper which noted:
Clause 2.13 Australia faces many security concerns other than those involving military force…They also
include concerns over illegal immigration, the drug trade, illegal fishing, piracy and quarantine
infringements.
Clause 2.14 Many of these problems, such as illegal immigration, involve the challenge of effective
surveillance, patrolling and policing of our maritime approaches. Illegal incursions into our Exclusive
Economic Zone and territorial waters, and onto our territory, constitute an on-going problem for Australia.
Given the size of our maritime jurisdiction, this is a significant challenge.20

Establishing cooperative arrangements with Indonesia in terms of maritime issues is extremely
significant for Australia as much of Australia’s maritime area to the north is shared with Indonesia.
However, the focus in the Defence White Papers in terms of the seas around Australia has been
on the issue of security as identified in the JCFADT Report, Australia’s Maritime Strategy:
Australia’s strategic interests are driven, in part, by the need to protect, monitor and control our 200
nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In addition, Australia is reliant on shipping for a large
proportion of its international trade. The maintenance of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are essential
to this trade.21

The EEZ forms an important role in terms of Australia’s national interests, along with the
movement of Australia’s international trade via the sea. As seventy percent of Australia’s exports
and imports in terms of value go by sea and largely through the Indonesian archipelagic straits of
Lombok, Malacca, Sunda and Sumba, the importance of maintaining a cooperative bilateral
relationship with Indonesia in terms of maritime issues is vital to Australia’s economic and
strategic interests. 22
In terms of maritime strategy and security, Australia’s Oceans Policy also detailed the
Department of Defence’s role in protecting Australia’s national interests. The Oceans Policy
stated: “It is the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) task…, to control our maritime approaches and

Clause 2.69, Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence of Australia 1987, p. 22.
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. 12.
21 Clause 6.1, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Maritime Strategy, p. 99.
22 Clause 6.6 and Clause 6.7, Ibid., p. 100.
19
20
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to exercise and protect Australia’s sovereignty and sovereign rights”.23 The Defence Force’s role
is broader than just defence issues and includes maritime surveillance and fisheries law
enforcement.
As I have noted, Australia’s foreign policy toward Indonesia is interrelated with Australia’s
Defence Policy and Oceans Policy when it comes to protecting Australia’s national interests. The
delimitation of maritime boundaries and the cooperation agreements established in relation to
fishing are an important issue for Australia and can provide considerable benefits. Added to this
Australia has the third largest EEZ in the world which is a challenge for Australian governments in
ensuring the security necessary to develop the offshore resources in Australia’s EEZ. In order to
provide an informed discussion of the fisheries agreements and maritime boundary treaties I will
first provide a brief summary of delimitation in terms of the development of the law of the sea.

Delimitation of Maritime Zones
Delimitation of maritime zones is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of international law,
though the Law of the Sea has its origins in Roman times.24 The purpose of delimitation is to
identify the jurisdictional regimes of each state in terms of the oceans and airspace, and with
reference to the oceans, to both the water column and the seabed. States establish maritime
boundaries in order to provide “jurisdictional clarity and certainty” where maritime zones intersect
with those of another state for “sustainable and equitable use of resources” and to reduce issues
of potential conflict.25 A brief description of the maritime zones is necessary for any further
discussion of delimitation.

Commonwealth of Australia, Australia's Oceans Policy - Specific Sectoral Measures, p. 37.
For a more detailed discussion about the Law of the Sea see C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea
(London: 1967), p. 33., P.T. Fenn, "Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea," American Journal of International Law, 19
(1925): pp. 716-27., and Sekhar Ghosh, Law of the Territorial Sea: Evolution and Development (Calcutta: Naya
Prokash, 1988), p. 33.
25 Peter Cozens, "Some Reflections on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes in the Asia-Pacific with a Focus
on the South China Sea," in The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific. ed.
Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and World
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2005), pp. 116-8.
23
24
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Figure 6.1
Diagram courtesy of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of
Wollongong.

Territorial Sea (TS) – this is the maritime zone that extends 12 nautical miles from the baseline of
the territorial sea. It is both the water adjacent to land and the airspace above this.26
Contiguous Zone (CZ) – the contiguous zone has its origins in the 20th century due to a number
of states concerned with extending a security zone beyond the territorial sea zone, particularly for
customs enforcement. The contiguous zone extends 24 nautical miles from the baseline of the
territorial sea.27
Continental Shelf (CS) – the continental shelf maritime zone is more recent, though the concept
of a continental shelf boundary began with the Proclamation by President Truman in 1945.28
Following the Truman Proclamation a number of states declared continental shelves. The
continental shelf is the extension or natural prolongation of a coastal state’s land mass. The ICJ
had set this concept of natural prolongation, particularly with the decision in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases in 1969. There was no international agreement on continental shelf
delimitation prior to the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982.29 At

Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, pp. 3-6.
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
28 As discussed by Ibid., p. 7. Kaye also notes that O’Connell in D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea,
ed. I.A. Shearer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982-1984), pp. 467-70. “discusses the writings of a number of authors
prior to the Second World War, pointing out the concept of a continental shelf in international law is not as recent as
a number of authors would claim. However, he notes that the development of offshore drilling in the late 1920s and
1930s provided the practical impetus for developments in the 1940s”. See footnote 26 in Kaye, Australia's Maritime
Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 7.
29 Hereinafter referred to as UNCLOS or LOSC.
26
27
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UNCLOS 111 a detailed definition was finally agreed. The continental shelf was defined as the
seabed up to 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline and may extend beyond this
point to a limit of 350 nautical miles depending on certain criteria relating to the seabed.30 Since
approximately 1977, subsequent decisions from the ICJ, and development in terms of maritime
zones have greatly reduced the importance and relevance of natural prolongation as a feature in
delimitation.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – the principles of an EEZ were adopted at UNCLOS 111. The
principles connected with the EEZ are that it gives exclusive rights to a coastal state to exploit for
economic reasons the seabed and the water column out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from
the baseline.31
Though the international law of the sea rules relating to the delimitation of maritime boundaries
are now set out in the text of UNCLOS 111, Australia did not ratify the LOSC until 1994.32 This
was an important year for Australia in terms of maritime zones. This was also the year that
Australia established an EEZ, which superseded the 200 nautical mile exclusive fishing zone that
had been established in 1979 and was referred to as the Australian Fishing Zone.33 A brief
discussion of maritime zones is relevant in any discussion of Australian and Indonesian maritime
delimitation because the continental shelf and the EEZ have created a number of issues in terms
of the negotiation of various agreements and treaties between the two states.

The 1971 Agreement34
Australia declared a continental shelf in 1953. However, it was not until 1971 that it concluded its
first continental shelf agreement with Indonesia. The 1971 Agreement was the first bilateral
maritime boundary that Australia had entered into with another state and in that sense it was

Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 9.
Ibid., pp. 10-1.
32 Penny Richards, "Why Australia Ratified the Convention," in The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea: What it Means to Australia and Australia's Marine Industries ed. Sam Bateman, Jon Delaney, and Martin
Tsamenyi, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 3 (Wollongong: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of
Wollongong, 1996), p. 43.
33 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 11., and Richards, "Why
Australia Ratified the Convention," pp. 43-54.
34 The full name of the agreement is the Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries, ATS 31, 1973, (Enacted on
18 May 1971: Entered into force on 8 November 1973). Hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Agreement. A copy of
the Agreement can be found in Volume Two – Appendices. Map 2 shows the boundary line of the Agreement.
30
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important. However, the Agreement reached was not particularly significant in its content and
only delimits the continental shelf. As this Agreement was negotiated prior to UNCLOS 111,
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issues of fisheries or an EEZ are not mentioned. It does appear, however, to be part of
Indonesia’s desire to negotiate maritime boundaries with its neighbours. In the late 1960s and
into the 1970s Indonesia negotiated maritime boundaries with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand.35 It should be noted that “Indonesia did not push hard for maximum claims, but
demonstrated a spirit of conciliation and a willingness to compromise”.36
The 1971 Agreement was signed on 18 May 1971 and came into force on 8 November 1973.
The boundary that was eventually concluded in the 1971 Agreement was a line that ran from
Point B1 in the Arafura Sea west of Cape York and out from New Guinea to Point A12 in the
Arafura Sea and to the north of Arnhem Land. In 1971 Papua was still under Australian
jurisdiction. However, in 1975 when Papua New Guinea gained its independence, the boundary
ran from Point A3. The agreement seems to have been based on the simple rule of equidistance,
though this is not stated, but:
The morphology of the seabed presented no complications and there was no available knowledge about
the structure and geology of those continental margins which would have encouraged either side to seek a
boundary beyond the line of equidistance.37

While the 1971 Agreement was not necessarily significant in terms of its content, the Agreement
recognised the importance of establishing maritime boundaries for both Indonesia and Australia
and signified the beginning of what I regard as part of a developing bilateral relationship that
would be of significance to both states in terms of future developments in maritime delimitation.

The 1972 Agreement38
At the time that the 1971 Agreement reached a successful conclusion, negotiations were also
taking place between Australia and Indonesia relating to the seabed in the area west of the 1971
Agreement, namely in the Arafura and Timor Seas. The 1972 Agreement was signed on 9

35 Agreements with these countries are included in Volume I and Volume II of the International Maritime Boundaries
Series.
36 Victor Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Seabed Boundaries)," in International Maritime Boundaries Volume Il. ed.
Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 1196.
37 Ibid., pp. 1195-205.
38 The full name of the agreement is the Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and
Arafura Seas Supplementary to the Agreement of 18 May 1971, ATS 32, 1973, (Enacted on 9 October 1972: Entered
into force on 8 November 1973). Hereinafter referred to as 1972 Agreement. A copy of this Agreement can be found
in Volume Two – Appendices. Map 2 shows the boundary line of the Agreement.
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October 1972 and came into force on 8 November 1973.39 The negotiation of this Agreement
was quite different from the 1971 Agreement where both states accepted unequivocally
delimitation based on equidistance. In terms of the 1972 Agreement the two states brought to the
negotiating table two distinctly different positions as to the position of the boundary line.40
Australia argued the concept of natural prolongation in negotiating the seabed boundary, while
Indonesia favoured a median line, or the principle of equidistance, as had been negotiated in the
1971 Agreement. Australia based its negotiating position on the geological position of Australia’s
continental shelf and argued that “the axis of the Timor trough…[marked] a fundamental divide
between distinct continental shelves”.41 The Timor Trough is an area that lies approximately forty
to sixty nautical miles off East Timor42 and has water depths of over 3000 metres in places.
While the subject of much debate between geologists, the Trough appears to be the boundary
between the Indo-Australian and Asian continental plates.43
Even though the 1971 Agreement had been negotiated on the basis of equidistance, Australia
had a strong case for arguing the position of natural prolongation or extension of the land mass of
the coastal state. In 1969, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands
brought before the ICJ the need for clarification of the boundaries of their continental shelves in
the North Sea. This is known as the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and in making its
decision the ICJ favoured delimitation on the basis of natural prolongation of the land mass of the
coastal state.44 In bringing down the ruling the ICJ indicated that delimitation of the continental
shelf was to be based on natural prolongation. “Hence if two States were separated by a
submarine continental divide, then that divide ought to be the boundary, regardless of equity
considerations”.45 Australia believed that the geophysical feature of the Timor Trough was
evidence of the existence of two continental shelves in the Timor Sea and therefore, in
For a more detailed discussion of the negotiations between Australia and Indonesia of the 1971 and 1972
Agreements refer to Alexander J. Munton, "A Study of the Offshore Petroleum Negotiations Between Australia, the
U.N. and East Timor" (Australian National University, 2007).
40 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 47.
41 Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, "The delimitation of maritime boundaries: a matter of 'life or death' for
East Timor?," in East Timor: Beyond Independence. ed. Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, (Clayton, VIC:
Monash University Press, 2007), p. 71.
42 The author understands that East Timor is now the independent state of Timor Lesté and at the time the 1971 and
1972 Agreements were signed, East Timor was known as Portuguese Timor. However, for the purposes of the
chapter I will refer to Timor Lesté and Portuguese Timor as East Timor.
43 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 47., and Victor Prescott,
"Australia-Indonesia (Timor and Arafura Seas)," in International Maritime Boundaries Volume Il. ed. Jonathan I.
Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 1211.
44 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor and Arafura Seas)," p. 1211., and Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries:
Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 15 and 49.
45 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 49.
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accordance with the principle of natural prolongation, the delimitation boundary “should accord
with a line approximating the axis of the Timor Trough”.46
The agreement appears to have reflected the Australian position far more than the Indonesian
position. The boundary began at Point A12 in the Arafura Sea where the 1971 Agreement had
ended and continued the course westward until it comes into line with the eastern end of the
Timor Trough. The boundary runs “along the southern side of the Trough, along the 200 metre
isobath”.47 However, it is interrupted between Points A16 and A17, before it continues along the
Trough where the boundary ends at Point A25. This is the point where the Trough ends and the
positions of Ashmore and Cartier Islands have a bearing on the boundary line. The interruption in
the boundary line between Points A16 and A17 reflects the part of Timor Island known as
Portuguese Timor, which in 1972 was under Portuguese jurisdiction. This area is known as the
Timor Gap and I will discuss this feature in detail in the following chapter.
The significance of the 1972 Agreement is that it favoured the continental shelf boundary, largely
due to the ICJ decision favouring delimitation on the basis of the principle of natural prolongation
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. The timing of the negotiations in this regard was
crucial to the outcome as the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases strengthened Australia’s
negotiating position considerably. Australia could argue that the Timor Trough represented the
continental divide between the Asian and Indo-Australian continental plates, and therefore the
boundary line should run on the southern side of the Trough rather than a median line which was
the basis of the 1971 Agreement. Given the decisions coming from the ICJ, Indonesia had very
little room to continue arguing a median line boundary and accepted the Australian position.
Thus the boundary in the 1972 Agreement lies well on the Indonesian side of what they would
have determined as a median line and gave Australia approximately eighty per cent of the
disputed area. The outcome of this situation was that the Indonesian territory was approximately
3,000 nautical square miles of a total area that measured approximately 20,800 nautical square
miles.48

Reflecting on the outcome, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar

Clive Schofield, "Minding the Gap: The Australia-East Timor Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor
Sea (CMATS)," The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 22, no. 2 (2007): p. 191.
47 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 49.
48 J.R.V. Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia," in International Maritime Boundaries Volume IV. ed. Jonathan I. Charney
and Robert W. Smith, (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), p. 2707.
46
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Kusumaatmadja, stated that Indonesia had been “taken to the cleaners”49 in terms of the
outcome of the 1972 Agreement.
For Australia the 1972 Agreement was a major coup. Australia’s desire to negotiate the maritime
boundaries in the Timor and Arafura Seas had also been strengthened through the late 1960s
and 1970s due to an interest in exploring the potential of the mineral resources of the continental
shelf.50 In November 1967 the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 had been established in
Australian domestic law.

The Act promoted the exploration and exploitation of potential

resources on the continental shelf around Australia, and Australia had begun to grant oil
exploration permits in the area prior to the 1972 Agreement.51
Following the introduction of the 1972 Agreement, research into the resource potential of the area
had increased considerably, especially in the area between Points A16 and A17, the Timor
Gap.52 There was little doubt that the need to delimit the boundary in the Timor Gap was
generated by the resource potential in this area, particularly small oil fields discovered to the west
of the gap and the “discovery of a major structure called Kelp in the Timor Gap and
gas/condensate discoveries on the Australian shelf east of the Timor Gap”.53

While the

finalisation of the 1972 Agreement was significant in terms of Australia’s ability to explore and
exploit the seabed, Indonesia’s perception that they had been “taken to the cleaners” did not
augur well for the negotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty.

Fishing
The negotiation of the maritime boundary agreements in 1971 and 1972 signalled a change in
terms of the Australian government’s practice towards Indonesian fishermen in areas around the
reefs and islands in the Timor Sea, namely, Ashmore, Cartier, Scott, Seringapatam Reefs and
Browse Islands.54

Sasha Stepan, Credibility Gap: Australia and the Timor Gap Treaty (Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas
Aid, 1990), p. 3. See also J.R.V. Prescott, Australia's Maritime Boundaries (Canberra: Department of International
Relations, Australian National University, 1985), p. 116., and Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong
Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 69.
50 Rothwell, "The Timor Gap Treaty: A Post-ICJ Analysis of its Implementation and Prospects," p. 42.
51 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor and Arafura Seas)," p. 1208.
52 Ibid., p. 1209.
53 Ibid., p. 1210.
54 Ruth Balint, Troubled Waters: Borders, boundaries and possession in the Timor Sea (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen &
Unwin, 2005), p. 72.
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As a Senior Fisheries Official noted in 1980:
There was no problem off the WA coast about seven years ago. Till then the only known intruders had
been the occasional apologetic fishing party swept off course by wind and currents. But from about 1973
Indonesian fishermen had begun to intentionally find their way to the fertile WA waters. They now
constituted what was considered a commercially oriented invasion.55

The increase of Indonesian fishing and concern about the activities of traditional Indonesian
fishermen in Australia’s exclusive fishing zone prompted the Australian government to negotiate
the 1974 Memorandum of Understanding in Relation to Indonesian Traditional Fishermen.56
Australia’s exclusive fishing zone was defined in the MoU as the “waters extending twelve miles
seaward off the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured”57 and the waters around the
reefs and islands detailed above.58 The MoU defined Indonesian traditional fishermen as those
who “traditionally [take] fish and sedentary organisms in Australian waters by methods which
have been the tradition over decades of time”.59
As noted on the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry website. The MoU:
…recognised the rights of access for traditional Indonesian fishers in shared waters to the north of
Australia. This access was granted in recognition of the long history of traditional Indonesian fishers that
have fished the area. The MoU provides Australia with a tool to manage access to Australian waters while
for Indonesia, it enables Indonesian traditional fishers to continue their customary practices and target
species such as trepang, trochus, abalone and sponges.60

The MoU resolved a potential obstacle that had existed for a small number of traditional
fishermen in terms of fishing in Australian waters. It achieved two things. First, it defined the
area of the sea that Indonesian traditional fishermen could continue to fish, and secondly it

Quoted in Bruce C Campbell and Bu V E Wilson, The Politics of Exclusion. Indonesian Fishing in the Australian
Fishing Zone, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, No. 5, 1993, p. 36 in Ruth Balint, "The Last Frontier:
Australia's Maritime Territories and the Policing of Indonesian Fishermen," Journal of Australian Studies, 23, no. 63
(1999): p. 31.
56 The full name of the Memorandum is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia
and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Regarding the Operations of Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in
Areas of the Australian Exclusive Fishing Zone and Continental Shelf, (Enacted on 7 November 1974). Hereinafter
referred to as the MoU in Relation to Indonesian Traditional Fishermen or MoU.
57 Clause 1, Ibid.
58 Clause 2, Ibid.
59 Clause 1, Ibid.
60 Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Indonesia - Australia Fisheries Cooperation (2009 [cited 5
October 2009); available from http://www.daff.gov.au/fisheries/international/regional/indonesia.
55

181

defined what was meant by ‘traditional’. While the wording of the MoU was clearly ambiguous in
terms of stating ‘traditional’ as “methods which have been the tradition over decades of time”,61
Prescott noted that “the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs had a clear interpretation of the
meaning of the phrase”.62 The wording of the MoU was understood to refer to a subsistence life
style for the fishermen and the method of fishing was in sailing vessels rather than boats driven
by motors. However, as Balint notes, “The MoU has not only restricted the fishermen spatially, it
has locked them into a technological time warp”.63
Since the signing of the MoU there have been a number of problems associated with the
operation of the MoU, though these have not been associated with the ambiguity of the language
in the MoU. These problems largely arise from breaches of the MoU, specifically in terms of
traditional fishermen fishing in waters outside the zone designated under the MoU or landing on
islands other than those designated. The other problem has been in terms of the use of motor
operated boats rather than traditional sailing vessels.64
During the 1980s there were a growing number of violations reported under the terms of the MoU
which led the Australian government to submit a revised draft MoU to the Indonesian government
in 1988. However, this was rejected by the Indonesian government.65 In 1989 officials from
Indonesia and Australia met on 29 April to discuss the issue of fisheries. At this meeting both
parties affirmed the continuation of the MoU and developed practical guidelines for the
implementation of the MoU that would reduce the likelihood of violations of the terms of the
Memorandum. These guidelines continued the MoU’s conditions that designated the waters as
limited to Indonesian traditional fishermen using traditional methods of fishing.66
Despite the guidelines, violations of the terms of the MoU continue and have resulted in the arrest
of a number of illegal fishing vessels since the late 1980s and still create problems for Australian
Clause 1, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia Regarding the Operations of Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in Areas of the Australian
Exclusive Fishing Zone and Continental Shelf.
62 Victor Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Fisheries)," in International Maritime Boundaries Volume Il. ed. Jonathan I.
Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martin Nijhoff, 1993), p. 1233.
63 Balint, "The Last Frontier: Australia's Maritime Territories and the Policing of Indonesian Fishermen," p. 32.
64 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Fisheries)," p. 1234. and Balint, "The Last Frontier: Australia's Maritime Territories
and the Policing of Indonesian Fishermen," p. 33.
65 Clause 8.1.4, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 114.
66 Appendix C in Natasha Stacey. Boats to Burn: Bajo Fishing Activity in the Australian Fishing Zone. (Place
Published: ANU E Press, 2007), http://epress.anu.edu.au/apem/boats/pdf/whole-book.pdf (accessed 16 March
2010).
61
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government officials today. The concern for Australian governments is over fishing by illegal
means and therefore the depletion of fishing species.

Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement67
In November 1979 Australia declared the Australian Fishing Zone. It extended 200 nautical miles
from the baseline of the territorial sea. In addition; “Where this claim overlapped similar claims by
neighbours, Australia defined a line of strict equidistance. In the Arafura Sea this line of
equidistance lay south of the seabed boundary agreed in 1972 by Australia and Indonesia”.68
Australia’s proclamation of an Australian Fishing Zone meant that waters that had been
traditionally fished by Indonesian fishermen under the 1974 MoU in Relation to Indonesian
Traditional Fishermen could now be claimed by Australia. However, the Australian government
made the decision that Indonesian traditional fishing practices could continue in the designated
areas of the MoU on the basis that: “The operations were confined to a subsistence level, and the
operations were carried out in the Declared Fishing Zone and territorial sea adjacent to the
Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Seringapatam Reef, Scott Reef, Adele Island and Browse Island”.69
Australia’s decision to claim an Australian Fishing Zone out to 200 nautical miles from the
coastline and Indonesia’s claim of an EEZ to the same limit resulted in overlapping claims in the
Timor Sea. Indonesia was not willing to accept a line of equidistance in terms of a fishing
boundary as “it placed Indonesia at a marked disadvantage” when the Ashmore and Cartier
Islands, which are Australian territory, were given full effect in terms of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines of these islands.70 Australia argued the full effect of these islands when denoting
Australia’s baselines and therefore argued the position of equidistance from the baselines of the
islands. On the other hand, Indonesia believed that the equidistance line should operate from the
baselines of the Australian mainland and the Indonesian archipelago not the Ashmore and Cartier
Islands even though the islands were Australian sovereign territory.71

67 The full name is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and
Government of Australia Concerning the Implementation of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement
Arrangement, (Enacted on 29 October 1981: Entered into force on 1 February 1982). Hereinafter referred to as the
Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement or Arrangement.
68 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Fisheries)," p. 1229.
69 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Control of Indonesian Traditional Fishing in the
Australian Fishing Zone of North-West Australia”, (Canberra: DFAT, 1988), Unpublished Report cited in Stacey.
Boats to Burn: Bajo Fishing Activity in the Australian Fishing Zone. (Place Published (accessed.
70 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Fisheries)," p. 1229.
71 Ibid., p. 1231.
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On this basis Australia and Indonesia agreed to a MoU which delivered seventy percent of the
disputed area to Indonesia.

The Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement

Arrangement signed on 29 October 1981 was a provisional line “which separate[d] areas where
Australia and Indonesia exercise jurisdiction of fisheries surveillance and enforcement”.72 The
eastern section of the line is based on equidistance and corresponds with the 1971 continental
shelf boundary. The central section, that is the area that is in the zone negotiated in the 1972
Agreement, is a line that falls south of the 1972 continental shelf boundary. The western section
of the line lies south of an equidistance line and establishes a 12 nautical mile arc around the
Ashmore and Cartier Islands.73
The acceptance of a median line in terms of the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and
Enforcement Line may appear to be a reduction of Australia’s entitlement compared to the 1972
Agreement, based on the continental shelf boundary. However, the Australian government at the
time made this decision based on Australia’s maximum legal entitlement under international
law.74 As noted in Cabinet documents of 6 July 1979:
In international law there is no justification in the area concerned for asserting fisheries jurisdiction beyond
a median line boundary. Such an assertion would now have no other effect in the delimitation negotiations
[that is the Timor Gap Treaty negotiations] than to provoke the Indonesians, making eventual agreement
on a median line boundary unduly difficult.75

While initially there was a dispute in terms of geography and the effect of the islands and reefs
that were Australian territory, the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement
Arrangement was agreed without major problems due in large part to the problems associated
with Indonesian traditional fishermen having been resolved in the MoU in Relation to Indonesian
Traditional Fishermen in 1974. A significant element in the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and
Enforcement Arrangement was that the line established was provisional and “without prejudice to
the position of either Government”76 in relation to a permanent boundary.

Ibid., p. 1234.
Refer to Map 1 showing the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Line.
74 Government of Australia Cabinet, Cabinet Minute Canberra 16 July 1979, Decision No 9325 (National Archives of
Australia, 29 September 2009), p. 7.
75 Annex 1 of Ibid., p. 1.
76 Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement as cited in Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia
(Fisheries)," p. 1239.
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Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Fisheries77
Following the practical guidelines established in 1989 for the further implementation of the 1974
MoU in Relation to Indonesian Traditional Fishermen, Indonesia and Australia signed an
Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Fisheries on 22 April 1992 which came into force on 29
May 1993. As noted in the JCFADT Report, Australia’s Relations with Indonesia, the Agreement
was established as a forum for discussion on fisheries cooperation and as part of the Agreement
a joint workshop was held in November 1992 to discuss the depletion of fisheries resources in the
Arafura Sea.78 The Agreement aims to provide:
…a framework for fisheries and marine cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, and provides for
information exchange on research, management and technological developments, complementary
management of shared stocks, training and technical exchanges, aquaculture development, trade
promotion and cooperation on illegal fishing.79

The Agreement outlines the details for cooperation on illegal fishing specifically stating the
requirement that foreign vessels comply with the enforcement jurisdiction of each Party
concerned. For Australia this means that Indonesian fishermen are to comply with Australian law
in terms of fishing jurisdictions. The Agreement allows for consultations on the operation of the
Agreement and where possible consultations were held on an annual basis. In a meeting in 2002
it was agreed that meetings would be held by the Working Group on Marine Affairs and Fisheries
as one of a number of working groups set up under the framework of the AIMF.80
The issues of illegal fishing have not really been satisfactorily served by the agreements that are
in place. As recognised in the JCFADT Report Australia’s Relations with Indonesia in 1993, two
subjects dominated the relationship between Australia and Indonesia and one of these was
fishing operations, particularly illegal fishing in the seas “off the north and north west coast of
Australia”.81

77 The full name is the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia Relating to Cooperation in Fisheries, ATS 18, 1993, (Enacted on 29 April 1992: Entered into force on 29
May 1993). Hereinafter referred to as the Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Fisheries or Agreement. A copy of
the Agreement can be found in Volume Two – Appendices.
78 Clause 8.1.6, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 114.
79 Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Indonesia - Australia Fisheries Cooperation.
80 Ibid.
81 Foreword, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with Indonesia,
p. xxvii.
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As argued in the Report:
Although the problem of illegal trochus fishing off the WA coast has largely been contained, there are
clearly unresolved issues relating to shark fishing in northern waters. Access by the Australian industry
and the question of depletion of species need to be resolved.82

While it was recognised by the JCFADT in 1993 that it was not the most important issue for
resolution between Australia and Indonesia,83 the issue of illegal fishing is a continuing problem
for Australian government officials and has been raised in regular meetings as part of the
Agreement in Relation to Fisheries Cooperation. Following consultation on fisheries cooperation
being undertaken by the Working Group on Marine Affairs and Fisheries under the auspices of
the AIMF, the issue of illegal fishing has been raised in the last four meetings of the AIMF as one
of growing concern for both Australia and Indonesia.84 At the 6th and 7th meetings of the AIMF
ministers and officials recognised and agreed that illegal fishing was a growing concern for both
states and agreed that further discussions would be held by officials with the aim of combating
illegal fishing.85 At the 8th meeting of the AIMF in 2006 it was acknowledged that both countries
recognised the need for “improved information sharing, joint study on illegal fishing, expanding
cooperation on coordinated fisheries surveillance activities and enhancing surveillance
capacity”.86 At the 9th meeting of the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum in 2008, the concern
in relation to illegal fishing was confirmed by the new Labor government, particularly “the links in
many cases between illegal fishing and transnational organised crime groups”.87

The

government now recognised the need for cooperation not only through the Agreement in Relation
to Fisheries Cooperation, but also its connection to the Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation.88 The issue of fisheries cooperation had now become not one just about economic
and environmental impacts, but also a security issue and could become an increasingly complex
issue in the political relationship between the two states.

Clause 8.6.1, Ibid., p. 124.
Clause 8.7.9, Ibid., p. 130.
84 Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement., Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint
Ministerial Statement., Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Statement: 8th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial
Forum., Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement - 9th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial
Forum.
85 Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement, p. 218. and Australia-Indonesia Ministerial
Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement, p. 5 of print view.
86 Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Statement: 8th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, p. 5 of print
view.
87 Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement - 9th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, pp.
3-4 of print view.
88 Ibid., p. 4 of print view.
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Conclusion
The importance of the seas between Indonesia and Australia form part of Australia’s foreign
policy, defence policy and oceans policy and their significance in terms of Australia’s economic
and security interests is obvious. In terms of maritime delimitation both Australia and Indonesia
have shown a mutual interest in defining the maritime boundaries between the states to explore
and exploit the resources within the seas and have shown a desire to reach agreement in terms
of fisheries cooperation. The negotiations of the 1971 and 1972 Agreements for Australia were
significant in terms of Australia’s ability to explore and exploit the resources within the Arafura
and Timor Seas and established the further need to negotiate the maritime boundary in the area
known as the Timor Gap. While the 1972 Agreement gave Australia approximately eighty
percent of the area under negotiation, the Indonesian government felt they had been denied an
equal share of the disputed area. On the basis of decisions forthcoming from the ICJ at the time,
the outcome based on the principle of natural prolongation was appropriate only in terms of the
inability of Indonesia to argue a contrary position. However, the outcome of the 1972 Agreement
resulted in a more determined negotiating position by the Indonesian government in relation to
the Timor Gap Treaty negotiations which I discuss in my next chapter.
The 1971 and 1972 Agreements also had an impact on the practices of Indonesian fishermen in
the area around the Ashmore, Cartier, Scott, Seringapatam Reefs and Browse Islands. This
resulted in Australia and Indonesia negotiating the MoU in Relation to Indonesian Traditional
Fishermen in 1974 which recognised the access rights that would allow traditional fishermen to
continue to fish in Australia’s Exclusive Fishing Zone. The MoU limited this access to the areas
stated above and defined the methods of operation of the fishermen. In essence the 1974 MoU
limited Indonesian fishermen’s traditional access and further reduced them to fishing on the basis
of a subsistence life style. Two other fishing Agreements have been established with Indonesia,
namely the 1981 Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement which
established a median line in terms of fishing entitlements of both states following Australia
claiming a 200 nautical mile Fishing Zone and Indonesia claiming a 200 nautical mile EEZ. This
resulted in Indonesia gaining seventy percent of the disputed fishing area. In 1992 Australia and
Indonesia established the Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Fisheries which established the
framework for fisheries cooperation and allowed for ongoing consultations on fishing issues.
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While these arrangements have been established and issues relating to fishing cooperation are
largely dealt with at ministerial and official levels between the two governments, the issue of
illegal fishing remains a problem for Australian governments. Illegal fishing has increased over
the past decade and remains a concern for Australian governments, both in terms of the cost of
surveillance and in terms of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia. While the issue has not had
a major impact on the political relationship to date, the potential for this to occur in the future is
obvious. The Indonesian government must be aware of the relatively weak position of the
traditional fishermen who operate outside the terms of the 1974 MoU and therefore will not wish
to raise this matter other than in meetings of the AIMF. More recently it has also become a
security issue for Australian governments, particularly in relation to border controls.
The technical arrangements identified in this chapter have assisted the political relationship
between Australia and Indonesia despite recognition that there remain problems in terms of illegal
fishing and Indonesia’s concern that it had been “taken to the cleaners” over the negotiation of
the 1972 Agreement. The indirect involvement of the ICJ’s decision in 1969 in relation to the
continental shelf had a direct influence in the outcome of the maritime boundary delimitation in
the 1972 Agreement and resulted in a more determined approach in Indonesia’s negotiating
position over the Timor Gap Treaty. Indonesia’s acceptance of the ICJ opinion in the 1969 North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases despite its disadvantage in terms of the outcome of the Agreement
shows a willingness to accept international decisions and maintain a good relationship with
Australia. This, however, changes over the Timor Gap. Indonesia’s feeling of being “taken to the
cleaners” had resulted in disputes over the maritime boundary, particularly given the valuable
resources in the Timor Sea.
It is difficult to gauge the impact of these technical matters on the political relationship, and
certainly when considering the earlier period in question, the issue of East Timor overshadowed
other areas of contention in the relationship. However, delimitation of maritime boundaries and
issues of illegal fishing remained a problem within the relationship and this is reflected in the
resulting treaties and arrangements that have been negotiated between the two states. This is
where the negotiations over technical matters have had a positive impact on the relationship.
While I do not agree that formal negotiations in this regard necessarily build a strong political
relationship, the willingness to find solutions and compromise on important issues that affect both
states is noticeable in the outcome of the agreements. However, given the economic resources
in the oceans between the two states and current issues of security, particularly in terms of
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border controls there cannot be any guarantee that maritime issues will not have an impact on the
political relationship in the future.

It will require both governments to maintain a shared

appreciation of the need for strong cooperation around the Timor and Arafura Seas issues,
particularly in terms of illegal fishing, immigration and border control as these are issues of
significance for Australia and would become contentious if a high level of cooperation is not
maintained.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - OPPORTUNITIES ABOUND? THE TIMOR GAP
TREATY AND THE 1997 TREATY

Introduction
The delimitation of the maritime zones between the two states and the treaties that have been
established to date are an important aspect of Australia’s foreign policy and oceans policy with
Indonesia. Both Indonesia and Australia have shown an ability to develop creative solutions to
maritime delimitation problems over the past twenty five years. While particular outcomes of the
agreements and treaties may not always have been mutually beneficial to both states, the
outcome of the Timor Gap Treaty1 and the 1997 Treaty2 certainly delivered solutions that not only
produced successful outcomes for the benefit of both parties, but also were successful in
maintaining cooperative bilateral relations between the two states.

While the negotiating

positions of the two parties seemed to remain far apart, the creation of the Joint Development
Zone in the Timor Gap Treaty and overlapping jurisdictions in the 1997 Treaty were innovative
solutions when agreement on a single delimitation boundary was unlikely to be achieved. It
cannot be denied that the motivations behind these solutions were principally driven by realist
concerns to secure potential and existing resources of the areas of the sea under negotiation.
However, both the negotiations and the outcomes produced positive results for the ongoing
bilateral relationship.
Both the Keating and Howard governments were particularly ‘upbeat’ over the negotiations of the
maritime agreements and treaties with Indonesia, viewing the Timor Gap Treaty and the 1997
Treaty as innovative and creative solutions over what had become to some degree a diplomatic
impasse, first with the Timor Gap Treaty and then the wider boundaries as negotiated in the 1997
Treaty. While there is evidence to suggest that even though the motivations of the Australian
government may have been economic in the realist tradition, the Timor Gap Treaty certainly
produced a much more liberal oriented cooperative relationship between the two states. This is,
however, overly optimistic as it overlooks difficulties that potentially exist, particularly with the lack

Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia. Hereinafter referred to as the Timor Gap Treaty or
Treaty. A copy of the Treaty can be found in Volume Two – Appendices.
2 Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing an
Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries, ATNIF4, (Enacted on 14 March 1997: Not
Entered into Force). Hereinafter referred to as the 1997 Treaty or Treaty. A copy of the Treaty can be found in
Volume Two – Appendices.
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of finality over the 1997 Treaty and the effect this may have on the political relationship if an issue
arises in relation to the water column or the seabed.
In this chapter I will further develop my observations and discussion of Australia-Indonesia
maritime relations that I offer in chapter six. I have undertaken a detailed discussion of the Timor
Gap and the 1997 Treaties and I have examined the significance of these two treaties for
Australia’s political relationship with Indonesia during the period of the Keating and Howard
governments. While the Timor Gap Treaty was not negotiated during the period of the Keating
government it had a major significance during this period in relation to the negotiations of the
1997 Treaty and the response to the finalisation of the Treaty.

Timor Gap Treaty
In the 1970s and 1980s Australia was keen to explore and exploit potential resources in the Timor
Gap and finalise the seabed boundary of the gap omitted from the 1972 Agreement. Australia’s
need for exploration was understandable as its output of oil, particularly from the Bass Strait was
declining.3 While Australia made attempts in the early 1970s to negotiate with Portugal over the
Gap, Portugal believed that East Timor was a low priority and was willing to await the outcome of
the delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent states, which was before UNCLOS
111.4
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, followed by Australia’s de jure recognition of
Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor in 1979, left the path open for Indonesia and Australia to
negotiate over the seabed boundary of the Timor Gap. Without de jure recognition being given
Australia was unable to negotiate with Indonesia. De jure recognition was accorded to Indonesia
by Australia in 1979 and Australia commenced formal negotiations with Indonesia in relation to
the seabed boundary of the Timor Gap in 1979.5

Victor Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor Gap)," in International Maritime Boundaries Volume Il. ed. Jonathan I.
Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 1249.
4 Keith Suter, "Timor Gap Treaty: The Continuing Controversy," Marine Policy, 17, no. 4 (1993): p. 299.
5 There are some differing opinions as to when the negotiations actually began. Lumb states that negotiations began
in 1978, following de facto recognition, R.D. Lumb, "The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries," Australian Yearbook of
International Law 7(1981): p. 74., while Willheim states that negotiations began in 1979, following de jure recognition,
Ernst Willheim, "Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development Zone in the
"Timor Gap," Natural Resources Journal, 29 (1989): p. 825. Campbell states that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Australia announced on 15 December 1978 that negotiations would begin and they began in 1979, Bill Campbell,
"Maritime Boundary Arrangements in the Timor Sea," in The Maritime Dimensions of Independent East Timor. ed.
Donald R. Rothwell and Martin Tsamenyi, (Wollongong: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2000),
3
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Following nine rounds of negotiations, Australia and Indonesia were unable to agree on a
permanent delimitation of the seabed boundary in the Timor Gap due to different views over the
principles of international law governing maritime boundaries adopted by the two states.6 These
different views were similar to those expressed by the two states in the negotiation of the 1972
Agreement, where each state expressed opposing views over where the seabed boundary should
be drawn. Australia believed that the existence of the Timor Trough was a geophysical feature
that created a divide between the two continental plates. It based its argument on the principle of
natural prolongation and on the point that the Timor Trough created the natural boundary of the
continental shelf. Australia relied on the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which “maintained
the depth/exploitability criteria” and on the “maintenance of physical criteria for delimiting the
continental shelf at UNCLOS 111”.7 The rulings of the ICJ had also reinforced Australia’s
position. In the Timor Gap negotiations Australia argued that Indonesia had already accepted the
principle of natural prolongation in the 1972 Agreement.
Indonesia argued a different position, but like Australia, drew on international law to support its
position. First, while Indonesia had signed the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention it had never
ratified it, and therefore was not obligated to comply with the Convention. Second, since the
negotiations of the 1972 Agreement, the principle of natural prolongation had been questioned in
cases brought before the ICJ. This had created a sense of ambiguity in terms of the principle of
natural prolongation in international law. Third, Indonesia maintained that every coastal nation
was entitled to a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles irrespective of whether the continental
shelf exists or not. Where the two coastlines are less then 400 nautical miles apart, then a
median line or the principle of equidistance is the appropriate measure to determine the seabed
boundary.8

p. 59. A Cabinet document dated 16 July 1979 stated that negotiations began in Canberra on 14-16 February 1979.
Cabinet, Cabinet Minute Canberra 16 July 1979, Decision No 9325, p. 3.
6 Stepan, "Portugal's Action in the International Court of Justice Against Australia Concerning the Timor Gap Treaty,"
p. 919. and Willheim, "Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development Zone
in the "Timor Gap," p. 825.
7 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 67.
8 See discussions in Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor Gap)," pp. 1252-3., Willheim, "Australia-Indonesia SeaBed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development Zone in the "Timor Gap," pp. 826-31., Kaye,
Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, pp. 67-9., Rothwell, "The Timor Gap
Treaty: A Post-ICJ Analysis of its Implementation and Prospects," p. 43., Suter, "Timor Gap Treaty: The Continuing
Controversy," pp. 299-300., and Stepan, "Portugal's Action in the International Court of Justice Against Australia
Concerning the Timor Gap Treaty," p. 919.
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Australia did not accept the median line view, maintaining that Article 76 of UNCLOS 111 argued,
“that the coastal nation was entitled to exercise jurisdiction over its continental shelf throughout its
natural prolongation”,9 and that where the continental shelf is less than 200 nautical miles the
coastal nation is entitled to seabed jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. Australia took the view that
the theory of natural prolongation of the continental shelf was maintained in Article 76 and gave
primacy over equidistance.10

An impasse was created as neither state wished to give away their positions on where the
delimitation boundary should be, and there was little evidence that decisions coming out of the
ICJ could provide resolution. In addition, neither party had revealed any inclination to have the
issue resolved by a third party, as there was too much uncertainty for both parties over the
outcome of any third party deliberations. Faced with this stalemate between the parties a Joint
Development Zone (JDZ) was suggested in the negotiations in 1984. Though the option of a JDZ
can be fraught with difficulties it was, however, a very real alternative to allow both parties to
explore and share the resources that were evident in the area of the Timor Sea covered by the
Timor Gap, particularly where permanent delimitation could not be agreed upon.

The initial reaction of the Indonesian negotiators was less than enthusiastic. However, in October
1985 the two states had agreed in principle to consider a JDZ as an alternative approach to allow
the Timor Gap to be developed. It was understood by both parties that the provisions provided
under a JDZ would be temporary provisions and were without prejudice to any delimitation of the
seabed in the Timor Gap. The negotiation of the boundaries of the JDZ took some time, but in
1988 an interim agreement was signed.

This committed both states to reaching a final

agreement within a year and in 1989 the legal regime and terms and conditions of the JDZ were
concluded.11 The period between the establishment of the interim agreement in 1988 and signing
in 1989 was taken up with the legal and administrative issues in the area of the JDZ.12
The Timor Gap Treaty was signed between Ali Alatas, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, and
Gareth Evans, the then Australian Foreign Minister, on 11 December 1989 in a plane flying over

Suter, "Timor Gap Treaty: The Continuing Controversy," p. 300.
Ibid.
11 See Willheim, "Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development Zone in
the "Timor Gap," p. 831., Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, pp.
69-70., and Campbell, "Maritime Boundary Arrangements in the Timor Sea," pp. 60-1.
12 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor Gap)," p. 1247.
9
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the Zone of Cooperation in the Timor Gap, and came into force on 9 February 1991.13 The Timor
Gap Treaty was a comprehensive international legal document which divided an area of some
60,000 square kilometres of the Timor Sea into a Zone of Cooperation divided into three areas A,
B and C.14 The preamble to the treaty reinforced the position in relation to exploration and
exploitation:
Desiring to enable the exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources of the continental shelf…;
Conscious of the need to encourage and promote development of the petroleum resources of the area;
Desiring that exploration for and exploitation of these resources proceed without delay.15

The boundaries of the Zone of Cooperation reflected the positions taken by both Indonesia and
Australia in the negotiations. The area of the Zone of Cooperation was a “coffin-shaped zone”
which involved an area of approximately 16,129 nautical square miles.16 The largest area, Area
A, was to be administered by both Australia and Indonesia. The area to the south of Area A,
Area B, was under Australian jurisdiction. In determining the line between Area A and Area B,
Indonesia’s argument of a median line was used and therefore this line was the median line
between the two coasts. The bottom of Area B reflected Indonesia’s claim of a maximum of 200
nautical miles from the coast of East Timor, which under international law would be the claim for
Indonesia’s EEZ. The area to the north of Area A, Area C, was under Indonesian jurisdiction.
The line between Area A and Area C was “marked by a simplified representation of the 1500
meter isobath”.17 The northern line of Area C reflected the Australian view of where the boundary
should be, based on the axis of the Timor Trough.18
As Kaye noted:
The north of Area A appears to indicate Australia’s position with regard to where it believes a permanent
boundary should run, while the median line closing off the south of Area A indicates Indonesia’s view of the
issue. The area in between was the area in dispute between the two parties, and as such was the area
subjected to joint control.19

For a more detailed discussion of the negotiations between Australia and Indonesia of the Timor Gap Treaty refer
to Munton, "A Study of the Offshore Petroleum Negotiations Between Australia, the U.N. and East Timor".
14 Refer to Map 1 and Map 2 showing the areas of the Treaty.
15 Preamble, Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between
the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia.
16 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor Gap)," p. 1246.
17 Ibid., p. 1251.
18 Ibid., pp. 1248-51., and Campbell, "Maritime Boundary Arrangements in the Timor Sea," p. 62.
19 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 71.
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The Timor Gap Treaty stated that Area B would be administered under Australian jurisdiction but
noted that Australia had agreed to give Indonesia sixteen per cent of the tax revenue from
petroleum.20 Area C was under the jurisdiction of Indonesia, and Indonesia had agreed to give
Australia ten per cent of the tax revenue from petroleum.21 Area A was to be under joint
jurisdiction between Australia and Indonesia and the Treaty noted that both states would share
management, exploration and exploitation. This area was to be “sovereignty neutral”.22 A
fundamental feature of the Treaty was that Area A was under:
…joint control by the Contracting States of the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources,
aimed at achieving optimum commercial utilization thereof and equal sharing between the two Contracting
States of the benefits of the exploitation of petroleum resources, as provided for in the Treaty;23

The Timor Gap Treaty established a Ministerial Council which had the task of overseeing the
operation of the Treaty relating to the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area
A, and its roles were stated in Part III of the Treaty. The Ministerial Council was to meet annually
and had “overall responsibility for all matters relating to the exploration for and exploitation of the
petroleum resources in Area A of the Zone of Cooperation”.24 In addition the Treaty detailed a list
of functions including the management of the Joint Authority. Part IV of the Treaty established a
Joint Authority under the mandate of the Ministerial Council which was “responsible for the
management of activities relating to exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources in
Area A in accordance with this Treaty, and in particular the Petroleum Mining Code and with
production sharing contracts”.25 The Joint Authority was responsible for all matters relating to oil
contracts, regulation and production of petroleum resources in Area A. Decision making in both
the Ministerial Council and Joint Authority was to be made by consensus and all legal aspects

Some texts state that this is ten per cent, however, ten per cent represents the gross amount. The sixteen per
cent figure represents the net amount. For clarification the wording of Article 4.1.(b) is “pay to the Republic of
Indonesia ten (10) per cent of gross Resource Rent Tax collected by Australia from corporations producing
petroleum from Area B equivalent to sixteen (16) per cent of net Resource Rent Tax collected, calculated on the
basis that general company tax is payable at the maximum rate”.Treaty between Australia and the Republic of
Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern
Australia.
21 Article 4, Clause 1 (b), Ibid.
22 Campbell, "Maritime Boundary Arrangements in the Timor Sea," p. 63.
23 Article 2, Clause 2 (a), Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an
Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia.
24 Article 6, Clause 1, Ibid.
25 Article 8, Ibid.
20
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were under both Indonesian and Australian legal jurisdiction.26 The terms and conditions
represented complete cooperation between the two states with neither party in the negotiations
allowing any advantage to be given to the other party.
Gareth Evans proclaimed the Timor Gap Treaty as:
…an outstanding example of an innovative approach to what seemed an insoluble problem, addressing as
it does the issue of undefined boundaries by creating a framework in which we could jointly explore for, and
develop resources for, the benefit of both our countries.27

It represented an extraordinary initiative and major breakthrough in the stalemate that had been
created in negotiations over a long period of time due to the inability of the two parties to agree on
the delimitation boundaries. It appears that it was “the most comprehensive such treaty in
existence”.28
Henry Burmester, one of the negotiators to the Timor Gap Treaty, described the joint
development as:
…a significant achievement as…it seeks to achieve true joint development and control and does not adopt
by means of sub-zones or other mechanisms a scheme whereby joint development really means
development under the control of one country with simply some mechanism for sharing the financial
return.29

The Timor Gap Treaty was an outcome of real joint development that required both parties to
work cooperatively and towards conciliatory outcomes to ensure the larger goals of exploration
and exploitation were achieved.
Australia’s primary motivations behind the settlement of the Timor Gap Treaty provoked some
differences of opinion between commentators. Some suggested that economic motivations drove
the negotiations of the Timor Gap Treaty, while others suggested that the relationship with
Indonesia was the main motivation. In Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East

Articles 3, 5, 7 and Part VI, Ibid., and Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime
Policy No. 12, pp. 70-81.
27 Evans, Committees: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: Report: Government response, p. 1232.
28 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor Gap)," p. 1253.
29 Henry Burmester, "Zone of Cooperation Treaty," Maritime Studies, 53 (1990): p. 16.
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Timor, Taylor notes that from 1986 the Australian government had already received some A$31
million from the sale of oil permits to companies.30 The then Australian Foreign Minister, Bill
Hayden, in a speech to the Joint Services Staff College in April 1984 said:
There is as you know a large gap off East Timor in the sea-bed boundary. In that gap are positioned
natural gas fields and probably oil fields. We would not be regarded with great public celebration if we
were to make a mess of those negotiations, and yet the implication of the negotiations is that as the area
open or undefined at this point is off East Timor, a certain recognition must be established to East Timor.
For some people in my party who have expressed concern about the pressure of Indonesia on East Timor,
this is a cold, hard, sobering reality that must also be addressed in respect of those other interests we must
attend to.31

Taylor suggests that this speech could hardly have been more direct as to the intention of the
Australian government. He believed that Australia’s motivations were purely economic and this
drove Australian policy from the time of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor.32 But this is hardly
a new idea in terms of a growing policy assessment. In August 1975, Richard Woolcott, the then
Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, sent a cablegram to the Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs in Canberra in which he suggested that the Minister for the Department of Minerals and
Energy may have an interest in the Timor issue at that time.33 The resource potential in the
Timor Gap was already well known by Australian policymakers prior to Indonesia’s occupation of
East Timor. For successive Australian governments the realist approach was seen in terms of
the economic benefits to be found in the Timor Gap, and the strengthening of the political
relationship with Indonesia through a negotiated agreement that was acceptable to both parties.
This was seen to be in Australia’s national interests.
The opposition to the Treaty mainly revolved around whether Australia had a legitimate right to
negotiate with Indonesia over the Timor Gap. Questions were asked with regard to the legitimacy
of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 and its subsequent integration of East Timor and
John G. Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor (Sydney: Pluto Press Australia,
1991), p. 171.
31 Canberra Times, 18 April 1984 as cited in Ibid.
32 Ibid., pp. 170-1.
33 The cablegram stated “We are all aware of the Australian defence interests in the Portuguese Timor situation but I
wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of the Minister or the Department of Minerals and
Energy in the Timor situation. It would seem to me that this Department might well have an interest in closing the
present gap in the agreed sea border and that this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia by closing
the present gap than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor”. “169 Cablegram to Canberra”, Way, Browne,
and Johnson, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of
Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, p. 314.
30
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the lack of an act of self-determination. Those opposing the Treaty were concerned that
Australia’s de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor was a violation of the
rights of the East Timorese and it was de jure recognition that had enabled the negotiations of the
Timor Gap Treaty to begin. The question of legitimacy is strongly associated with the realist
approach that had been taken by consecutive Australian governments.

Recognition of

Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor, which entailed the legitimate right to negotiate with
Indonesia, was a policy position based on Australia’s national interests both economically and
politically. In short, economic benefits would be forthcoming through the exploration of the Timor
Gap and that political benefits would derive from the development of a stronger relationship
through both the negotiations of the Treaty and the ongoing management of the JDZ.
Consecutive Australian governments took the position that liberal ideals of democratic selfdetermination for the East Timorese were incompatible with Australia’s national interest while at
the same time paying lip service to the notion of self-determination.
The Treaty resulted in two legal cases being brought against the government in addition to
growing public opposition in Australia to the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. It is
important to note that the cases were not concerned with the content of the Treaty in terms of
international law, but rather that Australia’s actions in negotiating with Indonesia, rather than
Portugal, were illegal in international law. The first case involved Portugal taking Australia to the
ICJ over Australia’s negotiation with Indonesia rather than with Portugal. Portugal maintained
that it was the sovereign power of East Timor.34 The second case was Horta v Commonwealth
brought by José Ramos Horta, an East Timorese activist (and now President of Timor Lesté),
against the Commonwealth of Australia over the implementation of the Treaty through the
Petroleum (Australia-Indonesia Zone of Co-operation) Act 1990. The basis of this case was “that
the Treaty was void under international law and therefore could not form a constitutional basis for
enacting the implementing legislation”35 under Section 51 (xxix) of the Constitution, External
Affairs. The High Court rejected the argument brought by Horta, stating that the Parliament did
have the right to exercise legislation under “external affairs powers”, and that the Court could not
rule on the basis of the Treaty’s legitimacy in international law. The High Court could only

A more comprehensive discussion of this case can be found in Chapter Two to this thesis titled Lost
Opportunities? - East Timor and the Keating Government.
35 Campbell, "Maritime Boundary Arrangements in the Timor Sea," p. 65.
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determine “whether the Parliament had enacted provisions consistent with a treaty entered into
by the Executive. The efficacy or validity of the treaty was a matter for the Executive alone”.36
On the other hand there was a group that believed that the Timor Gap Treaty was a sign of a
remarkable achievement between Australia and Indonesia and indicated the potential for the
ongoing relationship between the two states. As Evans described it, the Timor Gap Treaty was
the “most substantial bilateral agreement concluded in the 40-year history of Australia-Indonesia
relations”.37 It represented a triumph of creative solution over diplomatic impasse. It illustrated in
a very real and practical way the strong mutual political will that existed between Australia and
Indonesia.

The two countries had worked together as friends, neighbours and economic

partners. Evans goes on to say that it represented a significant achievement in finding a nonmilitary solution to a problem that had historically created conflict between the two countries
involving the disputed boundary. He believed it was significant in demonstrating the level of
maturity that had developed between Australia and Indonesia where neither country sought to
impose a unilateral solution, but rather produced a Treaty that was in the national interest of both
countries.38 Evans believed that: “The Treaty is thus not just an important agreement in itself: it is
a symbol of a more sophisticated approach to the security concerns between us which spring
naturally from our geographical proximity”.39
There are further indications that the political relationship between Australia and Indonesia had
played an important part in promoting the success of the Timor Gap Treaty.

36 Horta v Commonwealth, 181 CLR 183, pp. 194-5 (1994). discussed by Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries:
Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, pp. 89-90. For a more detailed discussion on these issues refer to
Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, pp. 87-92., Campbell,
"Maritime Boundary Arrangements in the Timor Sea," pp. 64-5., Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia).,
and Horta v Commonwealth.
37 Gareth Evans, "Australia and Indonesia - a developing relationship (Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Senator Gareth Evans to the Conference on Indonesia's New Order: Past, Present and Future in Canberra on
December 4, 1989)," Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade: The Monthly Record, 60, no. 12 (1989): p. 703.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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The report from the JCFADT, Australia’s Relations with Indonesia, November 1993 stated that:
While there have been concerns raised about the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty, it represents a
cooperative solution to part of the boundary and resource problems between Australia and Indonesia.
Pending the result of the case in the International Court of Justice, there would seem to be little purpose in
abandoning the Treaty. Should Australia lose this case, further negotiations with Indonesia would be
required. In any event, the Treaty will remain as an example of a solution of a difficult problem between
neighbours.40

The Timor Gap Treaty also represented part of a larger move by Australia to engage with Asia.
This was important given the trade opportunities that were to be gained through the economic
growth that many of the states in the region were experiencing. While Australia was accepted as
a trading partner it was not seen as a friend.41 The Timor Gap negotiations provided an
opportunity for Australia to engage directly with Indonesia and thereby seek to improve relations
with Indonesia. Australia saw the eventual success of the negotiations as providing a stronger
basis for a longer term relationship with Indonesia. It would also assist in furthering Australia’s
relations with other Asian states as Indonesia was seen as crucial to Australia’s acceptance in
Asia.
The Timor Gap Treaty was driven by both the relationship with Indonesia and the economic
resources that existed in the Timor Gap. While part of the preamble to the Treaty suggested that
the economic potential of the Timor Gap was the driving motivation behind the Treaty, another
section of the preamble also stated that the Treaty would “contribute to the strengthening of the
relations”42 between Australia and Indonesia. It is reasonable to conclude that the major reason
for negotiating the Zone of Cooperation was to enable the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum resources to progress as quickly as possible, particularly as Australia was being
recommended to do so by oil interests. The potential of the area was reinforced by the
development of an oil field, Jabiru, just to the west of the area of the Timor Gap and the potential
of an area called Kelp in Area A.43 In addition, the delimitation of this area of the seabed was an
issue that both countries wanted to resolve. It had been outstanding since the 1972 Agreement.

Clause 11.8.7, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with
Indonesia, p. 190.
41 Suter, "Timor Gap Treaty: The Continuing Controversy," pp. 298-9.
42 Preamble, Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between
the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia.
43 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia (Timor Gap)," p. 1249.
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Woolcott suggested a realist approach in securing Australia’s economic and strategic interests in
1975 and in this vein it is difficult to believe that the Australian government’s major reason for the
conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty was not driven by the economic gains to be made from the
Timor Sea, that is, the resource potential in the Area, given the preamble to the Treaty and the
evidence of petroleum resources in the Zone of Cooperation. While a creative solution was found
in negotiating a Zone of Cooperation, this established the need for complete cooperation between
Australia and Indonesia on the management and operation of the Zone of Cooperation, which
enhanced the bilateral relationship between these two neighbouring states. While national
economic interests were the driving motivation behind the Treaty, Evans also indicated that the
outcome of the Treaty resulted in the strengthening of the bilateral relationship between Australia
and Indonesia. It was the desire to move beyond the impasse that had caused problems in the
political relationship and so reaching an outcome that was beneficial both economically and
politically.

Australia believed that negotiations with Indonesia would produce a far more

favourable outcome than negotiating with Portugal. However, in concluding the Treaty Australia
compromised the country’s liberal values and at the same time legitimated Indonesia’s
annexation of East Timor in 1975. The latter was in defiance of the recognition by the UN of
Portugal as the legitimate administering authority in East Timor.

The 1997 Treaty
On 14 March 1997 Australia and Indonesia signed a treaty that resolved a series of maritime
boundary issues that had begun with the 1971 seabed boundary agreement. The 1997 Treaty
brought to a close issues that had been between the two countries and on the negotiating table
for over twenty five years. As Keating advised Parliament on 7 May 1992, following his visit to
Indonesia and Papua and New Guinea, 21-26 April 1992, “The Indonesian Government agreed to
conclude further bilateral agreements, covering…the delimitation of outstanding maritime
boundaries…”44
The 1997 Treaty established what some consider to be one of the longest maritime boundaries in
the world.45 In a media release on 13 September 1996, the then Australian Foreign Minister,
Alexander Downer, announced that the 1997 Treaty “is a great achievement of which both

44
45

Keating, Ministerial Statement: Visit to Indonesia and Papua and New Guinea, p. 2631.
Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 53.
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governments can be proud”.46 In a further joint statement on 14 March 1997 the Australian and
Indonesian Foreign Ministers announced that:
…finalisation of the seabed boundary provides a basis on which exploitation of natural resources can
proceed in a climate of confidence and certainty. The agreement on the complete EEZ boundary between
the two countries provides a clear foundation for the future management of fisheries resources and the
protection of the environment.47

The conclusion of the 1997 Treaty resulted from the willingness of both Australia and Indonesia to
produce innovative and creative solutions to maritime boundary delimitation issues that began
with the 1971 Agreement. Once again the two states found creative solutions and developed a
cooperative working relationship that benefited each party. The goodwill and cooperation that
had been established through the negotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty gave the impetus for the
conclusion of the 1997 Treaty and was a testament to the good relations that had been
established over the period of the negotiations of the Timor Gap Treaty and the operation of the
JDZ. However, as Prescott noted, “The negotiations were conducted on the basis that nothing
was agreed until everything was agreed”.48 It seems that both parties wanted to reach an
outcome that was mutually beneficial and would result in both parties being able to explore and
exploit the natural resources of the water column and the seabed. The outcome reached
suggested that the economic goals of both states were influential in terms of their desire to
negotiate the Treaty. There was “recognition that in the interest of future good relations, the
delimitation of maritime boundaries should be completed”.49 However, the period of 1995-96 was
also a time when both countries were experiencing advantageous bilateral relations and the
Treaty presented an opportunity for a mutually beneficial outcome to be produced.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Media Release: Australia-Indonesia: Historic Maritime Boundary
Agreement," (13 September, 1996).
47 Joint Ministerial Statement by the Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, and H. E. Mr.
Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Signature of the Treaty between Australia and
Indonesia Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries, Perth, Australia, 14
March 1997, as cited in Clause 3.20, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime
Delimitation Treaty 12th Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), p. 21., and Max Herriman and Martin Tsamenyi,
"The 1997 Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary Treaty: A Secure Legal Regime for Offshore Resource
Development?," Ocean Development & International Law, 29, no. 4 (1998): p. 362.
48 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia," p. 2698.
49 Ibid., p. 2699.
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There were a number of major provisions in the Treaty.
1. The Treaty affirms the 1971 and 1972 Seabed Agreements which established permanent
seabed boundaries within the areas of the Arafura and Timor Seas. As I have noted the
1972 Agreement produced a positive outcome for Australia, though Indonesia was not
overly happy with the outcome of the 1972 Agreement.50
2. The Treaty reaffirmed the Timor Gap Treaty and specified in Article 8 that the Treaty did
not affect “the rights and obligations of either Party as a Contracting State to the Zone of
Cooperation Treaty”.51 It confirmed the mutual cooperation that Australia and Indonesia
had displayed through the successful completion of the Treaty and the operation of the
Gap Authority in the previous five years that the authority had been in existence. It also
retained the MoU in Relation to Indonesian Traditional Fishermen negotiated in 1974
relating to traditional fishing areas.52
3. The Treaty separated the EEZ into two zones by dividing the EEZ into a seabed EEZ and
a water column EEZ, thus resolving the two different negotiating positions of Australia
and Indonesia. The resolution of separate EEZs recognised Australia’s position, which
was to continue the seabed boundary as described in the 1972 Agreement on the basis
of natural prolongation, and Indonesia’s desire for a more southerly boundary based on a
median line or the principle of equidistance. The boundary line in the Treaty began at
Point A12 in the Arafura Sea where the 1971 Agreement finished. It created an
overlapping jurisdiction between the seabed boundary that was determined in the 1972
Agreement and a boundary that effectively runs along the Provisional Fisheries
Surveillance and Enforcement Line that was negotiated as part of the Provisional
Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement in 1981. Between these two
boundary lines is an area of overlapping jurisdiction where the seabed boundary under
the 1972 Agreement remains Australia’s seabed EEZ and the new boundary line running
along the Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Line becomes Indonesia’s
water column EEZ.53 The area in between these two lines, known as the overlapping

Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing an
Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries.
51 Article 8, Clause 1, Ibid.
52 Article 8, Ibid.
53 Articles 2 and 7, Ibid., Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia," pp. 2697-707., and Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries:
Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, pp. 54-5.
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area, is where Australia has jurisdiction over the seabed and Indonesia has jurisdiction
over the water column.54
These are the areas in which Australia will exercise seabed jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over oil
and gas reserves, while Indonesia will exercise jurisdiction in the water column, including jurisdiction
over fisheries resources.55

This overlapping jurisdiction has the substantial advantage of permitting both states to
retain some elements of their negotiating positions and yet reach a mutually acceptable
solution. However, it now excludes the Australian fishing industry from operating in this
zone.56
There is an argument that the separation of the seabed and water column in the EEZ
could be in contention with the LOSC. However, the outcome of the Treaty is not
inconsistent with the convention. The LOSC defines the EEZ as the seabed and the
water column, though this does not exclude states from negotiating some other
arrangements as Australia and Indonesia have concluded with the overlapping
jurisdiction.

Where there may be differences between the two parties over the

overlapping jurisdiction, Article 7 of the 1997 Treaty provided for the areas of overlapping
jurisdiction, and the sovereign rights of each party over their respective areas of water
column and seabed. Under Article 7, Australia must give Indonesia three months notice
of any proposed grant of exploration or exploitation rights. Indonesia must give Australia
due notice in relation to the construction of a fish aggregating device and both countries
are required to give due notice prior to the construction of any installation and structure in
relation to their respective activities in the seabed and water column. Both countries
must also agree to the construction of any artificial island. Article 7 concluded by stating
that both countries shall cooperate in relation to the exercise of each state’s rights and
jurisdiction over their respective EEZs, however, such exercise of rights is not to hinder
the rights of the other state.57

Refer to Maps 1 and 2 showing the overlapping area and the delimitation boundary.
Clause 3.9, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report, p.
19.
56 Annex A authored by Vivian Louis Forbes in Cozens, "Some Reflections on Maritime Boundary and Territorial
Disputes in the Asia-Pacific with a Focus on the South China Sea," p. 128.
57 Article 7, Clauses (m) and (n), Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries.
54
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4. The 1997 Treaty extended boundaries beyond the 1972 Agreement, which ceased at
Point A25 near the Ashmore and Cartier Islands. The Provisional Fisheries Surveillance
and Enforcement Line extended a provisional boundary around the Ashmore and Cartier
Islands to a distance of 12 nautical miles. The 1997 Treaty extends this line to a radius
of 24 nautical miles.58 This was a considerable advantage for Australia as it increased
Australia’s fishing zone by approximately 1000 nautical square miles around the
Ashmore Reef.59 It was also a triumph for Australia as Indonesia had maintained that the
islands around the Ashmore reef “were incapable of human habitation or an economic life
of their own”.60 In the course of the negotiations two delegations visited the islands and
officials recognised that the islands were capable of habitation and as a result the arc
extended an additional 12 nautical miles north around the islands.
5. Another important feature of the Treaty was a new boundary that delimited “the areas of
seabed and EEZ belonging to Australia north of Christmas Island and to Indonesia south
of Java”.61 The boundary represented a weighted median line, reflecting in part the
different coastal lengths of Java and Christmas Island. The Parties to the negotiation
were influenced by the ruling from the ICJ in relation to The Greenland-Jan Mayen Case
and its Significance for the International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, where
the ICJ determined that different lengths of the two coasts represented a movement in
the equidistant line.62 The boundary between Java and Christmas Island favoured
Indonesia. However, Australia’s negotiating position was that the loss in this area was
set-off against the gains in the Timor Sea. The Australian position was that this was a
good negotiating outcome due mainly to the fact that the seas “north of Christmas Island
are deep and have limited economic potential, whereas there is at least some for
petroleum exploitation in the vicinity of the Ashmores and further west in the Browse
Basin”.63
In summary, the 1997 Treaty confirmed the existing maritime boundary arrangements between
the two states and affirmed the mutual cooperation that had been established through the
operation of the existing arrangements. Further, it extended this cooperative approach by
Article 2, Ibid.
Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia," p. 2704. For detailed geographical coordinates refer to Articles 1 and 3, Treaty
between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing an Exclusive
Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries.
60 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 56.
61 Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia," p. 2698.
62 Ibid., p. 2703.
63 Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 12, p. 57.
58
59

205

establishing an overlapping jurisdiction that reflected the negotiating positions of both parties, but
more importantly, delivered major benefits to both parties. Finally, the Treaty extended the
boundary arrangements beyond those negotiated in previous agreements and represented the
completion of delimitation between the two states that had commenced with the 1971 Agreement.
Given the growing importance of delimitation in international relations, the finalisation of the 1997
Treaty must be viewed as a significant achievement in terms of strengthening the political
relationship between Australia and Indonesia.
On balance, most commentators and certainly government officials would suggest that the 1997
Treaty was a positive outcome in terms of Australian and Indonesian relations. As Alexander
Downer noted in Parliament on 19 March 1997:
This was a truly historic moment in Australian diplomatic history because what this Treaty has done is
resolve the uncertainty as to how the seabed and water column should be divided between our two
countries. Now Australia will be able to exercise sovereign rights enforceable under international law to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage seabed and marine resources in those areas under our jurisdiction.
So the Treaty will have benefits to both countries. The exploration of natural resources will be able to
proceed in a climate of confidence and of certainty.64

Though the negotiating positions of the respective states were far apart, once again the two
negotiating teams had developed creative solutions through the division of water column and
seabed jurisdiction to create a realistic and sensible modification. As the 12th Report from the
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties noted in November 1997, “the Treaty is a further boost to
the broader bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia”.65 There were no obvious
economic gains from the 1997 Treaty. However, a general desire to explore and exploit the
areas of the water column and the seabed for the benefit of each state was a major element in
the negotiating positions and outcomes achieved. While Indonesia profited in terms of gaining
approximately two-thirds of the water column and seabed north of Christmas Island, and the
“conversion of most of the western sector of the provisional fisheries line to the status of an EEZ
boundary”,66 this was off-set by Australia gaining seabed rights within the Indonesian EEZ
boundary, particularly to the west of the 1972 Agreement.

64
65

Alexander Downer, Question without Notice: Maritime Treaty (House Hansard, 19 March 1997), p. 2433.
Clause 1.5, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report, p.

2.
66

Prescott, "Australia-Indonesia," p. 2705.
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As Prescott noted, the Treaty:
…can be considered equitable for two reasons. First, [terms] were freely negotiated by two government’s
during a period of cordial relations. Second, there were offsetting gains and losses of waters and seabed
for both countries.67

While the 1997 Treaty was applauded for its innovation, there was another view of the Treaty
provisions that did not support the confidence expressed in the Treaty. The first of these was that
while the 1997 Treaty was signed on 14 March 1997, the Treaty had not been ratified and was
therefore not in force.

The 12th Report from the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

recommended that the 1997 Treaty be ratified,68 and therefore there were no barriers that
prohibited Australia from the “…exchange of the instruments of ratification”.69 Following the
events in East Timor in 1999 the 1997 Treaty cannot now be ratified in its current form, as there
are a number of references to the Timor Gap Treaty in the Preamble, Article 2 and Article 8 of the
1997 Treaty. As Indonesia’s responsibilities over East Timor ceased in October 1999, the 1997
Treaty would need to be amended to remove the references to the Timor Gap Treaty.
Secondly, there have been questions raised regarding the area of overlapping jurisdiction. Some
would suggest that UNCLOS did not anticipate this, and therefore “the co-location of the EEZ of
one State with the continental shelf of another”70 makes the meaning of several provisions of the
LOSC unclear.

While Article 7 of the 1997 Treaty provided for the rights and special

arrangements of each party in relation to the overlapping jurisdiction, it was recognised that it is
silent on a number of matters that may be important to the operation of the Treaty.

Ibid., pp. 2710-1.
Clause 7.39, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report,
p. 69.
69 Article 11, Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries.
70 Clause 3.21, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report,
p. 21.
67
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These matters specifically relate to:

•

whether there is any obligation on behalf of Indonesia to allow construction of all proposed
Australian installations, which, whilst in contact with the seabed, must of necessity exist within
the water column;

•

whether Australia will be exempt from claims of compensation for lost fishing opportunities
occurring as a result of activity associated with the exploration or exploitation of seabed
resources;

•

whether Indonesia is compelled to allow all proposed marine scientific research by Australia that
is associated with the continental shelf;

•

with respect to marine research, whether Australia has a duty to provide to Indonesia all of the
information detailed at UNCLOS Article 248 and 249(1)(b), and, importantly, to comply with any
or all of the other conditions stipulated at Article 249; and

•

whether construction of Australian installations in the Indonesian EEZ will be exempt from any
levy to provide contingency funds to compensate for possible harm arising from ‘pollution of the
marine environment’.71

In addition to these matters there is also a suggestion that the Treaty in essence allows Indonesia
to enjoy:
…sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the marine living resources in the water
column, while Australia cannot exercise its right to explore and exploit the seabed without giving rise to the
possibility that Indonesia’s interests are harmed by such activity.72

In speaking to the second reading of the Primary Industries and Energy Legislation Amendment
Bill (No.3) 1997, in particular the portion of the bill which amended the Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) Act 1967, Stephen Smith, also raised concern over sovereign rights. His concern
addressed a number of areas. First the rights of those companies who had petroleum leases
granted prior to the 1997 Treaty where water column jurisdiction now resides with the coastal
state of Indonesia. Second, in relation to marine scientific research expressed in Article 7 of the
1997 Treaty and Articles 248 and 249 of UNCLOS whereby Australia, or in some cases the

Clause 3.22, Ibid., p. 22. These are the issues that Mr Herriman and Professor Tsamenyi argue in their
submission to the 12th Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties and can also be found, along with a
broader discussion of their arguments in Herriman and Tsamenyi, "The 1997 Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary
Treaty: A Secure Legal Regime for Offshore Resource Development?," pp. 361-96.
72 Clause 3.23, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report,
p. 22., and in Herriman and Tsamenyi, "The 1997 Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary Treaty: A Secure Legal
Regime for Offshore Resource Development?," p. 362.
71
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companies that have acquired leases under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act, would be
required to provide to Indonesia the results of their petroleum exploration.73 I argue that issues of
sovereignty are quite legitimate concerns in terms of the 1997 Treaty as Article 7 does not
adequately detail the sovereign rights in the area of overlapping jurisdiction where the exercise of
such rights may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the other party. This means that this
territorial confusion has the potential to cause problems in the political relationship.
Another issue raised concerned the use of terminology and specifically the terms in the 1997
Treaty, ‘seabed’ and ‘water column’ that differ from the maritime zones described in the LOSC as
‘continental shelf’ and ‘EEZ’. Herriman and Tsamenyi suggest that this is “an over simplistic
understanding of the nature of the ocean and international law of the sea”.74 They state that the
EEZ described in Part V of the LOSC is not strictly concerned with the water column, but is
concerned with both the water column and the seabed.75 The final area of concern is that in the
event that relations were to deteriorate between Australia and Indonesia, “the Treaty is silent on
matters that could be contentious and which might actually serve to aggravate relationship
difficulties”.76 This is of major concern given the unpredictability of the Indonesian and Australian
political relationship over the past sixty years. If such a matter did arise, it is also unclear as to
how a resolution could be found given both states’ unwillingness to resort to the use of third
parties for resolving potential disputes in the past. Without a comprehensive dispute settlement
procedure in place the Treaty relies on the good faith of both states.
The Attorney-General’s Department challenged many of these claims and stated that “the
principles contained in UNCLOS were applied throughout the negotiation of the Treaty and the
solution achieved is one which is equitable for both Parties”.77 In terms of the area of overlapping
jurisdiction, the Attorney-General’s Department argued that such a modification of a separation of
the water column and seabed is permitted under the LOSC.78 In a further submission to the 12th

Stephen Smith, Primary Industries and Energy Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 3) 1997: Second Reading (House
Hansard, 10 March 1998), p. 893.
74 Clause 3.24, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report,
p. 23. and Herriman and Tsamenyi, "The 1997 Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary Treaty: A Secure Legal
Regime for Offshore Resource Development?," p. 364.
75 Clause 3.24, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report,
pp. 22-3., and Herriman and Tsamenyi, "The 1997 Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary Treaty: A Secure Legal
Regime for Offshore Resource Development?," p. 364.
76 Clause 3.27, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Australia-Indonesia Maritime Delimitation Treaty 12th Report,
p. 23.
77 Clause 3.7, Ibid., p. 18.
78 Clause 3.28, Ibid., pp. 23-4.
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Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, this position was endorsed. It was
acknowledged that while the separation of the two zones was unusual “such an arrangement has
been expressly approved in obiter statements by the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of
Maine Case”.79 In relation to Article 7, the Attorney-General’s Department indicated that Australia
has sole control over the construction of installations. Further, Australia is only required to give
due notice of the construction of installations and structures and three months notice of any
proposal granting exploration and exploitation rights. The Attorney-General’s Department stated
that ‘due’ notice reflected the provisions in the LOSC and an acknowledgement that there may be
very little time from the decision to the actual construction of any installations or structures.
Further, the Department stated that the three months notice period does not imply, and is not
subject to, Australia needing Indonesia’s permission to proceed, rather it is a period of notice of
intent.80 The Attorney-General’s Department further argued that in relation to marine scientific
research, Australia had no obligation to obtain permission from Indonesia to carry out any such
research.81 The problem with this interpretation, however, is that these issues must be resolved
by cooperation and the question is whether this can be guaranteed.
While the arguments raise important legal questions in relation to the provisions of the 1997
Treaty, there is no conclusive evidence to confirm whether the provisions are adequate in dealing
with any legal challenges to the Treaty. Due to the concern over Article 7, there remains anxiety
and uncertainty as to the rights for the fishing industry and for the potential exploration and
exploitation of resources in the area of overlapping jurisdiction. Equally, as the Treaty is not yet
in force, and would require modifications, there is a question in relation to the legal standing of
the Treaty in international law and particularly the provisions in Article 7. If there was a dispute
between Australia and Indonesia over the terms of the Treaty, it is yet to be determined what the
outcome of any such dispute would be and therefore these concerns may be purely conjecture.
However, I argue that where there are significant benefits to be gained in relation to the 1997
Treaty, it would be unlikely that at some time in the future there will not be a dispute over the
interpretation and management of the Treaty.
There is little doubt that the 1997 Treaty is a very innovative solution to what was a potential
problem between the two states, namely the lack of certainty created by a lack of finality in

Clause 3.12, Ibid., p. 19.
Clause 3.31, Ibid., p. 24.
81 Clause 3.32, Ibid.
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relation to the delimitation of the maritime zones, in particular in the Arafura and Timor Seas.
Once again Australia and Indonesia demonstrated their ability to find creative solutions to issues
of potential conflict. Their solution benefited both parties. As Senator Coonan stated in tabling
the 12th Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Senate on 1 December 1997:
The Committee has come to the view that the Delimitation Treaty represents a satisfactory outcome for
Australia and makes a useful contribution to Australian-Indonesian bilateral relations…
This situation represents a fair and equitable outcome which will be maintained through mutual cooperation
and management…
The Committee has no doubt that this Treaty will create certainty for resource exploration and exploitation,
particularly in relation to potential oil and gas fields…
By any measure, the Treaty is of significance to Australia because it settles the issue of seabed jurisdiction
and provides a firm basis for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed in a
climate of confidence. The Treaty is a boost to the broader bilateral relationship between Australia and
Indonesia and contributes to the strengthening of security for the broader region.82

Because the Treaty has not been ratified there is a lack of finality between the two states over its
delimitation. The Treaty in its present form can now not be ratified. It would have to be amended
to delete the references to the Timor Gap Treaty and there is little evidence to show that
negotiations are taking place or will take place in the near future. Vivian Forbes noted, following
personal communication with DFAT on 17 June 2002, that “Ratification/entry into force is not
“imminent” but should occur in the foreseeable future”.83 A Joint Ministerial Statement of 18
March 2005 following the seventh meeting of the AIMF stated that “Ministers noted the
importance of the 1997 Perth Treaty entering into force as soon as practical, acknowledging
some work needed to be undertaken”.84 This was reiterated in the eighth meeting of the AIMF in
2006.85 A decade has now passed since the signing of the 1997 Treaty and ratification has not
occurred even though government officials from both Australia and Indonesia recognised the
importance of the Treaty entering into force following amendments. One can only conclude that
this is not an urgent matter requiring government attention, contrary to the statements made in
the AIMF meetings. The exploration and exploitation of the seabed has progressed and to date
the progression of this exploration does not appear to have been hindered by the occasional

Helen Coonan, Committees: Treaties Committee: Report (Senate Hansard, 1 December 1997), p. 9893.
Annex A of Cozens, "Some Reflections on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes in the Asia-Pacific with a
Focus on the South China Sea," p. 128.
84 Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement, p. 5 of print view.
85 Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Statement: 8th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, p. 5 of print
view.
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ambiguous political relationship. With the new Labor government gaining office in 2007 those
attending the 9th AIMF meeting in November 2008 also “expressed their concern at the links in
many cases between illegal fishing and transnational organised crime groups”.86 Not only is the
issue of illegal fishing an economic and environmental concern, it now creates security concerns
for both Australia and Indonesia just as bilateral cooperation on illegal fishing also forms part of
the framework of the Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation.
If the amendments were to be adopted then there are still questions over the legal implications of
Article 7. If Article 7 as it is written does not give sufficient legal assurance to Australia, then
Australia may have negotiated a position where its jurisdiction over the seabed in the overlapping
area may require Indonesia’s approval for any exploration or exploitation of the seabed resource.
If this legal argument were upheld then Indonesia could, if it wanted to, cause considerable
problems for Australia. The 1997 Treaty relies very heavily on the two states maintaining good
relations, and, given the record of relations between the two states over the past sixty years, this
cannot be guaranteed. We would have expected the 1997 Treaty to be ratified in 1998,
particularly following on from the recommendation in the 12th Report of the Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties. However, relations between the two states had begun to deteriorate over
East Timor and one can only conclude that this was the reason for the lack of ratification. While
Australia had maintained cordial relations through negotiations related to the Timor Gap Treaty
and the 1997 Treaty, the East Timor issue was one issue that caused problems in the bilateral
relationship over a twenty five year period. Given the events since 1999, the issue of East Timor
may have been overcome in the long-term in terms of the bilateral relationship. However,
Australian governments cannot rely on this being the only issue that may disturb the relationship
in the future. Tension over West Papuan asylum seekers and the intentions of the Australian
government in terms of Indonesia’s territorial integrity reinforces my observation.
An underlying issue in terms of the 1997 Treaty and any future amendments to it again relates to
East Timor. On 12 January 2006 East Timor and Australia finally concluded the Treaty on
Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea87 which came into force in February 2007. Of
particular note is that the CMATS Treaty does not delimit a maritime boundary between Australia
and East Timor, rather “it provides for an additional practical resource-sharing agreement” which

Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Joint Ministerial Statement - 9th Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, pp.
3-4 of print view.
87 Hereinafter referred to as the CMATS Treaty.
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is “without prejudice to either side’s claims to maritime delimitation”.88 Why did Australia not
agree to a delimitation boundary with East Timor, and why did it withdraw from the compulsory
maritime boundary arbitration mechanisms of the LOSC and the ICJ, which effectively prevented
East Timor from seeking independent resolution of the maritime boundary?89
In brief, Australia was concerned with the broader political and strategic implications that such a
boundary may provoke. In particular the government was reluctant to negotiate a delimitation
boundary based on the principle of equidistance which was the favoured position of East Timor.
The Australian government’s concern was that even though the existing maritime boundary
treaties with Indonesia are binding, any agreement over equidistance may well initiate an attempt
by Indonesia to renegotiate the agreements already in place, particularly since the 1997 Treaty
had not been ratified.90 This may be of particular relevance in terms of the boundaries settled
between Australia and Indonesia in the 1972 Agreement, particularly the positioning of Points
A16 and A17 and the eastern and western lateral boundaries of the JDZ, which were part of the
Timor Gap Treaty and now part of the CMATS Treaty. There is an argument that the eastern and
western lateral boundaries constrain East Timor’s full maritime jurisdiction and therefore any
negotiation with East Timor over maritime delimitation that affects Points A16 and A17 would of
necessity involve Indonesia.91 On this basis Indonesia may well want to renegotiate the existing
arrangements, particularly as the 1997 Treaty is not in force. Further, as Gillian Triggs, an
88 Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, "The delimitation of maritime boundaries: a matter of 'life or death' for East
Timor?," p. 74.
89 There has been much written on Australia’s withdrawal from the ICJ in relation to compulsory maritime boundary
arbitration and concern was raised in both Houses of Parliament regarding this. I have raised this question here not
in an attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of the moral issues in relation to East Timor of the government’s
decision as this is not the purpose of the chapter. The question is raised in terms of an assessment by the Australian
Government that an ICJ judgement may well support East Timor’s claim for the application of the principle of
equidistance, and given the judgements’ since UNCLOS this may well have been the outcome. In a question in the
Senate by Senator Kerry Nettle regarding the withdrawal from the ICJ, Senator Robert Hill says, “In the
Government’s view, maritime boundaries are best settled by negotiation and not by reference to an international
court or tribunal. The exclusion of disputes concerning maritime boundaries from Australia’s acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is consistent with
the Government’s position regarding the settlement of maritime boundaries with other countries”. Robert Hill,
Questions on Notice: Foreign Affairs: Maritime Zones (Senate Hansard, 1 March 2004), p. 20502. My assessment
would be that the government was concerned over the principle of equidistance coming from decisions of the ICJ and
the broader strategic issues this may have for Australia’s other treaties and agreements with Indonesia. By removing
Australia from the dispute resolution mechanism through the ICJ the government was protecting what they perceived
as their broader interests. While this may have been a valid position for the government to take this does not lend
itself to strengthening political relationships with either East Timor or Indonesia.
90 Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, "The delimitation of maritime boundaries: a matter of 'life or death' for East
Timor?," p. 73.
91 For a full discussion on the implications of this under UNCLOS refer to Gillian Triggs and Dean Bialek, "The New
Timor Sea Treaty and Interim Arrangements for Joint Development of Petroleum Resources of the Timor Gap,"
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 3, no. 2 (2002): pp. 341-63. Also refer to Annex B authored by Jeffrey Smith
in Cozens, "Some Reflections on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes in the Asia-Pacific with a Focus on the
South China Sea."
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international law expert stated: “There is no doubt Indonesia will feel quite aggrieved if we have
unequal boundaries in certain areas with Indonesia and we suddenly blow the boundary out and
make a more equidistant one in relation to East Timor”.92 While it would be very difficult for
Indonesia to renegotiate over the boundaries outside the existing points in the Timor Gap, these
issues have the potential to disrupt an improvement in bilateral relations following the disruption
caused by Australia’s actions in relation to East Timor in 1999-2000. The period of the
negotiations of the CMATS Treaty was at a time when there was a high priority placed on
rebuilding relations with Indonesia and the potential of a new security agreement. As Alexander
Downer stated in 2004, Australia had no desire “to ‘unscramble the omelette’ of all its previously
agreed boundaries with neighbouring states in the region”.93 While this is a valid position to take
in terms of a state protecting its national interests, it does not necessarily strengthen the political
relationship with Indonesia.

Conclusion
The maritime agreements and treaties with Indonesia are an important aspect of both Australia’s
Oceans Policy and its Foreign Policy. As Ken Harris stated, the seas are a “potential source of
security and insecurity”.94 Both states have shown an ability to develop creative solutions to
maritime delimitation problems over the past twenty five years. The outcome of the Timor Gap
Treaty and the 1997 Treaty certainly produced solutions that not only provided successful
outcomes to the benefit of both parties, but were also successful in maintaining cooperative
working relations between the two states. While the negotiating positions of the two parties were
initially far apart, the creation of the JDZ in the Timor Gap Treaty and the overlapping jurisdiction
in the 1997 Treaty were innovative solutions when agreement on a single delimitation boundary
was not likely to be achieved. The fact that the motivation behind these solutions was driven by
the potential and existing resources of the areas of the sea under negotiation cannot be denied.
However, both the negotiations and the outcomes produced positive benefits for both states, both
economically and in terms of a stronger bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, while Australia and
Indonesia have shown a willingness to produce positive results in terms of maritime delimitation,
given the lack of finality over the 1997 Treaty and the potential problems that exist in the
Cited in Clause 4.15, Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, East Timor, p. 60.
Part of this quote was a comment made at a symposium on “Strategic Directions for Australia and the Law of the
Sea” held at the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 16 November 2004 cited in Schofield
and I Made Andi Arsana, "The delimitation of maritime boundaries: a matter of 'life or death' for East Timor?," p. 74.
94 Keith Harris, "The Maritime Agenda," in Maritime Change: Issues for Asia. ed. Ross Babbage and Sam Bateman,
(St. Leonards, Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Royal Australian Navy and Defence Industries, 1993),
p. 3.
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overlapping area of jurisdiction, then questions exist as to the extent to which these issues may
cause problems for the political relationship. While I do not argue that the Australian and
Indonesian political relationship can necessarily be strengthened through a detailed renegotiation
of the 1997 Treaty, I do argue that if the past relationship has been strengthened through
delimitation negotiations where potential disputes have been resolved through a detailed treaty
arrangement, then potentially this is an area of the relationship that could be explored.
Given the situation I have outlined, it is difficult to understand why the JCFADT Report, Near
Neighbours – Good Neighbours has no mention of the role that the agreements and treaties have
played in building the relationship, or how the renegotiation of the amendments to the 1997
Treaty could improve this bilateral relationship. While the inquiry cannot detail every negotiation
between the two states, given the government’s ‘upbeat’ response to both the Timor Gap Treaty,
the 1997 Treaty and the significance of Australia’s Oceans Policy to Australia’s economic future, I
would expect that the agreements and treaties would have been mentioned in terms of the
positive outcome they have contributed to the bilateral relationship and the potential that any
future negotiations of maritime delimitation have to do so again. The significance of this oversight
is unclear. However, it does raise the question of why the treaties are not mentioned in the
inquiry given the importance both the Keating and Howard governments placed on the outcome
of the treaties. One can only assume that since the conclusion of the 1997 Treaty and the
resulting decline in the bilateral relationship over the issue of East Timor, the positive
developments that improved the relationship through negotiation of the treaties have been
overlooked. In the final analysis we can conclude that while the developments between the two
states in terms of maritime delimitation boundaries have produced positive results, other issues
that exist outside the negotiations will inevitably have a bearing, not only on the content of any
future delimitation boundary negotiations, but also on the bilateral relationship.
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Postscript
On the 21 April 2008, the Minister for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson, announced that:
…[he] welcomed findings from the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in
New York confirming Australia’s jurisdiction over an additional 2.5 million square kilometres of seabed.
The Commission’s findings confirm the location of the outer limit of Australia’s continental shelf in nine
distinct marine regions and Australia’s entitlement to large areas of shelf beyond 200 nautical miles…It
gives Australia the rights to what exists on and under the seabed, including oil resources; gas resources;
and biological resources, such as micro-organisms, which could be used in medicines.95

Further, in the House of Representatives on 15 May 2008, Tony Burke, Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry advised the House in response to a question put to him:
…that between the 17-30 April the Australian Fisheries Management Authority apprehended some 33
vessels off the coast of Northern Australian suspected of illegal fishing. [He] advised that the vessels were
apprehended in accordance with the Australian government guidelines dealing with vessels operating north
of the provisional fisheries surveillance and enforcement line under treaty arrangements between Australia
and Indonesia with respect to the south of the seabed boundary area. In this area, as opposed to many of
the other areas where we patrol for illegal fishing, we have control of the seabed, whereas Indonesia has
control of swimming species.96

While these may appear to be two distinctly different issues, particularly as they are dealt with by
two different government departments, both these incidences could have major significance in
terms of the existing maritime boundary agreements and the bilateral relationship between
Australia and Indonesia.
The 1997 Treaty is technically not in force, however, to date both parties have been observing the
provisions of the Treaty and the overlapping jurisdiction does not appear to have created tension
in the bilateral relationship. There is, however, no clear legal position on the status of the 1997
Treaty. One position would be that if there was a dispute between the two states that they could
not resolve, and this was sent to the ICJ for a decision, the ICJ may decide that the signing of the
1997 Treaty is in effect, and is binding on both parties. This assessment, however, cannot be
relied on. In other disputes of this nature this appears to be the leaning of the ICJ. However,
Martin Ferguson, Media Release: UN Confirms Australia's Rights Over Extra 2.5 Million Square Kilometres of
Seabed (Minister for Resources and Energy, Minister for Tourism, 21 April 2008), p. 1.
96 Tony Burke, Questions without Notice: Illegal Fishing (House Hansard, 15 May 2008), p. 2975.
95
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such an outcome relies on both states agreeing to a third party resolving such a dispute and from
past negotiations of this nature there is no guarantee that either party would agree to this.
The situation I have outlined also does not adequately deal with the potential controversial issues
already raised. As I mentioned previously, the 1997 Treaty is silent on matters that could
potentially aggravate the political relationship that the governments have claimed the Treaty
portrays. I believe that the apprehension of the illegal fishing vessels may well be one of these
matters. The 1997 Treaty is silent on legal matters, particularly relating to fishing vessels and
fishermen in the area of overlapping jurisdiction. What is of particular relevance here is that the
apprehension of fishing vessels suspected of illegal fishing appears to have been in the
overlapping area of jurisdiction where Indonesia has jurisdiction over the water column and
Australia has jurisdiction over the seabed. This begs the question over whether Australia had the
right to apprehend these vessels. Nine of the thirty three vessels were subsequently found to
have been fishing legally and the government compensated the fishermen on this basis.
However, this still does not answer my previous question, and in light of the fact that the Treaty is
silent on these matters, there seems to be no clear answer to this question. The problem as I see
it is that as the Treaty seems to be inadequate in many respects, it is therefore open to a range of
different interpretations and misunderstandings and on this basis has the potential to aggravate
the bilateral relationship.
The second issue is in relation to the extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
as announced by Martin Ferguson and the impact, if any, this has on the 1997 Treaty. Under
Article 76 of UNCLOS any coastal state may extend its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baseline, which then becomes known as an extended continental shelf. For this
purpose a coastal state must make a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf and it is then the responsibility of the Commission to provide comments and
recommendations. Australia lodged its submission to the Commission on 15 November 2004 and
the Minister’s announcement in April 2008 is the outcome of this submission.

For this

recommendation to enter into law, the government will need to make a proclamation under the
Seas and Submerged Lands Act in order for Australia to claim its jurisdiction over an additional
2.5 million square kilometres. The Australian submission to the Commission involved the
extension of the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in ten discrete
marine areas. The area applicable to the 1997 Treaty is the Argo area. While the 1997 Treaty
deals with this, there remains the issue of the lack of ratification of the 1997 Treaty, and secondly
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whether Indonesia will submit its claim for an extended continental shelf in relation to this
maritime region. In 2008 Indonesia made a submission to the Commission for the area west of
Aceh.

However, it had until May 2009 to submit any further claim.

According to the

Commission’s website which was last updated on 30 October 2009, Indonesia had made only
one submission for an extension of its continental shelf. It concerned the area north west of
Sumatra.97 One of the problems for Indonesia is that the surveys required by the Commission
are extensive and very expensive and require the integration of a number of technical disciplines.
Faced with the many problems that Indonesia has, such as, accessible education and health
services, there is an argument that the resources required would be better spent on hospitals and
schools. However, as Made Arsana notes, “a claim for extended continental shelf is not just a
matter for today. It is also an investment in the future…and [it is] a matter of…the sovereign
rights of coastal states”.98
The question then is - Where does this leave the further development of bilateral relations
between the two states?

As much as the negotiation of the 1997 Treaty produced an

improvement in the bilateral relationship, Australia needs to be particularly sensitive when
claiming any further extension of the continental shelf that may jeopardise the operation of the
parameters of the 1997 Treaty. The potential for disagreement over the parameters of the 1997
Treaty still exist and considering that the 1997 Treaty is not in force, it opens up the potential for a
disruption in the political relationship if Australia chooses to take a hard line approach in terms of
claiming a further extension of its continental shelf that may very well reduce Indonesia’s current
benefits. While Australia has the financial resources to pursue its national interests in claiming an
extension of Australia’s continental shelf as approved by the UN Commission, this approach does
not necessarily serve Indonesia’s interests. If Indonesia has insufficient resources to submit a
further claim, and obviously now the date for any such submission has past, then there is an
obvious power imbalance in the relationship between Australia and Indonesia in relation to
maritime issues.
Australia has the resources to pursue the extension through international courts to gain full
access to its rights under the extension. Pursuing the extension and decreasing Indonesia’s
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98 I Made Arsana, "Australian Maritime Boundaries Impact on Indonesia," (ASM, 2 May 2008), p. 1.
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entitlement to its maritime resources can only be seen as Australia using its privileged access to
international institutions to serve its own national interests. A more positive response in terms of
improving the political relationship would have been for Australia to offer technical expertise to
Indonesia in terms of maritime boundary delimitation as an example of strengthening the political
relationship. In terms of Australia’s extension to its EEZ, working with the Indonesian government
to find a solution that serves the interests of both states would assist the relationship. This would
mean the Australian government would have to act as a “good neighbour”.
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CONCLUSION
My aim in this thesis has been to consider the following key questions:
Is there a noticeable difference in the development of foreign policy toward Indonesia
between the Keating and Howard governments? If there is a difference:
i.

To what extent is there a change in policy or just a change in the details of the
policy?

ii. To what extent have policy decisions during the period of investigation enhanced
or hindered the political relationship between Indonesia and Australia?
My three areas of focus have been the East Timor legacy, the strategic environment and maritime
issues. My concluding comment provides a summary of the key arguments in each of these
three areas. The outcome of my research and careful analysis of the primary policy documents
has raised three key points that reveal both the similarities and differences between the Keating
and Howard governments. These three issues are the pragmatic-realism displayed by the
Keating and Howard governments versus a desire for a liberal-moral approach that is expressed
by the Australian public. The difference between the two governments in terms of how each
government viewed Australia’s strategic position in the Asian region, and last in the triumvirate,
the issues associated with Indonesia’s territorial integrity, including issues associated with the
integrity of maritime boundaries.

The East Timor Legacy
Both the Keating and Howard governments adopted a similar foreign policy position on the issue
of East Timor. They followed the policy that had been adopted by the Whitlam government.
Successive Australian governments recognised Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, while at
the same time recognising the need for an act of self-determination. This resulted in policy
failure. It was a major hindrance to the political relationship between Australia and Indonesia.
While the Whitlam government believed that there needed to be an act of self-determination in
terms of East Timor’s future, they had also strongly endorsed the incorporation of East Timor by
Indonesia. The incompatibility of these two foreign policy positions was ignored, first by the
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Whitlam government and then by the Keating and Howard governments. This situation was
particularly obvious during the period of Howard’s first term in office.
The policy position of both incorporation by Indonesia and the need for an act of selfdetermination was adopted by the Keating government. The government recognised Indonesia’s
annexation of East Timor and reaffirmed de jure recognition that had been granted by the
Australian government in 1979. For Keating, Indonesia was a primary national interest. He
argued that “No country is more important to Australia than Indonesia”.1
Three key issues arose during the Keating government period that many believed required the
government to reassess its policy position toward East Timor: the Dili massacre in 1991,
Portugal’s case to the ICJ against Australia over the entry into force of the Timor Gap Treaty, and
the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security in 1995. The Dili massacre raised the issue
of Indonesia’s continued incorporation of East Timor and the human rights abuses occurring
there, particularly with regard to a vocal segment of the Australian public who continued to
demand the right of the East Timorese to an act of self-determination. However, Keating was not
prepared to sacrifice the relationship with Indonesia over the issue of human rights in East Timor.
The Keating government maintained that through exercising an approach of quiet diplomacy with
the Indonesian government, the interests of the East Timorese would be advanced. However,
the approach of quiet diplomacy did not prevent the continued violence in East Timor and
resulted in the continuation of a policy of appeasement toward Indonesia. While the quiet
diplomacy approach may suggest a move towards liberal internationalism, by maintaining
recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, the Keating government was maintaining a
realist position. The Keating government in effect ignored the continuing violence occurring in
East Timor in order to satisfy their perception of Australia’s national interests.
The Portuguese case against Australia in relation to the Timor Gap Treaty again raised the issue
of Australia’s continued recognition of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. By negotiating and
finalising the Treaty Australia was endorsing Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. Again,
realist interests had taken precedence over moral issues. These realist national interests were
predominantly economic interests associated with the development of a stronger bilateral
relationship through the negotiation and outcome of the Timor Gap Treaty. It was not enough for
the Keating government to suggest that the Treaty would generate actual benefit for the East
1

Brereton, "A Labor Perspective," p. 35.
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Timorese. As the Treaty was between Australia and Indonesia there was no guarantee that the
East Timorese would reap any benefit from the Timor Sea. This was a fallacy promoted by the
Keating government.
The Portuguese case against Australia highlights the contradiction in the Keating government’s
position. While adopting the image of maintaining a moral approach the Keating government was
maintaining a strong realist position. If the ICJ had upheld the Portuguese case, Australia may
well have been in a position of having to choose between maintaining the international rule of law
and carrying on with the terms of the Timor Gap Treaty. Australia could have been in an
untenable situation if the ICJ had been willing to rule in the absence of Indonesia.
While the Keating government applauded the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security
for being significant in terms of increasing defence cooperation and the bilateral defence
relationship with Indonesia, this Agreement also met significant opposition from within Australia.
By finalising the Agreement the government indirectly condoned the actions of the Indonesian
military and demonstrated its belief that Australia’s relationship with Indonesia was more
important than the democratic rights, safety and sovereignty of the East Timorese people. Again
the Australian government argued that Australia’s national interests were better served through
the security agreement with Indonesia than through considering moral issues relating to the East
Timorese. As with Whitlam’s approach on the East Timor issue, the Keating government had
discarded moral principles and adhered to de jure recognition of Indonesia’s occupation of East
Timor. The government indicated strong support for Indonesia’s continued actions in East Timor.
Keating’s continual concentration on, and promotion of, the bilateral relationship at the expense of
moral considerations resulted in a policy position that was unpopular with many of the Australian
public. It was not in the tradition of the principles of good international citizenship that the Labor
party had long held. The Keating government’s position became a policy failure in the long-term
and eventually resulted in disruption to the Australia-Indonesia relationship. This was the very
consequence the Keating government had made all attempts to avoid.
The Howard government in 1996 endorsed the Keating government’s policy position of
Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor and stated that it would encourage an internationally
acceptable solution to the problem of East Timor. However, the government’s position changed
in 1998 as a consequence of events that took place outside the control of the Howard
government. President Habibie’s 1998 announcement of some form of autonomy package for
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East Timor gave the Howard government the opportunity to have some input into the direction for
East Timor, and more importantly to remove the long standing irritant in the relationship between
Australia and Indonesia. On the other hand, the risk of changing policy at this time was
significant for the Howard government. Any policy shift could place considerable strain on the
Australia-Indonesia relationship. The Howard government did reiterate support for Indonesia’s
sovereignty and continued its support for Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. However, the
government also stressed the need for an act of self-determination for East Timor. The objective
was to remove the long standing irritant of East Timor and provide a lasting solution to the East
Timor issue. Nevertheless, the Howard government continued to believe that Australia’s interests
were best served through East Timor remaining a part of Indonesia. The contradiction in this
policy is evident.

The government was not only aware of the East Timorese desire for

independence, but also of their distrust of the Indonesian military. Howard’s letter to Habibie in
1998 was greeted with consternation by Habibie himself who had refused any idea of a process
similar to the Matignon Accords. The Indonesian government believed that any autonomy
package that included an act of self-determination at sometime in the future would cause
considerable problems for Indonesia. In response to Howard’s letter proposing a Matignon
Accords approach, Habibie announced an act of self-determination for the East Timorese.
Howard’s letter, the subsequent announcement of a change of policy and the actions in
INTERFET, while gaining support in the domestic arena and claiming the moral high ground, left
the Indonesian government with a sense of unease in relation to Australia’s intentions in the
region. Intelligence issues were also a major problem at this time. The Howard government was
well aware of reports coming from various intelligence agencies noting that there would be
increased violence in the territory before and after the referendum. This advice was ignored in
favour of placating the Indonesian government and at the expense of the East Timorese.
The change in policy direction in 1999, including Australia’s role in INTERFET, resulted in the
cancellation of the Agreement on Maintaining Security with Indonesia. A strained relationship
with Indonesia developed together with an obligation to East Timor that may well last for some
time into the future. The Howard government refocussed its foreign policy on the US and gave
less weight to the benefits of regional cooperation. The change in policy position on East Timor
and the move to support the referendum vote for the East Timorese suggests that the Howard
government was taking a more liberal-moral position rather than a baldly self-interested realist
position on the East Timor issue. However, the continuation of maintaining both incorporation
and an act of self-determination suggests the realist position was being maintained while taking
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advantage of the opportunity that Habibie had given the government by declaring a vote of
independence for the East Timorese. I argue that Howard’s position maintained the realistpragmatism of the Keating government, though there is a change in the government’s reasons for
doing this. While both the Keating and Howard governments adopted the realist position in terms
of maintaining a strong relationship with Indonesia, Howard wanted more. He wanted to remove
the long standing irritant in the relationship while at the same time gaining domestic support.
Under the Howard government, while it would appear in 1998-99 a policy position was changed
and a more liberal approach was adopted, for much of the period up to 1999 and in spite of
Australia’s role in INTERFET, the Howard government maintained a strong realist position on
East Timor. The relationship with Indonesia continued to be considered more important than the
rights of the East Timorese.

The problem with this approach is that once again it was

contradictory. Both positions taken by the Howard government failed. While the previous policy
position affording recognition to Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor obviously pleased the
Indonesian government, it did not find support with the Australian public. With the events of 1999
and Australia’s role in INTERFET this changed and while it won support in terms of the Australian
public, it severely strained the political relationship with Indonesia. It caused deterioration in the
relationship that would take some time to overcome. Further to this, Australia will have to
maintain a continuing obligation for East Timor for some time to come.

The Howard

government’s policy resulted in major problems in the political relationship with Indonesia and
while I have argued from a moral point of view it was the appropriate position to take, it was not
issues of morality that drove the Howard government to make a policy change. If it had been,
then pressure would have been applied to the Indonesian government if not directly, than
indirectly, that would have meant that the atrocities that occurred in East Timor following the
referendum may have been avoided.

The Strategic Environment
What my research has made clear is the divergence in the security relationship with Indonesia
between the Keating and Howard governments.

The Keating government paid particular

attention to building a strong security relationship with the Asia-Pacific region and especially with
Indonesia. Indonesia, the largest country in South-East Asia, was to be recognised as having
considerable strategic importance for achieving the goal of an Asia-Pacific security community.
Conversely, the Howard government viewed the Asia-Pacific region as a potential threat to
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Australia’s security. The government’s answer to that threat was to more vigorously pursue
Australia’s security relationship with the US.
The 1995 signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security was the most important policy action
taken by the Keating government. It was intended to enmesh Australia’s security with that of
Indonesia and the Asia-Pacific. While the Agreement was largely symbolic, its value cannot be
underestimated as it recognised and confirmed the convergence of the security interests of
Australia and Indonesia within the South-East Asian region.

However, there were major

criticisms of the Agreement. The Keating government demonstrated little understanding of the
Australian public’s perception of Indonesia as a potential threat rather than an ally. This was a
major error of judgement on the part of the government. It was obvious that the Australian public
were wary of Indonesia’s intentions toward Australia. In addition, the signing of the Agreement
raised the issue of human rights abuses by the Indonesian military, particularly in East Timor.
This left the Australian public with the idea that their government had legitimised the activities of
the Indonesian military in East Timor. This perception was further compounded by the continued
training exercises between the ADF and Kopassus. Keating argued that the Agreement was in
Australia’s national interests. He insisted that Indonesia was of primary importance in terms of
Australia’s strategic interests. However, this raised the issue of whether foreign policy is in the
government’s interests or in Australia’s interests.
Considering the very vocal Australian public who were concerned over the human rights abuses
in East Timor, it would have been advisable for the Keating government to proceed with some
caution and particularly not to enter into secret Agreement negotiations with Indonesia. Keating’s
intentions to negotiate the Agreement in secret increased the Australian public’s concern over
engaging with a country that was viewed with various degrees of unease. Although Keating
states that the general direction of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia was well known to the
public, this hardly constitutes an acceptance of a formal security arrangement with a country that
was viewed by the Australian public as a potential threat. While I acknowledge that the Australian
public’s perception was not well grounded, I have argued that Keating needed to manage these
perceptions in order to avoid adverse criticism. The Keating government needed to be more
open and explicit in terms of the negotiations. Further, there was a need for an examination by
Parliament prior to the Agreement being finalised. This would have allowed for a much more
considered debate regarding the legitimacy of the government’s actions. Unfortunately, the
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Agreement did not achieve what Keating had hoped it would. He had hoped it would lay a strong
foundation for the Australia-Indonesia relationship.
The Howard government confirmed the Agreement on Maintaining Security after gaining office in
1996 and so affirmed the importance of Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia. However,
the Howard government shifted the Australian government’s security focus away from Asia. The
government’s review of the defence relationship with Indonesia in 1999 following the crisis in East
Timor is an example of this changing security focus. It clearly demonstrates a departure from
Keating’s policy of viewing Indonesia as a vital part of Australia’s security. This resulted in the
disruption of the relationship with Indonesia and I argue, gained support from the Australian
public. While the defence relationship was never severed by the events in East Timor it was
badly damaged. Essentially the Howard government had achieved what the Keating government
had not been able to achieve, namely the Australian public’s endorsement of its actions in terms
of the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

The defence relationship then changed somewhat

following September 11 and the Bali attacks when the Howard government and the Indonesian
government sought defence relationships in what the Howard government viewed as a counterterrorism priority in terms of Australian security. However, while there was some trust regained in
the security relationship through the joint engagement over issues of counter-terrorism and
transnational crime this did not support the development of a broader political relationship
between the Howard government and the Indonesian government.
The development of the relationship over issues of counter-terrorism and transnational crime also
failed to provide any evidence that the Howard government had changed their position. They
continued to view the Asia-Pacific region as a threat to Australian security. The Howard
government’s support of the “war on terror” and Howard’s subsequent announcement of preemptive strike action against another country in the region if Australia was threatened, illustrates
the strong divergence of security policy from that of the Keating government. Howard viewed the
Asian region as a threat. The motivations behind joint engagement with Indonesia over issues of
counter-terrorism can be explained by the Howard government’s need to work closely with
Indonesia in terms of the threat of terrorism. It was not a desire to build a security community in
the Asia-Pacific. If there was any real desire to build a regional security community, such as that
envisaged by Keating and Evans, there would have been an effort to advance multilateral
cooperation on counter-terrorism within the region. Further, if the Howard government was
concerned about rebuilding a security community in Asia and a broader political relationship with
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Indonesia then the government would have been more careful to ensure that its actions and
statements did not conflate issues of terrorism with those of Islam.
In 2006 when the Howard government celebrated the conclusion of the Agreement on the
Framework for Security Cooperation, the Agreement was said to be historically significant and it
was to be seen as an agreement that would provide a foundation for the security relationship. It
was to be viewed as a new era in the Australia-Indonesia relationship that would play a role in the
stability of both countries. However, while it was appropriate for the Howard government to
renegotiate a security agreement with Indonesia the Agreement largely affirms the Howard
government’s primary security focus on counter-terrorism. There is no indication that the
Agreement represented a desire by the Howard government to rebuild a broader political
relationship with Indonesia or engage in a multilateral security community in the Asia-Pacific. The
Agreement did not change the Howard government’s conviction that Australia’s most important
strategic relationship was with the US.
Following the East Timor crisis and the issue of the West Papuan asylum seekers, there was
concern among members of the Indonesian government over Australia’s intentions and strategic
objectives. One of the key commitments in the Agreement on the Framework for Security
Cooperation is that both parties are committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
party. As I have discussed in my thesis, the issue of Indonesian sovereignty was a new
component in the strategic relationship between Australia and Indonesia and the issue over the
West Papuan asylum seekers again demonstrated the Howard government’s lack of sensitivity
over territorial issues. It promoted the need for the Indonesian government to have concrete
assurance from the Howard government that it would respect Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
The commitment in the Agreement to Indonesia’s territorial integrity again demonstrated the
tension between those who take a realist approach and those who take a more liberal-moral
approach in determining Australia’s foreign policy agenda. On one side there are those who
believe that it would be counter-productive for Australia to take a moral approach over the issue
of West Papuan asylum seekers at the expense of the Indonesian relationship. There are others
who argue that liberal-moral considerations are an integral part of foreign policy and that in terms
of asylum seekers, there is a need to ensure Australia’s commitment to its international
obligations. However, this issue is more complex than an either/or situation. It raises the need
for Australian governments to recognise both their domestic and international obligations. The
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Howard government needed to exercise Australia’s international legal obligations to the West
Papuan asylum seekers, which it did, and at the same time it needed to ensure stability in
Indonesia. It would not be in Australia’s national interests to have an unstable Indonesia. In a
sense the 2006 Agreement recognises both these issues by affirming Indonesia’s territorial
integrity and at the same time acknowledging Australia’s obligations under international law.
However, it was totally inappropriate for the Howard government to introduce legislation regarding
asylum seekers in an attempt to appease Indonesia.

Maritime Issues
The maritime issues between Indonesia and Australia have generally been a positive aspect in
the bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, the 1972 Agreement clearly left Indonesia with the belief
that it had been “taken to the cleaners”. It resulted in a more hardline approach to the
negotiations over the Timor Gap Treaty by an Indonesian government seeking to ensure a more
equitable outcome. The result of this was the negotiation of creative cooperative arrangements.
There was an effort to find solutions that were mutually beneficial. It was recognised by both
governments that the development of a Zone of Cooperation in the Timor Gap Treaty was an
innovative initiative. It was a major breakthrough in the stalemate that had been created in the
negotiations. The cooperation established through the negotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty and
the subsequent management of the Treaty provided the motivation for an equitable outcome in
the 1997 Treaty that provided benefits for both parties.
In spite of the Timor Gap Treaty providing benefits for both parties, there were serious questions
raised regarding the Australian government’s primary motivation when negotiating the Treaty and
these questions provoked differences of opinion.

While there were those, particularly in

government, who viewed the Timor Gap Treaty as a major success, there were others who
believed it was an extension of self-interest and an amoral-realist approach informed primarily by
the opportunity to explore and exploit the resource potential of the Timor Gap.
Opposition to the Timor Gap Treaty revolved around the legitimacy of Australia’s actions in
negotiating with Indonesia. The opposition was concerned that by entering into negotiations with
Indonesia, rather than accepting Portugal as the internationally recognised sovereign power of
East Timor, the Australian government had condoned the Indonesian invasion of 1975 and was
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therefore complicit in the continuing violence that had occurred in East Timor. This violence was
widely seen to have been promoted by the Indonesian military.
Two legal cases resulted from the Treaty during the period of the Keating government. One
brought by Portugal to the ICJ claiming that Australia had no legal authority to negotiate with
Indonesia rather than Portugal. Portugal maintained that it was still the sovereign power. The
ICJ claimed that they could not make a final decision in the absence of Indonesia who had not
given adjudication rights to the ICJ. The second case was brought by José Ramos Horta against
the Commonwealth over the validity of the implementation of the Timor Gap Treaty in domestic
law.

He claimed that the Treaty was invalid under international law.

The Horta vs

Commonwealth case was rejected by the High Court because it stated that the constitution
allowed Australia to exercise legislation, and further that it was unable to adjudicate on the basis
of the validity of the Treaty in international law. These cases are important because they again
raise the issue of Australia’s continued recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor.
The cases exposed the illegality of Australia’s actions. They also again raised the question of the
Keating government’s liberal-moral principles.
The Howard government in announcing the conclusion of the 1997 Treaty stated that it was a
great achievement and provided the basis for the further exploitation of natural maritime
resources. Again the 1997 Treaty revealed the willingness of Australian governments to produce
creative solutions to potential problems where Australia has jurisdiction over the seabed EEZ and
Indonesia has jurisdiction over the water column EEZ. However, as I have argued there are a
number of potential problems that are raised with the conclusion of the 1997 Treaty and these
problems may well create tension in the on-going political relationship between the two countries.
The first problem relates to the lack of ratification of the Treaty. Ratification of the Treaty can now
not take place in its present form. It would require the parties to enter into negotiations to change
the Treaty and as I have shown through my research this may well result in a dispute over the
agreed outcome if either party felt that the provisions within the 1997 Treaty were not in their
long-term national interests. This is further complicated if Australia chose to negotiate a maritime
boundary in the Timor Sea with East Timor and agreed to more advantageous arrangements for
East Timor than that provided for in the 1997 Treaty between Indonesia and Australia. This may
well result in Indonesia feeling somewhat disenchanted with Australia. Second, problems could
occur through interpretation of the Treaty. With the lack of an agreed mediation process to solve
issues over interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty, future Australia-Indonesia relations
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could well be strained. A third issue that has the potential to cause problems in the future
relationship is where Australia’s claim to full rights to the extension of the continental shelf
overlaps with Indonesia’s rights to the resources within the sea. If Australian governments are
not sensitive to the importance of maritime resources to the Indonesian government this may well
produce a negative response. Given the Indonesian government’s reaction to issues of territorial
integrity the Australian government needs to be particularly sensitive to the same issues of
territorial integrity in relation to maritime delimitation.

Final Comment
What I have demonstrated in my thesis is that there are major differences in terms of the Keating
and Howard governments’ foreign policy toward Indonesia. The difficulties in the AustraliaIndonesia relationship for the Keating and Howard governments have centred on successive
Australian governments taking a pragmatic-realist approach rather than a liberal-moral position.
My research has raised an important difference in the priority given to engagement with the AsiaPacific region by both the Keating and Howard governments. While both governments viewed
the Asia-Pacific as important to Australia in terms of its future prosperity, the evidence I have
presented shows a difference in the level of engagement.
My research has also shown that while maritime issues have so far produced positive results for
the Australia-Indonesia political relationship, there can be no guarantee for the future. The 1997
Treaty relies on the need for both Indonesia and Australia to maintain a strong relationship to
ensure that both countries can explore and exploit the resources in the area of overlapping
jurisdiction.
In addition, the argument I have presented has demonstrated that there is now a need for future
governments to rebuild trust in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. There is an obvious need for
future governments to revise some of Keating’s vision of being a part of an Asia-Pacific
community in line with Australia’s national interests. However, this revision must be managed
with a high degree of diplomacy. The values that the Australian public believe are important must
be recognised and there is a need to respect and understand the needs of the Indonesian
government and community. Australian governments cannot afford to downplay the relationship
with the Indonesian government, as Howard attempted to do. The relationship is, as Keating was
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particularly keen to stress, of immense importance to Australia’s national interests. On the other
hand, Australian governments cannot afford to adopt a policy of appeasement toward Indonesia
that denies Australia’s liberal-moral tradition. There is a need for both the Australian and
Indonesian governments to find areas of common interest and to accept that there will also be
differences. This is a complex relationship that needs to be sensitively and carefully managed by
Australian governments.
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Note

I wish to acknowledge that I have been unable to obtain permission from the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade to include in this Volume of Appendices the Memorandums of
Understanding that I have referred to in the thesis.
When I requested soft copies of the Memorandums from the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade I was advised that:

Instruments of less than treaty are confidential documents between the parties (and are treated as
confidential even when the titles of the instruments are known). Accordingly, as a matter of diplomatic
policy, this Secretariat could not release such documents without the express permission of the other
party to the document.
Even if an FOI request were made for such documents we would decline to disclose the documents
because they are exempt documents under Section 33 (1) (a) (iii) of the Freedom Of Information (FOI)
Act 1982.

The Department further advised that Section 33 (1) (a) (iii) of the Freedom of Information (FOI)
Act 1982 stated:
…that a document is an 'exempt document' if disclosure of the document under the FOI Act ‘would, or
could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to ... the international relations of the Commonwealth.'
Section 4 of the FOI Act defines 'exempt document' as a document which by virtue of a provision of Part
IV of the FOI Act is an exempt document.
This definition is circular since Section 33 (1) (a) (iii) of the FOI Act is a provision of Part IV.
But an 'exempt document' is not subject to the right of access to documents - which is given
under Section 11 of the FOI Act.

All the Memorandums of Understanding that I have discussed in my thesis have been obtained
through reputable sources. The Treaties and Agreements in this Volume have been sourced
from the Australian Treaty Series.
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Australian Treaty Series 1993 No 18

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE
CANBERRA

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia relating to Cooperation in Fisheries
(Jakarta, 22 April 1992)
Entry into force: 29 May 1993
Australian Treaty Series
1993 No. 18

Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra
(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1995
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA RELATING TO
COOPERATION IN FISHERIES
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA ("the Parties");
WISHING to build further on the close bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia;
FULLY COMMITTED to maintaining, renewing and further strengthening the mutual respect,
friendship and cooperation between their two countries through existing agreements and
arrangements, as well as their policies of promoting constructive neighbourly cooperation;
DESIROUS of cooperating in the field of fisheries;
RECOGNISING that both Parties exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction over
adjacent maritime areas in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea[1];
NOTING that certain boundaries between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia have yet
to be established and that the fisheries line established under the 1981 Memorandum of
Understanding concerning the Implementation of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and
Enforcement Line is of provisional status;
RECALLING the 1974 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of
Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the operations of
Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in Areas of the Australian Exclusive Fishing Zone and
Continental Shelf and the 1989 guidelines and procedures for the implementation of that
Memorandum of Understanding;
RECALLING their mutual interest in the rational management, conservation and optimum
utilisation of the living resources of the sea;
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT developments in the Law of the Sea;
RECOGNISING that coastal States are obliged to seek, either directly or through
appropriate subregional or regional organisations, to agree upon measures necessary to
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of shared stocks;
WISHING to promote the development of mutually beneficial economic, scientific and
technological exchanges relating to fisheries matters, including at the regional level;
RECOGNISING their respective obligations under other related international agreements;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
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Article 1
The Parties shall facilitate cooperation in fisheries research relevant to the conservation and
optimum utilisation of marine living resources.
Article 2
1. The Parties shall exchange available information related to fisheries of mutual interest,
including:
(a) fishing catch and effort data from foreign and domestic vessels;
(b) the results of scientific research into:
(i) ecological studies;
(ii) population dynamics; and
(iii) stock distribution, abundance and assessment of sustainable yield;
(c) the development of national fisheries management programs; and
(d) fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance systems and technology.
2. The Parties shall establish channels of communication to facilitate the exchange of
information and this may include the convening of technical meetings on marine areas or
stocks of special interest to both Parties, including but not limited to:
(a) pelagic shark;
(b) tuna;
(c) demersal finfish; and
(d) trochus.
Article 3
1. The Parties shall seek to develop complementary regimes for the conservation,
management and optimum utilisation of shared stocks, straddling stocks and highly migratory
species.
2. The Parties shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organisations to
assure the conservation and management of marine living resources of the high seas.
Article 4
The Parties shall facilitate cooperation through exchanges and training of fisheries and
marine conservation personnel, including managers, scientists and students.
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Article 5
The Parties shall exchange available information on technological developments related to
fisheries, including:
(a) innovations in fishing gear which assist the development of sustainable fishing
techniques;
(b) monitoring, assessing and reducing the effects of fishing on marine mammals and other
protected marine biota; and
(c) processing of fish products and other aspects of post-harvest technology.
Article 6
1. If a Party determines that it can make fisheries resources under its jurisdiction available to
nationals of the other Party, and the latter Party wishes to exploit those resources, the Parties
shall seek to establish subsidiary agreements or arrangements between the two Governments
for the conduct of fishing operations.
2. Any such subsidiary agreement or arrangement shall specify terms and conditions of
access, including:
(a) procedures for recording vessel position, catch and effort;
(b) licence requirements;
(c) catch disposal requirements;
(d) provision for observers; and
(e) access fees.
Article 7
Each Party shall take steps intended to ensure that:
(a) its fishing vessels do not fish in areas subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the other
Party unless authorised under this or other agreements or arrangements or otherwise permitted
under the other Party's laws;
(b) any of its fishing vessels licensed to fish in areas subject to the enforcement jurisdiction
of the other Party comply with the laws of that Party applicable to foreign fishing vessels
(including the terms and conditions of licences) and the provisions of this and other applicable
agreements.
Article 8
In the event that enforcement action needs to be taken against fishing vessels or nationals
of the other Party by a Party for offences against its laws, the Party shall notify the other Party
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promptly through the diplomatic channel of the action taken, including the results of legal
proceedings involving the vessels or persons concerned.
Article 9
The Parties shall exchange information and cooperate in regard to aquaculture. Such
cooperation may take the form of, but is not limited to:
(a) management, including environment protection measures;
(b) technological developments; and
(c) marketing.
Article 10
The Parties shall promote trade in the fisheries sector including, as appropriate, through
encouragement and facilitation of:
(a) joint ventures in the processing of fish products; and
(b) cooperation in the marketing of fish products, fishing gear and fish processing
equipment.
Article 11
Pending final delimitation of the outstanding maritime boundaries between the two countries,
the Parties shall interpret and implement this Agreement consistently with the existing maritime
boundary agreements between the Parties and the 1981 Memorandum of Understanding
concerning the Implementation of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Line.
Article 12
1. Consultations between officials of the Parties shall be held from time to time at the
request of either Party.
2. These consultations may include technical meetings on marine areas or fish stocks of
special interest to both Parties as referred to in Article 2.
Article 13
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later of the written notifications by
which each Party shall notify the other that it has complied with its constitutional requirements
necessary for the entry into force of the Agreement[2].
2. This Agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of twelve months from the date
on which either Party shall have given notice in writing to the other of its intention to terminate
the Agreement.
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Article 14
This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of five years from the date of its entry
into force.
Article 15
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice:
(a) the position of either Party in regard to the extent of its maritime zones; or
(b) the 1974 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the operations of Indonesian Traditional
Fishermen in Areas of the Australian Exclusive Fishing Zone and Continental Shelf and the
1989 guidelines and procedures for the implementation of that Memorandum of Understanding.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Jakarta, this twenty-second day of April 1992, in the English language.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
[Signed:] [Signed:]
PHILIP FLOOD ALI ALATAS
[1] SD 30 Vol. I p. 1; ILM 21 p. 1261.
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CANBERRA

Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries

(Canberra, 18 May 1971)
Entry into force: 8 November 1973
Australian Treaty Series
1973 No. 31

Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra

(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1995
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ESTABLISHING CERTAIN SEABED BOUNDARIES
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,
DESIRING to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries; and
DESIRING particularly to cooperate in delimiting by agreement the boundaries of certain
areas of seabed in which the two countries respectively exercise sovereign rights for the
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
In the Arafura Sea eastwards of Longitude 133deg.23' East, the boundary between the area
of seabed that is adjacent to and appertains to the Commonwealth of Australia and the area
that is adjacent to and appertains to the Republic of Indonesia shall be the straight lines shown
on chart "A" annexed to this Agreement, commencing at the point of Latitude 9deg.52' South,
Longitude 140deg.29' East (Point A1), and thence connecting the points specified hereunder in
the sequence so specified:
A2. The point of Latitude 10deg.24' South, Longitude 139deg.46' East
A3. The point of Latitude 10deg.50' South, Longitude 139deg.12' East
A4. The point of Latitude 10deg.24' South, Longitude 138deg.38' East
A5. The point of Latitude 10deg.22' South, Longitude 138deg.35' East
A6. The point of Latitude 10deg.09' South, Longitude 138deg.13' East
A7. The point of Latitude 9deg.57' South, Longitude 137deg.45' East
A8. The point of Latitude 9deg.08' South, Longitude 135deg.29' East
A9. The point of Latitude 9deg.17' South, Longitude 135deg.13' East
A10. The point of Latitude 9deg.22' South, Longitude 135deg.03' East
A11. The point of Latitude 9deg.25' South, Longitude 134deg.50' East
A12. The point of Latitude 8deg.53' South, Longitude 133deg.23' East.
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Article 2
The two Governments have not provided in this Agreement for the delimitation of the
respective areas of adjacent seabed westward of Longitude 133deg.23' East, and have left this
question for discussion at further talks to be held at a mutually convenient date.
Article 3
1. Off the southern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian) westwards of Longitude
140deg.49'30" East, the boundary between the area of seabed that is adjacent to and
appertains to the Territory of Papua and the area that is adjacent to and appertains to the
Republic of Indonesia shall be the straight line shown on chart "A" annexed to this Agreement,
connecting the point of Latitude 9deg.24'30" South, Longitude 140deg.49'30" East (Point B1)
with the point of Latitude 9deg.52' South, Longitude 140deg.29' East (Point A1).
2. The two Governments have not provided in this Agreement for the drawing of a boundary
line between the point B1 referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and the point at which the
land boundary between the Territory of Papua and West Irian meets the southern coast of the
island of New Guinea (Irian), and have left this question for further discussion as and when
agreed.
Article 4
1. Off the northern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian), the boundary between the area
of seabed that is adjacent to and appertains to the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the area
that is adjacent to and appertains to the Republic of Indonesia shall lie along the straight line
shown on chart "B" annexed to this Agreement, connecting the point at which the land
boundary between the Trust Territory and West Irian meets the northern coast of the island of
New Guinea (Irian) (Point C1) with the point of Latitude 2deg.08'30" South, Longitude
141deg.01'30" East (Point C2). If any lines are drawn extending this line northward, they shall
be drawn on the same principle, that is to say the principle of equidistance.
2. The lines referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article are to be taken as indicating the
direction in which the lateral boundary of the respective areas of seabed is agreed to lie.
3. This Article shall not in any way affect any agreement that may subsequently be made
between the two Governments delimiting the lateral boundary of the territorial sea as between
the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Republic of Indonesia.
Article 5
For the purpose of this Agreement, "seabed" includes the subsoil thereof, except where the
context otherwise requires.
Article 6
1. The co-ordinates of the points specified in Articles 1, 3 and 4 of this Agreement are
geographical co-ordinates, and the actual location of the points and of the lines joining them
shall be determined by a method to be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the two
Governments.
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2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article the competent authorities in relation to the
Commonwealth of Australia shall be the Director of National Mapping and any person acting
with his authority, and in relation to the Republic of Indonesia shall be the Chief of the Coordinating Body for National Survey and Mapping (Ketua Badan Koordinasi Survey Dan
Pemetaan Nasional) and any person acting with his authority.
Article 7
If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral
deposit beneath the seabed, extends across any of the lines that are specified in Articles 1, 3
and 4 of this Agreement, and the part of such accumulation or deposit that is situated on one
side of the line is recoverable in fluid form wholly or in part from the other side of the line, the
two Governments will seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or
deposit shall be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits arising
from such exploitation.
Article 8
Any dispute between the two Governments arising out of the interpretation or
implementation of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation.
Article 9
This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional requirements
of each country, and shall enter into force on the day on which the Instruments of Ratification
are exchanged.[1]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Canberra this 18th day of May 1971 in the English and Indonesian
languages.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA:

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:

[Signed:] [Signed:]
LESLIE BURY SUMANTRI BRODJONEGORO

[1] Instruments of ratification were exchanged at Canberra 8 November 1973.

13
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ESTABLISHING CERTAIN SEABED BOUNDARIES IN THE AREA OF THE
TIMOR AND ARAFURA SEAS, SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE AGREEMENT OF 18
MAY 1971
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,
RECALLING the Agreement between the two Governments, signed on the eighteenth day
of May One thousand nine hundred and seventy-one, establishing seabed boundaries in the
Arafura Sea and in certain areas off the coasts of the island of New Guinea (Irian).[1]
RECALLING further that in the aforesaid Agreement the two Governments left for later
discussion the question of the delimitation of the respective areas of adjacent seabed in the
Arafura and Timor Seas westward of Longitude 133deg.23' East,
RESOLVING, as good neighbours and in a spirit of co-operation and friendship, to settle
permanently the limits of the areas referred to in the preceding paragraph within which the
respective Governments shall exercise sovereign rights with respect to the exploration of the
seabed and the exploitation of its natural resources,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
In the area to the south of the Tanimbar Islands, the boundary between the area of seabed
that is adjacent to and appertains to the Commonwealth of Australia and the area of seabed
that is adjacent to and appertains to the Republic of Indonesia shall be the straight lines shown
on the Chart annexed to this Agreement commencing at the Point of Latitude 8deg.53' South,
Longitude 133deg.23' East (Point A12, specified in the Agreement between the two countries
dated the eighteenth day of May One thousand nine hundred and seventy-one), thence
connecting in a westerly direction the points specified hereunder in the sequence so specified:
A13 The point of Latitude 8deg.54' South, Longitude 133deg.14' East
A14 The point of Latitude 9deg.25' South, Longitude 130deg.10' East
A15 The point of Latitude 9deg.25' South, Longitude 128deg.00' East
A16 The point of Latitude 9deg.28' South, Longitude 127deg.56' East.
Article 2
In the area south of Roti and Timor Islands, the boundary between the area of seabed that is
adjacent to and appertains to the Commonwealth of Australia and the area of seabed that is
adjacent to and appertains to the Republic of Indonesia shall be the straight lines, shown on
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the Chart annexed to this Agreement commencing at the point of Latitude 10deg.28' South,
Longitude 126deg.00' East (Point A17), and thence connecting in a westerly direction the
points specified hereunder in the sequence so specified:
A18 The point of Latitude 10deg.37' South, Longitude 125deg.41' East
A19 The point of Latitude 11deg.01' South, Longitude 125deg.19' East
A20 The point of Latitude 11deg.07' South, Longitude 124deg.34' East
A21 The point of Latitude 11deg.25' South, Longitude 124deg.10' East
A22 The point of Latitude 11deg.26' South, Longitude 124deg.00' East
A23 The point of Latitude 11deg.28' South, Longitude 123deg.40' East
A24 The point of Latitude 11deg.23' South, Longitude 123deg.26' East
A25 The point of Latitude 11deg.35' South, Longitude 123deg.14' East
Article 3
The lines between Points A15 and A16 and between Points A17 and A18 referred to in
Article 1 and Article 2 respectively, indicate the direction of those portions of the boundary. In
the event of any further delimitation agreement or agreements being concluded between
governments exercising sovereign rights with respect to the exploration of the seabed and the
exploitation of its natural resources in the area of the Timor Sea, the Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall consult
each other with a view to agreeing on such adjustment or adjustments, if any, as may be
necessary in those portions of the boundary lines between Points A15 and A16 and between
Points A17 and A18.
Article 4
The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia mutually acknowledge the sovereign rights of the respective Governments in and
over the seabed areas within the limits established by this Agreement and that they will cease
to claim or to exercise sovereign rights with respect to the exploration of the seabed and the
exploitation of its natural resources beyond the boundaries so established.
Article 5
For the purpose of this Agreement, "seabed" includes the subsoil thereof, except where the
context otherwise requires.
Article 6
1. The co-ordinates of the points specified in Articles 1 and 2 of this Agreement are
geographical co-ordinates, and the actual location of these points and of the lines joining them
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shall be determined by a method to be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the two
Governments.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, the competent authorities in relation to the
Commonwealth of Australia shall be the Director of National Mapping and any person acting
with his authority, and in relation to the Republic of Indonesia shall be the Chief of the Coordinating Body for National Survey and Mapping (Ketua Badan Koordinasi Survey Dan
Pemetaan Nasional) and any person acting with his authority.
Article 7
If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral
deposit beneath the seabed, extends across any of the lines that are specified or described in
Articles 1 and 2 of this Agreement, and the part of such accumulation or deposit that is situated
on one side of the line is recoverable in fluid form wholly or in part from the other side of the
line, the two Governments will seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the
accumulation or deposit shall be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from such exploitation.
Article 8
1. Where the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia has granted an exploration
permit for petroleum or a production licence for petroleum under the Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) Acts of the Commonwealth of Australia over a part of the seabed over which that
Government ceases to exercise sovereign rights by virtue of this Agreement, and that permit or
licence is in force immediately prior to the entry into force of this Agreement, the Government of
the Republic of Indonesia or its authorised agent shall, upon application by the registered
holder of the permit or licence, or where there is more than one registered holder, by the
registered holders acting jointly, be willing to offer and to negotiate a production sharing
contract under Indonesian law to explore for and to produce oil and natural gas in respect of
the same part of the seabed on terms that are not less favourable than those provided under
Indonesian law in existing production sharing contracts in other parts of the seabed under
Indonesian jurisdiction.
2. An application for negotiation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article must be made
by the registered holder or holders within nine months after the entry into force of this
Agreement. If no application is made within this period, or if an offer made in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article is, after negotiation, not accepted by the permittee or licensee, the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall have no further obligation to the registered
holder or holders of a permit or licence to which paragraph 1 of this Article applies.
3. For the purpose of this Article, "registered holder" means a company that was a registered
holder of an exploration permit for petroleum or a production licence for petroleum, as the case
may be, under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts of the Commonwealth of Australia
immediately prior to the entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 9
Any dispute between the two Governments arising out of the interpretation or
implementation of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation.
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Article 10
This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional requirements
of each country, and shall enter into force on the day on which the Instruments of Ratification
are exchanged.[2]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE IN DUPLICATE at Jakarta this ninth day of October 1972 in the English and
Indonesian languages.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
[Signed:] [Signed:]
NIGEL BOWEN SUMANTRI BRODJONEGORO

[1]ATS 1973 No. 31
[2] Instruments of ratification were exchanged at Canberra 8 November 1973.

18

19

Australian Treaty Series 1996 No 13

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE
CANBERRA

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia on Maintaining Security

(Jakarta, 18 December 1995)
Entry into force: 15 July 1996

Australian Treaty Series
1996 No. 13

(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1999

20

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON MAINTAINING
SECURITY
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (hereafter referred to as the "Parties"),
DESIRING to strengthen the existing friendship between them;
RECOGNISING their common interest in the peace and stability of the region;
DESIRING to contribute to regional security and stability in order to ensure circumstances in
which their aspirations can be best realised for the economic development and prosperity of
their own countries and the region;
REAFFIRMING their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial
integrity of all countries;
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful
means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;
RECOGNISING that each Party has primary responsibility for its own security;
MINDFUL of the contribution that would be made to their own security and that of the region
by cooperating in the development of effective national capabilities in the defence field and
hence their national resilience and self-reliance;
NOTING that nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the existing international
commitments of either Party;
THEREFORE AGREE as follows:
Article 1
The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters
affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their own
security and that of the region.
Article 2
The Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party
or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be
taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each Party.
Article 3
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The Parties agree to promote - in accordance with the policies and priorities of each mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field in areas to be identified by the two
Parties.
Article 4
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later notification by either
Government of the fulfilment of its requirements for entry into force of this Agreement.[1]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Jakarta on the eighteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and
ninety-five in the English and Indonesian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
[Signed:] [Signed:]
GARETH EVANS ALI ALATAS
Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs
PERSETUJUAN ANTARA PEMERINTAH AUSTRALIA DAN PEMERINTAH REPUBLIK
INDONESIA TENTANG PEMELIHARAAN KEAMANAN
PEMERINTAH AUSTRALIA DAN PEMERINTAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA (selanjutnya
disebut sebagai "para Pihak"),
BERHASRAT untuk memperkuat hubungan persahabatan yang ada di antara kedua Pihak;
MENGAKUI kepentingan bersama atas perdamaian dan stabilitas di kawasan;
BERHASRAT untuk menyumbang pada keamanan dan stabilitas kawasan dengan tujuan
menjamin keadaan dimana aspirasi kedua pihak dapat diwujudkan sebaik-baiknya demi
pembangunan ekonomi dan kesejahteraan negara masing-masing dan kawasan;
MENEGASKAN KEMBALI penghormatan terhadap kedaulatan, kebebasan politik, dan
kesatuan wilayah dari semua negara;
MENEGASKAN KEMBALI komitmen terhadap penyelesaian semua perselisihan
internasional melalui cara-cara damai sesuai dengan Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa dan
hukum internasional;
MENGAKUI bahwa masing-masing Pihak mempunyai tanggung jawab utama atas
keamanannya sendiri;
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MENYADARI sumbangan yang dapat diberikan kepada keamanan masing-masing dan
keamanan kawasan melalui kerjasama dalam mengembangkan kemampuan nasional yang
efektif di bidang pertahanan serta ketahanan nasional dan kemandirian;
MENCATAT bahwa tidak ada satu halpun dalam Persetujuan ini yang mempengaruhi
komitmen-komitmen internasional yang ada dari salah satu Pihak;
MAKA DENGAN INI MENYETUJUI sebagai berikut:
PASAL 1
Para Pihak sepakat untuk saling melakukan konsultasi pada tingkat Menteri secara berkala
mengenai hal-hal yang dapat mempengaruhi keamanan bersama serta mengembangkan
kerjasama sedemikian rupa yang dapat menguntungkan keamanan masing-masing dan
kawasan.
PASAL 2
Para Pihak sepakat untuk saling melakukan konsultasi dalam hal terjadinya tantangan yang
merugikan terhadap salah satu Pihak atau terhadap kepentingan keamanan bersama dan,
apabila layak, mempertimbangkan langkah-langkah yang dapat diambil secara sendiri-sendiri
atau bersama-sama sesuai dengan tata cara masing-masing Pihak.
PASAL 3
Para Pihak setuju untuk meningkatkan - sesuai dengan kebijakan dan prioritas masingmasing - kegiatan kerjasama yang menguntungkan kedua belah Pihak di bidang keamanan
dalam lingkup yang akan ditentukan oleh kedua belah Pihak.
PASAL 4
Persetujuan ini akan mulai berlaku pada tanggal pemberitahuan terakhir dari salah satu
Pihak tentang telah dipenuhinya persyaratan-persyaratan untuk pemberlakuan Persetujuan ini.
SEBAGAI BUKTI, yang bertanda-tangan di bawah ini, yang telah diberi kuasa penuh
Pemerintah masing-masing, telah menanda-tangani Persetujuan ini.
DIBUAT di Jakarta pada tanggal delapan belas bulan Desember tahun seribu sembilan
ratus sembilan puluh lima dalam Bahasa Inggris dan Indonesia, kedua naskah mempunyai
kekuatan hukum yang sama.
UNTUK PEMERINTAH UNTUK PEMERINTAH
AUSTRALIA: REPUBLIK INDONESIA:
[Signed:] [Signed:]
GARETH EVANS ALI ALATAS
Menteri Luar Negeri Menteri Luar Negeri
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[1] Notes to this effect were exchanged at Jakarta 18 December 1995-15 July 1996. The
Agreement entered into force 15 July 1996.
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON THE
FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY COOPERATION
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Australia (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Parties’)
Reaffirming the sovereign equality of the Parties, their faith in the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments;
Reaffirming the commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of
both Parties, and the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference
in the internal affairs of one another, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;
Recognising that both Parties are democratic, dynamic and outward-looking members of the
region and the international community;
Recognising also the new global challenges, notably from international terrorism, traditional
and non-traditional security threats;
Recognising further the importance of continued and enhanced cooperation in meeting the
challenges posed by international terrorism and transnational crime;
Determined to work together to respond to these new challenges and threats;
Determined also to maintain and strengthen bilateral cooperation and regular dialogue
including established regular discussions on strategic, defence, intelligence, law enforcement
and other matters;
Determined further to maintain and strengthen the long-standing political, economic, social and
security cooperation which exist between the two Parties, and their common regional interests
and ties, including the stability, progress and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region;
Recognising the value of bilateral agreements and arrangements between the two countries
since 1959 including the major bilateral instruments on security that have provided a strong
legal framework for both countries in dealing with various security threats and issues as well as
the importance of existing dialogues and cooperation through the Indonesia Australia
Ministerial Forum (IAMF);
Emphasizing also the importance of working together through regional and international fora on
security matters to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security;
Determined to comply in good faith with their obligations under generally recognized principles
and rules of international law;
Adhering to their respective laws and regulations;
Have agreed as follows:
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ARTICLE 1
PURPOSES
The main objectives of this Agreement are:
1.

to provide a framework for deepening and expanding bilateral cooperation and
exchanges as well as to intensify cooperation and consultation between the Parties in
areas of mutual interest and concern on matters affecting their common security as
well as their respective national security.

2.

to establish a bilateral consultative mechanism with a view to encouraging intensive
dialogue, exchanges and implementation of co-operative activities as well as
strengthening institutional relationships pursuant to this Agreement.
ARTICLE 2
PRINCIPLES

In their relations with one another, the Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental
principles, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
1.

Equality, mutual benefit and recognition of enduring interests each Party has in the
stability, security and prosperity of the other;

2.

Mutual respect and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and
political independence of each other, and also non-interference in the internal affairs of
one another;

3.

The Parties, consistent with their respective domestic laws and international
obligations, shall not in any manner support or participate in activities by any person or
entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the
other Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or
committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other Party;

4.

The Parties undertake, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
disputes that might arise between them by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace, security and justice are not endangered;

5.

The Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of the other, in accordance with the UN Charter;

6.

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect in any way the existing rights and obligations of
either Party under international law.
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ARTICLE 3
AREAS AND FORMS OF COOPERATION
The scope of cooperation of this Agreement shall include:
Defence Cooperation
In recognition of the long-term mutual benefit of the closest professional cooperation between
their Defence Forces,
1.

Regular consultation on defence and security issues of common concern; and on their
respective defence policies;

2.

Promotion of development and capacity building of defence institutions and armed
forces of both Parties including through military education and training, exercises, study
visits and exchanges, application of scientific methods to support capacity building and
management and other related mutually beneficial activities;

3.

Facilitating cooperation in the field of mutually beneficial defence technologies and
capabilities, including joint design, development, production, marketing and transfer of
technology as well as developing mutually agreed joint projects.

Law Enforcement Cooperation
In recognition of the importance of effective cooperation to combat transnational crime that
impacts upon the security of both Parties,
4.

Regular consultation and dialogue aimed at strengthening the links between institutions
and officials at all levels;

5.

Cooperation to build capacity of law enforcement officials to prevent, respond to and
investigate transnational crime;

6.

Strengthening and intensifying police to police cooperation including through joint and
coordinated operations;

7.

Cooperation between relevant institutions and agencies, including prosecuting
authorities, in preventing and combating transnational crimes, in particular crimes
related to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

People smuggling and trafficking in persons;
Money laundering;
Financing of terrorism;
Corruption;
Illegal fishing;
Cyber-crimes;
Illicit trafficking in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances and its precursors;
Illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition, explosives and other dangerous materials and
the illegal production thereof; and
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i.

Other types of crime if deemed necessary by both Parties.

Counter-terrorism Cooperation
In recognition of the importance of close and continuing cooperation to combat and eliminate
international terrorism through communication, cooperation and action at all levels,
8.

Doing everything possible individually and jointly to eradicate international terrorism and
extremism and its roots and causes and to bring those who support or engage in violent
criminal acts to justice in accordance with international law and their respective national
laws;

9.

Further strengthening cooperation to combat international terrorism including through
rapid, practical and effective responses to terrorist threats and attacks; intelligence and
information sharing; assistance to transport security, immigration and border control;
and effective counter-terrorism policies and regulatory frameworks;

10.

Strengthening cooperation in capacity building in law enforcement, defence, intelligence
and national security in order to respond to terrorist threats;

11.

Cooperation, when requested and where possible, in facilitating effective and rapid
responses in the event of a terrorist attack. In this regard, the requesting Party shall
have primary responsibility for the overall direction, organization and coordination for
such situation.

Intelligence Cooperation
12.

Cooperation and exchange of information and intelligence on security issues between
relevant institutions and agencies, in compliance with their respective national legislation
and within the limits of their responsibility.

Maritime Security
13.

Strengthening bilateral cooperation to enhance maritime safety and to implement
maritime security measures, consistent with international law;

14.

Enhancing existing Defence and other cooperation activities and capacity building in the
area of aerial and naval maritime security in accordance with international law.

Aviation Safety and Security
15.

Strengthening bilateral cooperation in the field of capacity building to enhance civil
aviation safety and security.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
In recognition of the Parties’ shared commitment not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile, retain or use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction,
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16.

Co-operate to enhance measures for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery including through strengthened national export
controls in accordance with their respective national laws as well as international law;

17.

Strengthening bilateral nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, including to further
the objective of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthen
international nuclear safety and security through enhanced standards, in accordance
with international law.

Emergency Cooperation
18.

Cooperation, as appropriate and as requested, in facilitating effective and rapid
coordination of responses and relief measures in the event of a natural disaster or other
such emergency. The Party requesting the assistance shall have primary responsibility
for determining the overall direction for emergency response and relief operation;

19.

Cooperation in capacity building for disaster preparedness and response.

Cooperation in International Organizations on Security-Related Issues
20.

Consultation and cooperation on matters of shared interest on security related issues in
the United Nations, other international and regional bodies.

Community Understanding and People-to-People Cooperation
21.

Endeavoring to foster contacts and interaction between their respective institutions and
communities with a view to improving mutual understanding of security challenges and
responses to them.
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ARTICLE 4
CONFIDENTIALITY
1.

The Parties shall protect confidential and classified information received pursuant to the
framework of this Agreement in accordance with their respective national laws,
regulations and policies.

2.

Notwithstanding Article 10, should this Agreement terminate, each Party shall continue
to comply with the obligation set out in paragraph 1 to information to which it had access
under the Agreement.
ARTICLE 5
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The Parties agree that any intellectual property arising under the implementation of this
Agreement shall be regulated under separate arrangement.
ARTICLE 6
IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM
1.

The Parties shall take any necessary steps to ensure effective implementation of this
Agreement, including through conclusion of separate arrangements on specific areas
of cooperation.

2.

For the purpose of this Article, the Parties shall meet on a regular basis under the
existing mechanism of the Indonesia-Australia Ministerial Forum (IAMF) to review and
give direction to the activities under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 7
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT

Any expenses incurred in the implementation of this Agreement will be met by the Party
incurring the expense, unless otherwise mutually decided.
ARTICLE 8
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Disputes arising in relation to the interpretation on implementation of this Agreement shall be
settled amicably by mutual consultation or negotiation between the Parties.
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ARTICLE 9
AMENDMENT
This Agreement may be amended in writing by mutual consent by both Parties. Any
amendment to this Agreement shall come into force on the date of later notification by either
Party of the completion of its ratification procedure for the amendment.
ARTICLE 10
ENTRY INTO FORCE, DURATION AND TERMINATION
1.

The Agreement shall enter into force on the date of receipt of the last notification by
which the Parties notify each other that their internal requirements for the entry into force
of this Agreement have been fulfilled.

2.

This Agreement shall remain in force until one Party gives written notice of its intention
to terminate it, in which case this Agreement shall terminate six months after receipt of
the notice of termination.

3.

Termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity or the duration of any
arrangement made under the present Agreement until the completion of such
arrangement, unless otherwise decided by mutual consent.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done at Lombok on this thirteenth day of November in the year of two thousand and six, in 2
(two) original copies in both English and Indonesian languages, all texts being equally
authentic. In case of divergence in the interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
For the Government of
Australia:

For the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia:

Alexander Downer
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Dr Hassan Wiryuda
Minister for Foreign Affairs
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PERJANJIAN
ANTARA AUSTRALIA DAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA
TENTANG KERANGKA KERJASAMA KEAMANAN
Pemerintah Australia dan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia (selanjutnya disebut sebagai ‘Para
Pihak’)
Menegaskan kesetaraan berdaulat Para Pihak, keyakinan mereka pada prinsip-prinsip dan
tujuan-tujuan Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa dan keinginan untuk hidup dalam
perdamaian dengan semua bangsa dan pemerintahan;
Menegaskan komitmen terhadap kedaulatan, kesatuan, kemerdekaan dan integritas teritorial
Para Pihak, dan pentingnya prinsip bertetangga baik dan tidak campur tangan terhadap urusan
dalam negeri masing-masing, sejalan dengan Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa;
Mengakui bahwa kedua Pihak adalah anggota yang demokratis, dinamis dan berpandangan ke
depan dari masyarakat regional dan internasional;
Mengakui juga tantangan-tantangan global baru, terutama terorisme internasional, ancaman
keamanan tradisional dan non-tradisional;
Mengakui pula pentingnya kelanjutan dan peningkatan kerjasama guna menghadapi tantangan
dari terorisme internasional dan kejahatan transnasional;
Berketetapan untuk bekerja bersama dalam menghadapi tantangan dan ancaman-ancaman
baru tersebut;
Berketetapan juga untuk memelihara dan memperkuat kerjasama bilateral dan dialog berkala
termasuk diskusi berkala yang telah ada di bidang strategis, pertahanan, intelijen, penegakan
hukum dan bidang lainnya;
Berketetapan pula untuk memelihara dan memperkuat kerjasama yang telah lama terjalin di
bidang politik, ekonomi, sosial dan keamanan yang ada di antara kedua Pihak, dan
kepentingan serta ikatan regional mereka bersama, termasuk stabilitas, kemajuan dan
kemakmuran kawasan Asia-Pasifik;
Mengakui nilai dari perjanjian dan pengaturan bilateral antara kedua negara sejak 1959
termasuk instrumen bilateral utama di bidang keamanan yang telah menciptakan kerangka
hukum yang kuat bagi kedua negara dalam menghadapi berbagai ancaman dan masalah
keamanan serta pentingnya dialog dan kerjasama yang telah ada melalui Forum Tingkat
Menteri Indonesia Australia / Indonesia Australia Ministerial Forum (IAMF);
Menekankan juga pentingnya bekerja bersama melalui forum regional dan internasional di
bidang keamanan untuk turut serta menjaga perdamaian dan keamanan internasional;
Berketetapan untuk mematuhi, dengan niat baik, kewajiban-kewajiban terhadap prinsip-prinsip
dan aturan-aturan hukum internasional yang diterima secara umum;
Mematuhi hukum dan peraturan masing-masing;
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Menyetujui hal-hal sebagai berikut:
PASAL 1
TUJUAN-TUJUAN
Tujuan utama dari Perjanjian ini adalah
1.

untuk menciptakan suatu kerangka guna memperdalam dan memperluas kerjasama dan
pertukaran bilateral serta untuk meningkatkan kerjasama dan konsultasi antara Para
Pihak dalam bidang yang menjadi kepentingan dan perhatian bersama mengenai
permasalahan yang mempengaruhi keamanan bersama serta keamanan nasional
masing-masing.

2.

untuk membentuk suatu mekanisme konsultasi bilateral dengan tujuan untuk memajukan
dialog dan pertukaran intensif serta penerapan kegiatan kerjasama dan sekaligus juga
memperkuat hubungan antar-lembaga sesuai dengan Perjanjian ini.
PASAL 2
PRINSIP-PRINSIP

Dalam hubungannya satu sama lain, Para Pihak akan berpedoman kepada prinsip-prinsip
dasar, sejalan dengan Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, sebagai berikut:
1.

Kesetaraan, saling menguntungkan dan pengakuan terhadap kepentingan masingmasing Pihak dalam stabilitas, keamanan dan kemakmuran dari Pihak lainnya;

2.

Saling menghormati dan mendukung kedaulatan, integritas teritorial, kesatuan bangsa
dan kemerdekaan politik setiap Pihak, serta tidak campur tangan urusan dalam negeri
masing-masing;

3.

Para Pihak, sejalan dengan hukum nasional dan kewajiban internasional mereka, tidak
akan dalam bentuk apapun, mendukung atau turut serta dalam kegiatan-kegiatan oleh
setiap orang atau lembaga yang merupakan ancaman terhadap stabilitas, kedaulatan
atau intergitas teritorial Pihak lain, termasuk oleh mereka yang berupaya untuk
menggunakan wilayahnya untuk mendorong atau melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut,
termasuk separatisme, di wilayah Pihak lainnya;

4.

Para Pihak sepakat, sejalan dengan Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, untuk
menyelesaikan setiap perselisihan yang mungkin timbul di antara mereka dengan caracara damai dengan sedemikian rupa sehingga tidak membahayakan perdamaian,
keamanan dan keadilan dunia;

5.

Para Pihak wajib menahan diri untuk melakukan ancaman atau menggunakan
kekerasan yang menentang integritas teritorial atau kemerdekaan politik Pihak lainnya,
sesuai dengan Piagam PBB;

6.

Tidak ada dari Perjanjian ini yang mempengaruhi, dalam bentuk apapun, hak-hak dan
kewajian-kewajiban setiap Pihak berdasarkan hukum internasional.
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PASAL 3
RUANG LINGKUP DAN BENTUK KERJASAMA
Ruang lingkup kerjasama Perjanjian ini meliputi:
Kerjasama Pertahanan
Dengan mengakui kepentingan bersama jangka panjang dari kerjasama profesional yang erat
antara Angkatan Pertahanan Para Pihak,
1.

Konsultasi berkala mengenai masalah-masalah pertahanan dan keamanan yang
menjadi kepentingan bersama; dan mengenai kebijakan pertahanan Para Pihak;

2.

Pemajuan pengembangan dan pembangunan kapasitas lembaga-lembaga pertahanan
dan angkatan bersenjata kedua Pihak termasuk melalui pendidikan dan pelatihan militer,
latihan, kunjungan dan pertukaran pendidikan, penerapan metode ilmiah untuk
mendukung pembangunan kapasitas dan manajemen serta kegiatan terkait lain yang
saling menguntungkan;

3.

Memfasilitasi kerjasama di bidang teknologi dan kemampuan pertahanan yang saling
menguntungkan, termasuk disain bersama, pengembangan, produksi, pemasaran dan
alih teknologi serta pengembangan proyek-proyek bersama yang disepakati bersama.

Kerjasama Penegakan Hukum
Dengan mengakui pentingnya kerjasama efektif untuk memberantas kejahatan transnasional
yang berdampak terhadap keamanan kedua Pihak,
4.

Konsultasi dan dialog berkala yang bertujuan untuk memperkuat hubungan antar institusi
dan pejabat di semua tingkat;

5.

Kerjasama untuk membangun kapasitas para penegak hukum untuk mencegah,
menangani dan menyelidiki kejahatan transnasional;

6.

Memperkuat dan mengintensifkan kerjasama antar kepolisian termasuk melalui operasi
bersama dan terkoordinasi;

7.

Kerjasama antar lembaga dan badan terkait, termasuk penuntut umum, dalam
mencegah dan melawan kejahatan transnasional, khususnya kejahatan menyangkut:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Penyelundupan dan perdagangan orang;
Pencucian uang;
Pendanaan terorisme;
Korupsi;
Penangkapan ikan ilegal;
Kejahatan dunia maya;
Perdagangan gelap narkotika dan bahan-bahan psikotropika serta prekursornya;
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h.
i.

Perdagangan gelap senjata, amunisi, peledak dan material berbahaya lainnya dan
produksi ilegal daripadanya; dan
Jenis kejahatan lain yang dianggap perlu oleh Para Pihak.

Kerjasama Pemberantasan Terorisme
Dengan mengakui pentingnya kerjasama yang erat dan terus-menerus untuk melawan dan
memberantas terorisme internasional melalui komunikasi, kerjasama dan tindakan di semua
tingkat,
8.

Melakukan segalanya yang mungkin secara sendiri-sendiri maupun bersama-sama
untuk memberantas terorisme dan ekstrimisme internasional beserta akar-akar dan
penyebabnya serta untuk mengadili orang-orang yang mendukung atau terlibat dalam
tindakan kriminal yang kejam sesuai dengan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional
yang berlaku pada masing-masing negara;

9.

Semakin memperkuat kerjasama untuk melawan terorisme internasional, termasuk
melalui penanganan yang cepat, praktis dan efektif terhadap ancaman dan serangan
teroris; berbagi informasi dan intelijen; bantuan terhadap keamanan transportasi,
imigrasi dan pengawasan perbatasan; dan kebijakan penanggulangan terorisme dan
kerangka pengaturan yang efektif;

10.

Memperkuat kerjasama pembangunan kapasitas dalam penegakan hukum, pertahanan,
intelijen dan kemanan nasional dalam rangka menangani ancaman terorisme;

11.

Kerjasama, apabila diminta dan dimungkinkan, dalam memfasilitasi tanggapan yang
cepat dan efektif dalam kejadian serangan teroris. Dalam hal ini, Pihak yang meminta
memiliki tanggung jawab utama terhadap arah, pengorganisasian, dan koordinasi secara
keseluruhan dalam situasi tersebut.

Kerjasama Intelijen
12.

Kerjasama dan pertukaran informasi dan intelijen dalam masalah keamanan antara
lembaga dan badan terkait, dengan menaati peraturan nasional dan dalam batasan
tanggung jawab masing-masing.

Keamanan Maritim
13.

Memperkuat kerjasama bilateral untuk meningkatkan keselamatan maritim dan untuk
menerapkan langkah-langkah keamanan maritim, secara konsisten dengan hukum
internasional;

14.

Meningkatkan kegiatan kerjasama pertahanan dan kerjasama lainnya yang telah ada
dan pembangunan kapasitas dalam bidang keamanan udara dan maritim sesuai dengan
hukum internasional.

Keselamatan dan Keamanan Penerbangan
15.

Memperkuat kerjasama bilateral dalam lingkup pembangunan kapasitas untuk
meningkatkan keselamatan dan keamanan penerbangan sipil.
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Proliferasi Senjata Pemusnah Masal
Dengan mengakui komitmen bersama Para Pihak untuk tidak mengembangkan, memproduksi,
atau mendapatkan, menyimpan, memiliki atau menggunakan senjata nuklir atau senjata
pemusnah masal lainnya,
16.

Bekerjasama untuk meningkatkan langkah-langkah pencegahan proliferasi senjata
pemusnah masal dan sarana pengirimannya termasuk dengan memperkuat
pengendalian eksport nasional sesuai dengan hukum nasional yang berlaku masingmasing dan hukum internasional;

17.

Memperkuat kerjasama nuklir bilateral untuk tujuan damai, termasuk dengan memajukan
tujuan non-proliferasi senjata pemusnah masal dan memperkuat keselamatan dan
keamanan nuklir internasional melalui standar-standar yang telah diperkuat, sesuai
dengan hukum internasional.

Kerjasama dalam Tanggap Darurat
18.

Kerjasama, apabila diperlukan dan diminta, dalam memfasilitasi koordinasi yang efektif
dan cepat dalam langkah-langkah tanggap darurat dan pemulihan bencana alam atau
keadaan darurat yang serupa. Pihak yang meminta bantuan memiliki tanggung jawab
utama dalam menentukan arah kebijakan secara keseluruhan operasi tanggap darurat
dan pemulihan kondisi darurat.

19.

Kerjasama dalam pembangunan kapasitas untuk kesiapan dan tanggap bencana.

Kerjasama di Organisasi Internasional yang terkait dengan Masalah-Masalah Keamanan
20.

Konsultasi dan kerjasama dalam hal yang merupakan kepentingan bersama mengenai
isu-isu keamanan di Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, badan internasional dan regional
lainnya.

Kerjasama Pengertian Antara Masyarakat dan Antar Orang
21.

Berupaya meningkatkan hubungan dan interaksi antara lembaga-lembaga dan
masyarakat masing-masing dengan tujuan untuk meningkatkan saling pengertian
tentang berbagai tantangan dan tanggapan di bidang keamanan.
PASAL 4
KERAHASIAAN

1.

Para Pihak wajib melindungi informasi yang dilindungi dan rahasia yang diterima
berdasarkan kerangka Perjanjian ini sesuai dengan hukum, peraturan dan kebijakan
nasional masing-masing yang berlaku.

2.

Dengan tidak mengesampingkan Pasal 10, apabila Perjanjian ini berakhir, tiap Pihak
wajib melanjutkan kewajibannya sebagaimana tercantum pada ayat 1 untuk informasi
yang didapatkan berdasarkan Perjanjian ini.
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PASAL 5
KEKAYAAN INTELEKTUAL
Para Pihak sepakat bahwa setiap kekayaan intelektual yang timbul dalam pelaksanaan
Perjanjian ini akan diatur secara terpisah dalam pengaturan tersendiri.
PASAL 6
MEKANISME PELAKSANAAN
1.

Para Pihak mengambil langkah-langkah yang diperlukan untuk memastikan pelaksanaan
yang efektif dari Perjanjian ini, termasuk melalui pembuatan pengaturan terpisah pada
bidang-bidang kerjasama tertentu.

2.

Untuk tujuan Pasal ini, Para Pihak bertemu secara berkala di bawah mekanisme yang
telah ada yaitu Forum Tingkat Menteri Indonesia Australia / Indonesia Australia
Ministerial Forum (IAMF) untuk mengkaji dan memberi arahan pada kegiatan-kegiatan
dalam Perjanjian ini.
PASAL 7
PENGATURAN KEUANGAN

Biaya yang timbul dalam pelaksanaan Perjanjian ini akan ditanggung oleh Pihak yang
mengeluarkannya, kecuali diputuskan lain secara bersama.
PASAL 8
PENYELESAIAN PERSELISIHAN
Perselisihan yang timbul karena penafsiran pelaksanaan Perjanjian ini diselesaikan secara
bersahabat melalui konsultasi bersama atau perundingan antara Para Pihak.
PASAL 9
PERUBAHAN
Perjanjian ini dapat diubah secara tertulis melalui kesepakatan bersama kedua Pihak. Setiap
perubahan Perjanjian ini mulai berlaku pada saat tanggal pemberitahuan oleh Pihak yang
terakhir menyelesaikan prosedur pensahan untuk perubahan tersebut.
PASAL 10
PEMBERLAKUAN, JANGKA WAKTU DAN PENGAKHIRAN
1.

Perjanjian ini berlaku pada tanggal penerimaan pemberitahuan yang terakhir dimana
Para Pihak saling memberitahukan bahwa persyaratan internal mereka untuk
pemberlakuan Perjanjian ini telah dipenuhi.
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2.

Perjanjian ini akan tetap berlaku hingga salah satu Pihak memberikan pemberitahuan
akan keinginannya untuk mengakhiri Perjanjian ini, dimana Perjanjian ini akan berakhir
enam bulan sejak penerimaan pemberitahuan pengakhiran.

3.

Pengakhiran Perjanjian ini tidak mempengaruhi keberlakuan atau jangka waktu setiap
pengaturan lain yang dibuat berdasarkan Perjanjian ini hingga penyelesaian pengaturan
tersebut, kecuali diputuskan lain secara bersama.

SEBAGAI BUKTI, yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini, telah menandatangani Perjanjian ini.
DIBUAT di Mataram, Lombok pada tanggal tiga belas bulan Nopember tahun dua ribu enam
dalam rangkap dua, masing-masing dalam Bahasa Inggris dan Bahasa Indonesia, seluruh
naskah mempunyai kekuatan hukum yang sama. Dalam hal terdapat perbedaan penafsiran,
maka naskah dalam Bahasa Inggris yang berlaku.
Untuk Pemerintah Australia

Untuk Pemerintah Republik Indonesia

..................................................
Menteri Luar Negeri Australia
Alexander Downer

...................................................................
Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia
Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda
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Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed
Boundaries
(Perth, 14 March 1997)

(Perth, 14 March 1997)
Note that this is a signed text but has not yet entered into force.

42

THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA (hereafter referred to as "the Parties")
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea done at
Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (hereafter referred to as "the 1982 Convention") to which
both Australia and the Republic of Indonesia are a party, and, in particular, Articles 74 and 83
which provide that the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
between States with opposite coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law in order to achieve an equitable solution;
AFFIRMING the Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia
and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries,
done at Canberra on 18 May 1971 and the Agreement between the Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing
Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas, Supplementary to the
Agreement of 18 May 1971, done at Jakarta on 9 October 1972 respectively, establishing
permanent seabed boundaries in the area of the Timor and Arafura Seas (hereafter collectively
referred to as "the Agreements");
AFFIRMING the Treaty between the two Parties on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area
between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia done over the Zone of
Cooperation on 11 December 1989 (hereafter referred to as "the Zone of Cooperation Treaty");
BELIEVING that the establishment of comprehensive boundaries in the maritime areas
between the two countries will encourage and promote the sustainable development of the
marine resources of those areas and enhance the protection and preservation of the marine
environment adjacent to the two countries;
BEARING IN MIND the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of
Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the Operations of
Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in Areas of the Australian Exclusive Fishing Zone and
Continental Shelf, signed at Jakarta on 7 November 1974 and the Agreed Minutes of Meeting
between Officials of Indonesia and Australia on Fisheries, signed at Jakarta on 29 April 1989;
FULLY COMMITTED to maintaining, renewing and further strengthening the mutual respect,
friendship and cooperation between the Parties through existing treaties, agreements and
arrangements, as well as their policies of promoting constructive neighbourly cooperation;
MINDFUL of the interests which the Parties share as immediate neighbours, and in a spirit
of cooperation, friendship and goodwill; and
CONVINCED that this Treaty will contribute to the strengthening of the relations between
their two countries;
THEREFORE AGREE as follows:
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Article 1
Western extension of the seabed boundary
1. In the area to the west of Point A25 specified in the Agreements, the boundary between
the area of seabed that is adjacent to and appertains to Australia and the area of seabed that is
adjacent to and appertains to the Republic of Indonesia is the line:
(a) commencing at the Point A25;
(b) running thence south to the point of Latitude 11deg. 48' 06.1" South, Longitude 123deg.
14' 04.5" East ("Point A26");
(c) thence north-westerly along the arc of a circle drawn concave to Ashmore Islands with a
radius of twenty four nautical miles to the point of Latitude 11º 47' 59.3" South, Longitude 123º
13' 38.1" East ("Point A27");
(d) thence generally north-westerly, westerly, south-westerly, and southerly along a series of
intersecting circular arcs drawn concave to Ashmore Islands with a radius of twenty four
nautical miles and having the following vertices:
Point
Number

Latitude South Longitude East

A28

11deg. 47' 40.3" 123deg. 12' 12.7"

A29

11º 47' 38.9"

123º 12' 05.2"

A30

11º 47' 25.6"

123º 11' 02.9"

A31

11º 46' 25.7"

123º 05' 27.9"

A32

11º 46' 31.8"

123º 00' 49.7"

A33

11º 46' 44.2"

122º 59' 22.9"

A34

11º 47' 07.4"

122º 57' 32.5"

A35

11º 47' 31.0"

122º 56' 08.2"

A36

11º 48' 32.1"

122º 53' 24.7"

A37

11º 50' 00.6"

122º 50' 34.5"

A38

11º 50' 48.1"

122º 49' 19.9"

A39

11º 51' 12.9"

122º 48' 05.1"

A40

11º 51' 22.4"

122º 47' 38.9"

A41

11º 51' 53.3"

122º 46' 21.2"

A42

11º 52' 53.4"

122º 44' 16.8"

A43

11º 54' 56.3"

122º 41' 04.3"

A44

11º 55' 46.7"

122º 40' 00.5"

A45

12º 00' 41.4"

122º 35' 27.9"

A46

12º 02' 05.0"

122º 34' 33.8"

A47

12º 03' 12.2"

122º 33' 55.8"
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A48

12º 06' 44.6"

122º 32' 24.1"

(e) thence southerly along the arc of a circle drawn concave to Ashmore Islands with a
radius of twenty four nautical miles to the point of Latitude
12deg. 14' 25.8" South, Longitude 122deg. 31' 06.6" East ("Point A49");
(f) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
13deg. 56' 31.7" South, Longitude 120deg. 00' 46.9" East ("Point A50");
(g) thence north along the meridian to the point of Latitude 12deg. 46' 27.9" South,
Longitude 120deg. 00' 46.9" East ("Point A51");
(h) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 45' 47" South,
Longitude 119deg. 59' 31" East ("Point A52");
(i) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 45' 38" South,
Longitude 119deg. 59' 15" East ("Point A53");
(j) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 43' 46" South,
Longitude 119deg. 56' 13" East ("Point A54");
(k) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 41' 57" South,
Longitude 119deg. 53' 18" East ("Point A55");
(l) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 41' 46" South,
Longitude 119deg. 52' 57" East ("Point A56");
(m) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 41' 36" South,
Longitude 119deg. 52' 38" East ("Point A57");
(n) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 40' 33" South,
Longitude 119deg. 50' 28" East ("Point A58");
(o) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 35' 43" South,
Longitude 119deg. 40' 33" East ("Point A59");
(p) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 32' 31" South,
Longitude 119deg. 33' 16" East ("Point A60");
(q) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 29' 19" South,
Longitude 119deg. 27' 17" East ("Point A61");
(r) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 25' 43" South,
Longitude 119deg. 21' 35" East ("Point A62");
(s) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 24' 59" South,
Longitude 119deg. 20' 34" East ("Point A63");
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(t) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 23' 58" South,
Longitude 119deg. 16' 35" East ("Point A64");
(u) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 23' 42" South,
Longitude 119deg. 15' 23" East ("Point A65");
(v) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 21' 51" South,
Longitude 119deg. 09' 03" East ("Point A66");
(w) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 20' 21" South,
Longitude 119deg. 05' 00" East ("Point A67");
(x) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 19' 55" South,
Longitude 119deg. 02' 40" East ("Point A68");
(y) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 18' 50" South,
Longitude 118deg. 58' 31" East ("Point A69");
(z) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 17' 54" South,
Longitude 118deg. 55' 12" East ("Point A70");
(aa) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 15' 57" South,
Longitude 118deg. 49' 30" East ("Point A71");
(ab) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 13' 12" South,
Longitude 118deg. 43' 09" East ("Point A72");
(ac) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 11' 01" South,
Longitude 118deg. 39' 00" East ("Point A73");
(ad) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 10' 26" South,
Longitude 118deg. 37' 28" East ("Point A74");
(ae) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 10' 06" South,
Longitude 118deg. 35' 16" East ("Point A75");
(af) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 07' 46" South,
Longitude 118deg. 25' 07" East ("Point A76");
(ag) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 06' 21" South,
Longitude 118deg. 20' 45" East ("Point A77");
(ah) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 04' 19" South,
Longitude 118deg. 07' 44" East ("Point A78");
(ai) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
12deg. 04' 08.8" South, Longitude 118deg. 06' 14.4" East ("Point A79");
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(aj) thence southerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 04' 24.9" South,
Longitude 118deg. 06' 17.2" East ("Point A80");
(ak) thence southerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 49' 54.8" South,
Longitude 118deg. 14' 22.6" East ("Point A81");
(al) thence southerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 13deg. 05' 27.0" South,
Longitude 118deg. 10' 08.9" East ("Point A82"), where it terminates.
2. An illustrative map depicting the line described in paragraph 1 of this Article forms Annex
1 to this Treaty.
3. A reference to the "seabed" in this Treaty includes the subsoil beneath the seabed.
Article 2
Exclusive economic zone
1. In the area between continental Australia and the Indonesian archipelago, the boundary
between the area of exclusive economic zone that is adjacent to and appertains to Australia
and the area of exclusive economic zone that is adjacent to and appertains to the Republic of
Indonesia is the line:
(a) commencing at the point of Latitude 10deg. 50' 00" South, Longitude
139deg. 12' 00" East ("Point Z1");
(b) running thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 24' 00"
South, Longitude 138deg. 38' 00" East ("Point Z2");
(c) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 22' 00" South,
Longitude 138deg. 35' 00" East ("Point Z3");
(d) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 09' 00" South,
Longitude 138deg. 13' 00" East ("Point Z4");
(e) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 57' 00" South,
Longitude 137deg. 45' 00" East ("Point Z5");
(f) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 08' 00" South,
Longitude 135deg. 29' 00" East ("Point Z6");
(g) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 17' 00" South,
Longitude 135deg. 13' 00" East ("Point Z7");
(h) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 22' 00" South,
Longitude 135deg. 03' 00" East ("Point Z8");
(i) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 25' 00" South,
Longitude 134deg. 50' 00" East ("Point Z9");
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(j) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 8deg. 53' 00" South,
Longitude 133deg. 23' 00" East ("Point Z10");
(k) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 06' 00" South,
Longitude 132deg. 46' 00" East ("Point Z11");
(l) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 14' 00" South,
Longitude 132deg. 33' 00" East ("Point Z12");
(m) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 16' 00" South,
Longitude 132deg. 30' 00" East ("Point Z13");
(n) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 20' 00" South,
Longitude 132deg. 20' 00" East ("Point Z14");
(o) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 23' 00" South,
Longitude 132deg. 12' 00" East ("Point Z15");
(p) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 31' 00" South,
Longitude 131deg. 57' 00" East ("Point Z16");
(q) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 33' 00" South,
Longitude 131deg. 52' 00" East ("Point Z17");
(r) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 36' 00" South,
Longitude 131deg. 43' 00" East ("Point Z18");
(s) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 40' 00" South,
Longitude 131deg. 31' 00" East ("Point Z19");
(t) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 42' 00" South,
Longitude 131deg. 28' 00" East ("Point Z20");
(u) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 47' 00" South,
Longitude 130deg. 55' 00" East ("Point Z21");
(v) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 45' 00" South,
Longitude 130deg. 43' 00" East ("Point Z22");
(w) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 39' 00" South,
Longitude 130deg. 06' 00" East ("Point Z23");
(x) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 45' 00" South,
Longitude 129deg. 30' 00" East ("Point Z24");
(y) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 59' 00" South,
Longitude 129deg. 01' 00" East ("Point Z25");
(z) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 26' 00" South,
Longitude 128deg. 18' 00" East ("Point Z26");
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(aa) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 28' 00" South,
Longitude 128deg. 14' 00" East ("Point Z27");
(ab) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
10deg. 29' 11.8" South, Longitude 128deg. 12' 28.4" East ("Point Z28");
(ac) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
10deg. 43' 37.8" South, Longitude 127deg. 59' 20.4" East ("Point Z29");
(ad) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
10deg. 53' 36.8" South, Longitude 127deg. 48' 49.4" East ("Point Z30");
(ae) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
10deg. 55' 20.8" South, Longitude 127deg. 47' 08.4" East ("Point Z31");
(af) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
11deg. 14' 18.9" South, Longitude 127deg. 31' 37.4" East ("Point Z32");
(ag) thence westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 17' 24.9" South,
Longitude 126deg. 58' 17.4" East ("Point Z33");
(ah) thence westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 17' 30.9" South,
Longitude 126deg. 57' 11.4" East ("Point Z34");
(ai) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
11deg. 19' 40.9" South, Longitude 126deg. 47' 08.4" East ("Point Z35");
(aj) thence westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 20' 02.9" South,
Longitude 126deg. 31' 58.4" East ("Point Z36");
(ak) thence westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 20' 00" South,
Longitude 126deg. 31' 00" East ("Point Z37");
(al) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 21' 00" South,
Longitude 126deg. 28' 00" East ("Point Z38");
(am) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 26' 00" South,
Longitude 126deg. 12' 00" East ("Point Z39");
(an) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 31' 00" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 00" East ("Point Z40");
(ao) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 37' 00" South,
Longitude 125deg. 45' 00" East ("Point Z41");
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(ap) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 45' 00" South,
Longitude 125deg. 25' 00" East ("Point Z42");
(aq) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 47' 00" South,
Longitude 125deg. 20' 00" East ("Point Z43");
(ar) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
12deg. 15' 34.4" South, Longitude 123deg. 33' 55.1" East ("Point Z44");
(as) thence northerly along the arc of a circle drawn concave to Ashmore Islands with a
radius of twenty four nautical miles to the point of Latitude
12º 14' 46.7" South, Longitude 123deg. 33' 55.8" East ("Point Z45");
(at) thence generally northerly, north-westerly, westerly, south-westerly, and southerly along
a series of intersecting circular arcs drawn concave to Ashmore Islands with a radius of twenty
four nautical miles and having the following vertices:
Point
Number

Latitude South Longitude East

Z46

12º 12' 43.7"

123º 33' 50.3"

Z47

12º 09' 21.0"

123º 33' 19.1"

Z48

12º 07' 56.3"

123º 32' 57.8"

Z49

12º 07' 04.6"

123º 32' 42.5"

Z50

12º 04' 15.3"

123º 31' 45.6"

Z51

12º 01' 34.7"

123º 30' 32.4"

Z52

12º 00' 01.1"

123º 29' 41.2"

Z53

11º 59' 08.6"

123º 29' 08.7"

Z54

11º 58' 49.6"

123º 28' 56.2"

Z55

11º 58' 46.9"

123º 28' 54.5"

Z56

11º 56' 52.6"

123º 27' 32.8"

Z57

11º 55' 05.8"

123º 25' 59.8"

Z58

11º 51' 32.1"

123º 21' 44.0"

Z59

11º 50' 02.2"

123º 19' 07.9"

Z60

11º 49' 45.0"

123º 18' 32.9"

Z61

11º 48' 58.5"

123º 16' 44.4"

Z62

11º 48' 32.5"

123º 15' 32.5"

Z63

11º 47' 59.3"

123º 13' 38.1"

Z64

11º 47' 40.3"

123º 12' 12.7"

Z65

11º 47' 38.9"

123º 12' 05.2"

Z66

11º 47' 25.6"

123º 11' 02.9"
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Point
Number

Latitude South Longitude East

Z67

11º 46' 25.7"

123º 05' 27.9"

Z68

11º 46' 31.8"

123º 00' 49.7"

Z69

11º 46' 44.2"

122º 59' 22.9"

Z70

11º 47' 07.4"

122º 57' 32.5"

Z71

11º 47' 31.0"

122º 56' 08.2"

Z72

11º 48' 32.1"

122º 53' 24.7"

Z73

11º 50' 00.6"

122º 50' 34.5"

Z74

11º 50' 48.1"

122º 49' 19.9"

Z75

11º 51' 12.9"

122º 48' 05.1"

Z76

11º 51' 22.4"

122º 47' 38.9"

Z77

11º 51' 53.3"

122º 46' 21.2"

Z78

11º 52' 53.4"

122º 44' 16.8"

Z79

11º 54' 56.3"

122º 41' 04.3"

Z80

11º 55' 46.7"

122º 40' 00.5"

Z81

12º 00' 41.4"

122º 35' 27.9"

Z82

12º 02' 05.0"

122º 34' 33.8"

Z83

12º 03' 12.2"

122º 33' 55.8"

Z84

12º 06' 44.6"

122º 32' 24.1"

(au) thence southerly along the arc of a circle drawn concave to Ashmore Islands with a
radius of twenty four nautical miles to the point of Latitude
12deg. 14' 25.8" South, Longitude 122deg. 31' 06.6" East ("Point Z85");
(av) thence south along the meridian to the point of Latitude 12deg. 50' 28.2" South,
Longitude 122deg. 31' 06.6" East ("Point Z86");
(aw) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 13deg. 15' 00" South,
Longitude 121deg. 49' 00" East ("Point Z87");
(ax) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
13deg. 56' 31.7" South, Longitude 120deg. 00' 46.9" East ("Point Z88");
(ay) thence north-westerly along the arc of a circle with a radius of 200 nautical miles drawn
through the following points to the point of Latitude
13deg. 40' 34.1" South, Longitude 119deg. 28' 46.1" East ("Point Z92"):
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Point
Number

Latitude South Longitude East

Z89

13deg. 53' 03.7" 119deg. 52' 30.7"

Z90

13deg. 49' 14.5" 119deg. 44' 24.5"

Z91

13deg. 45' 04.5" 119deg. 36' 29.3"

(az) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
13deg. 36' 30.2" South, Longitude 119deg. 22' 08.7" East ("Point Z93");
(ba) thence north-westerly along the arc of a circle with a radius of 200 nautical miles drawn
through the following points to the point of Latitude
13deg. 14' 33.6" South, Longitude 118deg. 24' 44.1" East ("Point Z100"), where it
terminates.
Point
Number

Latitude South Longitude East

Z94

13deg. 34' 26.1" 119deg. 13' 33.5"

Z95

13deg. 32' 00.1" 119deg. 05' 04.4"

Z96

13deg. 29' 12.5" 118deg. 56' 42.4"

Z97

13deg. 26' 03.7" 118deg. 48' 28.4"

Z98

13deg. 22' 34.0" 118deg. 40' 23.4"

Z99

13deg. 18' 43.8" 118deg. 32' 28.3"

2. An illustrative map depicting the line described in paragraph 1 of this Article forms Annex
2 to this Treaty.
3. The geographical coordinates referred to in sub-paragraphs 1(a) to 1(j) of this Article are
expressed in terms of the Australian Geodetic Datum 1966 (AGD66) system.
Article 3
Christmas Island/Java
1. In the area between Christmas Island (Australia) and Java Island (Republic of Indonesia),
the boundary between the area of seabed and exclusive economic zone that is adjacent to and
appertains to Australia and the area of seabed and exclusive economic zone that is adjacent to
and appertains to the Republic of Indonesia is the line:
(a) commencing at the point of Latitude 11deg. 10' 24.6" South, Longitude
109deg. 01' 25.8" East ("Point C1");
(b) running thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
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9deg. 46' 49.8" South, Longitude 105deg. 50' 55.4" East ("Point C2");
(c) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude
8deg. 52' 14.1" South, Longitude 102deg. 34' 12.7" East ("Point C3").
2. An illustrative map depicting the line described in paragraph 1 of this Article forms Annex
3 to this Treaty.
Article 4
Geodetic Reference System
1. Subject to paragraph 3 of Article 2, the geographical co-ordinates referred to in Articles 1,
2 and 3 are expressed in terms of the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84).
2. The Parties may treat the WGS84 co-ordinates referred to in paragraph 1 as being
equivalent to the co-ordinates in the International Earth Rotation Service Terrestrial Reference
Frame (ITRF).
3. All references to nautical miles shall be taken to mean the International Nautical Mile,
equivalent to 1852 metres.
Article 5
Seabed rights
1. Subject to Articles 7 and 8, in areas of seabed adjacent to and appertaining to a Party,
that Party may exercise the sovereign rights and jurisdiction in relation to the continental shelf
accorded to coastal States under the 1982 Convention.
2. The "areas of seabed adjacent to and appertaining to a Party" referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article and in Article 7 are those areas of seabed that are adjacent to and appertain to
that Party under:
(a) the Agreements; and
(b) Articles 1 and 3 of this Treaty.
Article 6
Exclusive economic zone rights
1. Subject to Articles 7 and 8, in areas of exclusive economic zone adjacent to and
appertaining to a Party, that Party may exercise the sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
exclusive economic zone accorded to coastal States under the 1982 Convention.
2. The "areas of exclusive economic zone adjacent to and appertaining to a Party" referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article and in Article 7 are those areas of exclusive economic zone that
are adjacent to and appertain to that Party under Articles 2 and 3 of this Treaty.
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Article 7
Areas of overlapping jurisdiction
In those areas where the areas of exclusive economic zone adjacent to and appertaining to
a Party (the First Party) overlap the areas of seabed adjacent to and appertaining to a Party
being the other Party (the Second Party):
(a) the First Party may exercise exclusive economic zone sovereign rights and jurisdiction
provided for in the 1982 Convention in relation to the water column;
(b) the Second Party may exercise continental shelf sovereign rights and jurisdiction
provided for in the 1982 Convention in relation to the seabed;
(c) the construction of an artificial island shall be subject to the agreement of both Parties.
An "artificial island" for the purposes of this Article is an area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide by reason of human intervention;
(d) the Second Party shall give the First Party three months notice of the proposed grant of
exploration or exploitation rights;
(e) the construction of installations and structures shall be the subject of due notice and a
permanent means of giving warning of their presence must be maintained;
(f) (i) any installation or structure which is abandoned or disused shall be removed by the
Party which authorised its construction in order to ensure the safety of navigation, taking into
account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard by the
competent international organisation;
(ii) such removal shall also have due regard to fishing and to the protection of the marine
environment. Appropriate publicity shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any
installations or structures not entirely removed;
(g) the construction of a fish aggregating device shall be the subject of due notice;
(h) the Party constructing an artificial island, installation, structure or fish aggregating device
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over it;
(i) marine scientific research shall be carried out or authorised by a Party in accordance with
the 1982 Convention and such research shall be notified to the other Party;
(j) the Parties shall take effective measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment;
(k) each Party shall be liable in accordance with international law for pollution of the marine
environment caused by activities under its jurisdiction;
(l) any island within the meaning of Article 121.1 of the 1982 Convention which emerges
after the entry into force of this Treaty shall be the subject of consultations between the Parties
with a view to determining its status;
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(m) neither Party shall exercise its rights and jurisdiction in a manner which unduly inhibits
the exercise of the rights and jurisdiction of the other Party; and
(n) the Parties shall cooperate with each other in relation to the exercise of their respective
rights and jurisdiction.
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Article 8
Zone of Cooperation
1. Nothing contained in this Treaty affects the rights and obligations of either Party as a
Contracting State to the Zone of Cooperation Treaty.
2. Nothing contained in this Treaty and no acts or activities taking place pursuant to this
Treaty shall be interpreted as prejudicing the position of either Party on a permanent seabed
delimitation in the Zone of Cooperation established under the Zone of Cooperation Treaty nor
shall anything contained in this Treaty be considered as affecting the respective seabed rights
claimed by each Party in the Zone of Cooperation.
Article 9
Exploitation of certain seabed deposits
If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral
deposit beneath the seabed, extends across the lines described in Articles 1 and 3 of this
Treaty, and the part of such accumulation or deposit that is situated on one side of the line is
recoverable in fluid form wholly or in part from the other side of the line, the two Parties will
seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or deposit shall be most
effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.
Article 10
Dispute settlement
Any dispute between the two Parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation of
this Treaty shall be settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation.
Article 11
Entry into force
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange
of the instruments of ratification.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective
Governments, have signed this Treaty.
DONE at Perth on the fourteenth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninetyseven in the English and Indonesian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
[Signed:] [Signed:]
ALEXANDER DOWNER ALI ALATAS
Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs
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ANNEX 1
SEABED BOUNDARY

Thin black line = Previously agreed seabed
boundary
Thick blue line = Western extension of the
seabed boundary (Article 1)

Mercator Projection
Central Meridian 121oE
Latitude of true scale 12oS
Produced by Australian Surveying and Land
Information Group MAP 96/523.5

ANNEX 2
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE BOUNDARY
Mercator Projection
Central Meridian 128oE
Latitude of true scale Oo

Thick blue line = Agreed exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
boundary in the are between continental Australia and the
Indonesian archipelago (Article 2)
Thin red line = Indonesian exclusive economic zone
boundary
Thin green line = Australian exclusive economic zone
boundary

Produced by Australian Surveying
and Land Information Group MAP
96/523.6
ANNEX 3
SEABED AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE BOUNDARY
Mercator Projection
Central Meridian 106oE
Latitude of true scale 10oS
Produced by Australian Surveying
and Land Information Group MAP
96/523.7

Thick blue line = Agreed seabed and exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) boundary in the area between Christmas
Island and Java Island
Thin red line = Indonesian exclusive economic zone
boundary
Thin green line = Australian exclusive economic zone
boundary
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TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON
THE ZONE OF COOPERATION IN AN AREA BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN
PROVINCE OF EAST TIMOR AND NORTHERN AUSTRALIA
[1]
AUSTRALIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea done at
Montego Bay on 10 December 1982[2] and, in particular, Article 83 which requires States with
opposite coasts, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, to make every effort to enter into
provisional arrangements of a practical nature which do not jeopardize or hamper the reaching
of final agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf;
DESIRING to enable the exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources of the
continental shelf of the area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and northern
Australia yet to be the subject of permanent continental shelf delimitation between the
Contracting States;
CONSCIOUS of the need to encourage and promote development of the petroleum
resources of the area;
DESIRING that exploration for and exploitation of these resources proceed without delay;
AFFIRMING existing agreements on the delimitation of the continental shelf between their
two countries;
DETERMINED to cooperate further for the mutual benefit of their peoples in the
development of the resources of the area of the continental shelf yet to be the subject of
permanent continental shelf delimitation between their two countries;
FULLY COMMITTED to maintaining, renewing and further strengthening the mutual respect,
friendship and cooperation between their two countries through existing agreements and
arrangements, as well as their policies of promoting constructive neighbourly cooperation;
MINDFUL of the interests which their countries share as immediate neighbours, and in a
spirit of cooperation, friendship and goodwill;
CONVINCED that this Treaty will contribute to the strengthening of the relations between
their two countries; and
BELIEVING that the establishment of joint arrangements to permit the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum resources in the area will further augment the range of contact and
cooperation between the Governments of the two countries and benefit the development of
contacts between their peoples;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
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PART I
ZONE OF COOPERATION
Article 1
Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Treaty,
(a) "contract" or "production sharing contract" means a contract between the Joint Authority
and corporations, concluded on the basis of the Model Production Sharing Contract, entered
into under Article 8 of this Treaty and in accordance with Part III of the Petroleum Mining Code;
(b) "contract area" means the area constituted by the blocks specified in the contract that
have not been relinquished or surrendered;
(c) "contractor" means a corporation or corporations which enter into a contract with the
Joint Authority and which is registered as a contractor under Article 38 of the Petroleum Mining
Code;
(d) "Contractors' Income Tax" means tax imposed by the Indonesian Laws No. 7 of 1983 on
Income Tax and No. 6 of 1983 on General Tax Provisions and Procedures as amended from
time to time;
(e) "criminal law" means any law in force in the Contracting States, whether substantive or
procedural, that makes provision for or in relation to offences or for or in relation to the
investigation or prosecution of offences or the punishment of offenders, including the carrying
out of a penalty imposed by a court. For this purpose "investigation" includes entry to a
structure in Area A, the exercise of powers of search and questioning and the apprehension of
a suspected offender;
(f) "good oilfield practice" means all those things that are generally accepted as good and
safe in the carrying on of petroleum operations;
(g) "Model Production Sharing Contract" means the model contract as appears in Annex C,
on the basis of which production sharing contracts for Area A should be concluded, as may be
modified from time to time by the Ministerial Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of
Article 6 of this Treaty;
(h) "petroleum" means
(a) any naturally occurring hydrocarbon, whether in a gaseous, liquid or solid state;
(b) any naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons, whether in a gaseous, liquid or solid
state; or
(c) any petroleum as defined by sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that has been
returned to a reservoir in the contract area;
(i) "Petroleum Mining Code" means the "Petroleum Mining Code for Area A of the Zone of
Cooperation" to govern operational activities relating to exploration for and exploitation of the
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petroleum resources in Area A of the Zone of Cooperation contained in Annex B, as amended
from time to time by the Ministerial Council in accordance with paragraph 1(b) of Article 6 of
this Treaty;
(j) "petroleum operations" means activities undertaken to produce petroleum and includes
exploration, development, field processing, production and pipeline operations, and marketing
authorized or contemplated under a production sharing contract;
(k) "Resource Rent Tax" means tax imposed by the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Act 1987
of Australia as amended from time to time;
(l) "structure" means an installation or structure used to carry out petroleum operations;
(m) "Taxation Code" means the "Taxation Code for the Avoidance of Double Taxation in
Respect of Activities Connected with Area A of the Zone of Cooperation", contained in Annex
D;
(n) "taxation law" means the federal law of Australia or the law of the Republic of Indonesia,
from time to time in force, in respect of taxes to which this Treaty applies but shall not include a
tax agreement between the Contracting States and a tax agreement of either Contracting State
with a third country;
(o) "Treaty" means this Treaty including Annexes A, B, C and D;
(p) "Zone of Cooperation" refers to the area so designated and described in Annex A and
illustrated in the maps forming part of that Annex, which consists of the whole of the area
embraced by Areas A, B and C designated in that Annex.
2. For the purposes of Article 10 of this Treaty and the Taxation Code, resident of a
Contracting State means:
(a) in the case of Australia, a person who is liable to tax in Australia by reason of being a
resident of Australia under the tax law of Australia; and
(b) in the case of the Republic of Indonesia, a person who is liable to tax in the Republic of
Indonesia by reason of being a resident of the Republic of Indonesia under the tax law of the
Republic of Indonesia,
but does not include any person who is liable to tax in that Contracting State in respect only
of income from sources in that Contracting State.
3. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, an individual is a resident
of both Contracting States, then the status of the person shall be determined as follows:
(a) the person shall be deemed to be a resident solely of the Contracting State in which a
permanent home is available to the person;
(b) if a permanent home is available to the person in both Contracting States, or in neither of
them, the person shall be deemed to be a resident solely of the Contracting State in which the
person has an habitual abode;
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(c) if the person has an habitual abode in both Contracting States, or if the person does not
have an habitual abode in either of them, the person shall be deemed to be a resident solely of
the Contracting State with which the person's personal and economic relations are the closer.
4. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article a person other than an
individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident
solely of the Contracting State in which its place of effective management is situated.
Article 2
The Zone
1. A Zone of Cooperation is hereby designated in an area between the Indonesian Province
of East Timor and northern Australia, which comprises Areas A, B and C.
2. Within the Zone of Cooperation activities in relation to the exploration for and exploitation
of petroleum resources shall be conducted on the following basis:
(a) In Area A, there shall be joint control by the Contracting States of the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum resources, aimed at achieving optimum commercial utilization thereof
and equal sharing between the two Contracting States of the benefits of the exploitation of
petroleum resources, as provided for in this Treaty;
(b) In Area B, Australia shall make certain notifications and share with the Republic of
Indonesia Resource Rent Tax collections arising from petroleum production on the basis of
Article 4 of this Treaty; and
(c) In Area C, the Republic of Indonesia shall make certain notifications and share with
Australia Contractors' Income Tax collections arising from petroleum production on the basis of
Article 4 of this Treaty.
3. Nothing contained in this Treaty and no acts or activities taking place while this Treaty is
in force shall be interpreted as prejudicing the position of either Contracting State on a
permanent continental shelf delimitation in the Zone of Cooperation nor shall anything
contained in it be considered as affecting the respective sovereign rights claimed by each
Contracting State in the Zone of Cooperation.
4. Notwithstanding the conclusion of this Treaty, the Contracting States shall continue their
efforts to reach agreement on a permanent continental shelf delimitation in the Zone of
Cooperation.
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PART II
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN THE ZONE OF COOPERATION
Article 3
Area A
1. In relation to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area A, the
rights and responsibilities of the two Contracting States shall be exercised by the Ministerial
Council and the Joint Authority in accordance with this Treaty. Petroleum operations in Area A
shall be carried out through production sharing contracts.
2. The Joint Authority shall enter into each production sharing contract with limited liability
corporations specifically established for the sole purpose of the contract. This provision shall
also apply to the successors or assignees of such corporations.
Article 4
Area B and Area C
1. In relation to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area B
Australia shall:
(a) notify the Republic of Indonesia of the grant, renewal, surrender, expiry and cancellation
of titles made by Australia being exploration permits, retention leases and production licences;
and
(b) pay to the Republic of Indonesia ten (10) per cent of gross Resource Rent Tax collected
by Australia from corporations producing petroleum from Area B equivalent to sixteen (16) per
cent of net Resource Rent Tax collected, calculated on the basis that general company tax is
payable at the maximum rate.
2. In relation to exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area C the
Republic of Indonesia shall:
(a) notify Australia of the grant, renewal, surrender, expiry and cancellation of petroleum
exploration and production agreements made by the Republic of Indonesia; and
(b) pay to Australia ten (10) per cent of Contractors' Income Tax collected by the Republic of
Indonesia from corporations producing petroleum from Area C.
3. In the event that Australia changes the basis upon which the Resource Rent Tax or
general company tax is calculated or that the Republic of Indonesia changes the basis upon
which Contractors' Income Tax is calculated, the Contracting States shall review the
percentages set out in paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of this Article and agree on new percentages,
ensuring that the relative shares paid by each Contracting State to the other in respect of
revenue collected from corporations producing petroleum in Area B and Area C remain the
same.
4. In the event of any change occurring in the relevant taxation regimes of either Contracting
State, the Contracting States shall review the formulation set out in paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of
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this Article and agree on a new formulation, ensuring that the relative shares paid by each
Contracting State to the other in respect of revenue collected from corporations producing
petroleum in Area B and Area C remain the same.
5. With regard to Area B and Area C, the Contracting States shall enter into necessary
administrative arrangements to give effect to the sharing arrangements in the two Areas as
provided in paragraph 1(b) and paragraph 2(b) of this Article at the time that production from
either Area commences. In particular, the arrangements shall provide for the manner in which
such a share shall be paid from one Contracting State to the other Contracting State. A
Contracting State when making a payment to the other Contracting State shall provide
information on the basis on which the relevant payment was calculated.
6. The Contracting States shall take necessary measures to ensure the timely and optimum
utilization of the petroleum resources in Area B and Area C.
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PART III
THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL
Article 5
The Ministerial Council
1. A Ministerial Council for the Zone of Cooperation is hereby established.
2. The Ministerial Council shall consist of those Ministers who may from time to time be
designated for that purpose by the Contracting States provided that, at any one time, there
shall be an equal number of Ministers designated by each Contracting State.
3. The Ministerial Council shall meet annually or as often as may be required.
4. The Ministerial Council shall normally meet alternately in Australia or in the Republic of
Indonesia. Its meetings shall be chaired alternately by a Minister nominated by each
Contracting State.
5. Decisions of the Ministerial Council shall be arrived at by consensus. The Ministerial
Council may establish procedures for taking decisions out of session.
Article 6
Functions of the Ministerial Council
1. The Ministerial Council shall have overall responsibility for all matters relating to the
exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources in Area A of the Zone of
Cooperation and such other functions relating to the exploration for and exploitation of
petroleum resources as the Contracting States may entrust to it. The functions of the Ministerial
Council shall include:
(a) giving directions to the Joint Authority on the discharge of its functions;
(b) of its own volition or on recommendation by the Joint Authority, in a manner not
inconsistent with the objectives of this Treaty, amending the Petroleum Mining Code to facilitate
petroleum operations in Area A;
(c) of its own volition or on recommendation by the Joint Authority, in a manner not
inconsistent with the objectives of this Treaty, modifying the Model Production Sharing Contract
to facilitate petroleum operations in Area A;
(d) approving production sharing contracts which the Joint Authority may propose to enter
into with corporations;
(e) approving the termination of production sharing contracts entered into between the Joint
Authority and corporations;
(f) approving the variation of the following provisions of a production sharing contract, with
the agreement of the contractor:
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(i) the Joint Authority's or the contractor's production share;
(ii) the operating cost recovery provisions;
(iii) the term of the contract; and
(iv) the contract area relinquishment provisions;
(g) approving the variation of the annual contract service fee;
(h) giving approval to the Joint Authority to market any or all petroleum production in
circumstances determined by the Ministerial Council;
(i) approving the transfer of rights and responsibilities by contractors to other corporations
that will then become contractors;
(j) approving the distribution to Australia and the Republic of Indonesia of revenues derived
from production sharing contracts in Area A;
(k) through consultation, settling disputes in the Joint Authority;
(l) approving financial estimates of income and expenditure of the Joint Authority;
(m) approving rules, regulations and procedures for the effective functioning of the Joint
Authority including staff regulations;
(n) reviewing the operation of this Treaty and making recommendations to the Contracting
States that the Council may consider necessary for the amendment of this Treaty;
(o) appointment of the Executive Directors of the Joint Authority;
(p) at the request of a member of the Ministerial Council inspecting and auditing the Joint
Authority's books and accounts;
(q) approving the result of inspections and audits of contractors' books and accounts
conducted by the Joint Authority;
(r) considering and adopting the annual report of the Joint Authority; and
(s) reviewing the distribution among the Republic of Indonesia, Australia and third countries,
of expenditure on petroleum operations related to Area A.
2. The Ministerial Council in exercising its functions shall ensure the achievement of the
optimum commercial utilization of the petroleum resources of Area A consistent with good
oilfield and sound environmental practice.
3. The Ministerial Council shall authorize the Joint Authority to take all necessary steps to
enable the commencement of exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources of
Area A as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty.
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PART IV
THE JOINT AUTHORITY
Article 7
The Joint Authority
1. A Joint Authority is hereby established.
2. The Joint Authority shall have juridical personality and such legal capacities under the law
of both Contracting States as are necessary for the exercise of its powers and the performance
of its functions. In particular, the Joint Authority shall have the capacity to contract, to acquire
and dispose of movable and immovable property and to institute and be party to legal
proceedings.
3. The Joint Authority shall be responsible to the Ministerial Council.
4. Decisions of the Executive Directors of the Joint Authority shall be arrived at by
consensus. Where consensus cannot be reached, the matter shall be referred to the Ministerial
Council.
5. Unless otherwise decided by the Ministerial Council, the Joint Authority shall have its
head office in the Republic of Indonesia and an office in Australia, each of which shall be
headed by an Executive Director.
6. The Joint Authority shall commence to function on entry into force of this Treaty.
Article 8
Functions of the Joint Authority
The Joint Authority, subject to directions from the Ministerial Council, shall be responsible for
the management of activities relating to exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum
resources in Area A in accordance with this Treaty, and in particular the Petroleum Mining
Code and with production sharing contracts. These management functions shall be:
(a) dividing Area A into contract areas, issuing prospecting approvals and commissioning
environmental investigations prior to contract areas being advertised, advertising of contract
areas, assessing applications, and making recommendations to the Ministerial Council on
applications for production sharing contracts;
(b) entering into production sharing contracts with corporations, subject to Ministerial Council
approval, and supervising the activities of the contractor pursuant to the requirements of the
Petroleum Mining Code, including regulations and directions thereunder, and the terms and
conditions set out in the contract;
(c) recommending to the Ministerial Council the termination of production sharing contracts
where contractors do not meet the terms and conditions of those contracts;
(d) terminating production sharing contracts by agreement with contractors;
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(e) recommending to the Ministerial Council the approval of transfer of rights and
responsibilities by contractors to other corporations that will then become contractors;
(f) collecting and, with approval of the Ministerial Council, distributing between the two
Contracting States the proceeds of the Joint Authority's share of petroleum production from
contracts;
(g) preparation of annual estimates of income and expenditure of the Joint Authority for
submission to the Ministerial Council. Any expenditure shall only be made in accordance with
estimates approved by the Ministerial Council or otherwise in accordance with regulations and
procedures approved by the Council;
(h) controlling movements into, within and out of Area A of vessels, aircraft, structures and
other equipment employed in exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources; and,
subject to Article 23, authorizing the entry of employees of contractors and their subcontractors
and other persons into Area A;
(i) establishment of safety zones and restricted zones, consistent with international law, to
ensure the safety of navigation and petroleum operations;
(j) issuing regulations and giving directions under the Petroleum Mining Code on all matters
related to the supervision of and control of petroleum operations including on health, safety,
environmental protection and assessments and work practices, pursuant to the Petroleum
Mining Code;
(k) making recommendations to the Ministerial Council to amend the Petroleum Mining Code
and to modify the Model Production Sharing Contract consistent with the objectives of this
Treaty;
(l) requesting action by the appropriate Australian and Indonesian authorities consistent with
this Treaty
(i) for search and rescue operations In Area A; and
(ii) in the event of terrorist threat to the vessels and structures engaged in petroleum
operations in Area A;
(m) requesting assistance with pollution prevention measures, equipment and procedures
from appropriate Australian or Indonesian authorities or other bodies or persons;
(n) preparation of annual reports for submission to the Ministerial Council;
(o) with the approval of the Ministerial Council, the variation of the following provisions of a
production sharing contract with the agreement of the contractor:
(i) the Joint Authority's or the contractor's production share;
(ii) the operating cost recovery provisions;
(iii) the term of the contract; and
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(iv) the contract area relinquishment provisions;
(p) with the approval of the Ministerial Council, the variation of the annual contract service
fee;
(q) variation, with the agreement of the contractor, of provisions in the production sharing
contract other than those in paragraphs (o) and (p) of this Article;
(r) with the approval of the Ministerial Council, the marketing of any or all petroleum
production in circumstances determined by the Ministerial Council;
(s) inspecting and auditing contractors' books and accounts relating to the production
sharing contract for any calendar year;
(t) monitoring and reporting to the Ministerial Council the distribution among the Republic of
Indonesia, Australia and third countries, of expenditure on petroleum operations related to Area
A; and
(u) such other functions as may be conferred on it by the Ministerial Council.
Article 9
Structure of the Joint Authority
1. The Joint Authority shall consist of:
(a) Executive Directors appointed by the Ministerial Council comprising an equal number of
persons nominated by each Contracting State;
(b) the following three Directorates responsible to the Executive Directors:
(i) a Technical Directorate responsible for operations involving exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum resources including operations in respect of functions referred to in
paragraph (l) of Article 8;
(ii) a Financial Directorate responsible for collecting fees and proceeds from the sale of the
Joint Authority's share of production; and
(iii) a Legal Directorate responsible for providing advice on any legal issues relating to
production sharing contracts and on the operation of law applying in Area A; and
(c) a Corporate Services Directorate, to provide administrative support to the Executive
Directors and the three other Directorates and to service the meetings of the Ministerial
Council.
2. The personnel of the Joint Authority shall be appointed by the Executive Directors under
terms and conditions that have regard to the proper functioning of the Joint Authority and the
nature of the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources being undertaken from
time to time in Area A from amongst individuals nominated by each Contracting State. Of the
four Directors heading the Directorates, the Executive Directors shall appoint two from each
Contracting State. If an Indonesian nominee is appointed to head the Technical Directorate,
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then an Australian nominee shall be appointed to head the Financial Directorate, and vice
versa.
3. Unless otherwise decided by the Ministerial Council, the Technical Directorate shall be in
the Joint Authority office located in Australia.
4. The Executive Directors and the four Directors shall constitute the Executive Board.
5. The Executive Directors and personnel of the Joint Authority shall have no financial
interest in any activity relating to exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area
A.
Article 10
Taxation of the Joint Authority and its officers
1. The Joint Authority shall be exempt from the following existing taxes:
(a) in Australia, the income tax imposed under the federal law of Australia;
(b) in Indonesia, the income tax (Pajak-Penghasilan) imposed under the law of the Republic
of Indonesia,
as well as any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed after the date of
signature of this Treaty in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes.
2. The Executive Directors and other officers of the Joint Authority:
(a) shall be exempt from taxation of salaries, allowances and other emoluments paid to them
by the Joint Authority in connection with their service with the Joint Authority other than taxation
under the law of the Contracting State in which they are deemed under the provisions of Article
1 of this Treaty to be resident for taxation purposes; and
(b) shall, at the time of first taking up a post with the Joint Authority located in the
Contracting State in which they are not resident under the provisions of Article 1 of this Treaty,
be exempt from customs duties and other such charges (except payments for services) in
respect of imports of furniture and other household and personal effects in their ownership or
possession or already ordered by them and intended for their personal use or for their
establishment; such goods shall be imported within six months of an officer's first entry but in
exceptional circumstances an extension of time shall be granted by the Government of the
Contracting State; goods which have been acquired or imported by officers and to which
exemptions under this sub-paragraph apply shall not be given away, sold, lent, hired out, or
otherwise disposed of except under conditions agreed in advance with the Government of the
Contracting State in which the officer is located.
3. The Ministerial Council may recommend to the Contracting States that additional
privileges be conferred on the Joint Authority or its officers, if that is necessary to promote the
effective functioning of the Joint Authority. Such privileges shall be conferred only following the
agreement of the two Contracting States.
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Article 11
Financing
1. The Joint Authority shall be financed from fees collected under Part VI of the Petroleum
Mining Code, provided that the Contracting States shall advance such funds as they jointly
determine to be necessary to enable the Joint Authority to commence operations.
2. In the event that the Joint Authority cannot meet an obligation under an arbitral award
arising from a dispute under a production sharing contract, the Contracting States shall
contribute the necessary funds in equal shares to enable the Joint Authority to meet that
obligation.
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PART V
COOPERATION ON CERTAIN MATTERS IN RELATION TO AREA A
Article 12
Surveillance
1. For the purposes of this Treaty, both Contracting States shall have the right to carry out
surveillance activities in Area A.
2. The Contracting States shall cooperate on and coordinate any surveillance activities
carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. The Contracting States shall exchange information derived from any surveillance activities
carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article 13
Security measures
1. The Contracting States shall exchange information on likely threats to, or security
incidents relating to, exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area A.
2. The Contracting States shall make arrangements for responding to security incidents in
Area A.
Article 14
Search and rescue
The Contracting States shall cooperate on arrangements for search and rescue in Area A
taking into account generally accepted international rules, regulations and procedures
established through competent international organizations.
Article 15
Air traffic services
The Contracting States shall cooperate on the provision of air traffic services in Area A
taking into account generally accepted international rules, regulations and procedures
established through competent international organizations.
Article 16
Hydrographic and seismic surveys
1. Both Contracting States shall have the right to carry out hydrographic surveys to facilitate
petroleum operations in Area A. Both Contracting States shall cooperate on:
(a) the conduct of such surveys, including the provision of necessary on-shore facilities; and
(b) exchanging hydrographic information relevant to petroleum operations in Area A.
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2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting States shall cooperate in facilitating the
conduct of seismic surveys in Area A, including in the provision of necessary on-shore facilities.
Article 17
Marine scientific research
Without prejudice to the rights under international law in relation to marine scientific research
in Area A claimed by the two Contracting States, a Contracting State which receives a request
for consent to conduct marine scientific research into the non-living resources of the continental
shelf in Area A shall consult with the other Contracting State on whether the research project is
related to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area A. If the
Contracting States decide that the research is so related they shall seek the views of the Joint
Authority on the research project and, in the light of such views, mutually decide on the
regulation, authorization and conduct of the research including the duty to provide data,
samples and results of such research to both Contracting States and the Joint Authority and
participation by both Contracting States in the research project.
Article 18
Protection of the marine environment
1. The Contracting States shall cooperate to prevent and minimize pollution of the marine
environment arising from the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum in Area A. In
particular:
(a) the Contracting States shall provide such assistance to the Joint Authority as may be
requested pursuant to paragraph (m) of Article 8 of this Treaty; and
(b) where pollution of the marine environment occurring in Area A spreads beyond Area A,
the Contracting States shall cooperate in taking action to prevent, mitigate and eliminate such
pollution.
2. Pursuant to paragraph (j) of Article 8 of this Treaty the Joint Authority shall issue
regulations to protect the marine environment in Area A. It shall establish a contingency plan
for combating pollution from petroleum operations in that Area.
Article 19
Liability of contractors for pollution of the marine environment
Contractors shall be liable for damage or expenses incurred as a result of pollution of the
marine environment arising out of petroleum operations in Area A in accordance with
contractual arrangements with the Joint Authority and the law of the State in which a claim in
respect of such damage or expenses is brought.
Article 20
Unitization between Area A and areas outside Area A
If any single accumulation of petroleum extends across any of the boundary lines of Area A
of the Zone of Cooperation as designated and described in Article 1 and Annex A of this
Treaty, and the part of such accumulation that is situated on one side of a line is exploitable,
wholly or in part, from the other side of the line, the Contracting States shall seek to reach
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agreement on the manner in which the accumulation shall be most effectively exploited and on
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.
Article 21
Construction of facilities
In the event that exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in Area A
necessitates the construction of facilities and provision of services outside Area A, the
Contracting States shall provide every assistance to contractors and the Joint Authority to
enable the construction and operation of those facilities, and the provision of those services.
Construction and operation of such facilities and provision of such services shall be subject to
the law and regulations of the relevant Contracting State and any terms and conditions set by
the Contracting States.
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PART VI
APPLICABLE LAWS
Article 22
Law applicable to production sharing contracts
The law applicable to a production sharing contract shall be specified in that contract.
Article 23
Application of customs, migration and quarantine laws
1. Each Contracting State may, subject to paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Article, apply customs,
migration and quarantine laws to persons, equipment and goods entering its territory from, or
leaving its territory for, Area A. The Contracting States may adopt arrangements to facilitate
such entry and departure.
2. Contractors shall ensure, unless otherwise authorized by the Contracting States, that
persons, equipment and goods do not enter structures in Area A without first entering Australia
or the Republic of Indonesia, and that their employees and the employees of their
subcontractors are authorized by the Joint Authority to enter Area A.
3. One Contracting State may request consultations with the other Contracting State in
relation to the entry of particular persons, equipment and goods to structures in Area A aimed
at controlling the movement of such persons, equipment or goods.
4. Nothing in this Article prejudices the right of either Contracting State to apply customs,
migration and quarantine controls to persons, equipment and goods entering Area A without
the authority of either Contracting State. The Contracting States may adopt arrangements to
coordinate the exercise of such rights.
5. (a) Goods and equipment entering Area A for purposes related to petroleum operations
shall not be subject to customs duties.
(b) Goods and equipment leaving or in transit through a Contracting State for the purpose of
entering Area A for purposes related to petroleum operations shall not be subject to customs
duties.
(c) Goods and equipment leaving Area A for the purpose of being permanently transferred to
a part of a Contracting State may be subject to customs duties of that Contracting State.
Article 24
Employment
1. The Contracting States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that preference is given
in employment in Area A to nationals or permanent residents of Australia and the Republic of
Indonesia, and to their employment in equivalent numbers over the term of a production
sharing contract, but, with due regard to efficient operations and to good oilfield practice.
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2. The terms and conditions under which persons are employed on structures in Area A shall
be governed by employment contracts or collective agreements. The terms and conditions shall
include provisions on insurance and compensation in relation to employment injuries, including
death or disability benefits, and may provide for use of an existing compensation system
established under the law of either Contracting State. The terms and conditions shall also
include provisions in relation to remuneration, periods of duty or overtime, leave and
termination. The terms and conditions shall be no less favourable than those which would apply
from time to time to comparable categories of employment in both Australia and the Republic of
Indonesia.
3. Paragraph 2 of this Article shall also apply to persons employed on seismic, drill, supply
and service vessels regularly engaged in activities related to petroleum operations in Area A,
regardless of the nationality of the vessel.
4. In relation to the provision of facilities and opportunities, there shall be no discrimination
on the basis of nationality amongst persons to which paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article apply.
5. Disputes arising between employers and employees shall be settled by negotiation in the
first instance. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiation shall be settled either by
recourse to a tripartite dispute settlement committee, comprising representatives of employers,
employees and persons nominated by the Contracting States, or by recourse to a conciliation
and arbitration system available in either Contracting State.
6. Employer and employee associations recognised under the law of either Contracting
State may respectively represent employers and employees in the negotiation of contracts or
collective agreements and in conciliation and arbitration proceedings.
7. An employment contract or collective agreement shall provide that it shall be subject to
the law of one or other Contracting State and shall identify, consistent with paragraph 5 of this
Article, the applicable dispute settlement mechanism. Any arbitration decision shall be
enforceable under the law of the Contracting State under which it is made.
Article 25
Health and safety for workers
The Joint Authority shall develop, and contractors shall apply, occupational health and safety
standards and procedures for persons employed on structures in Area A that are no less
effective than those standards and procedures that would apply in relation to persons
employed on similar structures in both Australia and the Republic of Indonesia. The Joint
Authority may adopt, consistent with this Article, standards and procedures taking into account
an existing system established under the law of either Contracting State.
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Article 26
Petroleum industry vessels
Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, vessels engaged in petroleum operations shall
be subject to the law of the Contracting State whose nationality they possess and, unless they
are a vessel with the nationality of the other Contracting State, the law of the Contracting State
out of whose ports they operate, in relation to safety and operating standards, and crewing
regulations. Such vessels that enter Area A and do not operate out of either Contracting State
shall be subject to relevant international safety and operating standards under the law of both
Contracting States.
Article 27
Criminal jurisdiction
1. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article a national or permanent resident of a Contracting
State shall be subject to the criminal law of that State in respect of acts or omissions occurring
in Area A connected with or arising out of exploration for and exploitation of petroleum
resources, provided that a permanent resident of a Contracting State who is a national of the
other Contracting State shall be subject to the criminal law of the latter State.
2. (a) Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, a national of a third State, not being a permanent
resident of either Contracting State, shall be subject to the criminal law of both Contracting
States in respect of acts or omissions occurring in Area A connected with or arising out of the
exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources. Such a person shall not be subject to
criminal proceedings under the law of one Contracting State if he or she has already been tried
and discharged or acquitted by a competent tribunal or already undergone punishment for the
same act or omission under the law of the other Contracting State or where the competent
authorities of one Contracting State, in accordance with its law, have decided in the public
interest to refrain from prosecuting the person for that act or omission.
(b) In cases referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, the Contracting States shall,
as and when necessary, consult each other to determine which criminal law is to be applied,
taking into account the nationality of the victim and the interests of the Contracting State most
affected by the alleged offence.
3. The criminal law of the flag State shall apply in relation to acts or omissions on board
vessels including seismic or drill vessels in, or aircraft in flight over, Area A.
4. (a) The Contracting States shall provide assistance to and cooperate with each other,
including through agreements or arrangements as appropriate, for the purposes of enforcement
of criminal law under this Article, including the obtaining of evidence and information.
(b) Each Contracting State recognizes the interest of the other Contracting State where a
victim of an alleged offence is a national of that other State and shall keep that other State
informed to the extent permitted by its law of action being taken with regard to the alleged
offence.
5. The Contracting States may make arrangements permitting officials of one Contracting
State to assist in the enforcement of the criminal law of the other Contracting State. Where
such assistance involves the detention of a person who under paragraph 1 of this Article is
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subject to the jurisdiction of the other Contracting State that detention may only continue until it
is practicable to hand the person over to the relevant officials of that other Contracting State.
Article 28
Civil actions
Claims for damages or restitution of expenses as a result of activities in Area A may be
brought in the Contracting State which has or whose nationals or permanent residents have
suffered the damage or incurred the expense. The court in which the action is brought shall
apply the law and regulations of that State.
Article 29
Application of taxation law
1. For the purposes of the taxation law related directly or indirectly to:
(a) the exploration for or the exploitation of petroleum in Area A; or
(b) acts, matters, circumstances and things touching, concerning, arising out of or connected
with any such exploration or exploitation,
Area A shall be deemed to be, and be treated by, each Contracting State as part of that
Contracting State.
2. In the application of the taxation law:
(a) in Area A;
(b) to interest paid by a contractor; or
(c) to royalties paid by a contractor,
each Contracting State shall grant relief from double taxation in accordance with the
Taxation Code.
3. A Contracting State shall not impose a tax not covered by the provisions of the Taxation
Code in respect of or applicable to:
(a) the exploration for or exploitation of petroleum in Area A; or
(b) any petroleum exploration or exploitation related activity carried on in Area A,
unless the other Contracting State consents to the imposition of that tax.
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PART VII
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 30
Settlement of disputes
1. Any dispute arising between the Contracting States concerning the interpretation or
application of this Treaty shall be resolved by consultation or negotiation between the
Contracting States.
2. Each production sharing contract entered into by the Joint Authority shall contain
provisions to the effect that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of such
contract shall be submitted to a specified form of binding commercial arbitration. The
Contracting States shall facilitate the enforcement in their respective courts of arbitral awards
made pursuant to such arbitration.
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PART VIII
FINAL CLAUSES
Article 31
Amendment
1. This Treaty may be amended at any time by agreement between the Contracting States.
2. The Petroleum Mining Code, in accordance with paragraph 1(b) of Article 6 of this Treaty
and the Model Production Sharing Contract, in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 6 of
this Treaty, may also be amended or modified by decision of the Ministerial Council. Such
amendments or modifications shall have the same status as the Petroleum Mining Code and
the Model Production Sharing Contract.
Article 32
Entry into force
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting
States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for entry into force
of this Treaty have been complied with.[3]
Article 33
Term of this treaty
1. This Treaty shall remain in force for forty (40) years from the date of entry into force of this
Treaty.
2. Unless the two Contracting States agree otherwise, this Treaty shall continue in force
after the initial forty (40) year term for successive terms of twenty (20) years, unless by the end
of each term, including the initial term of forty years, the two Contracting States have concluded
an agreement on a permanent continental shelf delimitation in the area covered by the Zone of
Cooperation.
3. Where the Contracting States have not concluded an agreement on a permanent
continental shelf delimitation in the area covered by the Zone of Cooperation five years prior to
the end of any of the terms referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article, representatives of the
two Contracting States shall meet with a view to reaching agreement on such permanent
continental shelf delimitation.
4. This Article shall be without prejudice to the continued operation of Article 34 of this
Treaty.
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Article 34
Rights of contractors
1. In the event that
(a) this Treaty ceases to be in force following conclusion of an agreement between the
Contracting States on permanent continental shelf delimitation in the area of the Zone of
Cooperation; and
(b) there are in existence immediately prior to the date on which this Treaty ceases to be in
force, production sharing contracts with the Joint Authority,
production sharing contracts shall continue to apply to each Contracting State or some other
person nominated by the Contracting State concerned, in place of the Joint Authority, in so far
as the contract is to be performed within the territorial jurisdiction of each Contracting State,
having regard to the agreement on delimitation. Each Contracting State shall apply to
contractors performing contracts within its territorial jurisdiction a regime no more onerous than
that set out in this Treaty and the relevant production sharing contract.
2. The two Contracting States shall at the time of the conclusion of the permanent
delimitation agreement make arrangements to give effect to paragraph 1 of this Article.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed this Treaty.
DONE over the Zone of Cooperation[4] on this eleventh day of December, one thousand
nine hundred and eighty nine, in two originals in the English language.
FOR AUSTRALIA: FOR THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
[Signed:] [Signed:]
GARETH EVANS ALI ALATAS
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister for Foreign Affairs
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ANNEX A
DESIGNATION AND DESCRIPTION INCLUDING MAPS
[5] AND COORDINATES OF THE AREAS COMPRISING THE ZONE OF COOPERATION
NOTE
Where for the purposes of this Treaty it is necessary to determine the position on the surface
of the Earth of a point, line or area, that position shall be determined by reference to the
Australian Geodetic Datum, that is to say, by reference to a spheroid having its centre at the
centre of the Earth and a major (equatorial) radius of 6 378 160 metres and a flattening of
1/298.25 and by reference to the position of the Johnston Geodetic Station in the Northern
Territory of Australia. That station shall be taken to be situated at Latitude 25o56'54.5515"
South and at Longitude 133o12'30.0771" East and to have a ground level of 571.2 metres
above the spheroid referred to above.
ZONE OF COOPERATION
WHOLE
The area bounded by the line(a) commencing at the point of Latitude 9deg. 12' 19" South, Longitude 127deg. 33' 32"
East;
(b) running thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 22' 53"
South, Longitude 127deg. 48' 42" East;
(c) thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 28' 00" South,
Longitude 127deg. 56' 00" East;
(d) thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 29' 57" South,
Longitude 127deg. 58' 47" East;
(e) thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 29' 17" South,
Longitude 128deg. 12' 24" East;
(f) thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 42' 10" South,
Longitude 128deg. 29' 10" East;
(g) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 03' 17" South,
Longitude 127deg. 45' 00" East;
(h) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 15' 28" South,
Longitude 127deg. 08' 28" East;
(i) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 20' 08" South,
Longitude 126deg. 31' 54" East;
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(j) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 28' 00" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 00" East;
(k) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 06' 40" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 25" East;
(l) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 46' 01" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 50" East; and
(m) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of commencement.

ZONE OF COOPERATION
AREA A
The area bounded by the line(a) commencing at the point of Latitude 9deg. 22' 53" South, Longitude 127deg. 48' 42"
East;
(b) running thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 06' 40"
South, Longitude 126deg. 00' 25" East;
(c) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 28' 00" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 00" East;
(d) thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 20' 08" South,
Longitude 126deg. 31' 54" East;
(e) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 19' 46" South,
Longitude 126deg. 47' 04" East;
(f) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 17' 36" South,
Longitude 126deg. 57' 07" East;
(g) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 17' 30" South,
Longitude 126deg. 58' 13" East;
(h) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 14' 24" South,
Longitude 127deg. 31' 33" East;
(i) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 55' 26" South,
Longitude 127deg. 47' 04" East;
(j) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 53' 42" South,
Longitude 127deg. 48' 45" East;
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(k) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 43' 43" South,
Longitude 127deg. 59' 16" East;
(l) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 29' 17" South,
Longitude 128deg. 12' 24" East;
(m) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 29' 57" South,
Longitude 127deg. 58' 47" East;
(n) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 28' 00" South,
Longitude 127deg. 56' 00" East; and
(o) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of commencement.

ZONE OF COOPERATION
AREA B
The area bounded by the line(a) commencing at the point of Latitude 10deg. 29' 17" South, Longitude 128deg. 12' 24"
East;
(b) running thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 42' 10"
South, Longitude 128deg. 29' 10" South;
(c) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 03' 17" South,
Longitude 127deg. 45' 00" East;
(d) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 12deg. 15' 28" South,
Longitude 127deg. 08' 28" East;
(e) thence north-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 20' 08" South,
Longitude 126deg. 31' 54" East;
(f) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 19' 46" South,
Longitude 126deg. 47' 04" East;
(g) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 17' 36" South,
Longitude 126deg. 57' 07" East;
(h) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 17' 30" South,
Longitude 126deg. 58' 13" East;
(i) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 11deg. 14' 24" South,
Longitude 127deg. 31' 33" East;
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(j) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 55' 26" South,
Longitude 127deg. 47' 04" East;
(k) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 53' 42" South,
Longitude 127deg. 48' 45" East'
(l) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 43' 43" South,
Longitude 127deg. 59' 16" East; and
(m) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of commencement.

ZONE OF COOPERATION
AREA C
The area bounded by the line(a) commencing at the point of Latitude 9deg. 12' 19" South, Longitude 127deg. 33' 32"
East;
(b) running thence south-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 22' 53"
South, Longitude 127deg. 48' 42" East;
(c) thence south-westerly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10deg. 06' 40" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 25" East;
(d) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 9deg. 46' 01" South,
Longitude 126deg. 00' 50" East; and
(e) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of commencement.
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ANNEX B
PETROLEUM MINING CODE FOR AREA A OF THE ZONE OF COOPERATION
PART I
DEFINITIONS
Article 1
Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Petroleum Mining Code:
(a) "block" means a block constituted in accordance with Article 2 of this Petroleum Mining
Code;
(b) "calendar year" means a period of twelve (12) months commencing on 1 January and
ending on the following 31 December, according to the Gregorian Calendar;
(c) "contract operator" means the contractor appointed and authorized by the contractors to
be responsible for petroleum operations and all dealings with the Joint Authority under the
contract on behalf of the contractors;
(d) "contract year" means a period of twelve (12) consecutive months according to the
Gregorian Calendar counted from the effective date of the contract or from the anniversary of
such effective date;
(e) "discovery area" means the blocks declared by the Joint Authority under Article 16 of this
Petroleum Mining Code to contain petroleum;
(f) "effective date" means the date a production sharing contract is entered into by and
between the Joint Authority and the contractor;
(g) "operating costs" means those costs defined in a production sharing contract which are
incurred and are recoverable by the contract operator in the course of undertaking petroleum
operations;
(h) "petroleum pool" means a discrete accumulation of petroleum under a single pressure
system;
(i) "pipeline" means a pipe or system of pipes and associated equipment necessary for
conveying petroleum;
(j) "work program and budget of operating costs" means the details of petroleum operations
to be carried out in or related to the contract area and the aggregate cost estimates for those
operations;
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(k) "Treaty" means the Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone
of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern
Australia to which this Petroleum Mining Code is an Annex.
2. The terms used in this Petroleum Mining Code shall, unless otherwise specified, have the
same meaning as those in the Treaty.
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PART II
AREA A
Article 2
Graticulation of Area A
1. The surface of Area A shall be divided by the Joint Authority into graticular sections
defined by meridians of five (5) minutes of longitude (reference the meridian of Greenwich) and
by parallels of latitude of five (5) minutes (reference the Equator). A block shall constitute a
graticular section as described above and shall include part graticular sections. Each block in
Area A shall be allocated a discrete identifying number.
2. The Joint Authority may subdivide each block into graticular sections. Where this is done,
the graticular sections shall be defined by meridians of longitude and by parallels of latitude,
and each section shall form a block. Each block so defined shall be allocated a discrete
identifying number.
3. Contract areas within Area A shall be described in terms of the component blocks.
Article 3
Geodetic datum
Whenever it is necessary to determine the position of a line in Area A that position shall be
determined by reference to a spheroid having its centre at the centre of the earth and a major
(equatorial) radius of 6378160 metres and a flattening of 100/29825 and by reference to the
position of the Johnston Geodetic Station in the Northern Territory of Australia. That station
shall be taken to be situated at 133 degrees, 12 minutes and 30.0771 seconds of East
Longitude and at 25 degrees, 56 minutes and 54.5515 seconds of South Latitude and to have
a ground level of 571.2 metres above the spheroid referred to above.
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PART III
THE CONTRACT
Article 4
Rights conferred by contract
1. A production sharing contract entered into by the Joint Authority, with the approval of the
Ministerial Council, shall give to the contractor the exclusive right and the responsibility to
undertake petroleum operations in a contract area, subject to the provisions of the Treaty,
relevant regulations and directions issued by the Joint Authority, and the terms and conditions
of the contract.
2. During each calendar year, any petroleum production shall be shared between the Joint
Authority and the contractor.
3. The contract shall not confer on the contractor ownership of petroleum in the ground but
shall provide for the contractor to take a share of petroleum production as payment from the
Joint Authority for the petroleum operations undertaken by the contract operator pursuant to the
contract. Ownership of the Joint Authority's share of petroleum production shall remain with the
Joint Authority. Except as provided in paragraph 5 of this Article, the Joint Authority shall
authorize the marketing of its share of petroleum production by the contractor who shall market
all petroleum produced from the contract area.
4. Title to the contractor's share of petroleum production shall pass to the contractor at the
point of tanker loading. Petroleum production shall be measured at the point of tanker loading.
For the purposes of a production sharing contract, all such measured production shall be
deemed to have been produced on the day of the commencement of tanker loading. Subject to
paragraph 5 of this Article the contractor shall have the right to lift, dispose of and export its
share of petroleum, and retain abroad the proceeds obtained therefrom. Except where the Joint
Authority markets petroleum as provided in paragraph 5 of this Article, the contract shall require
the contractor to pay to the Joint Authority, at regular periods during each calendar year, an
amount of money estimated to be equal to the value of the Joint Authority's share of petroleum
production lifted for those periods. The contract shall specify the length of each period, monthly
if workable, the means by which the value of the Joint Authority's share of petroleum production
is estimated for each period, and when each payment shall be made. The estimated value of
the Joint Authority's share of petroleum production for each period shall be based on the work
program and budget of operating costs and revisions to it, and the expected value of quantities
of petroleum to be produced. The estimated value shall be revised during the calendar year
having regard to the actual operating costs and value of sales of petroleum.
5. The Joint Authority, with the approval of the Ministerial Council, may market any or all
petroleum production. Where it is the Joint Authority's share of petroleum production which is to
be marketed by the Joint Authority, the method of determining the estimated value of the Joint
Authority's share shall be based on that method described in paragraph 4 of this Article. Where
petroleum production marketed by the Joint Authority includes the contractor's share, the
contract shall require the Joint Authority to pay to the contractor, at regular periods during each
calendar year, an amount of money estimated to be equal to the value of the contractor's share
of petroleum production so lifted for those periods. The method of determining the estimated
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value of the Joint Authority's and the contractor's shares shall be based on that method
described in paragraph 4 of this Article. The contract operator shall be obliged to coordinate the
efficient lifting of the petroleum production, including tanker nomination and scheduling.
6. The contract shall also specify that within thirty (30) days after the end of each calendar
year, adjustments and cash settlements between the contractor and the Joint Authority shall be
made on the basis of the actual quantities, amounts and prices involved, in order to ensure that
the Joint Authority receives the correct share of petroleum production for each calendar year.
7. In the case of a contract entered into with a group of corporations, each corporation shall
be jointly and severally liable for meeting the conditions of the contract, and for complying with
the requirements of this Petroleum Mining Code and the regulations and directions issued by
the Joint Authority. Each corporation shall be a signatory to the contract with the Joint
Authority.
Article 5
The contract
1. Without limiting the matters to be dealt with, the contract shall be concluded on the basis
of the Model Production Sharing Contract and shall include:
(a) the definition of the responsibilities and rights of the contractor, the contract operator and
the Joint Authority;
(b) the term of the contract and block relinquishment provisions;
(c) the work program and expenditure commitments;
(d) the definition of operating costs and the method of recovery of those costs by the
contract operator;
(e) the petroleum production share to be allocated to the contractor;
(f) provisions for the termination of the contract;
(g) provisions for exemption from and variation of contract conditions;
(h) provisions for the resolution of disputes between the contractor and the Joint Authority;
and
(i) any other provisions that are consistent with the Treaty.
Article 6
Contract operator
1. Where a number of corporations enters into a contract with the Joint Authority, the
corporations shall appoint and authorize one of their number to be the contract operator

92
responsible, on behalf of the group of corporations, for petroleum operations and all dealings
with the Joint Authority under the contract.
2. The contract operator shall undertake petroleum operations in an efficient manner which
minimizes costs and in a manner in accordance with the provisions of the production sharing
contract. Costs incurred by the contract operator in undertaking petroleum operations shall not
include any component of profit which accrues to the contract operator solely by virtue of its
role as contract operator.
3. All communications on matters related to the contract shall be effected between the
contract operator and the Joint Authority. The contract operator shall establish an office in
either the Republic of Indonesia or Australia.
Article 7
Term of contract
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, and Articles 22 and 48 of this Petroleum Mining
Code, the term of a production sharing contract shall be thirty (30) years. In addition, the
provisions of the production sharing contract shall include:
(a) an obligation on the Joint Authority to give sympathetic consideration to an extension of
the term of the contract beyond the thirtieth (30th) contract year if petroleum production has not
ceased by that year; and
(b) automatic extension of the term of the contract to allow continuation of petroleum
production to meet natural gas sales contracts the terms of which extend beyond the thirtieth
(30th) contract year of the production sharing contract.
2. The production sharing contract may also include a specified term after which the contract
may be terminated if a discovery is not made.
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PART IV
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION
Article 8
Advertisement of blocks
1. The Joint Authority shall invite applications to enter into a contract over specific blocks.
The invitation for applications shall specify:
(a) the blocks over which the rights shall be granted;
(b) the bidding system to apply;
(c) the basis on which bids shall be assessed;
(d) details of the contract to be entered into including the rights and responsibilities of the
parties to the contract; and
(e) the period within which applications may be made.
2. Details of the invitation for applications shall be published in official Australian and
Indonesian Government Gazettes and in such other ways as the Joint Authority decides.
Article 9
Bidding system
1. The Joint Authority shall invite applications to enter into a contract over parts of Area A
using a work program bidding system which identifies annual exploration work program and
expenditure commitments to be undertaken in the contract area.
2. The Joint Authority shall make available full details of the bidding system to be used at the
time applications are invited.
Article 10
Application for contracts
1. The Joint Authority shall set out in formal guidelines the form in which applications shall
be prepared and lodged. As a minimum requirement a draft contract based on the Model
Production Sharing Contract shall be completed and lodged, and applications shall set out
details of the work program and expenditure commitments, and the financial capability and
technical knowledge and ability available to the applicant.
2. Where an application is lodged by a group comprising several corporations, the
application shall be accompanied by evidence that an agreement can be reached between
those corporations for cooperation in petroleum operations in the contract area.
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3. The application shall be accompanied by the fee specified in Article 44 of this Petroleum
Mining Code.
Article 11
Consideration of application
1. The Joint Authority shall set out in formal guidelines the basis on which applications will
be considered and the relevant criteria which applicants will be expected to meet. Contracts
shall be offered in accordance with the published criteria for that bidding round. The principal
criteria shall be the amount and quality of the exploration work bid.
2. The Joint Authority shall be satisfied that an applicant has the necessary financial
capability and technical knowledge and ability to carry out petroleum operations in a manner
consistent with the terms and conditions of the contract and this Petroleum Mining Code,
including the necessary environmental and safety requirements.
Article 12
Grant or refusal of contracts
1. The Joint Authority shall seek prior approval from the Ministerial Council to enter into a
contract with the preferred applicant or group of applicants.
2. Subject to that approval, the Joint Authority shall notify in writing the successful applicant
that it has Ministerial Council approval to enter into a contract with the applicant covering
petroleum operations in a specified contract area on terms and conditions set out in the
contract. The applicant shall have thirty (30) days within which to accept or refuse the offer in
writing. On the applicant accepting the offer, paying the contract service fee, and providing
evidence that it has fulfilled any prerequisite conditions such as insurance cover, the Joint
Authority shall enter into the contract with the applicant.
3. Unsuccessful applicants shall be advised accordingly.
Article 13
Publication of contracts
The Joint Authority shall publish in official Australian and Indonesian Government Gazettes
summary details of:
(a) contracts entered into; and
(b) termination of contracts.
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Article 14
Commencement of work
The contract operator shall commence petroleum operations within six (6) months from the
date the contract is entered into, except for reasons of force majeure.
Article 15
Discovery of petroleum
1. The contract operator shall notify the Joint Authority in writing within twenty four (24)
hours whenever any petroleum is discovered and on request by the Joint Authority shall
provide details in writing of the:
(a) chemical composition and physical properties of the petroleum; and
(b) the nature of the sub-soil in which the petroleum occurs.
2. The contract operator shall provide the Joint Authority with any other information
concerning the discovery on request by the Joint Authority.
3. The contract operator shall also do such things as the Joint Authority requests to
determine the chemical composition and physical properties of any petroleum discovered, and
to determine the geographical extent of any petroleum pool and the quantity of petroleum in
that pool.
Article 16
Declaration of discovery area
1. The Joint Authority shall declare the blocks within the contract area covering a petroleum
pool as a discovery area, provided that the Joint Authority and contract operator agree that the
petroleum pool can be produced commercially. These blocks shall form a single contiguous
area.
2. At any time after a discovery area has been declared, the Joint Authority may, of its own
volition or on request from the contract operator, agree that certain blocks be included in or
excluded from the discovery area. Blocks included in the discovery area in this way shall be
from within the contractor's contract area.
Article 17
Approval to produce petroleum
The contract operator shall not construct any production structures without the approval of
the Joint Authority. The Joint Authority shall not unreasonably withhold approvals.
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Article 18
Approval to construct pipeline
1. The contract operator shall not construct a pipeline for the purpose of conveying
petroleum within or from Area A without the approval of the Joint Authority, nor shall the
contract operator operate or remove that pipeline without the approval of the Joint Authority.
2. The Joint Authority may direct a contract operator owning a pipeline to enter into a
commercial agreement with another contract operator to enable the second mentioned
operator to transport petroleum.
Article 19
Petroleum production work
Unless otherwise agreed between the contract operator and the Joint Authority, work on a
permanent structure to produce petroleum shall commence within six (6) months of approval to
construct the structure.
Article 20
Rates of production
The Joint Authority may direct and make regulations about the commencement of petroleum
production and the specific rates of petroleum production. In giving such directions and making
such regulations the Joint Authority shall take account of good oilfield practice.
Article 21
Unitization
Where a petroleum pool is partly within a contract area and partly within another contract
area, but wholly within Area A, the Joint Authority shall require the contractors to enter into a
unitization agreement with each other within a reasonable time, as determined by the Joint
Authority, for the purpose of securing the more effective and optimized production of petroleum
from the pool. If no agreement has been reached within such reasonable time, the Joint
Authority shall decide on the unitization agreement. Without limiting the matters to be dealt
with, the unitization agreement shall define or contain the approach to define the amount of
petroleum in each contract area, the method of producing the petroleum, and shall appoint the
contract operator responsible for production of the petroleum covered by the unitization
agreement. The Joint Authority shall approve the unitization agreement before approvals under
Article 17 of this Petroleum Mining Code are given. Any changes to the unitization agreement
shall be subject to approval by the Joint Authority.
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Article 22
Block relinquishment
1. The contract shall contain provisions for the progressive relinquishment of blocks from the
contract area.
2. In calculating the relinquishment requirements, the blocks in a discovery area shall not be
counted as part of the original number of blocks in the contract area.
3. In the event that no discovery area has been declared in the contract area before the end
of an initial period specified in the contract, the contract operator shall either relinquish all
remaining blocks in the contract area and the contract shall be terminated, or the contract
operator shall exercise the option provided in the contract to extend the term of the contract.
Article 23
Surrender of blocks
1. The contractor may surrender some or all of the blocks in a contract area provided the
conditions of the contract have been met to the satisfaction of the Joint Authority. Blocks
surrendered in this way shall be credited towards the block relinquishment requirement in
Article 22 of this Petroleum Mining Code.
2. Before agreeing to an application to surrender some or all of the blocks in a contract area,
the Joint Authority may direct the contract operator to clean up the contract area or remove
structures, equipment and other property from the contract area and the contract operator shall
comply with that direction.
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PART V
GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 24
Work practices
It shall be the responsibility of the contract operator to ensure that petroleum operations are
carried out in a proper and workmanlike manner and in accordance with good oilfield practice.
The contract operator shall take the necessary action to:
(a) protect the environment in and about the contract area; and
(b) secure the safety, health and welfare of persons engaged in petroleum operations in or
about the contract area.
Article 25
Insurance
1. The Joint Authority shall require the contractor to take out and maintain from the effective
date of the contract, to the satisfaction of the Joint Authority, insurance on a strict liability basis
and for an amount determined by the Joint Authority in consultation with applicants for
contracts. It shall also agree with the contractor on a mechanism whereby compensation claims
can be determined. The insurance shall cover expenses or liabilities or any other specified
things arising in connection with the carrying out of petroleum operations and other activities
associated with those operations in the contract area, including expenses associated with the
prevention and clean-up of the escape of petroleum.
2. The contract operator shall ensure that transportation of petroleum in bulk as cargo from
Area A only takes place in tankers with appropriate insurance commensurate with relevant
international agreements.
Article 26
Maintenance of property
The contract operator shall be responsible for maintaining in safe and good condition and
repair all structures, equipment and other property in the contract area.
Article 27
Removal of property
1. As directed by the Joint Authority, the contract operator shall remove all property brought
into the contract area and comply with regulations and directions concerning the containment
and clean-up of pollution.
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2. In the event that the contract operator does not remove property or pollution to the
satisfaction of the Joint Authority or take such other action as is necessary for the conservation
and protection of the marine environment in that contract area, the Joint Authority may direct
the contract operator to take such remedial action as the Joint Authority deems necessary. If
the contract operator does not comply with that direction, the contractor shall be liable for any
costs incurred by the Joint Authority in rectifying the matter.
Article 28
Exemption from or variation of conditions
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 28, the Joint Authority may agree to exempt the
contractor from complying with the conditions of the contract.[6] The Joint Authority may also
agree to vary those conditions.
2. The Joint Authority shall not exempt the contractor from or vary the following conditions of
a contract without prior approval of the Ministerial Council:
(a) the Joint Authority's or the contractor's production shares;
(b) the operating cost recovery provisions;
(c) the term of the contract;
(d) the block relinquishment provisions;
(e) the annual contract service fee;
(f) obligations aimed at protecting the environment and preventing and cleaning up pollution
as provided under the Treaty including the Petroleum Mining Code and the contract; and
(g) the exploration work program required to be performed by a contractor in the first three
(3) years of a contract.[7]
Article 29
Provision of information
1. The Joint Authority may direct the contractor to provide the Joint Authority with data,
documents or information relating to petroleum operations including but not limited to routine
production and financial reports, technical reports and studies relating to petroleum operations.
2. The Joint Authority may require the contractor to provide that information in writing within
a specified period. The Joint Authority shall have title to all data obtained from the petroleum
operations.
3. A contractor shall not be excused from furnishing information on the grounds that the
information might tend to incriminate the contractor but the information shall not be admissible
in evidence against the contractor in criminal proceedings.
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Article 30
Safety zones
1. The Joint Authority may declare a safety zone around any specified structure in Area A,
and may require the contract operator to install, maintain or provide thereon, navigation, fog
and illumination lighting, acoustic and other devices and equipment necessary for the safety of
the petroleum operations. A safety zone may extend up to five hundred (500) metres from the
extremities of the structure. Unauthorized vessels shall be prohibited from entering the safety
zone.
2. Additionally, a restricted zone of one thousand two hundred and fifty (1250) metres may
be declared around the extremities of safety zones and pipelines in which area unauthorized
vessels employed in exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources are prohibited from
laying anchor or manoeuvring.
Article 31
Records to be kept
The Joint Authority shall require the contractor to keep accounts, records or other
documents, including financial records, in connection with petroleum operations and to furnish
to the Joint Authority in a specified manner data, reports, returns or other documents in
connection with those activities. These arrangements shall also apply to cores, cuttings and
samples taken in connection with petroleum operations in the contract area.
Article 32
Prospecting approval
The Joint Authority may issue a prospecting approval to any person to carry out petroleum
exploration activities in blocks not in contract areas. The prospecting approval shall specify
those conditions to which the person shall be subject. The conditions of a prospecting approval
shall not include any preference for or rights to enter into a contract over those blocks. All data
and reports resulting from such activities shall be submitted to the Joint Authority for its own
free use.
Article 33
Access approval
1. In order to promote the optimum exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources in
Area A, the Joint Authority may give approval to a contract operator, and persons holding
prospecting approvals or undertaking marine scientific research, to enter a contract area, not
being its contract area, to carry out activities in accordance with that approval. The Joint
Authority shall consult with the contract operator of the contract area into which access is
sought before giving approval. The terms and conditions of approval shall include an obligation
to furnish to the Joint Authority in a specified manner data, reports, returns or other documents
in connection with activities carried out under the access approval and a prohibition on the
drilling of exploration wells.
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2. The Joint Authority may also give approval to a contract operator to lay and fix petroleum
production facilities on the seabed in a contract area not being its contract area, provided that
such activities do not interfere with the petroleum operations in the first contract area.
Article 34
Inspectors
1. The Joint Authority may appoint a person to be an inspector for the purposes of this
Petroleum Mining Code, the regulations and directions issued under Article 37 of this
Petroleum Mining Code, and contract terms and conditions applying to petroleum operations in
Area A. A person so appointed shall, at all reasonable times and on production of a certificate
of appointment:
(a) have the right to enter any structure, vessel or aircraft in Area A being used for petroleum
operations;
(b) have the right to inspect and test any equipment being used or proposed to be used for
petroleum operations; and
(c) have the right to enter any structure, vessel, aircraft or building in which it is thought there
are any documents relating to petroleum operations in Area A and may inspect, take extracts
from and make copies of any of those documents.
2. The contractor shall provide an inspector with all reasonable facilities and assistance that
the inspector requests for the effective exercise of the inspector's powers.
Article 35
Service of notices
1. A document to be served on a person other than the Joint Authority or a corporation shall
be served:
(a) by delivering the document to that person;
(b) by posting the document as a letter addressed to that person;
(c) by delivering the document to that address and leaving the document with a person
apparently in the service of that person;
(d) by sending the document in the form of a telex or facsimile to that person's telex or
facsimile number, as appropriate; or
(e) by sending the document as a telegram addressed to that person.
2. A document to be served on a corporation shall be served by complying with subparagraphs (b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1 of this Article.
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3. A document to be served on the Joint Authority shall be served by leaving it with a person
apparently employed in connection with the Joint Authority, at a place of business of the Joint
Authority specified in the contract or by posting the document as a letter or telegram addressed
to the Joint Authority at that place of business or by sending the document as a telex or
facsimile to the Joint Authority's telex or facsimile number.
4. Where a document is posted as a letter, service shall be deemed to have been effected
within seven (7) days of the letter having been posted, unless the contrary is proved.
Article 36
Release of information and data
1. The Joint Authority may make such use as it wishes of information and data contained in
a report, return or other document furnished to the Joint Authority, provided that information
and data is not made publicly known before the periods of confidentiality identified below have
expired.
2. Basic information and data about petroleum operations in a contract area may be
released two (2) years after it was lodged with the Joint Authority or when the blocks to which
that information and data relates cease to be part of the contract area, if earlier. However,
conclusions drawn or opinions based in whole or in part on that information and data shall not
be released until five (5) years after that information and data was lodged with the Joint
Authority.
3. Information and data relating to a seismic or other geochemical or geophysical survey
shall be deemed to have been lodged no later than six (6) months after the survey was
essentially completed. Information and data on wells shall be deemed to have been lodged no
later than three (3) months after the well was essentially completed.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, the contract operator shall have the right to
have access to and use all information held by the Joint Authority relating to the blocks in Area
A adjacent to its contract area. Where information and data has been released by the person or
some party acting on the person's behalf, the Joint Authority shall not be obliged to maintain
the confidentiality of that information and data.
5. The Joint Authority shall be free to use any information and data relating to relinquished,
surrendered and other blocks outside the contract area, including releasing it to any party.
6. Contractors shall not use such information and data outside Australia or the Republic of
Indonesia without the approval of the Joint Authority.
7. Officials of the Australian and Indonesian Governments may have access to information
and data provided to the Joint Authority under this Petroleum Mining Code, provided such
officials comply with the provisions of this Article.
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Article 37
Regulations and directions
1. The Joint Authority shall issue regulations and directions to apply to persons, consistent
with the Treaty including this Petroleum Mining Code, in order to carry out its functions. In
particular, the regulations and directions shall deal with, but are not limited to, the following
matters:
(a) the exploration for petroleum and the carrying on of operations, and the execution of
works, for that purpose;
(b) the production of petroleum and the carrying on of operations, and the execution of
works, for that purpose;
(c) the measurement and the sale or disposal of the Joint Authority's and the contractor's
petroleum production, and the carrying on of operations for that purpose, including procedures
for transfer of title to petroleum and measurement and verification of petroleum so transferred;
(d) the conservation, and prevention of the waste of, the natural resources, whether
petroleum or otherwise;
(e) the construction, erection, maintenance, operation, use, inspection and certification and
re-certification of structures, pipelines or equipment;
(f) the control of the flow or discharge, and the prevention of the escape, of petroleum, water
or drilling fluid, or a mixture of water or drilling fluid with petroleum or any other matter;
(g) the clean-up or other remedying of the effects of the escape of petroleum;
(h) the prevention of damage to petroleum-bearing strata;
(i) the prevention of the waste or escape of petroleum;
(j) the removal from a contract area of structures, equipment and other property brought into
the contract area for or in connection with petroleum operations;
(k) the carrying on of petroleum operations in a safe and environmentally sound manner;
(l) the preparation of assessments of the impact of petroleum operations on the
environment;
(m) the authorization by the Joint Authority of entry into Area A by the employees of
contractors and the employees of their sub-contractors; and
(n) the control of movement into, within and out of Area A of vessels, aircraft, structures and
equipment employed in petroleum operations.
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2. The Joint Authority may, by instrument in writing served on a person or class of persons,
make a regulation or direction on a matter consistent with the above to apply specifically to that
person or class of persons.
Article 38
Register of contractors
The Joint Authority shall maintain a register setting out summary details of:
(a) areas over which contracts are in force;
(b) the contract operator and the contractor for each contract area;
(c) work and expenditure commitments relating to the contract area;
(d) changes to contract conditions, the contract operator and the undivided participating
interest of the contractor in a contract area;
(e) blocks relinquished or surrendered from contract areas;
(f) changes in names and addresses of the contract operator and the contractor; and
(g) unitization agreements.
Article 39
Approval of contractors
Corporations wishing to hold an undivided participating interest which would result in
changes to the contractor or the contract operator in a contract area shall be required to obtain
the Joint Authority's approval of those changes. The Joint Authority shall note such approval in
the register. Until such approval is given by the Joint Authority, with the prior consent of the
Ministerial Council, the new participating interest holders' agreement shall not be recognized by
the Joint Authority, and the contractor's and contract operator's liabilities under a contract shall
remain unchanged.
Article 40
Inspection of register
The Joint Authority shall ensure the register is available for inspection by any person at all
convenient times.
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Article 41
Auditing of contractor's books and accounts
The contractor's books and accounts shall be subject to audit by the Joint Authority, which
shall be conducted annually. The Joint Authority may issue regulations and directions with
respect to the auditing of books and accounts.
Article 42
Security of structures
1. Operators of vessels, drilling rigs and structures in Area A shall be responsible for
controlling access to their facilities; providing adequate surveillance of safety zones and their
approaches; and establishing communications with, and arranging action by, the appropriate
authorities in the event of an accident or incident involving threat to life or security.
2. To assist operators in meeting these responsibilities, the Joint Authority shall appoint
persons, to be stationed at the office of the Technical Directorate of the Joint Authority,
responsible for liaising with appropriate Australian and Indonesian authorities.
Article 43
Amendment of Petroleum Mining Code
Except in the case of amendments to Part VI of this Petroleum Mining Code, where the
provisions of this Petroleum Mining Code are amended, to the extent that the amendments are
not consistent with the provisions of contracts in force prior to the amendments, those
amendments may only apply to such contracts by agreement between the contract operator
and the Joint Authority.
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PART VI
FEES
Article 44
Application fees
1. The fee to be lodged with applications for production sharing contracts is US$ six
thousand (6000).
2. The fee to be lodged with applications for a prospecting approval is US$ one thousand
(1000).
3. Application fees shall not be refunded to unsuccessful applicants.
Article 45
Contract service fee
1. At the beginning of each contract year, the contract operator shall pay to the Joint
Authority a contract service fee of US$ one hundred and twenty five thousand (125,000). Upon
termination of a contract during the first six (6) contract years of the term of the contract, the
contractor must immediately pay the Joint Authority the sum of US$ seven hundred and fifty
thousand (750,000) less any contract service fee previously paid by the contractor, to
compensate the Joint Authority for any expense or loss incurred or suffered by the Joint
Authority as a result of the termination of the contract.[8]
2. In addition, if one or more discovery areas have been declared in the contract area, the
contract operator shall pay to the Joint Authority at the beginning of the contract year a service
fee of:
(a) US$ forty thousand (40,000) for the first discovery area; and
(b) US$ twenty thousand (20,000) for each additional discovery area within the contract
area.
3. Where more than one production structure is installed in a discovery area in the contract
area, the contract operator shall pay to the Joint Authority at the beginning of the contract year
an additional service fee of US$ twenty thousand (20,000).
Article 46
Registration fees
For the approval and registration of agreements between corporations which result in
changes to the undivided participating interests of the contractor in a contract area, a fee of
US$ five hundred (500) shall be payable.
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Article 47
Amendment of fees
With the approval of the Ministerial Council, the Joint Authority may change the fees
specified in this Part to reflect any changes in the costs of administration. Those changes in
fees shall not be made more frequently than once a year and shall not be applied
retrospectively.
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PART VII
PENAL PROVISIONS
Article 48
Termination of contracts
1. Where the contractor has not complied with the provisions of this Petroleum Mining Code,
the regulations and directions issued by the Joint Authority, or the terms of the contract the
Joint Authority may recommend to the Ministerial Council that the contract be terminated. The
Joint Authority shall give thirty (30) days written notice to the contractor of the Joint Authority's
intention to recommend termination of the contract.
2. The Ministerial Council shall not agree to the termination of the contract until the
contractor has had an opportunity to provide the Joint Authority with reasons why the contract
should not be terminated, and the Joint Authority has given full consideration to those reasons.
The contractor must provide reasons for non-termination within thirty (30) days of receipt of
notice of the Joint Authority's intention to terminate.
3. Notwithstanding the termination of a contract, the contractor shall remain liable to take
such action as is necessary to clean-up the contract area and remove all property brought into
that area. The contractor shall remain liable to the Joint Authority to pay any outstanding debts
due to the Authority.
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ANNEX C

MODEL PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE JOINT
AUTHORITY AND (CONTRACTORS)
This production sharing contract, which has been approved by the Ministerial Council
established under the Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of
Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia
(hereinafter called the Treaty), is made and entered into on this
day of , 19 by and between the Joint Authority established under the Treaty and , (a)
corporation(s) organized and existing under the law of hereinafter called the "contractor", both
hereinafter sometimes referred to either individually as the "Party" or collectively as the
"Parties".
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, petroleum existing within Area A of the Zone of Cooperation established by the
Treaty is a resource to be exploited jointly by the Contracting States;
WHEREAS, the Joint Authority, with the approval of the Ministerial Council, has an exclusive
authority to contract for petroleum operations in and throughout the area described in Appendix
A of this Contract and outlined on the map which is Appendix B of this contract, which area is
hereinafter referred to as the "contract area";
WHEREAS, the Joint Authority wishes to promote petroleum operations in the contract area
and the contractor desires to join and assist the Joint Authority in accelerating the exploration
and development of the potential petroleum resources within the contract area;
WHEREAS, the contractor has the necessary financial capability, and technical knowledge
and ability to carry out the petroleum operations hereinafter described;
WHEREAS, in accordance with the Treaty, including the Petroleum Mining Code set out in
Annex B of the Treaty, a cooperative agreement in the form of a production sharing contract
may be entered into between the Joint Authority and corporations for the purpose of petroleum
operations; and
NOW, therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, it is agreed as
follows:
SECTION 1
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
SCOPE
1.1. This contract is a production sharing contract subject to the Treaty, including the
Petroleum Mining Code. The Joint Authority shall be responsible for the management of the
operations contemplated hereunder in accordance with its management functions defined
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under the Treaty, including the Petroleum Mining Code. The contractor appoints and authorizes
(name of corporation to be the contract operator), being one of the contracting corporations, to
be the contract operator who, on behalf of the contractor, shall be responsible to the Joint
Authority for the execution of petroleum operations in accordance with the provisions of this
contract, and is hereby appointed and constituted as the exclusive corporation to conduct
petroleum operations. The contractor shall provide all human, financial and technical resources
required for the performance of petroleum operations authorized by the contract, and shall
therefore have an economic interest in the development of the petroleum pools in the contract
area and be entitled to share in petroleum produced from the contract area in accordance with
the provisions of Section 7 of this contract.
1.2. Except for expenditures on capital costs for the development of petroleum pools, the
contractor shall not incur interest expenses to finance petroleum operations.
DEFINITIONS
1.3. Words and terms used in this contract shall have the same meaning as those defined in
the Treaty, including the Petroleum Mining Code set out in Annex B to the Treaty, except where
a new definition is expressly provided for in this contract.
(a) "Affiliated corporation or affiliate" means a corporation or other entity that controls, or is
controlled by, a Party to this contract, it being understood that control shall mean ownership by
one corporation or entity of at least fifty (50) per cent of:
(i) the voting stock, if the other corporation is a corporation issuing stock; or
(ii) the controlling rights or interests, if the other entity is not a corporation.
(b) "Barrel" means a quantity or unit of oil, having a volume of forty-two (42) United States
gallons at the temperature of sixty (60) degrees Fahrenheit.
(c) "Contract area" means the area not relinquished or surrendered, constituted by the
blocks which are the subject of this contract and which are specified in Appendices A and B of
this contract.
(d) "Crude oil" means crude mineral oil and all liquid hydrocarbons in their natural state or
obtained from natural gas by condensation or extraction.
(e) "Development plan" means a description of the proposed petroleum reservoir
development and management program, details of the production facilities, the production
profile for the expected life of the project, the estimated capital and non-capital expenditure
covering the feasibility, fabrication, installation and pre-production stages of the project, and an
evaluation of the commerciality of the development of the petroleum from within a discovery
area.
(f) "Exploration and appraisal strategy" means a brief description of the
exploration/geological play concepts for, the extent to which the leads and prospects are
identified in, and the data reviews, seismic surveys and exploration wells planned for the
contract area.
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(g) "First tranche petroleum" means the quantity of petroleum production defined in
subsection 9 of Section 7.
(h) "Force majeure" means circumstances beyond the control and without the fault or
negligence of the contract operator and the Joint Authority including but not restricted to acts of
God or the public enemy, perils of navigation, fire, hostilities, war (declared or undeclared),
blockade, labor disturbances, strikes, riots, insurrections, civil commotion, quarantine
restrictions, epidemics, storms, earthquakes, or accidents.
(i) "Natural gas" means all gaseous hydrocarbons, including wet mineral gas, dry mineral
gas, casinghead gas and residue gas remaining after the extraction of liquid hydrocarbons from
wet gas.
SECTION 2
TERM OF THIS CONTRACT
2.1. Subject to the provisions of this Section and Section 13, the term of this contract shall
be thirty (30) years as from the effective date.
2.2. If at the end of the initial six (6) years as from the effective date, no petroleum is
discovered in commercial quantities in the contract area, the contractor shall have the option
either to terminate this contract or to request the Joint Authority, by means of a sixty (60) days
written notice prior to the end of the initial six (6) years, to extend this contract to the end of the
tenth year from the effective date. Where a discovery is made but has not been appraised
before the end of the tenth contract year, the Joint Authority shall extend the term of this
contract so as to allow completion of an expeditious appraisal of the discovery, or if necessary
in the case of a natural gas discovery, until marketing arrangements and sales contracts are
completed. The extension shall be promptly granted, without prejudice to the provisions of
Section 13 of this contract relating to termination, provided a work program and expenditures
are agreed in accordance with subsection 3 of Section 4 of this contract.
2.3. If, at the end of the term of this contract as extended under subsection 2 of this Section,
no petroleum is discovered in commercial quantities in the contract area, this contract shall
automatically terminate in its entirety.
2.4. If petroleum is discovered in any block or blocks of the contract area within the initial six
(6) year period or any extension pursuant to subsection 2 of this Section, which the Joint
Authority and the contract operator agree can be produced commercially, based on the
consideration of all pertinent operating and financial data, then as to that particular block or
blocks of the contract area the Joint Authority shall declare a discovery area and the contract
operator shall commence development. In other blocks in the contract area, the contract
operator shall continue exploration without prejudice to the provisions of Section 3 regarding
the relinquishment of blocks.
2.5. If petroleum production has not ceased permanently in and from the contract area by
the end of the thirtieth contract year, the Joint Authority shall give sympathetic consideration to
extending the term of this contract beyond the thirtieth contract year until production ceases
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permanently. In the case of a natural gas project, the contract term shall be automatically
extended to the end of the term of the natural gas sales contract.
2.6. If petroleum production has ceased permanently in and from the contract area before
the end of the thirtieth contract year, then this contract shall be terminated upon the permanent
cessation of production.
SECTION 3
RELINQUISHMENT OF BLOCKS
3.1. On or before the end of the third contract year as from the effective date, the contract
operator shall relinquish twenty-five (25) per cent of the blocks in the original contract area.
3.2. On or before the end of the sixth contract year the contract operator shall relinquish an
additional twenty-five (25) per cent of the blocks in the original total contract area.
3.3. Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of this contract, on or before the end of the tenth
contract year, the contract operator shall relinquish all of the blocks in the contract area not
contained in discovery areas.
3.4. The contract operator's obligation to relinquish parts of the contract area under the
preceding provisions shall not apply to any blocks in the contract area declared as a discovery
area. In this respect, in calculating the percentages under subsections 1 and 2 of this Section,
blocks in discovery areas shall be excluded from the original contract area.
3.5. Upon thirty (30) days written notice to the Joint Authority prior to the end of any contract
year, the contract operator shall have the right to surrender some, but not all, of the blocks in
the contract area, provided the conditions of the contract have been met to the satisfaction of
the Joint Authority and such blocks shall then be credited against the blocks in the contract
area which the contract operator is next required to relinquish under the provisions of
subsections 1, 2 and 3 of this Section.
3.6. The contract operator shall advise the Joint Authority in advance of the date of
relinquishment of the blocks to be relinquished. For the purpose of relinquishments, the
contract operator and the Joint Authority shall consult with each other regarding which blocks
are to be relinquished. So far as is reasonable, such blocks shall form an area of sufficient size
and convenient shape to enable petroleum operations to be conducted thereon.
3.7. For the purposes of calculating the number of blocks to be relinquished under
subsections 1 and 2 of this Section, where the number of blocks is not exactly divisible by four
(4), only the whole number of blocks after the division by four (4) shall be relinquished.
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SECTION 4
WORK PROGRAM AND EXPENDITURES
4.1. The contract operator shall commence petroleum operations not later than six (6)
months after the effective date.
4.2. The amount of exploration work to be undertaken by the contract operator pursuant to
the terms of this contract during the first six (6) years following the effective date shall, subject
to any negotiated change to the exploration work program and expenditures for contract years
four (4) to six (6), be at least that specified for each of these six (6) years as follows:[9]
Data Review Seismic Surveys Wells Expenditure
US$ Kms No. US$
First Contract Year
Second Contract Year
Third Contract Year
Fourth Contract Year
Fifth Contract Year
Sixth Contract Year
4.3. If the contract is still in force after the sixth contract year, the Joint Authority and the
contract operator shall agree to an exploration work program and expenditures for those
subsequent contract years.
4.4. The Joint Authority and the contract operator may negotiate a change to the exploration
work program and expenditures covering contract years four (4) to ten (10), provided the
changes are made at least three (3) months prior to the beginning of the contract year affected
by the changes. No changes will be made to the exploration work program and expenditures
for contract years one (1) to three (3).[10]
4.5. If during:
(a) the first three (3) contract years the contract operator completes less than the amount of
exploration work required to be completed during those years, the Joint Authority shall
terminate the contract;
(b) any of the contract years four (4) to ten (10) the contract operator completes less than
the amount of exploration work required within that year, the Joint Authority may terminate the
contract and, if the contract is not terminated, the Joint Authority shall require the completion of
that work in the following contract year; or
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(c) any contract year the contract operator completes more than the amount of exploration
work required to be completed by the end of that year, the excess shall be counted towards
meeting the exploration work obligations of the contract operator during succeeding contract
years.
4.6. For the purpose of subsection 5 of this Section, the Joint Authority, in determining
whether the contract operator has completed the exploration work required to be completed in
the first three (3) contract years, and in later contract years if work commitments are specified,
shall have regard to the actual physical work completed, and not the estimates of expenditure.
Where work commitments are not specified, the Joint Authority shall have regard to the
estimates of expenditure.
4.7. At least two (2) months prior to the beginning of each calendar year, the contract
operator shall prepare and submit, for approval by the Joint Authority, an exploration and
appraisal strategy to be adopted for the ensuing contract year for the contract area.
4.8. At least one (1) month prior to the beginning of each calendar year, the contract
operator shall prepare and submit, for approval by the Joint Authority, a work program and
budget of operating costs to be carried out during the ensuing calendar year for the contract
area.
4.9. Before work can commence on the development of a petroleum discovery, the contract
operator shall prepare and submit, for approval by the Joint Authority, a development plan.
4.10. Should the Joint Authority wish to propose a revision to specified aspects of the work
program and budget of operating costs, the Joint Authority shall specify its reasons for
requesting those changes but shall not require the contract operator to undertake more
petroleum operations than the minimum work program and expenditure commitments specified
in this contract. The Parties shall reach agreement on any changes before they become
effective.
4.11. It is recognized by the Joint Authority that the details of the work program and budget
of operating costs, and the development plan may require changes in the light of existing
circumstances and nothing herein contained shall limit the rights of the contract operator to
make such changes, provided they do not change the general objective, quantity and quality of
the petroleum operations.
4.12. The Joint Authority shall ensure that every effort is made to avoid delays in approving
the exploration and appraisal strategy, the work program and budget of operating costs, and
the development plan.
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SECTION 5
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES
5.1. The contract operator shall have the rights accorded to it under the Treaty, including the
Petroleum Mining Code and the Taxation Code, and in particular shall:
(a) subject to paragraph (k) of subsection 2 of this Section, have the right to enter and leave
the contract area and move to and from the contract operator's facilities wherever located at all
times;
(b) have the right to have access to and use all geological, geophysical, drilling, well
(including well location maps), production and other information held by the Joint Authority
relating to the contract area; and
(c) in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum Mining Code, have the right to have
access to and use all geological, geophysical, drilling, well, production and other information
now or in the future held by the Joint Authority relating to the blocks in Area A adjacent to the
contract area.
5.2. The contract operator shall comply with all of the obligations imposed on it by the
Treaty, including the Petroleum Mining Code and the Taxation Code, and the regulations and
directions issued under the Petroleum Mining Code and, in particular, shall:
(a) provide all human, financial and technical resources required for the performance of the
petroleum operations;
(b) carry out petroleum operations in a proper and workmanlike manner and in accordance
with good oilfield practice;
(c) take the necessary precautions to avoid interference with navigation and fishing;
(d) develop an environmental management plan to be approved by the Joint Authority,
prevent pollution of the marine environment, and pay for the costs associated with clean-up of
any pollution from any petroleum operations within the contract area;
(e) upon the termination of this contract, clean-up the contract area and remove all
structures, equipment and other property brought into the contract area;
(f) submit to the Joint Authority copies of all original geological, geophysical, drilling, well,
production and other data (including cores, cuttings and samples taken in connection with
petroleum operations in the contract area) and reports compiled during the term of this
contract;
(g) appoint and authorize a person to represent the contract operator and communicate with
the Joint Authority, and that person shall have an office in either Jakarta or Darwin or both;
(h) give preference to goods and services which are produced in Australia or the Republic of
Indonesia, or provided by subcontractors operating out of Australia or the Republic of
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Indonesia, provided they are offered on competitive terms and conditions compared with those
available from other countries;
(i) give preference to the employment of Indonesian and Australian nationals and permanent
residents, and employ them in equivalent numbers over the term of this contract, having due
regard to safe and efficient operations and good oilfield practice;
(j) take out and maintain, to the Joint Authority's satisfaction, from the effective date of this
contract, insurance cover to the value of US$ in accordance with Article 25 of the Petroleum
Mining Code;
(k) except as otherwise approved by the Joint Authority, ensure that all persons, equipment
and goods do not enter structures in the contract area without first entering Australia or the
Republic of Indonesia, and notify the Joint Authority of all persons, vessels, aircraft and
structures entering or leaving the contract area, and of movements within the contract area;
and
(l) make secure and safe all structures in the contract area, including the installation of
warning lights, radar and other appropriate equipment.
5.3. The contractor shall have the rights accorded under the Treaty, including the Petroleum
Mining Code and the Taxation Code, and in particular shall:
(a) have the right to appoint a new contract operator subject to prior approval by the Joint
Authority;
(b) have the right to transfer all or part of its undivided participating interest in this contract to
any affiliated corporation or any other corporation with the approval of the Joint Authority. Such
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld provided the corporation taking up those rights
and obligations under this contract has, in the opinion of the Joint Authority, the necessary
financial capability and technical knowledge and ability, in accordance with Article 11 of the
Petroleum Mining Code;
(c) have the right during the term of this contract to lift, dispose of and export its share of
petroleum production, subject to Section 7 of this contract, and retain abroad the proceeds
obtained therefrom; and
(d) have the right to retain ownership and control of all property purchased or leased for the
purposes of complying with the conditions of this contract, and be entitled to freely remove the
same from the contract area, Australia or the Republic of Indonesia provided the conditions of
this contract have been met.
5.4. The contractor shall comply with all of the obligations imposed on it by the Treaty,
including the Petroleum Mining Code and the Taxation Code, and the regulations and
directions issued under the Petroleum Mining Code and, in particular, shall:
(a) be jointly and severally liable to meet the obligations imposed on the contract operator;
and
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(b) be subject to the taxation law of the Contracting States, in accordance with Article 29 of
the Treaty.
5.5. The Joint Authority shall comply with all of the obligations imposed on it by the Treaty,
including the Petroleum Mining Code and, in particular, shall be responsible for the
management of the petroleum operations contemplated hereunder having regard to the
contract operator's responsibilities for undertaking the petroleum operations.
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SECTION 6
OPERATING COSTS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
6.1. The accounting procedures in this Section shall be followed and observed in the
performance of the contractor's obligations under the contract.
6.2. The contractor's books and accounts shall be prepared and maintained in accordance
with a generally accepted and recognized accounting system consistent with modern petroleum
industry practices and procedures. Books and accounts shall be available for the use of the
Joint Authority in order that it may carry out its auditing responsibilities under this contract.
6.3. "Operating costs" means the sum of the following costs incurred in petroleum operations
undertaken before or at the point of tanker loading:
(a) current calendar year exploration costs;
(b) current calendar year non-capital costs;
(c) current calendar year depreciation of capital costs; and
(d) allowable operating costs incurred in previous calendar years which have not been
recovered in accordance with subsection 2 of Section 7 of this contract;
less
(e) miscellaneous receipts as defined in subsection 8 of this Section.
6.4. All calculations required to determine operating costs shall be done in United States
dollars. Where costs are denoted in any other currency, they shall be translated into United
States dollars at the exchange rate set, on the day the cost was incurred, by a bank designated
by the Joint Authority.
EXPLORATION COSTS
6.5. "Exploration costs" means those operating costs incurred which relate directly to the
current calendar year's exploration operations in the contract area and include but are not
limited to the following:
(a) costs of exploratory and appraisal drilling in the contract area including labor, materials
and services used in the drilling of wells with the object of finding unproven reservoirs of
petroleum;
(b) costs of surveys in the contract area including labor, materials and services (including
desk studies and analysis of survey data) used in aerial, geological, geochemical, geophysical
and seismic surveys, and core hole drilling; and
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(c) costs of other exploration directly related to petroleum operations in the contract area,
including the cost of auxiliary or temporary facilities used in exploration.
NON-CAPITAL COSTS
6.6. "Non-capital costs" means those operating costs incurred that relate directly to the
current calendar year's operations in the contract area, excluding exploration costs and capital
costs. Non-capital costs include, but are not limited to the following:
(a) costs of labour, materials and services used in day to day well operations, field
production facilities operations, secondary recovery operations, storage handling,
transportation and delivery operations, gas processing auxiliaries and utilities, and other
operating activities, including repairs and maintenance;
(b) costs of office, services and general administration directly related to the petroleum
operations carried out in the contract area including technical and related services, office
supplies, office rentals and other rentals of services and property, and personnel expenses;
(c) costs of production drilling in the contract area including labour, materials and services
used in drilling wells with the object of penetrating a proven reservoir such as the drilling of
delineation wells as well as redrilling, deepening or recompleting wells;
(d) costs of feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments directly related to
petroleum operations in the contract area;
(e) application fees, contract service fees, and registration fees directly related to petroleum
operations in the contract area;
(f) premiums paid for insurance normally required to be carried for the petroleum operations
carried out by the contract operator under this contract;
(g) closing down costs, being those expenditures incurred at the end of the production life of
a petroleum pool in the contract area which could include the costs of:
(i) removal of all production facilities including the removal of platforms and associated
facilities;
(ii) environmental restoration including any feasibility studies; and
(h) costs of purchased geological and geophysical information.
CAPITAL COSTS
6.7. "Capital costs" means expenditures made for items directly related to petroleum
operations in the contract area and which normally have a useful life of more than one (1) year.
Capital costs include but are not limited to the following:
(a) costs of construction utilities and auxiliaries, workshops, power and water facilities,
warehouses, site offices, access and communication facilities;

120
(b) costs of production facilities including offshore platforms (including the costs of labour,
fuel hauling and supplies for both the offsite fabrication and onsite installation of platforms, and
other construction costs in erecting platforms), wellhead production tubing, sucker rods, surface
pumps, flow lines, gathering equipment, delivery lines, storage facilities, all other equipment,
facilities and modules on platforms, oil jetties and anchorages, treating plants and equipment,
secondary recovery systems, gas plants and steam systems;
(c) costs of pipelines and other facilities for the transporting of petroleum produced in the
contract area to the point of tanker loading;
(d) costs of movable assets and subsurface drilling and production tools, equipment and
instruments, and miscellaneous equipment used for production in the contract area;
(e) costs of floating craft, automotive equipment, furniture and office equipment; and
(f) if approved by the Joint Authority, costs of employee and welfare housing, recreational,
educational, health and meals facilities, and other similar costs necessary for petroleum
operations in Area A.
MISCELLANEOUS RECEIPTS
6.8. "Miscellaneous receipt" means the value of property defined in paragraph (c) below and
all monies received by the contractor, other than for the disposal of petroleum produced from
the contract area, which are directly related to the conduct of petroleum operations in the
contract area. Miscellaneous receipts include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) any amounts received from the sale or disposal of petroleum produced from production
testing operations undertaken in exploration and appraisal wells;
(b) any amounts received for the disposal, loss, or destruction of property the cost of which
is an operating cost;
(c) the value of property, the cost of which is an operating cost, when that property ceases to
be used in petroleum operations in the contract area;
(d) any amounts received by the contract operator under an insurance policy, the premiums
of which are operating costs, in respect of damage to or loss of property;
(e) any amounts received as insurance, compensation or indemnity in respect of petroleum
production lost or destroyed prior to the point of tanker loading;
(f) any amounts received from the hiring or leasing of property, the cost of which is an
operating cost;
(g) any amounts received from supplying information obtained from surveys, appraisals, or
studies the cost of which is an operating cost;
(h) any amounts received as charges for the use of employee amenities, the cost of which is
an operating cost; and
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(i) any amounts received in respect of expenditures which are operating costs, by way of
indemnity or compensation for the incurring of the expenditure, refund of the expenditure, or
rebate, discount or commission in respect of the expenditure.
INELIGIBLE COSTS
6.9. The following expenditures are not eligible as operating costs:
(a) payments of principal or interest on a loan or other borrowing costs unless approved by
the Joint Authority under paragraph (c) of subsection 10 of this Section;
(b) payments of interest components of credit-purchase payments;
(c) payments of dividends or the cost of issuing shares;
(d) repayments of equity capital;
(e) payments of private override royalties;
(f) payments associated with a farm-in agreement;
(g) payments of taxes under the taxation law of either Contracting State made in accordance
with Article 29 of the Treaty;
(h) payments of administrative accounting costs, and other costs indirectly associated with
petroleum operations in the contract area;
(i) costs incurred once petroleum production has passed the point of tanker loading;
(j) costs incurred as a result of non-compliance by the contract operator with the provisions
of this contract, the Petroleum Mining Code or the regulations and directions issued under the
Petroleum Mining Code; and
(k) unless otherwise approved by the Joint Authority, costs incurred by contractors other
than the contract operator.
ACCOUNTING METHODS TO BE USED TO CALCULATE RECOVERY OF OPERATING
COSTS
6.10. The following methods shall be used to calculate the recovery of operating costs.
(a) Depreciation
Depreciation shall be calculated beginning in the calendar year in which the asset to be
depreciated is placed into service. A full year's depreciation shall be allowed in that calendar
year. In each calendar year the allowable recovery of capital cost depreciation shall be twenty
(20) per cent of the individual asset's initial capital cost (calculated using the straight line
method of depreciation).
(b) Allocation of overhead costs
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General and administration costs, such as those listed in paragraph (b) of subsection 6 of
this Section, but other than direct charges, allocable to petroleum operations in the contract
area shall be determined by a detailed study, and the method determined by such a study shall
be applied each year consistently. The method determined shall require agreement of the Joint
Authority and the contractor.
(c) Interest Recovery
Interest on loans obtained by a contractor at rates not exceeding prevailing commercial
interest rates on loans for capital investments in development of petroleum pools may be
recoverable as an operating cost provided the Joint Authority has given its approval. The Joint
Authority may give its approval if it is satisfied that recovery of interest is necessary to ensure
the financial viability of the project.
(d) Gas Costs
The following procedures shall be used to allocate operating costs related to natural gas
production.
(i) Operating costs directly related to the production of natural gas shall be directly
chargeable against natural gas revenues in determining the entitlements of the Joint Authority
and the contractor under Section 7.
(ii) Operating costs incurred for the production of both natural gas and crude oil shall be
allocated to natural gas and crude oil revenues based on the relative value of the products
produced for the current calendar year. Common support costs shall be allocated on an
equitable basis agreed to by both Parties.
(iii) If after commencement of production, the natural gas revenues do not permit full
recovery of natural gas costs, as outlined above, then the excess costs shall be recovered from
crude oil revenues. Likewise, if there are excess crude oil costs (crude oil costs less crude oil
revenues), this excess shall be recovered from natural gas revenues.
(iv) If production of either natural gas or crude oil has commenced while the other has not,
the allocable production costs and common support costs shall be allocated on an equitable
basis agreed to by both Parties. Propane and butane fractions extracted from natural gas but
not spiked in crude oil shall be deemed as natural gas for the purpose of accounting.
(e) Inventory Accounting
Inventory levels shall be based on normal good oilfield practice. The value of inventory items
used outside the contract area or sold, the cost of which has been recovered as an operating
cost, shall be treated as miscellaneous receipts in accordance with subsection 8 of this
Section. The costs of items purchased for inventory shall be recoverable as operating costs at
such time as the items are landed in Area A.
(f) Insurance and Claims
Operating costs shall include premiums paid for insurance normally required to be carried for
the petroleum operations relating to the contractor's obligations conducted under the contract,
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together with all expenditures incurred and paid in settlement of any and all losses, claims,
damages, judgements and other expenses, including fees relating to the contractor's
obligations under the contract.
(g) Apportioning of Costs and Miscellaneous Receipts
Where property, or any other thing, for which an operating cost is allowable or a
miscellaneous receipt is assessable, is only used partially in conducting petroleum operations
in the contract area, only that proportion of the cost or the receipt which relates to the conduct
of petroleum operations in the contract area shall be allowed as an operating cost or assessed
as a miscellaneous receipt.
SECTION 7
RECOVERY OF OPERATING COSTS AND SHARING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
7.1. The contractor is authorized by the Joint Authority and obliged to market all petroleum
produced and saved from the contract area subject to the following provisions.
7.2. Subject to subsections 9 and 10 of this Section, to recover operating costs, the contract
operator shall be entitled to a quantity of petroleum production, which is produced and saved
hereunder and not used in petroleum operations, equal in value to those costs. If in any
calendar year, the operating costs exceed the value of petroleum produced and saved
hereunder and not used in petroleum operations, then the unrecovered excess of operating
costs shall be carried forward and recovered in succeeding years.
7.3. In each calendar year in which petroleum is produced from the contract area, if the
investment credit and operating costs recoverable under subsections 10 and 2 of this Section
respectively are less than the value of the quantity of petroleum produced from the contract
area, then of the petroleum production remaining after deducting the quantity of petroleum
production equal in value to the investment credit and operating costs, the Parties shall be
entitled to take and receive the following:
(a) the Joint Authority fifty (50) per cent and the contractor fifty (50) per cent for the tranche
of 0 to 50,000 barrels daily average of all crude oil production from the contract area for the
calendar year;
(b) the Joint Authority sixty (60) per cent and the contractor forty (40) per cent for the tranche
of 50,001 to 150,000 barrels daily average of all crude oil production from the contract area for
the calendar year; and
(c) the Joint Authority seventy (70) per cent and the contractor thirty (30) per cent for the
tranche of more than 150,000 barrels daily average of all crude oil production from the contract
area for the calendar year.
For the purposes of calculating the daily average of all crude oil production in the calendar
year when the first commercial production of crude oil from the contract area is produced, the
daily average production shall be calculated by reference to the number of days in the calendar
year from the day when commercial production commenced. In the calendar year when
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commercial production of crude oil from a contract area is terminated, the daily average
production shall be calculated by reference to the number of days in the calendar year up to the
day on which production is terminated in the contract area.
7.4. The method of recovering investment credits and operating costs before the
entitlements are taken by each Party as provided under subsection 3 of this Section shall be
subject to the following proration method. For each calendar year, the recoverable investment
credits and operating costs shall be apportioned for deduction from the production of each of
the tranches defined in subsection 3 of this Section using the same ratios as the production
from each such tranche over the total production of that calendar year.
7.5. Of the amount of natural gas, including propane and butane fractions extracted from
natural gas but not spiked in crude oil, remaining after recovering investment credits and
operating costs associated with natural gas operations, the Joint Authority shall be entitled to
take and receive fifty (50) per cent and the contractor shall be entitled to take and receive fifty
(50) per cent.
7.6. Title to the contractor's share of petroleum production under subsections 3, 5 and 9 of
this Section as well as to the shares of petroleum production exported and sold to recover
investment credits and operating costs under subsections 10 and 2 of this Section respectively
shall pass to the contractor at the point of tanker loading.
7.7. The contractor shall use its best reasonable efforts to market petroleum production to
the extent markets are available.
7.8. Any natural gas produced from the contract area and not used in petroleum operations
hereunder may be flared if the processing and utilization of the natural gas is not considered by
the Parties to be economic. Such flaring shall be permitted to the extent that gas is not required
to enable the maximum economic recovery of petroleum by secondary recovery operations,
including repressuring and recycling.
7.9. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Section, in the initial five (5) calendar years
of production from the contract area, the Parties shall be entitled to take and receive a quantity
of petroleum equal to ten (10) per cent of the petroleum production in those years, called the
"first tranche petroleum", before any recovery of investment credits and operating costs. In
each subsequent calendar year, the first tranche petroleum shall be equal to twenty (20) per
cent of the petroleum produced in that year. The quantity of first tranche petroleum from crude
oil production for each calendar year shall be shared between the Joint Authority and the
contractor in accordance with the sharing percentages as provided under subsection 3 of this
Section, by apportioning it as applicable to the respective production tranches as therein
defined, using the same ratios as the production from each such tranche over the total
production of that calendar year. The quantity of first tranche petroleum from natural gas
production for each calendar year shall be shared between the Joint Authority and the
contractor in accordance with the sharing percentages as provided under subsection 5 of this
Section. The initial five (5) calendar years of production is to commence on the day when the
first commercial production of petroleum is produced and shall end at midnight (2400 hours)
local time, being 1600 hours Greenwich Mean, Time on the day preceding the fifth anniversary
of this first commercial production from the contract area.
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7.10. Investment credits for exploration and capital costs defined in subsection 5 of Section
6 and paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of subsection 7 of Section 6 shall be allowed to the contract
operator, and, in each calendar year, shall be recoverable by the contract operator after the
sharing of the first tranche petroleum but before the recovery of operating costs. The contract
operator shall recover the investment credits, as a quantity of petroleum production equal in
value to one hundred and twenty seven (127) per cent of such exploration and capital costs
incurred. Investment credits not recovered in the calendar year in which the exploration and
capital costs were incurred may be carried forward and recovered in subsequent years.
7.11. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1 of this Section which oblige the
contractor to market all petroleum produced from the contract area, the Joint Authority may
market any or all petroleum when the Joint Authority secures a net realized price for the
petroleum, f.o.b. the contract area, which is greater than the price which can be realized by the
contractor. The Joint Authority's right to market any or all of the petroleum shall continue for
such period as it can secure a net realized price, f.o.b. the contract area, greater than that
which can be realized by the contractor. The contract operator shall coordinate the efficient
lifting of the petroleum production, including tanker nomination and scheduling.
SECTION 8
VALUATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
8.1. Petroleum production sold to third parties shall be valued as follows:
(a) all petroleum production to which the contractor is entitled under this contract and which
is sold to third parties, shall be valued at the net realized price, f.o.b. the contract area;
(b) all petroleum production to which the Joint Authority is entitled under this contract which
is sold to third parties shall be valued at the net realized price, f.o.b. the contract area; and
(c) where a contract of sale involves other than a net realized price f.o.b., the Joint Authority
shall determine a fair and reasonable net f.o.b. price for the purposes of that sale.
8.2. Petroleum production sold to other than third parties shall be valued by the Joint
Authority as follows:
(a) by using the weighted average per unit price, adjusted as necessary for quality, quantity,
grade and specific gravity of the petroleum production, received by the contractor and the Joint
Authority from sales to third parties during the three (3) months preceding such sale, excluding
commissions and brokerages incurred in relation to such third party sales; and
(b) if there are no third party sales as defined in paragraph (a), at prevailing market prices,
adjusted to take account of quality, quantity, grade and specific gravity of the petroleum
production and taking into consideration any special circumstances with respect to sales of
such petroleum production.
8.3. For the purpose of this Section, "third party sales" means sales by the contractor to
independent purchasers with whom, at the time the sale is made, the contractor has no direct
or indirect contractual relationship or joint interest.

126
8.4. Commissions or brokerages incurred in connection with sales to third parties, if any,
shall not exceed the customary and prevailing rate.
8.5. During any calendar year in which petroleum is produced from the contract area, the
contractor shall be liable to make provisional payments to the Joint Authority, equal to the
estimated value of petroleum to which the Joint Authority is entitled under Section 7 of this
contract. The provisional payments shall be made on a monthly basis unless the Joint Authority
and the contractor agree on alternate arrangements. The amount of each provisional payment
shall be calculated by the contractor using the estimates of operating costs contained in the
work program and budget of operating costs, and the contractor's estimate of the value of
quantities of petroleum sold. During the calendar year the provisional payments may be
adjusted having regard to actual operating costs and the actual value of sales of petroleum.
Within thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year, adjustments and cash settlements
between the Joint Authority and the contractor shall be made on the basis of the actual
amounts of the operating costs and actual value of sales of petroleum made during the
calendar year, in order to comply with Section 7. Similarly, where the Joint Authority markets
petroleum production pursuant to subsection 11 of Section 7, the Joint Authority shall be liable
to make provisional payments to the contractor in a manner consistent with this subsection.
8.6. Petroleum production disposed of other than by sale or destruction shall be valued
using the method defined in subsection 2 of this Section.
8.7. The contractor shall notify the Joint Authority of quantities and sales prices of all
petroleum production sold or disposed of before the sales or disposals are made.
SECTION 9
PAYMENTS
9.1. The contract operator shall make all payments to the Joint Authority for which it is liable
under this contract in United States dollars or some other currency agreed between the
contract operator and the Joint Authority. Payments shall be made to a bank designated by the
Joint Authority. Where a payment is made in currency other than United States dollars, the
exchange rate used to convert the United States dollars liability into that currency shall be the
exchange rate set down on the day of payment by a bank designated by the Joint Authority.
9.2. The Joint Authority shall make all payments to the contract operator in United States
dollars or some other currency agreed between the contract operator and the Joint Authority.
Where a payment is made in currency other than United States dollars, the exchange rate used
to convert the United States dollar liability into that currency shall be the exchange rate set
down on the day of payment by a bank designated by the Joint Authority.
9.3. Any payments required to be made pursuant to this contract shall be made within ten
(10) days following the end of the month in which the obligation to make such payments is
incurred.
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SECTION 10
TENDERS FOR PETROLEUM OPERATIONS
10.1. The contract operator shall draw invitations to tender for sub-contracts to the attention
of Australian and Indonesian sub-contractors.
10.2. Subject to subsection 4 of this Section, all tenders for petroleum operations called by
the contract operator shall be subject to approval by the Joint Authority.
10.3. The Joint Authority shall provide its approval or non-approval within thirty (30) days of
receipt of the tender details from the contract operator. The tender details to be provided by the
contract operator shall include a summary of the tenders received compared against the tender
criteria determined by the contract operator and the reasons for the selection of the preferred
tender.
10.4. Notwithstanding subsection 2 of this Section, the contract operator may enter into subcontracts without the approval of the Joint Authority where:
(a) the tender for petroleum operations is expected to involve expenditure of less than US$
two million (2,000,000);
(b) the tender for petroleum operations is expected to involve expenditure of less than US$
ten million (10,000,000) and those operations form part of a project for the development of
petroleum resources, the cost of which is expected to exceed US$ one hundred million
(100,000,000); or
(c) the tender selected by the contract operator is the lowest cost tender and has been
submitted by an Australian or Indonesian corporation.
10.5. The contract operator shall provide the Joint Authority, for information, with the full
financial details of the sub-contract, irrespective of the amount of the expenditure involved.
SECTION 11
TITLE TO EQUIPMENT
11.1. Equipment purchased by the contract operator pursuant to the work program and
budget of operating costs remains the property of the contractor and shall be used in petroleum
operations.
SECTION 12
CONSULTATION AND ARBITRATION
12.1. Periodically, the Joint Authority and the contract operator shall meet to discuss the
conduct of petroleum operations under this contract and shall make every effort to settle
amicably any problems arising therefrom.
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12.2. Disputes, if any, arising between the Joint Authority and contractor relating to this
contract or the interpretation and performance of this contract which cannot be settled amicably
shall be submitted to arbitration.
12.3. Except as may be otherwise agreed by the Parties, arbitration shall be conducted in
accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.
12.4. The Joint Authority on the one hand and the contractor on the other hand shall each
appoint one arbitrator and so advise the other Party, and these two arbitrators shall appoint a
third. If either Party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty (30) days after receipt of a written
request to do so, such arbitrator shall, at the request of the other Party, if the Parties do not
otherwise agree, be appointed by the President of the International Chamber of Commerce. If
the first two arbitrators appointed as aforesaid fail to agree on a third within thirty (30) days
following the appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator shall, if the Parties do not
otherwise agree, be appointed, at the request of either Party, by the President of the
International Chamber of Commerce. If an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, that arbitrator's
successor shall be appointed in the same manner as the arbitrator who is replaced.
12.5. The decision of a majority of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the Parties
and an award may be enforced in any court having jurisdiction for that purpose. In accordance
with paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Treaty, in the event that the Joint Authority cannot meet an
obligation under an arbitral award arising from a dispute under this contract, the Contracting
States shall contribute the necessary funds in equal shares to enable the Joint Authority to
meet that obligation.
12.6. The place of arbitration shall be (to be agreed by the Parties before
the contract is signed). The language of the arbitration shall be (to be agreed
by the Parties before the contract is signed).

SECTION 13
TERMINATION
13.1. This contract shall not be terminated during the first three (3) years from the effective
date.
13.2. Subject to subsection 1 of this Section, this contract may be terminated at any time by
agreement of the Parties or in accordance with Article 48 of the Petroleum Mining Code.
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SECTION 14
BOOKS, ACCOUNTS AND AUDITS
BOOKS AND ACCOUNTS
14.1. In addition to any requirements pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 4 of Section 5,
the contractor shall keep complete books and accounts recording all operating costs as well as
monies received from the sale or disposal of petroleum production.
AUDITS
14.2. The Joint Authority may require independent auditing of the contractor's books and
accounts relating to this contract for any calendar year and may require the independent
auditor to perform such auditing procedures as are deemed appropriate by the Joint Authority.
The contractor shall forward a copy of the independent accountant's report to the Joint
Authority within sixty (60) days following the completion of the audit. The Joint Authority
reserves the right to inspect and audit the contractor's books and accounts relating to this
contract.
SECTION 15
OTHER PROVISIONS
NOTICES
15.1. Any notices required or given by either Party to the other shall be served in
accordance with Article 35 of the Petroleum Mining Code.
15.2. All notices to be served on the contract operator shall be addressed to:
(contract operator's address)
15.3. All notices to be served on the Joint Authority relating to matters for which the head
office of the Joint Authority is responsible shall be addressed to:
(address of the Joint Authority's head office)
15.4. All notices to be served on the Joint Authority relating to matters for which the
Technical Directorate of the Joint Authority is responsible shall be addressed to:
(address of the Joint Authority's Technical Directorate)
15.5. Either Party may substitute or change the above such address by giving written notice
to the other.
APPLICABLE LAW
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15.6. Subject to the provisions of the Treaty, including the Petroleum Mining Code, the law
of shall apply to this contract.
SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATIONS
15.7. Any failure or delay on the part of either Party in the performance of its obligations or
duties under the contract shall be excused to the extent that such failure or delay is attributable
to force majeure.
15.8. If exploration is delayed, curtailed or prevented by force majeure the Joint Authority
shall agree to vary the work program and expenditure commitments or exempt the contract
operator from part or all of the work program and expenditure commitments during the period of
force majeure.
15.9. The Party whose ability to perform its obligations is so affected by force majeure shall
immediately notify the other Party in writing, stating the cause, and both Parties shall do all that
is reasonably within their power to discharge their obligations.
SECTION 16
EFFECTIVENESS
16.1. This contract shall come into effect on the day it is entered into by and between the
Joint Authority and the contractor.
16.2. This contract shall not be amended or modified in any respect, except by the mutual
consent in writing of the Parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this contract, in triplicate and in
the English language, on this day of , 19 .
THE JOINT AUTHORITY
BY
(CONTRACTOR)
BY
APPROVED BY THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL on this day of , 19
BY BY
Minister of Minister for
on behalf of the GOVERNMENT OF on behalf of the GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AUSTRALIA
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ANNEX D

TAXATION CODE FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION IN RESPECT
OF ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH AREA A OF THE ZONE OF COOPERATION
Article 1
General definitions
1. In this Taxation Code, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) the term "Australian tax" means tax imposed by Australia, other than any penalty or
interest, being tax to which this Taxation Code applies;
(b) the term "company" means any body corporate or any entity which is treated as a
company or body corporate for tax purposes;
(c) the term "competent authority" means, in the case of Australia, the Commissioner of
Taxation or an authorised representative of the Commissioner and, in the case of the Republic
of Indonesia, the Minister of Finance or an authorised representative of the Minister;
(d) the term "Indonesian tax" means tax imposed by the Republic of Indonesia, other than
any penalty or interest, being tax to which this Taxation Code applies;
(e) the term "law of a Contracting State" means the law of that Contracting State from time to
time in force relating to the taxes to which this Taxation Code applies;
(f) the term "person" includes an individual, a company and any other body of persons; and
(g) the terms "tax" or "taxation" mean Australian tax or Indonesian tax, as the context
requires.
2. In the application of this Taxation Code by a Contracting State any term not defined in this
Taxation Code or elsewhere in the Treaty shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the
meaning which it has under the law of that Contracting State from time to time in force relating
to the taxes to which this Taxation Code applies.
Article 2
Personal scope
The provisions of this Taxation Code shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both
of the Contracting States as well as in respect of persons who are not residents of either of the
Contracting States, but only for taxation purposes related directly or indirectly to:
(a) the exploration for or the exploitation of petroleum in Area A; or
(b) acts, matters, circumstances and things touching, concerning, arising out of or connected
with any such exploration or exploitation.
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Article 3
Taxes covered
1. The existing taxes to which this Taxation Code shall apply are:
(a) in Australia:
(i) the income tax imposed under the federal law of Australia;
(ii) the fringe benefits tax imposed under the federal law of Australia; and
(iii) the sales tax imposed under the federal law of Australia;
(b) in Indonesia:
(i) the income tax (Pajak-Penghasilan), including the tax on profits after income tax payable
by a contractor, imposed under the law of the Republic of Indonesia, and its implementing
regulations;
(ii) the value-added tax on goods and services and sales tax on luxury goods (Pajak
Pertambahan Nilai atas Barang dan Jasa dan Pajak Penjualan atas Barang Mewah) imposed
under the law of the Republic of Indonesia, and its implementing regulations.
2. The provisions of this Taxation Code shall also apply to any identical or substantially
similar taxes which are imposed after the date of signature of this Treaty in addition to, or in
place of, the existing taxes. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify
each other of any substantial changes which have been made in their respective taxation laws
within a reasonable period of time after such changes.
Article 4
Business profits
1. For the purposes of the taxation law of each Contracting State, the business profits or
losses of a person, other than an individual, derived from, or incurred in, Area A in a year shall
be reduced by fifty (50) per cent.
2. Business profits derived from Area A in a year by an individual who is a resident of a
Contracting State shall be taxable only in that Contracting State.
3. Business profits derived from Area A in a year by an individual who is not a resident of
either Contracting State may be taxed in both Contracting States but subject to a rebate
entitlement against the tax payable in each Contracting State of fifty (50) per cent of the gross
tax payable on those profits in that Contracting State.
4. Business losses, incurred in Area A in a year by an individual who is not a resident of
either Contracting State, that are eligible under the law of a Contracting State to be carried
forward for deduction against future income shall, for the purposes of that law, be reduced by
fifty (50) per cent.
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5. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article any losses brought forward from
prior years in accordance with the law of a Contracting State as a deduction from income shall
not be taken into account in determining the profit or loss for the year.
6. For the purposes of this Article:
(a) the term "year" means:
(i) in Australia, any year of income;
(ii) in Indonesia, any taxable year; and
(b) the terms "business profits" and "business losses" do not include gains or losses of a
capital nature to which Article 8 of this Taxation Code applies.
Article 5
Dividends
1. Dividends which are paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State wholly
or partly out of profits derived from sources in Area A, and which are beneficially owned by a
resident of the other Contracting State, may be taxed only in that other Contracting State.
2. The term "dividends" as used in this Article means income from shares or other rights
participating in profits and not relating to debt claims, as well as other income which is
subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the law of the Contracting
State of which the company making the distribution is a resident.
Article 6
Interest
1. Interest paid by a contractor, being interest to which a resident of a Contracting State is
beneficially entitled, may be taxed in that Contracting State.
2. Such interest may also be taxed in the other Contracting State, but the tax so charged
shall not exceed ten (10) per cent of the gross amount of the interest.
3. Where such interest is taxed in the other Contracting State in accordance with paragraph
2 of this Article, that interest shall, for the purposes of determining a foreign tax credit
entitlement under the taxation law of the Contracting State referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article, be deemed to be income derived from sources in the other Contracting State.
4. Interest paid by a contractor, being interest to which a person who is not a resident of
either Contracting State is beneficially entitled, may be taxed in both Contracting States but the
taxable amount of any such interest shall be an amount equivalent to fifty (50) per cent of the
amount that would be the taxable amount but for this paragraph.
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Article 7
Royalties
1. Royalties paid by a Contractor, being royalties to which a resident of a Contracting State
is beneficially entitled, may be taxed in that Contracting State.
2. Such royalties may also be taxed in the other Contracting State, but the tax so charged
shall not exceed ten (10) per cent of the gross amount of the royalties.
3. Where such royalties are taxed in the other Contracting State in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this Article, those royalties shall, for the purposes of determining a foreign tax
credit entitlement under the taxation law of the Contracting State referred to in paragraph 1 of
this Article, be deemed to be income derived from sources in the other Contracting State.
4. Royalties paid by a Contractor, being royalties to which a person who is not a resident of
either Contracting State is beneficially entitled, may be taxed in both Contracting States but the
taxable amount of any such royalties shall be an amount equivalent to fifty (50) per cent of the
amount that would be the taxable amount but for this paragraph.
Article 8
Alienation of property
1. Where a gain or loss of a capital nature accrues to or is incurred by an individual who is a
resident of a Contracting State, from the alienation of property situated in Area A or shares or
comparable interests in a company, the assets of which consist wholly or principally of property
situated in Area A, the amount of the gain or loss shall be taxable, or otherwise recognised for
taxation purposes, only in that Contracting State.
2. Where a gain or loss of a capital nature accrues to or is incurred by a person, other than
an individual who is a resident of a Contracting State, from the alienation of property situated in
Area A or shares or comparable interests in a company, the assets of which consist wholly or
principally of property situated in Area A, the amount of the gain or loss shall, for the purposes
of the law of a Contracting State, be an amount equivalent to fifty (50) per cent of the amount
that would be the gain or loss but for this paragraph.
Article 9
Independent Personal Services
1. Income derived by an individual who is a resident of a Contracting State in respect of
professional services, or other independent activities of a similar character, performed in Area
A shall be taxable only in that Contracting State.
2. Income derived by an individual who is not a resident of either Contracting State in
respect of professional services, or other independent activities of a similar character,
performed in Area A may be taxed in both Contracting States but subject to a rebate
entitlement against the tax payable in each Contracting State of fifty (50) per cent of the gross
tax payable in that Contracting State on the income referred to in this paragraph.
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Article 10
Dependent personal services
1. Salaries, wages and other similar remuneration derived by an individual who is a resident
of a Contracting State in respect of employment exercised in Area A shall be taxable only in
that Contracting State.
2. Remuneration derived by an individual who is not a resident of either Contracting State in
respect of employment exercised in Area A may be taxed in both Contracting States but
subject to a rebate entitlement against the tax payable in each Contracting State of fifty (50) per
cent of the gross tax payable in that Contracting State on the income referred to in this
paragraph.
Article 11
Other income
1. Items of income of a resident of a Contracting State, derived from sources in Area A, not
dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Taxation Code shall be taxable only in that
Contracting State.
2. Items of income of a person who is not a resident of either Contracting State, derived from
sources in Area A and not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Taxation Code may be
taxed in both Contracting States but subject to a rebate entitlement against the tax payable in
each Contracting State of fifty (50) per cent of the gross tax payable in that Contracting State
on the income referred to in this paragraph.
Article 12
Fringe benefits
For the purposes of the taxation law of Australia, the taxable value of any fringe benefits
provided in a year of tax to employees, who are not residents of either Contracting State, in a
year of tax in respect of employment exercised in Area A shall be reduced by fifty (50) per cent.
Article 13
Goods imported into Area A
Goods imported into Area A from a place other than either Contracting State shall not be
taxable in either Contracting State unless and until such goods are permanently transferred to
another part of a Contracting State in which case the goods may be taxed only in the
Contracting State last referred to.
Article 14
Mutual agreement procedure
1. Where a person considers that the actions of the competent authority of one or both of the
Contracting States result or will result for the person in taxation not in accordance with the
provisions of this Taxation Code, the person may, irrespective of the remedies provided by the
domestic law of the Contracting States, present a case to the competent authority of the
Contracting State of which the person is a resident, or to either competent authority in the case
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of persons who are not residents of either Contracting State. The case must be presented
within three (3) years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in
accordance with the provisions of this Taxation Code.
2. The competent authority shall endeavour, if the claim appears to it to be justified and if it
is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to resolve the case by agreement with the
competent authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance of taxation
which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Taxation Code. Any agreement reached
shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of the Contracting
States.
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate with each other
directly for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Taxation Code.
Article 15
Exchange of information
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is
necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Taxation Code or of the domestic law of the
Contracting States concerning taxes covered by this Taxation Code, insofar as the taxation
thereunder is not contrary to this Taxation Code, in particular for the prevention of avoidance or
evasion of such taxes. Any information received by the competent authority of a Contracting
State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the
domestic law of that Contracting State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities
(including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the
enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to, the
taxes covered by this Taxation Code and shall be used only for such purposes.
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article be construed so as to impose
on the competent authority of a Contracting State the obligation:
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the law or the administrative
practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the law or in the normal course of the
administration of that or of the other Contracting State; or
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or
professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of which would be contrary
to public policy.
[1] The following text contains amendments to Articles 4.4, 28.2, 44.1, 44.2, 45.1, 45.2 and
45.3 of the Petroleum Mining Code and to Subsections 4.7, 7.3 and 7.9 of the Model
Production Sharing Contract as approved by the Ministerial Council at its inaugural meeting at
Denpasar on 9 February 1991 pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty. Further amendments adopted
at the Sixth Ministerial Council Meeting at Brisbane on 20 October 1995 to Articles 28.1, 28.2
and 45.1 of the Petroleum Mining Code and to Subsections 4.2 and 4.4 of the Model
Production Sharing Contract have subsequently been added.
[2] SD 30 Vol. I p. 1; ILM 21 p. 1261; Cmnd. 8941.
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[3] Notes to this effect were exchanged at Canberra 10 January 1991. The Treaty entered
into force 9 February 1991.
[4] The Treaty was concluded aboard an aircraft flying above the Timor Sea in an area
designated as the Zone of Cooperation under this Treaty.
[5] Two maps of the Zone of Cooperation are held in the rear pocket of printed text.
[6] The words "Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 28," were added at the Sixth Ministerial
Council Meeting at Brisbane on 20 October 1995.
[7] Subparagraph (g) was added at the Sixth Ministerial Council Meeting at Brisbane on 20
October 1995.
[8] Paragraph 1 was amended at the Sixth Ministerial Council Meeting at Brisbane on 20
October 1995. It originally read:
"At the beginning of each contract year, the contract operator shall pay to the Joint Authority
a contract service fee of US$ one hundred thousand (100,000)."
[9] First paragraph of subsection 4.2 was amended at the Sixth Ministerial Council Meeting
at Brisbane on 20 October 1995. It originally read:
"The amount of exploration work to be undertaken by the contract operator pursuant to the
terms of this contract during the first six (6) years following the effective date shall, unless
otherwise approved by the Joint Authority, be at least that specified for each of these six (6)
years as follows:

